Navigating the U.S.-Turkey Relationship Beyond the Quagmire

By Elizabeth Teoman

Key Takeaway: The U.S. needs Turkey as an active partner despite its slide into authoritarianism under Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The U.S. should adopt an interest-based approach towards Turkey that shapes its behavior in line with shared strategic objectives such as reversing the gains of Iran and Russia in the Middle East.

The U.S. needs Turkey to contribute actively as an ally in NATO. The U.S. and NATO face an increasingly aggressive Russia in the Middle East and Europe. Turkey plays an integral role in countering this threat. It dominates the Turkish Straits connecting the Black Sea to the Eastern Mediterranean. It provides a strategically-positioned platform on the southern flank of NATO from which to exert influence in the Middle East and Black Sea. It also maintains the second-largest available combat force in NATO. The U.S. and NATO already operate a number of critical military installations across Turkey including Incirlik Airbase.

Turkey is nonetheless the largest vulnerability to NATO’s cohesion. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan cemented his own authoritarian rule in the 2018 Turkish General Elections. His new regime is pursuing self-serving policies that undermine the U.S. and NATO. Erdogan is willing to align with Russia and Iran against the U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition. He has repeatedly fueled diplomatic rifts with the U.S. and EU. He has conducted military operations targeting the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) - the principal ground partner of the U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition in Syria. His interventions (and de facto territorial annexations) in Iraq and Syria undermine the ability of the U.S. and NATO to credibly condemn similar acts of aggression by Russia.

The U.S. should commit to a smarter interest-based approach that compels greater cooperation from Turkey.The U.S. and Turkey are mired in tactical negotiations that fail to address their wider strategic divergences or repair the damage from years of opposing policy choices in Iraq and Syria. The Trump Administration has engaged to resolve discrete challenges with Turkey such as the status of the contested town of Manbij in Northern Syria and the arbitrary detention of U.S. Pastor Andrew Brunson. These talks are insufficient to mend the relationship absent a more fundamental realignment between the U.S. and Turkey. The U.S. must refocus on areas of shared interest with Turkey following the reelection of an emboldened Erdogan.

• Counter-Terrorism: The U.S. and Turkey can find common ground against designated terrorist groups such as ISIS, al Qaeda, and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). All three groups threaten the long-term stability of Turkey. The U.S. could offer military and intelligence support against the PKK in Turkey and Iraq. The U.S. should also actively limit the influence of the PKK-linked Syrian Kurdish YPG within the SDF. These reforms are independently valuable as a means to address grievances among local Sunni Arabs that could fuel a renewed insurgency against the U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition. Turkey must in turn cease its cooperation with al Qaeda in Syria and instead engage actively in counter-terrorism operations against al Qaeda and other Salafi-Jihadist Groups. Turkey must also halt cross-border operations against the SDF that disrupt the Anti-ISIS Campaign in Syria.

• Regional Stability: The U.S. and Turkey both aim to contain and ultimately resolve the crises in Iraq and Syria. The U.S. and Turkey could cooperate to build mutually-acceptable local governance and security structures in both countries that exclude Iran as well as Salafi-Jihadist Groups. The U.S. should revisit its regional strategy to incorporate Turkey as a productive contributor - rather than a reluctant late addition - to the U.S. Anti-ISIS Campaign. Turkey must in turn limit its unilateral interventions against the PKK in Iraq and Syria and curb its covert support for local actors linked to Salafi-Jihadist Groups.

• Iran: The U.S. and Turkey both agree on the need to curtail Iran’s influence in the Middle East. Both states desire to reverse Iran’s military and political gains in both Syria and Iraq. The U.S. and Turkey could cooperate to support the formation of a new Government of Iraq not beholden to Iran. Turkey should be encouraged to limit its cross-border trade with Iran as well as its diplomatic cooperation with Iran and Russia in the Astana Process on Syria. The U.S. can encourage this outcome through the threat of trade-related sanctions as well as support for alternative energy pathways such as the Southern Gas Corridor.

• Russia: The U.S. and Turkey share an interest in containing a revisionist Russia. Turkey particularly is threatened by the expansion of Russia into Syria and the Black Sea. The U.S. and NATO must reassure Turkey by increasing military deployments to deter aggression by Russia in the Black Sea and Middle East. Turkey must freeze its purchase of the Russian S-400 Surface-to-Air Missile System. The U.S. in turn should sustain its bilateral security partnership with Turkey including joint military exercises and the sale of key capabilities such as advanced air defense systems and the F-35. Turkey should also be encouraged to limit its diplomatic cooperation with Russia and Iran in the Astana Process on Syria.

• Responsible Governance in Turkey: The U.S. still holds a stake in the long-term economic and political durability of Turkey despite the reelection of Erdogan. The U.S. should promote reforms or trade agreements that create a positive investment market in Turkey without rewarding economic mismanagement under Erdogan. The U.S. also must not shy away from enforcing minimal standards of behavior on Turkey. Turkey must be pressed to halt its use of ‘hostage diplomacy’ and release detained political prisoners such as U.S. Pastor Andrew Brunson. The U.S. must continue to promote a return to rule of law in Turkey that includes an independent judiciary and other checks on the power of Erdogan.

