Olivia Gibson, Grace Mappes, Jennie Olmsted, Christina Harward, Anna Harvey, and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate Trotter
August 17, 2025, 9:45 pm ET
Click here
to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here
to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a
computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this
data-heavy tool.
Click here
to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain
map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will
update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note:
The data cut-off for this product was 12:15pm ET on August 17. ISW will
cover subsequent reports in the August 18 Russian Offensive Campaign
Assessment.
US officials acknowledged
that Putin has yet to demonstrate a willingness to offer the concessions
necessary to reach a peace agreement. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated in an interview with Face the Nation
on August 17 that both Russia and Ukraine need to make concessions in
order to achieve a peace agreement.[1] Rubio noted that any agreement in
which only one side makes concessions would be a surrender, not a peace
agreement. Rubio stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin offered
"a couple" of unspecified concessions at the August 15 Alaska summit,
but did not offer enough concessions to reach a just peace agreement
immediately. Rubio reiterated Trump's August 13 statement that the
United States is not in a position to accept or reject a deal on behalf
of Ukraine and that Ukraine must decide for itself what conditions it
will accept for a peace deal.[2] Rubio stated that the Trump
administration wants a deal that allows Ukraine to rebuild its country
and to "be assured" a Russian invasion "never happens again." Rubio
stated that harsher US sanctions against Russia would end the peace
talks and continue the war for at least another year to a year and a
half. ISW continues to assess that Putin has not moderated his original
war aims throughout the full-scale invasion and has offered no
indication that he intends to change or compromise on these aims in any
peace talks with Ukraine.[3]
Russia will be unable
to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast rapidly through force, as
Russian forces have failed to do for over a decade. Russia could only
rapidly seize all of Donetsk Oblast if Ukraine concedes to Putin's
demand and withdraws from the remainder of the oblast. Axios
reported on August 16, citing a source with direct knowledge of Trump's
August 16 call with Zelensky and European leaders, that Trump stated
that Putin told him that Russia could seize all of Donetsk Oblast if
Putin so desired.[4] Putin's claim that Russian forces will inevitably
seize all of Donetsk Oblast if the war continues is false. The Russian
campaign to seize all of Donetsk Oblast has been ongoing since Russia's
first invasion in 2014 and remains incomplete. Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelensky noted on August 17 that Russia has tried and failed
to seize all of Donetsk Oblast in the past 12 years of fighting in
eastern Ukraine.[5] Russian forces have been bogged down in campaigns to
seize multiple towns and cities in Donetsk Oblast since the start of
Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022, and Russian forces are still
struggling to achieve the objectives of several of these campaigns
today. Seizing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast will very likely take
Russian forces multiple years to complete after several difficult
campaigns.
Russian forces have historically thrown themselves into costly campaigns to seize fortified or urban areas in eastern Ukraine, a reality far from Putin's claims of rapid advances. Russian forces undertook four notable campaigns in eastern Ukraine in 2024 into 2025 that illustrate how difficult it will likely be for Russian forces to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast through force.[6] Russian forces first began efforts to retake Kupyansk, Kharkiv Oblast in October 2023 and have conducted multiple separate campaigns aimed at seizing the town in the nearly two years since.[7] Russian forces are currently struggling to complete the encirclement or envelopment of Kupyansk from the northwest and have not yet seized the settlement despite 22 months of offensive operations. Russian forces began a dedicated effort to seize Toretsk, Donetsk Oblast in mid-June 2024.[8] Russian forces started this effort not far from the positions that Russian forces held prior to the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022. Russian forces seized Toretsk by August 1, 2025, taking 14 months to advance about 6.4 miles from the southeastern outskirts of Toretsk to the northwestern outskirts of Toretsk.[9]
The Russian campaign for Chasiv Yar, Donetsk Oblast, began in May 2023 after Russian forces seized Bakhmut (east of Chasiv Yar), and Russian forces intensified efforts to seize Chasiv Yar in April 2024.[10] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces completed the seizure of Chasiv Yar on July 31, 2025, although ISW has yet to observe evidence that Russian forces have seized the entirety of the settlement.[11] It has taken Russian forces 26 months to advance about 6.8 miles (roughly 11 kilometers) from western Bakhmut to the western edge of Chasiv Yar.
