Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 7, 2025

Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Daria Novikov, Jessica Sobieski, Justin Young, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Karolina Hird

August 7, 2025, 10:45 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30 pm ET on August 7. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 8 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

US and Russian officials continue to provide updates about a possible meeting between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin in the near future, but exact details remain uncertain. A White House official told ABC News, Bloomberg, and the New York Post on August 7 that the United States and Russia have not yet set a location for the meeting, and a White House source told CNN on August 6 that the meeting could occur within the next two weeks (by about August 21).[1] The White House official told Western news outlets that Trump set the condition that Putin must agree to meet bilaterally with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky before Trump would meet with Putin. Putin stated on August 7 that he is not against meeting with Zelensky "in general" but that "certain conditions must be created" before such a meeting.[2] Trump later clarified, however, that Putin does not have to meet with Zelensky before Trump will meet with Putin.[3]

Putin proposed the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as a possible location to meet with Trump.[4] Kremlin Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov claimed on August 7 that US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff proposed a trilateral meeting between Trump, Zelensky, and Putin during Witkoff's August 6 visit to Moscow but that Russia did not comment on this "option" during the visit.[5] Ushakov stated that Russia wants to first focus on a bilateral Trump-Putin meeting and claimed that the United States and Russia have set a location or this meeting. The Kremlin has attempted to set the pace and sequence of negotiations about temporary ceasefires and a permanent peace in Ukraine since the start of the US effort to hold negotiations to end the war in February 2025.[6] Putin's efforts to posture himself as amenable to US peace proposals and meaningful negotiations while refusing to meet with Zelensky in the near-term are attempts to obfuscate the reality that Putin remains uninterested in ending his war and is attempting to extract bilateral concessions from the United States without meaningfully engaging in a peace process.

Zelensky reiterated his willingness on August 7 to meet with Trump and Putin and commit to a ceasefire.[7] Zelensky listed Ukraine's top priorities as ceasing casualties and reaching a ceasefire agreement with Russia; a meeting between the heads-of-state to achieve a lasting peace; and ensuring long-term security with assistance from the United States and Ukraine's European partners.

Putin may have used his meeting with Witkoff to propose a long-range strikes moratorium, which would allow Russia to stockpile long-range drones and missiles and renew devastating large-scale strikes against Ukraine after the moratorium expires. A strikes moratorium will also handicap Ukraine's ability to continue its long-range strike campaign aimed at attriting the Russian defense industrial base and wartime economy. Bloomberg reported on August 5, citing people familiar with the situation, that Russia considered accepting a moratorium on long-range strikes in order to mitigate the threat of secondary US sanctions.[8] Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, who often reiterates Kremlin rhetorical lines to support the Kremlin's objectives, claimed on August 1 that he recently told US representatives that Russia is interested in another long-range strikes moratorium.[9] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio confirmed on August 6 that Putin gave Witkoff a ceasefire proposal but did not specify the contents of the proposal.[10] Rubio stated that a ceasefire is an important part of the negotiation process because it is difficult to negotiate a permanent peace deal while under fire — reiterating Trump's preferred timeline of establishing a ceasefire in Ukraine before starting formal peace negotiations to end the war.[11]

Russia has significantly scaled up its drone and missile production in 2025, allowing Russia to rapidly increase the size of its strike packages that it launches against Ukraine. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) assessed on June 9 that Russia can produce roughly 170 Shahed-type drones per day and that Russia plans to increase production capacity to 190 drones per day by the end of 2025.[12] Ukrainian outlet Kyiv Independent reported on June 24 that it received GUR intelligence in early June 2025 that indicated that Russia had stockpiled roughly 600 Iskander-M ballistic missiles and 300 Iskander-K cruise missiles — a stockpile that would last about two years, should Russia sustain its current pace of missile strikes against Ukraine.[13] Russia continues to heavily invest in its long-range drone and missile production capabilities, including by leaning on partners and allies like Belarus, Iran, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and North Korea for weapons provisions, joint production efforts, and sanctions evasion schemes.[14] Russia will only continue to invest in its drone and missile production capabilities and lean on its allies as it prepares for a prolonged war effort in Ukraine and potential future conflict against NATO. The size of Russia's strike packages against Ukraine will therefore likely only continue to increase, as will the damage to civilian infrastructure and civilian casualties.[15] Russia in 2025 has already conducted over 10 of the largest-ever drone and missile strikes in the war thus far and reportedly seeks to increase the size of its strike packages to contain up to 2,000 drones.[16] A temporary strikes moratorium would also degrade Ukraine's long-range strike campaign targeting Russia's defense industrial facilities and energy infrastructure — a campaign that is aimed at targeting Russia's defense production and energy revenues, as opposed to the solely civilian infrastructure that the Russian campaign often strikes.[17] Any agreement less than a full and long-term cessation in long-range strikes against civilian infrastructure will pose a great threat to Ukraine's civilian population and infrastructure upon the expiration of the agreement and resumption of long-range Russian strikes.