The U.S. can manage its relationship with Turkey without capitulating to Erdogan. The U.S. and Turkey both need one another to confront their mutual adversaries in the Middle East and Europe. This fact remains true despite the unacceptable growth of authoritarianism under Erdogan. There is no quick policy fix to resolve the tensions between the U.S. and Turkey. The U.S. could nonetheless use an incremental and interest-based approach focused on clear areas of strategic convergence in order to protect its long-term alliance with a post-Erdogan Turkey.

Syria’s “War after ISIS” Begins as Turkey Attacks America’s Anti-ISIS Partner

by: Jennifer Cafarella and Elizabeth Teoman with Bradley Hanlon

Key Takeaway: Turkey launched an air-ground operation against the American partner force in Syria, the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), in Afrin district northwest of Aleppo City on January 20th, 2018. Turkey’s goal is to extend its buffer zone along the Syrian-Turkish border. Turkey may subsequently attack the town of Manbij, east of Afrin on the banks of the Euphrates River. Turkey’s operations threaten to provoke a widening Turkish-Kurdish war that could unravel the U.S. stabilization effort in eastern Syria, place U.S. service members in Manbij at risk, and force the U.S. to reconsider support for the YPG.

Turkey launched an air-ground operation against the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) to extend Turkey’s buffer zone along the Syrian-Turkish border. Forces from Turkey’s Second Army launched a three-pronged ground attack – “Operation Olive Branch” – against YPG forces northwest of Aleppo City on January 20th, 2018. The Turkish Air Force and Syrian armed opposition groups are supporting the operation. Turkey cited the right to self-defense in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter as a legal justification for its operation. Turkey’s immediate objective is to extend its buffer zone to sever the YPG’s access to the Turkish border northwest of Aleppo City. Turkey previously seized and secured a buffer zone from the outskirts of Afrin to the east bank of the Euphrates River in northern Aleppo Province beginning on August 24th, 2016. Turkey may pursue the full defeat of YPG forces in the Aleppo countryside after securing the border. Turkey may attack terrain east of Afrin that YPG forces seized in 2016 while the Syrian opposition attempted to defend Aleppo City against a Russian- and Iranian-backed Bashar al Assad regime offensive. Initial Turkish airstrikes targeted the YPG-held Menagh airbase north of Aleppo City on January 20th. These strikes may indicate Turkish intent to seize the airbase and the nearby city of Tel Rifaat.

Turkey secured Russia’s permission for the operation and likely negotiated a new “de-escalation” line north of Aleppo City. Turkish Chief of the General Staff Hulusi Akar and Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization head Hakan Fidan met with Russian Chief of the General Staff General Valery Gerasimov and Russian Minister of Defense Sergey Shoigu in Moscow on January 18th to coordinate the operation. Turkey’s air operations on January 20th demonstrate that Turkey secured Russian permission to conduct close air support in Syrian airspace. Turkey also took steps in coordination with Russia to mitigate the risk of a Syrian regime escalation. Assad threatened to shoot down Turkish warplanes on January 18th while Turkey and Russia were de-conflicting operations. Turkish Defense Minister Nurettin Canikli dismissed the regime’s threats as “mere thoughts” of a state with “limited capacity” and signaled that the Russian anti-air systems in Syria were Turkey’s only concern. Turkey deployed electronic warfare systems to counter possible regime anti-air attacks and to enable Turkey to respond to YPG artillery fire against Turkish territory. Turkey likely cleared the deployment of these systems with Russia during the Moscow visit. Turkey and Russia likely also agreed on a future “de-escalation” line of contact that balances their interests in Aleppo Province. The exact location of this future line of contact is unclear from openly available information. Russia withdrew its forces from Afrin district, likely to Aleppo City. Russia’s goal in the negotiation with Turkey was likely to ensure that pro-regime forces can secure and defend Aleppo City against possible future attack.

Erdogan may next attack Manbij, where U.S. forces operate. Erdogan demanded a “handover” of Manbij on January 14th and reiterated his intent to take the city by force after operations in Afrin conclude on January 20th. He is likely providing covert support to Arab resistance against YPG dominance in Manbij that escalated alongside his demand for the handover of the city. Arab tribal leaders in Manbij issued a list of demands to the SDF on January 16th that amount to the dismantlement of the existing YPG-dominated governing structure in the city. The tribal demands followed the outbreak of large-scale protests against the YPG in Manbij beginning on January 12th, which the SDF blamed on Turkey. A car bomb targeted senior SDF military figures in Manbij on January 20th. The combination of tribal pressure and targeted attacks could reflect covert Turkish efforts to set conditions for future military operations to seize Manbij with local support.