Russian
forces began efforts to seize Pokrovsk, Donetsk Oblast, in February
2024 after the seizure of Avdiivka and have dedicated multiple efforts
to seizing Pokrovsk through frontal assaults, envelopment, or
encirclement – all of which have thus far been unsuccessful after more
than 18 months.[12]
Recent Russian advances northeast of Pokrovsk do not indicate that Russia can rapidly seize fortified or urban areas.
Russian forces took open areas without any significantly fortified
settlements during their recent penetration northeast of Pokrovsk near
Dobropillya.[13] Russian forces still have not demonstrated any
capability to rapidly seize large, fortified positions, however, as the
campaigns for Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk have
shown.[14] Russian forces are struggling to supply and reinforce their
tactical penetration near Dobropillya and defend against Ukrainian
counterattacks on the flanks —suggesting that Russian forces may not be
able to consolidate their positions and exploit this penetration. The
Russian effort for Dobropillya is just one part of Russia's broader
18-month effort to seize Pokrovsk, moreover. Russia's efforts near
Dobropillya result from the failure of Russia's initial effort to
encircle Pokrovsk from the southwest and northeast, causing the Russian
command to try a deeper envelopment further northeast and north.
None
of these many-months-long efforts to take Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar,
Toretsk, and Pokrovsk have been at the scale needed to seize all of
Ukraine's fortress belt – Ukraine's highly fortified, main defensive
line in Donetsk Oblast that consists of cities that are significantly
larger in terms of size and population.[15] Russian efforts to seize the
rest of Donetsk Oblast by force would take several years, given the
number of fortified urban areas Russian forces must overcome to reach
the Donetsk Oblast administrative boundaries.
Russia continues to deny Ukraine's sovereignty and to demand the right to dictate Ukrainian domestic affairs. The New York Times
(NYT), Reuters, and BBC, citing anonymous European officials, reported
on August 17 that Putin asked Trump on August 15 for guarantees that
Russian would become an official language again in parts or all of
Ukraine and that Ukraine would end its "persecution" of the Ukrainian
Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP).[16] The UOC MP is not an
independent religious organization, but rather is the Kremlin-controlled
Russian Orthodox Church's (ROC) subordinate element in Ukraine.[17] The
ROC is notably an element of Russia's hybrid warfare toolkit,
particularly in the Kremlin's efforts to promote Kremlin narratives and
Russian nationalist ideology to sustain and expand Russia's influence in
former Soviet states.[18] The ROC has also advocated for the
codification of a Russian state ideology premised on the idea that
Ukraine should not exist.[19] Putin's demands regarding the Russian
language and the protection of the ROC's activities in Ukraine via the
UOC MP deny Ukraine the right to establish its own domestic laws as a
sovereign and independent state.
Putin's demands that Ukraine make Russian an official language again and allow the UOC MP to operate in Ukraine are similar to Russian demands to exert control over Ukraine's domestic affairs in the 2015 Minsk accords. The Minsk II agreement required Ukraine to amend its constitution to give more autonomy to the Russia-controlled Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republic (DNR and LNR) and expand their role in Ukraine’s politics.[20]
Russian
President Vladimir Putin's insistence that any peace agreement must
address Russia's perceived "root causes" of the war will make it
difficult to reach a peace agreement as rapidly as Trump desires, given
the complexity of the "root causes." Putin reiterated his
ongoing demand that any peace agreement must eliminate the "root causes"
of the war during the joint press conference at the Alaska summit on
August 15.[21] Putin stated on August 1 that the "main thing" in the
peace process is the eradication of the war's "root causes," which Putin
described as issues related to Russia's security, the use of the
Russian language in Ukraine, and the conditions for the Ukrainian
Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP) – the ROC's arm in
Ukraine.[22] Putin's demands to formalize Russian as an official
language in Ukraine and protect the ROC in Ukraine come from Russia's
demands of Ukraine that the Kremlin made in the Spring 2022 Istanbul
negotiations. Russia demanded in Spring 2022 during the Istanbul
negotiations that Ukraine "prevent restrictions and discrimination"
against the UOC MP and restore all of the church's rights.[23] Russia
also demanded in Spring 2022 that Ukraine guarantee the Russian language
as an official language.[24] Marco Rubio responded to a question
regarding Putin's demands at the Alaska summit during an interview with
Face the Nation on August 17, stating that Putin's demands to address
the alleged "root causes" allude to long historical complaints that the
Kremlin has repeatedly invoked.[25] Rubio stated that the United States
is not going to focus on the "root causes" but rather on halting the
fighting.