Putin likely claimed to Witkoff that Russia's territorial ambitions are limited to the seizure of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. Putin is likely attempting to frame Russia's seizure of the four oblasts as inevitable in order to push Ukraine and the West to capitulate to Kremlin demands. Kremlin sources recently implied to Reuters that Putin remains committed to his demand that Russia occupy all four oblasts before he would be willing to establish a ceasefire — a reiteration of Putin's June 2024 demand that he and other Kremlin officials have since publicly repeated.[18] A Kremlin source also told Reuters that the Russian General Staff recently told Putin that the frontline in Ukraine will likely "crumble" in two to three months. ISW assessed that the Kremlin is likely leaking this information to try to project confidence in Russia's military capabilities and, in turn, to undermine Ukrainian and Western morale.

Russia's occupation of the four oblasts is neither inevitable nor imminent, as Russian forces will face serious operational obstacles in what are likely to be multi-year endeavors. ISW assesses that Russia has yet to seize roughly 6,500 square kilometers of Donetsk Oblast, or about 25 percent of the region. Russian advances aimed at enveloping Pokrovsk have accelerated in recent weeks, but Russian forces have spent the last 18 months trying to seize an area of about 30 square kilometers.[19] Russian forces have been fighting to seize Chasiv Yar (pre-war population of 12,000) since April 2024, and it took Russian forces 26 months to advance 11 kilometers from western Bakhmut to western Chasiv Yar.[20] Russian forces in the Chasiv Yar and Toretsk directions are increasingly threatening the southern tip of Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast at Kostyantynivka.[21] Kostyantynivka is roughly 30 kilometers from Slovyansk, the northern tip of the fortress belt, and the cities in the fortress belt (Kostyantynivka, Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk, and Slovyansk) collectively had a pre-war population of roughly 373,000. Russian forces have not demonstrated the capacity to seize cities of this size since mid-2022, and ISW continues to assess that the seizure of the fortress belt will be a difficult, multiyear effort.[22]

Future Russian operations to seize the entirety of Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts will require significant river crossing operations that Russian forces have historically struggled to complete since 2022. Russian forces still have to seize roughly 7,200 square kilometers of Zaporizhia Oblast (about 26 percent of the region) and roughly 7,000 square kilometers in Kherson Oblast (about 26 percent of the region). Russian gains in the Zaporizhia direction in the past two years have mostly consisted of advances in areas that Ukrainian forces liberated during their Summer 2023 counteroffensive, and Russian forces have yet to seize Orikhiv (roughly 35 kilometers southeast of Zaporizhzhia City). Russian forces appear to be trying to advance along the Kamyanske-Stepnohirsk line (west of Orikhiv on the bank of the Dnipro River) northward toward Zaporizhzhia City but are roughly 20 kilometers from the southern outskirts of the city. Zaporizhzhia City had a pre-war population of 706,000 people, and the seizure of the city and the rest of the oblast will require Russian forces to cross the Dnipro River, which runs through the city and separates northwestern Zaporizhia Oblast from the rest of the region. Zaporizhzhia City is a heavily fortified city like those of the Donetsk Oblast fortress belt, and the Russian military command would have to commit a significant contingent of Russian personnel and equipment to the seizure of these cities. The seizure of Kherson Oblast would also require operations to cross the Dnipro River, establish a lodgment on the west (right) bank of the river, and seize Kherson City (pre-war population of 275,000). Russian forces would also have to contend with significant defenses that Ukrainian forces have established on west bank Kherson Oblast since liberating this area in 2022. Russian forces have not conducted a successful cross-river operation at scale across the Dnipro River since Russian forces withdrew to east (left) bank Kherson Oblast in November 2022, and this river crossing occurred as Russian forces attempted to rapidly retreat from oncoming Ukrainian forces. Russia would likely struggle to pursue simultaneous efforts in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts, particularly considering the impacts of three years of war on Russian combat capabilities.