The U.S. strategy for de-escalation with Turkey has failed. Turkey’s operations threaten to provoke a widening Turkish-Kurdish war that could unravel the U.S. stabilization effort in eastern Syria and force the U.S. to reconsider support for the YPG. Possible Turkish follow-on operations against Manbij put U.S. forces directly at risk. American military forces are patrolling front lines in Manbij as part of a U.S. effort “to prevent security incidents from occurring, to observe and report whatever security situation that they saw and to reassure” both Turkey and the SDF. The U.S. must abandon this tactical approach to de-escalation and acknowledge the scale of the rift with Turkey. The U.S. cannot prevent ISIS’s resurgence, pivot toward countering Assad, contain Iran, or pursue a negotiated settlement of the Syrian civil war if Turkey’s priority remains thwarting U.S. policy.

Turkey's Erdogan Pivots to Target U.S.-Backed Force in Syria

By Elizabeth Teoman and Jennifer Cafarella with Bradley Hanlon

Key Takeaway: Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is preparing to attack America’s local partner in northern Syria on two fronts along the Turkish border. Russia and the Bashar al Assad regime support his planned operation, which could constrain the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to the eastern bank of the Euphrates River and possibly neutralize American plans to build an SDF-linked “border security force.” Erdogan’s escalation is consistent with the Institute for the Study of War’s September 2017 forecast that Turkey will conduct new military operations against U.S.-backed forces.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan pivoted from blocking Russia in northern Syria’s Idlib Province to preparing an attack against the U.S. partner force. Erdogan announced his intent to attack the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) at a political event in Turkey on January 13. He stated Turkish forces will attack two SDF-held areas along the Turkish border within one week unless Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), which dominate the SDF, withdraw. The areas Erdogan intends to attack are a zone of YPG control northwest of Aleppo City called the “Afrin canton” and the town of Manbij, northeast of Aleppo City. Erdogan deployed reinforcements to the front line between Turkish troops and the YPG in Afrin and began a military buildup across the Turkish border on January 14. Turkish forces and Turkish-backed Syrian opposition groups renewed shelling YPG-held areas on January 13, provoking return fire. Erdogan does not face internal obstacles to launching offensive operations against the SDF and claimed the operation can “start at any time” on January 15. Erdogan will likely seek the formality of the Turkish National Security Council’s (MGK) approval during the next meeting on January 17, however.

Erdogan has been preparing to attack the YPG for nearly one year. Erdogan regards the YPG as a Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), which is waging an insurgency in Turkey. Erdogan has consistently reiterated his intent to remove what he refers to as the YPG’s “terror corridor” along Turkey’s southern border. He intervened militarily in mid-2016 to block further YPG gains and prepare future options. He began preparing for renewed military operations against Afrin in March 2017, when Prime Minister Binali Yildirim announced the conclusion Turkey’s Operation Euphrates Shield in Syria and suggested Turkey would launch future operations. Turkish troops deployed into northwestern Syria to secure the front line between the YPG and Turkish-backed opposition groups west of Aleppo City in October 2017 in order to prepare for future operations against YPG forces in Afrin. Erdogan meanwhile built up his opposition proxy force north of Aleppo City in order to prepare for future operations against Manbij.

Turkey is now taking pre-emptive action to block the U.S. from further solidifying the SDF in power. Turkey is prepared to seize SDF territory to mitigate the effect of U.S. policy in Syria, or, in Erdogan’s ideal scenario, to reverse it. U.S. officials announced plans to build a “Border Security Force” from the SDF in late 2017 and stated that the U.S. intends to make the SDF into a “model for a future Syria.” Erdogan views the conversion of the SDF into a stabilization force as a fundamental threat to Turkish national security and Turkey’s interests in Syria. Turkey condemned the U.S. policy as “absolutely impossible” for Turkey to accept. Erdogan plans to take pre-emptive action to prevent the U.S. from transitioning the SDF into a durable stabilization force. He will also use the operation to gain domestic support among the Turkish nationalist electorate ahead of Turkey’s presidential election in 2019. The Institute for the Study of War warned on November 21, 2017 that Erdogan would become even more aggressively anti-U.S. as he campaigns for re-election.

Russia and the Assad regime are backing Erdogan’s play out of a shared desire to thwart U.S. policy. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and other Russian officials condemned the U.S. for “provocations” against Turkey on January 14 and 15. Russian state-controlled media has framed the U.S. plan to build the “Border Security Force” as an instigator of Turkish aggression. Russia’s rhetoric is consistent with Turkish messaging and helps legitimize Erdogan’s operations. Russian forces are deployed along front lines in both Afrin and Manbij, and will likely withdraw. The Assad regime has also condemned the U.S. policy as an attack on Syrian sovereignty and appeared to condone a Turkish operation. Russia will attempt to exploit Turkey’s operation for its own gain and to further strengthen the Assad regime. Russia may draw back to and reinforce its positions in the Menagh Airbase and Tel Rifaat, north of Aleppo City, which provide leverage it can use to attempt to thwart possible future Turkish-backed efforts to contest pro-regime control of Aleppo City. Russia will likely seek to create a new security arrangement with Turkey that protects its interests in Aleppo City and the surrounding countryside after the operation, if it occurs. Lavrov called on Turkish forces to establish up to twenty observation points on January 15 as part of the ‘de-escalation’ agreement between Russia, Iran, and Turkey. Lavrov’s statement indicates that Russia will continue to drive Turkey to become a security guarantor in northern Syria in order to enable Russia to leverage great-power negotiations to solve local problems in Syria

