By Christopher Kozak and Jonathan Mautner
Russia announced
the start of a “major operation” against positions allegedly held by ISIS and al-Qaeda
in Central Syria on November 15. The operation is designed to showcase the
military strength and power projection capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces.
The Russian aircraft carrier ‘Admiral Kuznetsov’ launched a number of
sorties from the Eastern Mediterranean Sea targeting core opposition-held
terrain in Idlib and Aleppo Provinces – the first such
use of an aircraft carrier in combat by Russia. These strikes were accompanied
by a wave of cruise missiles launched from missile
frigates accompanying the ‘Admiral Kuznetsov’ as well as long-range
strategic bombers sortied from Northern Russia. Russia also reportedly
conducted several strikes against inland targets with its Bastion-P
anti-ship missile system. These integrated land, naval, and air capabilities
are neither necessary nor sufficient to defeat the opposition in Northern
Syria. Instead, Russian President Vladimir Putin likely intends to leverage
this display of advanced weaponry in order to assert his ‘great power’ status
and bolster domestic support for his intervention into the Syrian Civil War.
Russia also resumed its air operations
against opposition-held districts of Aleppo City after a nearly month-long
pause on strikes in the besieged city. Activists reported the start of heavy
airstrikes throughout Eastern Aleppo City on November 15 despite claims by
the Russian Ministry of Defense that a moratorium on airstrikes remained in
place. Russian Ministry of Defense Spokesperson Maj. Gen. Igor Konashenkov even
denied
the reports as “public rhetoric” and “blatant lies” from the U.S. State
Department. The intensified airstrikes come amidst continued pro-regime ground
operations to tighten the blockade on Eastern Aleppo City after opposition
forces launched a failed bid to lift the siege of the city in late October
2016. Although pro-regime forces remain unable to seize the entirety of Aleppo
City over the near-term, the military assistance provided by Russia will likely
precipitate its ultimate surrender under the regime’s siege-and-starve campaign.
The UN reported the distribution of the last food rations
in the besieged opposition-held districts of Eastern Aleppo City on November 10
and predicted a “killer winter” for their estimated 250,000 residents. The
surge in air operations also coincided with an uptick in reports of airstrikes
targeting hospitals,
schools,
and other critical civilian infrastructure across Northern Syria.
The U.S. faces increasing
constraints on its available courses of action as Russia takes continued steps
to limit future options for engagement in the Syrian Civil War. Russia aims to
force the surrender of Eastern Aleppo City and thereby impose a major defeat on
the remaining acceptable opposition in Northern Syria. This outcome will hasten
the transformation of the opposition into a movement dominated by
Salafi-Jihadist groups such as ISIS and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, eliminating
potential partners for the U.S. in Syria and legitimizing the counter-terrorism
narrative of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Meanwhile, Russia also consolidated
its control over regional airspace with the deployment of seven additional
S-300V4 air defense systems to Syria on November 15, reinforcing the effective
no-fly zone created by its integrated air defense systems in the country. These
measures aim to raise the cost of any military intervention against the regime
and steer the U.S. into accepting military cooperation against ‘terrorism’ with
Russia and Syria as the path of least resistance. Any partnership along these
terms would only exacerbate the long-term grievances that fuel Salafi-Jihadist groups
in Syria while allowing Russia to consolidate its regional influence and
advance its strategic objective to expel the U.S. from the Middle East.
The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, statements by Russian and Western officials, and documentation of Russian airstrikes through social media. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties.
High-Confidence Reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated by documentation from opposition factions and activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible that demonstrate a number of key indicators of Russian airstrikes.
Low-Confidence Reporting. ISW places low confidence in reports corroborated only by multiple secondary sources, including from local Syrian activist networks deemed credible or Syrian state-run media.
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