Russia's "root causes" extend beyond Ukraine, and eliminating them would require substantial negotiations with NATO. Russian
officials have defined one of the "root causes" of the war as NATO's
alleged violation of commitments not to expand into eastern Europe and
along Russia's borders in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s.[26] Russia issued
a broad set of ultimatums to the United States in December 2021
demanding that NATO commit to not accepting Ukraine or any other
countries as new members; not deploy any military forces to states that
became NATO members after May 1997; refrain from military activity in
Ukraine, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia; and refrain
from deploying intermediate-range missiles within range of Russian
territory.[27] The 2021 ultimatums also demanded that the United States
commit to upholding the ban on NATO enlargement and refrain from
deploying weapons in Europe. Putin's demand that any peace agreement
eliminate the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine would require a
lengthy, complicated negotiation process not only with Ukraine but also
with NATO and the United States. Russia's demands about the "root
causes" are demands for massive NATO concessions that would jeopardize
NATO's integrity and European and US security more broadly.
Putin's
offer of a Russian law forbidding a future invasion of Ukraine is not
credible because Russia has already twice broken previous binding
international commitments not to invade and because Putin has shown that
he can freely change Russian law as he desires. US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff
stated on August 17 that Putin agreed during the Alaska summit that
Russia would "legislatively enshrine" promises that Russia would not
invade any other territory in Ukraine or elsewhere in Europe – likely
referring to the creation of new Russian legislation or amendments to
the Russian Constitution.[28] Putin has extensively disregarded and
amended the Russian Constitution to support his political objectives, as
evidenced by the Kremlin's manipulation of the 2020 vote for a
constitutional amendment to allow Putin to run for president again in
2024 and potentially remain in power until 2036.[29] Putin's two
invasions of Ukraine also broke Russia's obligations under the 1994
Budapest Memorandum to respect the independence and sovereignty of
Ukraine within Ukraine's borders at the time.[30] Russia has continually
violated international agreements prohibiting aggression against
Ukraine, including the Minsk agreements.[31] Putin’s promise to codify
Russian promises against future aggression into Russian legislation or
the Russian Constitution is neither credible nor a concession, and there
is no evidence to suggest that Putin would abide by any such law
forbidding a renewed invasion of Ukraine after concluding a peace
agreement.
The details about Ukrainian security
guarantees to which Putin may have agreed remain unclear at this time,
but the Kremlin may be attempting to resurrect its demands about
security guarantors from April 2022 that would have neutered such
guarantees. Axios stated on August 16 that sources
briefed on Trump's call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and
European leaders after the Trump-Putin meeting in Alaska stated that
Putin said he was willing to discuss security guarantees for Ukraine and
mentioned the People's Republic of China (PRC) as one of the possible
guarantors.[32] Witkoff stated on August 17 that Trump and Putin came to
an agreement that the United States and Europe could "effectively offer
Article 5-like language" as a security guarantee for Ukraine against
future renewed Russian aggression – referring to NATO's collective
defense clause.[33] Putin's reported suggestion that the PRC could be a
security guarantor mirrors Russia's proposed peace settlement in
Istanbul in April 2022. The April 2022 proposed treaty listed the PRC,
several Western states, and Russia as the security guarantors for
Ukraine.[34] Russia demanded in the proposal that guarantor states
provide Ukraine with aid in the event of a future attack only after all guarantor states had agreed to such a decision.
The PRC is a close Russian ally that has significantly helped the
Russian war effort and defense industrial base (DIB), and the PRC would
not be a neutral guarantor.[35] Russia's involvement in the guarantee
would make it meaningless. The parameters of the security guarantees for
Ukraine that Putin is reportedly willing to accept are unclear. Any
future peace settlement that includes stipulations similar to the
demands that Russia made in April 2022 requiring unity among guarantor
states would enable the PRC (or Russia, if Russia is one of them) to
veto any decisions to help Ukraine in the event of another Russian
invasion.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky
arrived in Brussels on August 17 to meet with European Commission
President Ursula von der Leyen and to participate in a Coalition of the
Willing teleconference.[36] The teleconference
aimed to coordinate Ukraine's and Europe's positions before Zelensky's
visit to the White House on August 18. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz,
Italian President Giorgia Meloni, Finnish President Alexander Stubb,
French President Emmanuel Macron, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer,
NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte, and Von der Leyen announced that they
will accompany Zelensky during his meeting with Trump.[37]
Key Takeaways:
- US officials acknowledged that Putin has yet to demonstrate a willingness to offer the concessions necessary to reach a peace agreement.