Erdogan’s previous intervention in Idlib Province, south of Afrin, set conditions for his pivot against the U.S. Erdogan applied constraints on the scale of a current pro-regime push in Idlib Province by raising pro-regime military costs and proposing that Turkey and pro-regime forces refocus on their common interest against the U.S. in Syria. Erdogan provided armored vehicles and advanced weapons systems to Syrian opposition forces fighting alongside Hay’at Tahrir al Sham (HTS), the successor of al Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria. Turkish support enabled these forces to reverse some pro-regime gains from January 11-15 and inflict higher casualties on pro-regime forces. Russia pivoted away from escalation with Turkey and back towards escalation with the U.S. after Putin spoke with Erdogan via phone on January 11. Russian media had shifted  blame for a January 6 drone attack on Russia’s airbase in Hmeimim on the Syrian coast from the U.S. to Turkey on January 11 as Russia and Turkey escalated in Idlib. Putin later absolved Erdogan of responsibility, and Russian media resumed its campaign to implicate the U.S. Erdogan and Putin’s deal appears limited to northwestern Syria despite Erdogan’s effort to include the Syrian capital, however. Putin has not conceded to Erdogan’s demand for a halt to pro-regime operations in Damascus.

The YPG is unlikely to accept the loss of Afrin and Manbij. The YPG was on track to deepen its relations with the U.S. after the U.S. decided in late 2017 to remain in Syria and increase U.S. support to the YPG-dominated SDF. The YPG views Manbij and Afrin as critical components of its statelet in northern Syria. The YPG rebuked Russia’s effort to coopt it by inviting its political wing to participate in international negotiations. Such negotiations have excluded YPG-linked groups to date. A YPG-linked political leader in the SDF, Aldar Khalil, publicly rejected Russia’s offer to participate in upcoming negotiations, accusing Russia of holding them for “show.” The YPG may recalculate its alignment with the U.S. if the U.S. does not take action to prevent a Turkish attack, however. The YPG is posturing as if it will retaliate against a Turkish strike. Kurdish leaders in Afrin affirmed that YPG forces are “not responsible” for the outcome if they are forced to exercise their right to self-defense. The YPG has also reportedly reasserted military control over Manbij and accused Turkey of provoking anti-YPG demonstrations on January 14. The YPG has a range of options for how to respond to an outright ground attack. YPG forces could try to strike a deal with Russia that contains the scale of the Turkish operations. The YPG could also simply choose to fight back. Possible most dangerous escalation paths include YPG support to the PKK insurgency in Turkey.

A change in U.S. policy is required to achieve a viable “post-ISIS” political-security structure in northern Syria. The U.S. shares long-term interests with Turkey in Syria that include containing and reducing Iran’s proxy buildup and reaching a negotiated settlement of the war in accordance with the 2012 Geneva Communiqué. Near-term U.S. policies remain out of alignment with these long-term goals, however. The result is a perpetual showdown with Turkey reflected in increasingly incompatible American- and Turkish-backed structures. The U.S. should reconsider plans to develop the border security force and offer to restart a diplomatic engagement with Turkey over a “post-ISIS” stabilization strategy that re-aligns the U.S. and Turkey. The U.S. must redline the involvement of al Qaeda and affiliated groups, which Turkey has been willing to enable and, in some cases, support. The U.S. can still find common ground with Turkey, however. The U.S. should pursue technical talks on the ultimate merger of American-backed and Turkish-backed structures. The U.S. should consider committing to the following in order to incentive Turkey to choose engagement over escalation: negotiations on the composition of a future border security force that leverages both American-backed and acceptable Turkish-backed forces, providing guarantees that acceptable Turkish-backed opposition parties can participate politically in Raqqa, and U.S. or international action to hold the SDF accountable for upholding human rights and inclusive governance.

Turkey Attempts to Block Russian-led Push in Western Syria

By Jennifer Cafarella and Elizabeth Teoman with Matti Suomenaro

Key Takeaway: Turkey is using a combination of military and diplomatic pressure to compel Russia and Iran to halt further offensive operations against Syria’s al Qaeda-dominated Idlib Province. An Assad-Iranian-Russian conquest of Idlib is not in America’s national security interest. The US should help Turkey block these operations but must do so without accepting Turkey’s willingness to work with al Qaeda and without submitting to Russia’s sham diplomatic track to negotiate an end to the Syrian war. The US must instead retain freedom of action and avoid the temptation to outsource American national security requirements to regional actors already at war in Syria. 