Russian objectives are not limited to the occupation of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, however, despite Kremlin attempts to frame Russia's war aims as such in an effort to make its demands seem more reasonable. Russia has not abandoned its more extensive, original war aims. Statements from Kremlin officials, including Putin, have repeatedly indicated that Russia has more expansive territorial aims in Ukraine beyond the four oblasts.[23] Putin recently claimed that "all of Ukraine" is Russia's, Russian officials have called for Russia to seize Sumy City, and Kremlin officials routinely label Odesa and Kharkiv cities as "Russian" cities, for example.[24] Russia is also committing significant forces and means to offensive operations beyond the four oblasts, further casting doubt on claims that Russia only seeks to occupy these four regions. Russian forces are currently conducting offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast and northern and eastern Kharkiv Oblast. The Russian military command has committed elements of its relatively more "elite" airborne (VDV) and naval infantry forces to fighting in northern Sumy Oblast and has been intensifying efforts to seize Kupyansk in recent months.[25] The deployment of VDV and naval infantry forces to these sectors suggest some level of prioritization within the Russian General Staff — prioritization that is incongruent with the claim that Russia is only concerned with the seizure of Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts.

Putin's war aims are also not limited to territory. Kremlin statements continue to indicate that Putin remains committed to replacing the democratically elected Ukrainian government with a pro-Russian puppet government, reducing Ukraine's military such that Ukraine cannot defend itself from future aggression, abolishing NATO's long-held Open Door Policy, and changing the Ukrainian constitution to commit Ukraine to neutrality.[26] Putin remains committed to destroying the Ukrainian state, identity, and culture and subjugating the Ukrainian people.[27] Russian efforts to conquer all of Ukraine through battlefield gains would take decades should the current rate of advance continue, but Putin's theory of victory is contingent on the hypothesis that the West will abandon Ukraine long before he must.[28] Putin continues to believe that time is on Russia's side and that Russia can outlast Ukraine and the West. Economic measures coupled with Western military aid that enables Ukraine to inflict battlefield setbacks on Russian forces remain critical to changing Putin's calculus and bringing him to the negotiating table willing to make compromises to end the war.

The Kremlin is engaged in a delicate balancing act between feigning interest in negotiations to Trump and conditioning Russian society to accept nothing short of Putin's desired full victory in Ukraine, no matter how long it takes. Russian State Duma Deputy and former 58th Combined Arms Army Commander Lieutenant General Viktor Sobolev claimed on August 7 that "under no circumstances" should one expect talks between Putin and Trump to end Russia's war against Ukraine.[29] Sobolev claimed that Russia will not be able to accomplish its war goals with a ceasefire or truce. Sobolev reiterated claims that any peace settlement must eliminate the "initial causes" of the war — a variation on the phrase that Kremlin officials often invoke to refer to NATO expansion and Ukraine's alleged discrimination against Russian-speakers.[30] Sobolev repeated Putin's original war goals to "demilitarize" and "denazify" Ukraine — that is, to significantly constrain the Ukrainian military and replace the Ukrainian government. Sobolev claimed that Russia seeks control over Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and that Russian forces will create "buffer zones" in Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts. Russian forces currently only occupy minuscule parts of Dnipropetrovsk and Mykolaiv oblasts, and Sobolev appears to be demanding that Russia seize additional territory. Russian forces are also notably not operating in Chernihiv and Odesa oblasts, indicating that Sobolev is calling for Russia to launch completely new offensive operations. State Duma Defense Committee First Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlev claimed on August 7 that Russia will "obviously" not be satisfied with freezing the frontline and that Trump must understand that Russia "cannot be defeated."[31] State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa claimed on August 7 that Russia has always been ready for peace talks but noted that Russia's position has not changed since Russia's pre-war ultimatums in 2021 (when Russia demanded that NATO and the United States cease NATO expansion and limit military activity in Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia).[32] Russian ultranationalist outlet Tsargrad published an op-ed on August 7 claiming that the war in Ukraine is an "internal affair" for Russia.[33] The article claimed that Russia does not want peace with Ukraine, "but peace without Ukraine," as "there should be no Ukraine." Russian state media also amplified narratives from Russian officials on August 7 about Ukrainian authorities' alleged disregard for Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and civilians.[34]

Russian deputies' statements are largely intended for domestic consumption, and Kremlin-affiliated Russian oligarch, Orthodox nationalist, and Tsargrad founder Konstantin Malofeev often works to condition the Russian nationalist community to support Russia's war effort.[35] These statements from Russian officials and Russian media are part of the Kremlin's efforts to prepare Russian society for negotiations to fail and for the war to continue. The Kremlin is setting conditions to accuse Ukraine of not caring about its own population in the event of Ukrainian disagreements with Russian demands in future negotiations. The Kremlin will likely try to use this narrative to shift the blame for failed negotiations onto Ukraine — not Russia — and to justify a prolonged war to the Russian people.