- Russia will be unable to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast rapidly through force, as Russian forces have failed to do for over a decade. Russia could only rapidly seize all of Donetsk Oblast if Ukraine concedes to Putin's demand and withdraws from the remainder of the oblast.
- Russian forces have historically thrown themselves into costly campaigns to seize fortified or urban areas in eastern Ukraine, a reality far from Putin's claims of rapid advances.
- Recent Russian advances northeast of Pokrovsk do not indicate that Russia can rapidly seize fortified or urban areas.
- Russia continues to deny Ukraine's sovereignty and to demand the right to dictate Ukrainian domestic affairs.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin's insistence that any peace agreement must address Russia's perceived "root causes" of the war will make it difficult to reach a peace agreement as rapidly as Trump desires, given the complexity of the "root causes."
- Russia's "root causes" extend beyond Ukraine, and eliminating them would require substantial negotiations with NATO.
- Putin's offer of a Russian law forbidding a future invasion of Ukraine is not credible because Russia has already twice broken previous binding international commitments not to invade and because Putin has shown that he can freely change Russian law as he desires.
- The details about Ukrainian security guarantees to which Putin may have agreed remain unclear at this time, but the Kremlin may be attempting to resurrect its demands about security guarantors from April 2022 that would have neutered such guarantees.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk.
We
do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities
are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the
military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue
to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on
the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on
combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations
of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Limited fighting continued in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 16 and 17.[38]
A
Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern
Grouping of Forces claimed on August 17 that two companies of the
Russian 346th Motorized Rifle Regiment (Mobilization Reserve) are
operating near Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) and that the number of
Russian soldiers in the unit who are deserting is increasing.[39]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment
(formed during 2022 partial reserve call up) are reportedly operating
near Tetkino.[40]
Ukrainian forces conducted a
drone strike in Kursk Oblast that severely wounded the Russian Northern
Group of Forces Deputy Commander. Ukraine's Main Military
Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on August 17 that Ukrainian
forces struck a Russian column on an unspecified sector of the 38K-040
Rylsk-Khomutovka highway and seriously wounded Russian Northern Group of
Forces Deputy Commander Lieutenant General Esedulla Abachev.[41] The
GUR reported that Abachev required an arm and leg amputation after the
strike. Geolocated footage published on August 17 shows at least three
damaged and burned Russian transport vehicles along the highway south of
Zhuryatino (just north of Rylsk).[42]
Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against a Russian logistics hub in Voronezh Oblast.
A GUR source reported to Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne and Ukrainian
Ministry of Defense's (MoD) news agency ArmyInform that the GUR,
Ukrainian State Border Guard Service, and other Ukrainian forces
conducted a drone strike against the Lisky railway station, disrupting
rail traffic and damaging the rail connection[43] The GUR source stated
that the Lisky railway station is a critical railway hub that supplies
Russian forces in occupied Ukraine and that the strike disrupted the
supply of Russian ammunition and personnel. Geolocated footage published
on August 16 shows a fire at the Lisky railway station in Voronezh
Oblast.[44] Voronezh Oblast Governor Aleksandr Gusev claimed that
Russian air defense downed at least six drones and that drone debris
damaged a power line at a railway station.[45] The Russian Federal
Passenger Company claimed that drone debris at the Lisky railway station
delayed 14 trains.[46] Russian opposition outlet Astra published
footage on August 17 showing a drone strike and subsequent explosion
near the Lisky railway station.[47]
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
(Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine
along the international border and approach to within tube artillery
range of Sumy City)
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Sumy direction.
Assessed
Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 16 indicates
that Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Novomykolaivka (north of
Sumy City).[48]
Unconfirmed claims: The Ukrainian General
Staff reported on August 17 that Ukrainian forces advanced near
Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City).[49]
Russian forces
attacked north of Sumy City near Oleksiivka, Novokostyantynivka, and
Varachnye and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka on August 16 and
17.[50] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked
near Sadky (northeast of Sumy City) and Novokostyantynivka.[51]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade
are reportedly operating near Sadky.[52] Elements of the 106th VDV
Division, including of its 137th VDV Regiment, are reportedly operating
in the Sumy direction.[53]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
(Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international
border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range
of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 17 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced toward
Tykhe and west of Synelnykove (both northeast of Kharkiv City) on
August 16 and 17.[54]
Russian forces attacked northeast of
Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, and Synelnykove on
August 16 and 17.[55] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with
the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces
counterattacked near Vovchanski Khutory and Synelnykove.[56]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Ambarne on August 17 but did not advance.[57]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 17 but did not advance.