Russia, Iran, and Syrian President Bashar al Assad’s regime launched a joint operation in northwestern Syria against the al Qaeda stronghold in Idlib Province in November 2017. Their operational objective is to seize the Abu ad Duhor airbase southwest of Aleppo City. Russian airstrikes shifted to front lines in Hama and Idlib Provinces in November 2017 to set conditions for a ground operation. Pro-regime forces including Iranian proxy militias have reportedly seized the base as of January 10, 2018, although conflicting reports indicate clashes are ongoing. 

The pro-regime offensive violates the “de-escalation” zone in Idlib Province. Russia, Iran, and Turkey agreed to deploy monitoring forces to enforce the de-escalation zone in September 2017. Russian military police deployed to front lines on the southern outskirts of Idlib Province on September 13th. The deployment blocks further al Qaeda-led attacks against the regime’s stronghold in Hama. Turkish troops deployed on the northern outskirts of Idlib Province along the front line between the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) and al Qaeda-led opposition groups in mid-October 2017. Turkey’s deployment opens a second front line against a pocket of YPG control northwest of Aleppo City. The pro-regime push to seize the Abu ad Duhor airbase strengthens the pro-regime front line in eastern Idlib by extending it to a more defensible perimeter. It also sets conditions for a possible subsequent offensive deeper into Idlib. 

Turkey is using a combination of military and diplomatic pressure to compel Russia and Iran to stop their offensive at the airbase. An unidentified group conducted three attacks against Russia’s Hmeimim airbase on the Syrian coast on December 27th & 31st, 2017 and January 6th, 2018. The first two attacks included rockets and mortars likely fired from al Qaeda-held areas on the outskirts of Latakia Province. The third attack was a complex drone swarm attack. Al Qaeda likely conducted the attacks as retaliation against the pro-regime operation in Idlib, but has not claimed credit. It is possible that Turkey indirectly or covertly supported these attacks. Russia demanded that Turkish intelligence increase its control over anti-Assad groups in northwestern Syria on January 10th, 2018, indicating that Russia intends to hold Turkey accountable for future attacks. The military threat to Hmeimim undermines Russian President Vladimir Putin’s narrative of victory and military strength in Syria. Continued attacks could also increase the cost of Russian operations in Syria. Groups fighting with al Qaeda in Idlib have also used advanced weapons systems including reports of MANPADs and other guided missile systems against advancing pro-regime forces, possibly indicating Turkey is equipping these groups to defend against the offensive.

Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is also applying diplomatic pressure. The Turkish Foreign Ministry told Russian Ambassador Alexei Yerkhov on January 8th to cease “violations” of the de-escalation zone ahead of the upcoming Syrian war diplomatic talks in Sochi, Russia on January 29. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu later called on Russia and Iran to “realize their duties” as guarantors of the de-escalation zone in Idlib on January 10th. Erdogan is leveraging European and American fears over a renewed migrant flow out of Idlib to rally support to pressure Russia and Iran to halt their offensive. The pro-regime operation has reportedly already displaced up to 100,000 Syrians. Cavusoglu stated that Turkey raised this issue with the US, France, Germany, and the UK in addition to Russia and Iran on January 10th. 

Turkey is likely conditioning its support to the Russian-backed diplomatic process on a cessation of the Idlib operation. Cavusoglu stated on January 10th that Turkey supports democratic elections in Syria that maintain Syria's territorial integrity and that "We seek to integrate” the tripartite Russian-Iranian-Turkish Astana negotiations with the Russian effort to broker a deal between Syrian parties in Sochi on January 29th. Cavosoglu’s statement puts Turkish support for Russia’s Sochi talks on the table as part of a negotiation over Idlib Province. Erdogan had previously signaled Turkish opposition to Russia’s diplomatic play on December 27, 2017. Erdogan called Assad a “terrorist” and stated it is “absolutely impossible” to move ahead in the Syrian diplomatic track with Assad in power. 

Turkey is applying constraints on the diplomatic track in order to mitigate risks to its own interests in Syria, meanwhile. Turkey retains veto power at the negotiating table through its influence over Syrian opposition groups. Turkey claimed to receive guarantees in December 2017 that US-backed Syrian Kurds would not attend upcoming talks in Sochi, although Russia claims the attendee list is still under negotiation. Turkey also summoned the American chargé d'affaires in Turkey to protest US support for the YPG on January 10th. The meeting likely indicates Turkey seeks to pressure the US to block the YPG's participation in the political process. 