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are likely operating west of Kupyansk, indicating that Russian forces may not yet maintain enduring positions on the settlement's western outskirts in Sobolivka. ISW reported on August 6 that geolocated footage showing two Russian servicemembers moving on foot in fields and windbreaks in Sobolivka (immediately west of Kupyansk) indicated that Russian forces recently advanced to the western outskirts of Kupyansk and seized Sobolivka.[36] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on August 7 that Russian forces have not seized Sobolivka.[37] The milblogger claimed that the footage may show a Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group and referenced another milblogger’s claim from late July 2025 that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are operating near Kupyansk.[38] Russian forces are increasingly using sabotage and reconnaissance groups to infiltrate behind Ukrainian positions into settlements as part of larger envelopment efforts.[39] ISW assessments of Russian advances based on geolocated footage reflect the observed presence of Russian forces within a given area. ISW’s "Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine" map layer is distinct from the "Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory" layer, for which ISW uses the doctrinal definition of control that imposes a high bar to confirm the exclusion of enemy forces from an area.[40] ISW will continue to monitor the situation for further reporting about Russian activity near Sobolivka.

Key Takeaways:

• US and Russian officials continue to provide updates about a possible meeting between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin in the near future, but exact details remain uncertain.
• Putin may have used his meeting with Witkoff to propose a long-range strikes moratorium, which would allow Russia to stockpile long-range drones and missiles and renew devastating large-scale strikes against Ukraine after the moratorium expires. A strikes moratorium will also handicap Ukraine's ability to continue its long-range strike campaign aimed at attriting the Russian defense industrial base and wartime economy.
• Russia has significantly scaled up its drone and missile production in 2025, allowing Russia to rapidly increase the size of its strike packages that it launches against Ukraine.
• Putin likely claimed to Witkoff that Russia's territorial ambitions are limited to the seizure of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. Putin is likely attempting to frame Russia's seizure of the four oblasts as inevitable in order to push Ukraine and the West to capitulate to Kremlin demands.
• Russia's occupation of the four oblasts is neither inevitable nor imminent, as Russian forces will face serious operational obstacles in what are likely to be multi-year endeavors.
• Russian objectives are not limited to the occupation of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, however, despite Kremlin attempts to frame Russia's war aims as such in an effort to make its demands seem more reasonable. Russia has not abandoned its more extensive, original war aims.
• Putin's war aims are also not limited to territory.
• The Kremlin is engaged in a delicate balancing act between feigning interest in negotiations to Trump and conditioning Russian society to accept nothing short of Putin's desired full victory in Ukraine, no matter how long it takes.
• Russian forces advanced in the Toretsk direction and likely completed the seizure of Toretsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued offensive operations in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 6 and August 7 but did not advance.[41]

Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian military infrastructure and defense industrial base (DIB) facilities in the Russian deep rear. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 7 that Ukrainian drones struck the Afipsky Oil Refinery in Afipsky, Krasnodar Krai, overnight on August 6 to 7.[42] Geolocated footage published on August 7 shows a drone strike and subsequent fire at a gas and gas condensate processing unit of the Afipsky Refinery.[43] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the refinery refines 6.25 million tons of oil annually, which is 2.1 percent of Russia's total oil refining capacity.[44] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian forces also struck other unspecified Russian defense industrial facilities and are clarifying outcomes. Krasnodar Krai authorities reported that falling drone debris caused a fire that burned down a gas processing unit at the Afipsky Oil Refinery.[45] Russian opposition outlet Astra published footage of a fire at Russian military unit number 61661 in Slavyansk-on-Kuban, Krasnodar Krai and stated that local authorities reported a drone strike on the military unit.[46] A Ukrainian open-source intelligence-focused channel stated on August 7 that drone strikes against the base of unit number 61661 caused a fire at a fuel and lubricant warehouse reportedly belonging to the Russian 76th Separate Repair and Restoration Battalion.[47] Astra also published footage on August 6 of a fire at a railway station in Surovikino, Volgograd Oblast, following a reported Ukrainian drone strike.[48] Volgograd Oblast Governor Andrey Bocharov reported on August 7 that Russian air defense repelled drone strikes against Volgograd Oblast and that a fire broke out at an unspecified railway station.[49]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on August 7 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced on the east (left) bank of the Loknya River in Sumy Oblast (northeast of Sumy City).[50]

Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Kindrativka, Kostyantynivka, and Novokostyantynivka; northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka and Sadky; and southeast of Sumy City near Lukashivka (near the Sumy-Kharkiv Oblast administrative border) on August 6 and 7.[51] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Sumy City near Andriivka, Oleksiivka, Novokostyantynivka, and Stepove; and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, Varachyne, and Sadky.[52]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Group of Forces claimed that the Russian military command deemed elements of the 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade unfit for assault tasks and sent the brigade to dig trenches and hold defensive positions near Yunakivka in areas under threat by Ukrainian drones.[53] The milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces broke through defensive positions of the Russian 104th VDV Regiment (76th VDV Division) in Yunakivka, compelling Russian military command to divert elements of the 234th VDV Regiment (76th VDV Division) from assault missions to reinforce the 104th VDV Regiment.[54] The milblogger stated that there are roughly three such Ukrainian breakthroughs per day. The milblogger noted that the Russian military command is using assault troops to hold fortifications while regular infantry conduct assaults. The milblogger added that elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) recently refused to take up assigned positions in their area of responsibility (AOR).[55] ISW observed reports of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade operating near Kostyantynivka (north of Sumy City) as of August 6.[56]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating on the eastern bank of the Loknya River.[57] Elements of the 1st Battalion of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in Oleksiivka.[58] Elements of the 51st VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate near Sadky.[59] Elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz, 11th Separate VDV Brigade, and artillery elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[60] Drone operators of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Velyka Berizka (northwest of Sumy City), Kindrativka, Mohrytsya (northeast of Sumy City), and Luhivka (southeast of Sumy City).[61] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Mykilske (northeast of Sumy City).[62]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 7 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced near Vovchansk and Synelnykove (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[63]

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Synelnykove, and Vovchanski Khutory on August 6 and 7.[64]

The commander of a Ukrainian border guard brigade operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast reported that the Russian military command is constantly concentrating forces for combat operations in the Vovchansk direction and that Russian forces launch daily assaults in fireteams of three to five personnel with support from large numbers of strike and reconnaissance drones.[65] The commander added that Russian forces are landing fiber-optic cable drones in fields near Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs), setting the drones to wait, and then activating the drones to strike passing Ukrainian vehicles.[66] The officer also reported that Russian forces still field tanks, armored fighting vehicles, and armored personnel carriers to transport infantry during larger-scale assaults.[67]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Chervona Zorya, Neskuchne, and Hoptivka (all north of Kharkiv City).[68]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove.[69]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 7 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[70]

Russian forces attacked toward Kupyansk itself; west of Kupyansk near Sobolivka and Myrove; northwest of Kupyansk near Tyshchenkivka; north of Kupyansk near Holubivka, Kindrashivka, and Radkivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Fyholivka, Krasne Pershe, and Kamyanka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and toward Kurylivka on August 6 and 7.[71]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Azimut-31 Detachment (Belgorod Oblast's volunteer unit) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Kupyansk.[72]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on August 7 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka and Zahryzove and southeast of Borova near Olhivka on August 6 and 7.[73]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on August 7 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Lyman near Karpivka, Serednie, and Shandryholove; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Myrne; and east of Lyman near Zarichne and in the Serebryanske forest area.[74] A Russian milblogger claimed that at least part of Zarichne is a contested “gray zone."[75]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Karpivka and toward Serednie and Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Lypove, and Zelena Dolyna and toward Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi, Myrne, and Yampolivka; and east of Lyman near Torske, Dibrova, and in the Serebryanske forest area on August 6 and 7.[76]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated on August 7 that the Russian military command is sending poorly equipped and supplied personnel to conduct attritional infantry-led assaults.[77]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Lyman direction.[78]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on August 7 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; south of Siversk near Pereizne; and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka on August 6 and 7.[79]