Russian
forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; west of Kupyansk near Sobolivka;
north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka, Holubivka and Zapadne; northeast of
Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe and Kamyanka; east of Kupyansk near
Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on
August 16 and 17.[58]
The head of unmanned systems of a
Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on August
17 that Russian forces have recently become more active in the
area.[59] The head noted that Russian forces are attacking in small
infantry groups as part of efforts to seize Kupyansk. A non-commissioned
officer (NCO) in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk
direction reported that small Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups
of three to five soldiers are trying to infiltrate Ukrainian positions
in areas such as Kivsharkivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[60]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th
Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue
to operate near Stepova Novoselivka.[61] Drone operators of the 27th
Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military
District [MMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Kupyansk
direction.[62]
Russian forces continued offensive operations southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on August 17 but did not advance.[63]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on August 17 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south
of Kolodyazi (north of Lyman) and Dibrova (east of Lyman).[64]
Russian
forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Shandryholove and Serednie;
north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Karpivka, Zelena Dolyna, and Kolodyazi and
toward Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman
in the Serebryanske forest area on August 16 and 17.[65]
A
servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction
reported on August 17 that Russian forces are attacking largely with
sabotage and reconnaissance groups in an effort to reach the Ukrainian
near rear.[66] The servicemember noted that drone operators accompany
the sabotage and reconnaissance groups. The servicemember reported that
Russian forces are using light vehicles to bring supplies to frontline
positions but noted that Russian servicemembers sometimes must transport
supplies on foot up to 30 kilometers. A Russian milblogger claimed that
Russian forces conducted a first-person view (FPV) drone strike against
a transformer substation in Lyman, disrupting power supply in southern
Lyman and complicating Ukrainian logistics.[67]
Order of
Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian
General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking
Ukrainian positions near Vovchiy Yar (northwest of Lyman).[68]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on August 17 but did not advance.
Russian
milbloggers credited elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle
Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's
Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) with
seizing Serebryanka (northeast of Siversk).[69] ISW assessed that
Russian forces seized Serebryanka as of August 16.[70]
Russian
forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka
and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka on August 16 and 17.[71]
Ukrainian
11th AC Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported
that Russian forces have increased the number of assaults and artillery
and air strikes in the Siversk direction and are attacking with a large
number of personnel, armored vehicles, and motorcycles.[72] Zaporozhets
stated that Russian forces have so far failed to achieve their Summer
2025 task of gaining a foothold on the outskirts of Siversk. Zaporozhets
stated that Russian forces are accumulating troops at the Lysychansk
Oil Refinery in occupied Verkhnokamyanske (east of Siversk) and will
likely conduct mass assaults with equipment by the end of August 2025.
Zaporozhets added that it is still unclear how many pieces of equipment
Russian forces have accumulated at the refinery but that Russian forces
will definitely use motorcycles in future large-scale assaults.
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 85th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd
CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Soledar (Siversk)
direction.[73]
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces reported ground activity in the Chasiv Yar direction on August 17.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.