It is unclear whether pro-regime forces will halt at the Abu ad Duhor airbase. The military threat to Russia’s airbase on the Syrian coast could deter further operations in the near term. Putin likely intends to keep his losses in Syria low ahead of Russia’s presidential election in March 2018 in order to avoid undue risk to his domestic support. Erdogan can also spoil Putin’s effort to grandstand as a mediator in Syria by rejecting the upcoming Sochi talks. A halt to Russia’s air support in Idlib would prevent further large scale pro-regime operations in Idlib, which depend on Russia’s air campaign to advance. Pro-regime forces will likely take an operational pause in Idlib, at minimum, after they secure the Abu ad Duhor airbase.

A pro-regime campaign to seize Idlib Province is not in America’s interest. The extension of Assad’s control produces a corollary extension of Iran’s military footprint and leverage in Syria. This outcome directly contradicts the Trump administration’s stated Iran policy. Assad and his external backers remain the primary drivers of radicalization in Syria, moreover. Their operations drive support for al Qaeda and will likely trigger a widening escalation of the war in Western Syria. Al Qaeda retains significant combat power in Idlib and will launch a counter-offensive. 

Neither Turkey nor Russia can deliver an outcome in Syria that supports US interests. The US should help Turkey block pro-regime operations that will cause further humanitarian catastrophe. The US must refrain from accepting either Russia’s diplomatic play or Turkey’s relationship with al Qaeda, however. The US must instead retain freedom of action and avoid the temptation to outsource American national security requirements to regional actors already at war in Syria.

Turkey’s Politics Promise a More Hostile Erdogan

By Noah Ringler and Elizabeth Teoman

Key Takeaway: Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan faces a new political challenge at home as a new opposition party fractures his main political ally. Erdogan may ultimately strengthen his position against the divided opposition with tools of repression he has employed in his bid for greater power. Erdogan will grow more hostile toward the U.S. and the broader West as he competes for nationalists’ support ahead of Turkey’s 2019 presidential election.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s key political ally, the main nationalist bloc, is fracturing. Turkey’s former Interior Minister Meral Aksener established a new Turkish opposition party named the Good Party (İYİ Parti) on October 25. She has opposed Erdogan for some time and campaigned against the constitutional reforms he achieved through his April 2017 referendum. The referendum amended Turkey’s constitution to shift from a parliamentary system to a presidential system, centralizing the Turkish Presidency’s power. Aksener seeks to siphon support from other opposition groups, including the Turkish Nationalist Movement (MHP) currently in a coalition with Erdogan’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). Aksener quietly campaigned for support before announcing her party. Hundreds of MHP members resigned with the intent to join her in the months before she announced the formation of the Good Party. Aksener will likely attempt to run against Erdogan in Turkey’s upcoming presidential election in 2019. 

Erdogan’s growing authoritarianism fuels the nationalist political fracture. Aksener broke from the MHP in early 2016 after a failed attempt to usurp the party’s leadership. MHP leader Devlet Bahceli deepened his political alliance with Erdogan after ejecting her and other dissidents from the party. Bahceli then supported Erdogan’s constitutional referendum, providing the votes necessary for Erdogan's narrow victory. Bahceli’s attempt to maintain power alienated nationalists opposed to Erdogan’s authoritarianism. The mass resignation of hundreds of MHP members since mid-2017 indicates Bahceli’s support for Erdogan has weakened his leadership of Turkey’s main nationalist party. Aksener seeks to supplant Bahceli’s leadership role and deny Erdogan the nationalist vote in 2019. 

The Good Party’s durability is unclear. Aksener is attempting to unify diverse opponents of Erdogan. Aksener’s anti-Erdogan stance may galvanize individuals frustrated with the failure of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) to contest Erdogan. A leading CHP member defected to the Good Party on October 23, expanding Aksener’s reach beyond the MHP. Preliminary polling indicates Aksener’s party could win additional seats in parliament and may even contest the CHP as the largest opposition party in 2019. The nascent party currently lacks a network capable of sustaining a nationwide campaign, which could limit its ability to translate current public appeal to enduring support. It is unclear whether opposition to Erdogan is sufficient to overcome divisions between former MHP and CHP members over the long term. One of the party’s founding members resigned on November 16, highlighting the risk of fragmentation. The Good Party will likely struggle to capitalize on public appeal despite its success in siphoning political support from other parties. Aksener oversaw a broad and violent crackdown on the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) and civilians in Turkey’s predominantly Kurdish southeast provinces during her tenure as Interior Minister in the mid-1990s. This legacy will likely limit her appeal to Kurdish voters as an “anti-Erdogan” candidate. That period also included rising political instability and economic stagnation, for which voters may hold her accountable. It is unclear whether her resistance to Erdogan will be sufficient to overcome her previous negative public perception. 