Ukrainian 11th Army Corps Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets, operating in the Siversk direction, stated that Russian forces recently intensified their offensive activity and are attempting to bypass Siversk from the directions of Hryhorivka, Serebryanka, and the Serebryanske forest area.[80] Zaporozhets stated that Ukrainian forces are anticipating that Russian forces will soon resume offensives in the Siversk direction from the Toresk direction in an effort to consolidate the frontlines and put more pressure on Ukrainian defenses in Kostyantynivka. Zaporozhets added that Russian forces are currently taking a tactical pause in the Siversk direction and are not conducting active assaults against Kostyantynivka but are instead launching artillery and air strikes against the city. Zaporozhets added that Russian shelling increased from five to 10 artillery fires per day to between 150 and 180.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Serebryanka.[81]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on August 7 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of southern Chasiv Yar.[82]

Russian forces attacked north of Chasiv Yar near Novomarkove and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and Predtechyne on August 6 and 7.[83]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 7 indicates that Russian forces advanced to central Katerynivka (immediately northwest of Toretsk) and central Shcherbynivka (immediately west of Toretsk) during a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault, indicating that Russian forces likely recently completed the seizure of Toretsk.[84]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east and southeast of Oleksandro-Shultyne (north of Toretsk), east of Nelipivka, and northeast and southwest of Rusyn Yar (both northwest of Toretsk).[85]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; northeast of Toretsk near Pleshchiivka; north of Toretsk toward Oleksandro-Shultyne; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka; and northwest of Toretsk near Popiv Yar, Poltavka, Katerynivka, Yablunivka, Oleksandro-Kalynove, and Rusyn Yar on August 6 and 7.[86]

The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction stated that the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 54th Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 3rd CAA, SMD) and the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD), including its 68th Tank Regiment, are relatively well-trained units and that elements of these units recently redeployed to the Toretsk direction.[87] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are only conducting infantry assaults and not fielding heavy military equipment, and that Russian forces are actively operating fiber-optic and reconnaissance drones in the Toretsk direction.

A Russian milblogger published footage purportedly showing a Russian FAB-3000 glide bomb strike near Kostyantynivka (northwest of Toretsk).[88]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 39th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are attacking toward Rusyn Yar (northwest of Toretsk) from Poltavka.[89] Drone operators of the Berkut Group of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Kostyantynivka.[90]

Elements of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating near Shcherbynivka.[91] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Oleksandro-Kalynove.[92] Elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Regiment (possibly a reformed Soviet unit) are reportedly operating near Toretsk.[93] Elements of the 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are reportedly fighting near Oleksandro-Shultyne.[94]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on August 7 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Mashovets stated that Russian forces are attempting to seize Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk), indicating that Ukrainian forces may have retaken some or all of the settlement.[95] ISW assessed that Russian forces seized Kotlyne as of January 24, and a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on February 26 that Ukrainian forces had retaken Kotlyne.[96] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in southern Pokrovsk.[97]

Russian forces attacked north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Sukhetske and toward Krasnyi Lyman; northeast of Pokrovsk near Volodymyrivka, Mayak, Novoekonomichne, Boykivka, Nykanorivka, Zatyshok, and Mykolaivka; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka and toward Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka and Chunyshyne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne and toward Molodetske on August 6 and 7.[98] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Mayak and Udachne.[99]

The chief sergeant of a Ukrainian drone platoon operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces are attempting to bypass and envelop Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad and noted that Russian forces are using motorcycles, buggies, and first-person view (FPV) and fiber-optic drones in attacks.[100] The communications department head of another Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces are utilizing injured personnel in attempts to infiltrate Pokrovsk.[101] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces sometimes wear civilian clothes or clothes with Ukrainian patterns to evade detection and merge with the terrain.[102] Wearing civilian clothing in combat operations is perfidy under international law, which prohibits killing, injuring, or capturing an adversary by resort to perfidy.[103]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly attacking toward Volodymyrivka and Mayak.[104] Mashovets stated that elements of the 1st and 9th motorized rifle brigades (both 51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly operating northeast of Pokrovsk near Fedorivka and Razine and north of Pokrovsk toward Rodynske. Mashovets stated that elements of the 1441st Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely comprised of mobilized personnel) are simultaneously attempting to retain control over Zvirove. Elements of the Russian Somali Battalion of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[105]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on August 7 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced northeast of Yalta (south of Novopavlivka).[106]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka and Novomykailivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove and near Zelenyi Kut; south of Novopavlivka near Zaporizhzhia; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai and Tovste and toward Filiya on August 6 and 7.[107] Mashovets and a Russian milblogger stated that Ukrainian forces counterattacked between Kotlyarivka and Horikhove (both northeast of Novopavlivka) and near Filiya and Dachne (south of Novopavlivka).[108]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are operating near Kotlyarivka and Horikhove.[109] Mashovets stated that elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) are operating toward Zelenyi Hai and Ivanivka (both southwest of Novopavlivka).[110] Elements of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating in the Dnipropetrovsk (Novopavlivka) direction.[111]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on August 7 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) advanced 1.5 kilometers northeast of Oleksandrohrad (northeast of Velykomykhailivka) with support of elements of the 430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (29th CAA).[112] Mashovets stated that Russian forces also seized Voskresenka (east of Velykomykhailivka) and consolidated positions within the settlement.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Piddubne and toward Oleksandrohrad and Andriivka-Klevtsove; east of Novomykhailivka near Voskresenka; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Maliivka and Novopil and toward Zaporizke on August 6 and 7.[113]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are operating near Voskresenka, Maliivka, and Sichneve (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[114] Mashovets stated that elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) and the 69th Cover Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) are operating near Shevchenko and Komyshuvakha (both southeast of Velykomykhailivka). Mashovets stated that elements of the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade or 60th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (both 5th CAA, EMD), are operating southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Novopil and Temyrivka. Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Zaporizke, Sichneve, Berezove, and Kalynivkse (both south of Velykomykhailivka).[115]