Assessed
Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 16 indicates
that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced southeast of
Nelipivka (northwest of Toretsk).[74]
Russian forces
attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and
Oleksandro-Shultyne; northwest of Toretsk near Pleshchiivka, Poltavka,
Kleban Byk, and Katerynivka; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on
August 16 and 17.[75] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces
counterattacked near Shcherbynivka.[76]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted a Geran-2 drone strike against Raiske (northwest of Toretsk).[77]
Order
of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle
Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) and artillery
elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly
operating near Kleban Byk.[78] Elements of the 1194th Motorized Rifle
Regiment (reportedly of the 7th Military Base, 49th CAA, SMD) are
reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Nelipivka.[79]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 16 indicates
that Russian forces recently advanced west of Novoekonomichne (northeast
of Pokrovsk).[80]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian
milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Kucheriv Yar (northeast of
Pokrovsk and Dobropillya).[81]
Russian forces conducted
offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near
Nove Shakhove, Zapovidne, Novoekonomichne, and Volodymyrivka; north of
Pokrovsk near Rodynske; east of Pokrovsk near Promin and Myrnohrad;
southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka
and Chunyshyne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Troyanda, Leontovychi,
Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne and toward Molodetske on August 16 and
17.[82]
A Ukrainian reserve officer noted that the
intensity of the Russian assaults that initially infiltrated Ukrainian
positions east and northeast of Dobropillya is not sustainable and that
Russian force quality, attrition, fatigue, and increased operational
tempo will limit how long Russian forces can maintain their current pace
in the area.[83] A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a drone platoon
operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces are
intensifying their use of modified fiber optic drones that can wait in
standby mode "for a long time" for Ukrainian equipment targets to
appear.[84] The NCO stated that Russian forces have modified drones to
extend the amount of time they can stay in the air, allowing Russian
forces to conduct reconnaissance longer.[85]
Ukrainian
Donetsk Oblast Police stated that Russian forces conducted a Geran-2
drone strike against Svyatohorivka (just west of Dobropillya), killing
two civilians.[86] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces
conducted Geran-2 and glide bomb strikes against Bilozerske (north of
Dobropillya).[87]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian
114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's
Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) and drone operators of the 16th Spetsnaz Brigade
(Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly
operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[88] Drone operators of the 80th
Sparta Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly operating near
Myrnohrad.[89]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on August 17 but did not advance.
Russian
forces continued ground attacks toward Novopavlivka itself; northeast
of Novopavlivka near Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove;
south of Novopavlivka toward Filya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near
Tovste and Novokhatske on August 16 and 17.[90]
Order of
Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 69th Separate Cover Brigade (35th
CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade
(5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Zaporizhzhia (south of
Novopavlivka).[91]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on August 17 but did not advance.
Russian
forces continued ground attacks northeast of Velykomykhailivka near
Piddubne; east of Velykomykhailivka near Myrne and Voskresenka; and
southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Shevchenko, Ternove, Novomykolaivka,
and Maliivka on August 16 and 17.[92]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Sichneve (east of Velykomykhailivka) is a contested "gray zone."[93]
Order
of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle
Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly
striking Ukrainian forces near Komyshuvakha (southeast of
Velykomykhailivka).[94] Drone operators of the Russian 305th Artillery
Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD])
are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Sosnivka (southeast of
Velykomykhailivka).[95]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
(Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas
against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of
Zaporizhzhia City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on August 17 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Olhivske and Temyrivka on August 16 and 17.[96]
Order
of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade (5th
Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are
reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Poltavka (east of
Hulyaipole) and Novohryhorivka (northeast of Hulyaipole).[97]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 17 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in
Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv) and Stepnohirsk (west of
Orikhiv).[98]
Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv
near Mala Tokmachka, south of Orikhiv toward Novodanylivka, southwest
of Orikhiv near Nesteryanka, and west of Orikhiv near Plavni and
Stepnohirsk on August 16 and 17.[99] Russian milbloggers claimed that
Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Stepnohirsk and Plavni and near
Kamyanske (west of Orikhiv) and Mala Tokmachka.[100]
Ukraine’s
Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that the GUR
destroyed a Russian ammunition depot near the Korvatskyi passage in
occupied Melitopol on August 16, killing at least six Russian naval
infantrymen and a Chechen Vostok-Akhmat Battalion drone crew.[101]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th
VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Stepnohirsk, and elements of
the Russian 108th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) and the BARS-1
Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in the
Zaporizhia direction.[102]
Russian forces continued limited attacks in the Kherson direction on August 16 and 17 but did not advance.[103]
Russian
Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian
military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian
forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine
on the night of August 16 to 17. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that
Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile and 60
Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Bryansk
cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai;
and Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast.[104] The Ukrainian Air Force reported
that Ukrainian forces downed 40 drones over northern and eastern Ukraine
and that 20 drones and the missile struck 12 locations in the frontline
areas of Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. The spokesperson
for a Ukrainian border guard unit reported on August 17 that Russian