Aksener’s move may ultimately strengthen Erdogan. Erdogan retains the political advantage because he controls tools of repression. He has already taken steps to reinvigorate his AKP party after his narrow referendum victory in order to decrease his reliance on the MHP. He forced the resignation of several mayors in key electorates that failed to sufficiently support his referendum campaign, including Istanbul Mayor Kadir Topbas on September 22 and Ankara Mayor Melih Gokcek on October 29. He will still compete for the nationalist vote to secure a wider margin of victory in 2019. Erdogan will continue to use aggressive media campaigns and legal inquiries to discredit opposition parties, including the Good Party. He will also continue his campaign of intimidating and arresting opposition lawmakers. He has already begun to undermine Aksener by arresting her lawyer and allegedly attempting to block the Good Party’s first party congress on October 25. He may once again manipulate the electoral processes itself, if necessary. 

Erdogan will become more aggressively anti-Western as he competes for nationalist support. Aksener’s anti-U.S. stance rivals that of Erdogan. She vehemently opposes Turkey’s membership in the U.S.-led Anti-Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) Coalition. Her opposition to Erdogan’s presidency will drive him to even more aggressive policies against the U.S. in order to solicit nationalist support. He may revoke U.S. access to Incirlik Air Base, which supports anti-ISIS air operations in Syria. He will increase his support for ethnic Turkmen populations in Iraq and Syria, a key nationalist cause. He will also increase his support for a Sunni insurgency against the primary U.S. military partner force in northern Syria, the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG). He will continue to demand the extradition of alleged putschist Fethullah Gulen from the United States. He may arrest additional U.S. citizens and employees of the U.S. Diplomatic Mission to Turkey. The U.S.-Turkish alliance will continue to deteriorate as Erdogan’s fear of losing his grip on power rises.

Syria Situation Report: April 14 - 20, 2017

By ISW Syria Team and Syria Direct

Russia, Iran, and Syria demonstrated their enduring partnership during a trilateral foreign ministerial meeting in Moscow on April 14 to discuss their response to the recent strike by the U.S. against Shayrat Airbase in Syria on April 6. The ministers stressed the three countries share “common procedures against any aggression” and expressed concern regarding expanded deployments by the U.S. to the Syrian-Jordanian Border. Meanwhile, activists and anonymous officials continued to report the consolidation of pro-regime warplanes onto former civilian airfields – including the Bassel al-Assad International Airport in Latakia Province – in anticipation of any future strikes by the U.S. in Syria.

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad continued to consolidate his grip around core regime terrain in Damascus and Hama City. Buses evacuated over two thousand opposition fighters and civilians from the besieged towns of Zabadani and Madaya near Damascus in exchange for the evacuation of nearly eight thousand pro-regime fighters and civilians from the besieged towns of Fu’ah and Kefraya in Idlib Province. The evacuations come as part of a broader deal brokered by Iran and Qatar that includes population transfers, prisoner releases, and the release of a member of the Qatari Royal Family kidnapped in Iraq in 2015. Pro-regime forces also reversed all of the gains achieved by opposition forces in Northern Hama Province since the start of a major offensive against Hama City on March 21.

Finally, Turkish President Recep Erdogan achieved his longstanding goal to solidify his political dominance. Turkey voted by a narrow margin on April 16 to approve a controversial constitutional referendum to implement an executive presidential system amidst allegations of widespread fraud as well as condemnations from international observers. Erdogan has long pursued constitutional reform to concentrate executive power within his hands. The disputed results will likely generate additional domestic and regional instability as Erdogan defends his claims to a nationwide mandate and attempts to bolster the stability of his fracturing nationalist electoral coalition – potentially by launching new military operations against Kurds in Iraq and Syria.

These graphics mark the latest installment of our Syria SITREP Map made possible through a partnership between the Institute for the Study of War and Syria Direct. The graphic depicts significant recent developments in the Syrian Civil War. The control of terrain represented on the graphic is accurate as of April 3, 2017.

Warning Update: Turkish Aggression Against Syrian Kurds Threatens to Halt U.S. Anti-ISIS Operations in Syria

By Tom Ramage

Key Takeaway: The U.S.-led coalition’s fight against ISIS in Syria is in jeopardy as Turkey threatens an offensive against the U.S.’s primary partner force on the ground, the Syrian Democratic Forces. Turkey has stated its intent to shift its focus from ISIS to the Syrian Kurds after the seizure of the ISIS-held town of al Bab in Northern Aleppo Province, which ISW forecasts is likely in the coming weeks. If the U.S. fails to protect its partner force, the Syrian Kurdish-led de facto government of Northern Syria may pursue closer cooperation with Russia, which could hinder the U.S.’s ability to influence the outcome of the Syrian Civil War and continue its operations in the country. Conflict between the U.S.’s allies in Northern Syria will also relieve pressure on ISIS in Raqqa Province and thereby allow ISIS to seize territory from the Syrian regime or reinforce its core terrain in Iraq.