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on August 7.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Ternove (southeast of Hulyaipole).[116]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 7 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recently advanced to northern Plavni and made advances northeast of Kamyanske and near Stepnohirsk (all west of Orikhiv).[117]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; south of Orikhiv toward Novodanylivka; and west of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka and toward Plavni and Stepnohirsk on August 6 and 7.[118] Russian milbloggers reported that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Stepnohirsk.[119]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Novoandriivka (west of Orikhiv).[120] Elements of the 108th and 247th Airborne (VDV) regiments (both 7th VDV Division), are reportedly operating near Kamyanske.[121]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on August 7 but did not advance.[122]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 104th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces on the right (west) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.[123]

Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian military targets in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) published footage on August 7 showing Ukrainian drones striking Russian Nebo-SVU, Podlyot K-1, and 96L6E radar stations, a Raptor-class project 02510 landing craft, and the air defense base of the Russian 3rd Radio Engineer Regiment (Russian Aerospace Forces' [VKS] radio engineering troops) in unspecified locations in occupied Crimea.[124]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on August 6 to 7. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russia launched 112 Shahed-type strike and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk City; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske and Cape Chauda, Crimea.[125] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 89 strike and decoy drones and that 23 Russian drones struck 11 unspecified locations in Ukraine. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged residential buildings and transportation infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[126]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on August 7 that Russian forces currently launch about 200 guided glide bombs against Ukraine per day.[127]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) submitted a draft law to the Belarusian House of Representatives on August 7 that proposes amending the criteria for adopting martial law in Belarus to include attacks on the Union State and CSTO member states.[128]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

---

[1] https://edition.cnn.com/2025/08/06/europe/putin-witkoff-meeting-constructive-kremlin-says-intl; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-08-07/russia-says-putin-trump-meeting-to-take-place-in-next-few-days; https://nypost.com/2025/08/07/us-news/trump-to-meet-putin-in-coming-days-with-venue-to-be-announced-later-kremlin-says/; ttps://abcnews.go.com/International/kremlin-trump-putin-agreed-meeting-coming-days/story?id=124438908&cid=social_twitter_abcn

[2] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77728

[3] https://x.com/Archer83Able/status/1953555552627576928; https://x.com/annmarie/status/1953554705277497696; https://x.com/christopherjm/status/1953561690118766911?s=46

[4] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77728

[5] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77725; https://t.me/tass_agency/329676; https://t.me/tass_agency/329678; https://t.me/MID_Russia/63555 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/08/07/kreml-rossiya-i-ssha-dogovorilis-o-vstreche-putina-i-trampa-v-blizhayshie-dni

[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072425; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022625

[7] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15536; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15551; https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/prezidenti-ukrayini-ta-franciyi-obminyalisya-detalyami-konta-99393

[8] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-08-05/russia-weighs-ukraine-air-truce-offer-to-trump-without-ending-war

[9] https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/24688783

[10] https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/08/secretary-of-state-marco-rubio-with-larry-kudlow-of-fox-business-network

[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225;

[12] https://mezha dot media/oboronka/chi-bude-1000-shahediv-za-nich-302439/; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-20-2025