Shahed drones struck Chernihiv Oblast.[105]
Significant
activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence
in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable
frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note:
ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only
publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian,
Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as
commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as
the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided
in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/marco-rubio-face-the-nation-transcript-8-17-2025/
[2] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081325
[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081625 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar080225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041925 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-10-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar04172025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040425
[4] https://www.axios.com/2025/08/16/trump-zelensky-meet-white-house-putin-summit ; https://archive dot ph/7th56
[5] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15656
[6] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-has-failed-break-ukraine
[7] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-has-failed-break-ukraine; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-7-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-6-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-winter-spring-2024-offensive-operation-kharkiv-luhansk-axis
[8] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-has-failed-break-ukraine
[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025
[10] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-has-failed-break-ukraine
[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar073125
[12] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-has-failed-break-ukraine; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar080825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072225
[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-12-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-15-2025
[14] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-has-failed-break-ukraine
[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-16-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-7-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025
[16] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/16/world/europe/trump-putin-ukraine-land-swap.html ; https://www.reuters.com/world/china/outline-emerges-putins-offer-end-his-war-ukraine-2025-08-17/ ; https://www.bbc.com/news/live/c2kzn1nw1d4t?post=asset%3A9a4b9742-6558-43ed-a9c5-de560671ffa8#post
[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9-2023
[18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041125
[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar073024
[20] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/lessons-minsk-deal-breaking-cycle-russias-war-against-ukraine
[21] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77793
[22] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025
[23] https://static01.nyt.com/newsgraphics/documenttools/e548b273c4d42a3a/5e73b566-full.pdf
[24] https://static01.nyt.com/newsgraphics/documenttools/a456d6dd8e27e830/e279a252-full.pdf
[25] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/marco-rubio-face-the-nation-transcript-8-17-2025/
[26] https://isw.pub/UkrWar053025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031025
[27] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825 ; https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/nato/1790803/?lang=ru
[28] https://www.cnn.com/politics/live-news/trump-putin-zelensky-ukraine-news-08-17-25#cmefp5qq1000o3d5v6w44xc7v
[29] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/weakness-lethal-why-putin-invaded-ukraine-and-how-war-must-end ; https://www.rferl.org/a/the-putin-constitution-how-will-it-change-russia/30699899.html ; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/E30%20-%20Putin%20Rigs%20Constitutional%20Amendment%20to%20Extend%20His%20Presidency%20Beyond%202024.pdf ; https://x.com/nataliabugayova/status/1957115696673964406?s=46
[30] https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%203007/Part/volume-3007-I-52241.pdf; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/why-putin-remains-uninterested-meaningful-negotiations-ukraine
[31] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/E30%20-%20Putin%20Rigs%20Constitutional%20Amendment%20to%20Extend%20His%20Presidency%20Beyond%202024.pdf ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012925 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/lessons-minsk-deal-breaking-cycle-russias-war-against-ukraine ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021625
[32] https://www.axios.com/2025/08/16/putin-trump-summit-territory-claims-donetsk
[33] https://edition.cnn.com/politics/live-news/trump-putin-zelensky-ukraine-news-08-17-25#cmefqp88u000n3b6qsap1u79b
[34] https://static01.nyt.com/newsgraphics/documenttools/a456d6dd8e27e830/e279a252-full.pdf; https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/06/15/world/europe/ukraine-russia-ceasefire-deal.html
[35] https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/The%20Strengthening%20China-Russia%20Nexus.pdf; https://isw.pub/UkrWar092524; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/adversary-entente-task-force-update-july-9-2025
[36] https://suspilne dot media/1092628-zelenskij-pribuv-u-brussel-ta-zustrivsa-z-golovou-evrokomisii-fon-der-laen/ ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1957075367883325563 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1957075364104024137
[37] https://suspilne dot media/1092586-merc-meloni-i-stubb-takoz-budut-na-zustrici-zelenskogo-i-trampa/ ; https://www.standard.co.uk/news/politics/donald-trump-keir-starmer-volodymyr-zelensky-ursula-von-der-leyen-european-b1243315.html ; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/aug/17/european-leaders-to-join-zelenskyy-washington-meeting-trump-ukraine-russia
[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27917; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27883; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27881 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27879
[39] https://t.me/severnnyi/4852
[40] https://t.me/severnnyi/4852
[41] https://t.me/DIUkraine/6679
[42] https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1957071333470175344; https://x.com/blinzka/status/1956788117605617775; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1956780324060299679
[43] https://suspilne dot media/1092638-gur-ta-sili-oboroni-vdarili-dronami-po-logisticnomu-vuzlu-u-voronezkij-oblasti-rf/ ; https://t.me/army_tv/11990 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/17/drony-gur-urazyly-vazhlyvyj-zaliznychnyj-vuzol-u-voronezkij-oblasti-dzherela-armiya-tv/
[44] https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/1956890556598215150; https://x.com/VyshnyaOstap/status/1956882955030425658
[45] https://t.me/gusev_36/4244; https://t.me/gusev_36/4246 ; https://t.me/gusev_36/4248; https://t.me/tass_agency/331687; https://t.me/tass_agency/331692 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/331693
[46] https://t.me/luchshepoezdom/3430
[47] https://t.me/astrapress/89794
[48] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9809; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/11008; https://t.me/oprichnikbpla/132
[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27901