Turkey’s threat to launch an offensive against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) after the impending seizure of al Bab endangers the U.S.-led coalition’s fight against ISIS in Syria. Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) and Turkish-backed opposition groups entered the ISIS-held town of al Bab in Northern Aleppo Province on February 9 following a two and a half month offensive on the town. Pro-regime forces severed ISIS’s last remaining ground line of communication south of al Bab on February 6, and ISW forecasts that the city will likely fall in the coming weeks. Turkish President Recep Erdogan stated on January 27 that the Turkish Armed Forces and Turkish-backed opposition groups will not advance further south following the seizure of al Bab, but rather will launch an offensive against the SDF in Manbij City to push the SDF east of the Euphrates. The U.S. is relying on the SDF as the only U.S.-led coalition partner force currently capable of isolating ISIS’s de-facto capital in Syria – ar-Raqqah City. A Turkish offensive that both distracts and weakens the U.S.’s partner force in Syria will diminish the U.S.’s ability to combat ISIS in Syria.

Turkish officials have consistently announced their hostility towards the dominant group in the political alliance behind the SDF, the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), due to its links to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a U.S.-designated terrorist organization. Turkey launched Operation Euphrates Shield, currently a TSK and Turkish-backed opposition offensive against ISIS in Northern Aleppo Province, in large part to prevent the formation of a contiguous zone of control along the Syrian-Turkish border de facto governed by the PYD. In addition, TSK and Turkish-backed forces recently increased attacks against the SDF in Northern Aleppo Province, indicating that Turkey is preparing to escalate its currently low-scale conflict with the SDF. Turkey is also using arrests of alleged ‘PYD militants’ in Turkish-held Northern Aleppo Province and Turkey to reinforce Turkey’s designation of the PYD as a terrorist organization and legitimize their potential offensive.

Turkish President Recep Erdogan is likely timing its assault on the SDF in Northern Aleppo Province in conjunction with preparations to hold a referendum on a constitutional amendment package that would increase his executive powers. A Turkish offensive on the SDF will demonstrate Erdogan’s commitment to Turkey’s ongoing anti-PKK campaign, which is likely to increase popular support for the proposed constitutional amendments. Turkish officials likely also see U.S. President Donald Trump’s reported rejection of previous plans to increase support for the SDF as well as his recent phone conversation with Erdogan as indicators that the new administration is open to sacrificing support for the SDF in exchange for a closer partnership with Turkey in Syria.

A Turkish offensive to drive the SDF east could divert Turkish and SDF resources from combatting ISIS for months. The U.S. will likely attempt to hedge this effect by offering Turkey a leading role in operations to seize ar-Raqqah City. A Turkish offensive would require SDF approval to traverse Kurdish-held terrain, however, otherwise Turkish forces would have to advance approximately 100 miles through ISIS-held territory before attacking ar-Raqqah City. The PYD is opposed to allowing Turkey to establish a governing structure in ar-Raqqah City that is hostile to its goal of establishing a federal system in post-war Syria. The PYD is currently creating local governance structures for the city and the surrounding region with the support of local Arab tribal leaders in order to demonstrate the viability of its proposed governance structure and establish allied control over the region. Moreover, the extended Turkish assault on the ISIS-held town of al Bab demonstrates that Turkish-backed opposition forces are not independently combat capable of seizing ISIS-held urban terrain. A successful Turkish assault on ar-Raqqah City would require an increased commitment of TSK troops or the use of prominent Salafi-jihadi group Ahrar al Sham in addition to the full support of the U.S.-led coalition. Most dangerously, a halt to the SDF’s operations against ISIS could allow the group to retake territory in Northern Syria, divert forces to its assault on pro-regime held Deir ez-Zour City, or send reinforcements to defend Mosul City in Iraq.

The PYD may turn to Russia as an alternate patron if the U.S. fails to prevent an offensive against the SDF or attempt to allow Turkey a greater role in the ar-Raqqah offensive. Russia has attempted to reconcile the PYD with its rival Syrian Kurdish political parties in the Kurdish National Council and the Syrian regime in the past. Russia is also hosting a pan-Kurdistan meeting in Moscow on February 15 to reportedly discuss ways to foster Kurdish unity and PYD requirements for a post-war Syrian constitution. The PYD has already allowed Russian military police to patrol its controlled districts within Aleppo City and currently shares territory with pro-regime forces in Northern Aleppo Province west of the town of al Bab. The regime also reportedly delivered twenty-five tons of ammunition to the SDF on October 13 before the SDF launched operations against ISIS in ar-Raqqah City. Russian mediated reconciliation between the regime and the PYD would be a major political coup against U.S. influence in Syria, effectively pushing the U.S. further out into the fringes of being able to affect both the Syrian Civil War and the fight against ISIS in Syria.

Turkey may indicate an upcoming offensive by deploying further TSK reinforcements to the towns of Jarablus and Azaz in Northern Aleppo Province. An escalation in clashes between Turkish-backed opposition groups and the SDF in Northern Aleppo Province will also indicate that Turkey is shifting the focus of its operations in Syria from ISIS to the SDF. Syrian Kurds could show signs of drifting to Russia’s sphere of influence by accepting Russia’s offered concessions in a potential post-war Syrian constitution or taking increasingly frequent meetings with Russian officials.