[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27917; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27883; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27881; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27879; https://t.me/rybar/72881; https://t.me/dva_majors/77641 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28552; https://t.me/dva_majors/77641; https://t.me/severnnyi/4847
[51] https://t.me/tass_agency/331707; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32585 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/4847
[52] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32585
[53] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32565
[54] https://t.me/wargonzo/28552 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32557?single
[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27917; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27883; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32557?single; https://t.me/severnnyi/4847
[56] https://t.me/severnnyi/4847
[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27883
[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27917 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27883 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27881 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15791 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28552
[59] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/17/na-kupyanskomu-napryamku-vorog-aktyvizuvavsya-ale-tehnika-navit-ne-doyizhdzhaye-do-pozyczij-zsu/
[60] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/17/rosijski-drg-namagayutsya-prorvaty-oboronu-vijskovi-pro-sytuacziyu-na-kordoni/
[61] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41032
[62] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176253
[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27917
[64] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176268 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66749
[65] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176280 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27917 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27883 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27881 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15791
[66] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/17/u-povnomu-ekipiruvanni-tyagnut-boyekomplekt-na-plechah-do-30-km-yak-rosiyany-zabezpechuyut-logistyku/
[67] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176293
[68] https://t.me/Secrets_of_Vinakos/9580 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/16499
[69] https://t.me/dva_majors/77644 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66749 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97890 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176188 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176268
[70] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-16-2025
[71] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27917 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27883 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27881 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15791
[72] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/16/try-pyat-sim-desyat-u-sylah-oborony-nazvaly-napryamok-de-vorog-chy-ne-najaktyvnishe-vykorystovuye-motoczykly/
[73] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176249
[74] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1956878304192889106; https://t.me/rusich13sho/1048; https://t.me/shock3OA/1929
[75] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27917 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27883 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27881 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15791 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176280
[76] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176280
[77] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176209
[78] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176168
[79] https://t.me/shock3OA/1929
[80] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9812; https://t.me/argus38/658
[81] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41039
[82] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27917; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27883 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27881; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15791; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176280
[83] https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1957040241703002137
[84] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1092472-ukrainski-sili-strimuut-vijska-rf-na-pokrovskomu-napramku-rosiani-zastosovuut-legku-tehniku/
[85] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/17/desantnyky-rozpovily-pro-osoblyvosti-povedinky-voroga-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/
[86] https://dn.npu.gov dot ua/news/piat-zahyblykh-i-chotyry-poranenykh-naslidky-rosiiskykh-obstriliv-donechchyny; https://suspilne dot media/1092360-zelenskij-pogovoriv-z-trampom-rosijski-vijska-mozut-posiliti-tisk-na-ukrainski-pozicii-1271-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1755427516&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
[87] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176209; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176306
[88] https://t.me/mod_russia/55631; https://t.me/milinfolive/154812
[89] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14185
[90] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27917; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27883; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27881; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15791
[91] https://t.me/voin_dv/16497; https://t.me/voin_dv/16498
[92] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27917; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27883; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27881; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15791
[93] https://t.me/wargonzo/28552
[94] https://t.me/voin_dv/16500
[95] https://t.me/voin_dv/16492
[96] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27883; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27881; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15791; https://t.me/wargonzo/28552
[97] https://t.me/voin_dv/16492
[98] https://t.me/vrogov/21559
[99] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27883; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27881; https://t.me/wargonzo/28552; https://t.me/rybar/72881; https://t.me/dva_majors/77641; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32572
[100] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32572; https://t.me/vrogov/2155; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32581
[101] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/hurkit-u-melitopoli-znyshcheno-sklad-bk-ta-okupantiv-yakykh-perekydaly-na-zaporizkyi-napriamok.html
[102] https://t.me/osetin20/11419; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32565; https://t.me/mod_russia/55625; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32565
[103] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27917; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27883; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27881
[104] https://t.me/kpszsu/40519
[105] https://suspilne dot media/1092360-zelenskij-pogovoriv-z-trampom-rosijski-vijska-mozut-posiliti-tisk-na-ukrainski-pozicii-1271-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1755411974&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