[13] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2025; https://kyivindependent dot com/investigation-russia-expands-strategic-plant-producing-icbms-with-chinas-help/

[14] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2025

[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-2-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-21-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar073125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072625

[16] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-31-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-9-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-24-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2025

[17] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-4-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-drone-innovations-are-likely-achieving-effects-battlefield-air-interdiction; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-17-2025

[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070725; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051725

[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar070525

[20] https://isw.pub/UkrWar073125

[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025

[22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-31-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021625

[23] https://isw.pub/UkrWar053125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225

[24] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031925

[25] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071225; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060225; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025

[26] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051125

[27] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021825

[28] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052525; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071425; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2025 https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2025 https://isw.pub/UkrWar061424

[29] https://www.gazeta dot ru/politics/news/2025/08/07/26444930.shtml

[30] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar013025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2024

[31] https://t.me/DeputatZhuravlev/13436 ; https://t.me/DeputatZhuravlev/13434

[32] https://lenta dot ru/news/2025/08/07/v-rossii-vyskazalis-ob-ozhidaniyah-ot-vstrechi-putina-i-trampa/

[33] https://tsargrad dot tv/articles/ukraina-raspolzjotsja-do-urala-esli-peregovory-neizbezhny-bej-pervym_1330855

[34] https://t.me/MID_Russia/63567; https://t.me/DeputatZhuravlev/13428; https://t.me/tass_agency/329569; https://t.me/tass_agency/329570; https://t.me/tass_agency/329663; https://t.me/tass_agency/329574; https://t.me/tass_agency/329575; https://t.me/tass_agency/329776; https://t.me/tass_agency/329769

[35] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/primer-russian-cognitive-warfare

[36] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-6-2025; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9758

[37] https://t.me/rybar/72676

[38] https://t.me/kcaebirds/1820

[39] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072725; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072225;

[40] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Cartographical%20Methodology%20Explanation%20ISW%20CTP%202022.pdf

[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27514; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532

[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27522; https://suspilne dot media/1085219-gur-ta-sili-oboroni-urazili-naftopererobnij-zavod-u-krasnodaskomu-krai-rf/ ; https://t.me/astrapress/88909 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/08/07/drony-vsu-atakovali-krasnodarskiy-kray-proizoshel-pozhar-na-neftepererabatyvayuschemzavode

[43] https://t.me/supernova_plus/42433; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1953435619348103417; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1953435701699051918; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/1953314750084874734; https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1953413656068215217

[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27522

[45] https://t.me/opershtab23/13899

[46] https://t.me/astrapress/88886 ; https://t.me/astrapress/88881 ; https://t.me/astrapress/88898

[47] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/11872

[48] https://t.me/astrapress/88878 ; https://t.me/astrapress/88880 ; https://t.me/astrapress/88882

[49] https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1953340389148053703 ; https://t.me/rgn_34/9609 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1953341054062637162; https://t.me/tass_agency/329632

[50] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32163

[51] https://t.me/wargonzo/28324; https://t.me/severnnyi/4752; https://t.me/rusich_army/25084; https://t.me/tass_agency/329670

[52] https://t.me/tass_agency/329670; https://t.me/severnnyi/4752; https://t.me/rusich_army/25084  

[53] https://t.me/severnnyi/4753

[54] https://t.me/severnnyi/4756

[55] https://t.me/severnnyi/4752

[56] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-6-2025

[57] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32163; https://t.me/severnnyi/4753

[58] https://t.me/severnnyi/4752

[59] https://t.me/severnnyi/4752

[60] https://t.me/dva_majors/76910; https://t.me/severnnyi/4753;

[61] https://t.me/bear007/73394; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175105

[62] https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/380; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175151

[63] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32152; https://t.me/severnnyi/4752

[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27514; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://t.me/wargonzo/28324; https://t.me/tass_agency/329641

[65] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wn0NmT8f2mg; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/07/sidayut-na-dorozi-chekayut-na-tehniku-zasyllya-vorozhyh-dronnyh-zasidok-na-vovchanskomu-napryamku/

[66] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wn0NmT8f2mg; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/07/sidayut-na-dorozi-chekayut-na-tehniku-zasyllya-vorozhyh-dronnyh-zasidok-na-vovchanskomu-napryamku/

[67] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wn0NmT8f2mg; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/07/sidayut-na-dorozi-chekayut-na-tehniku-zasyllya-vorozhyh-dronnyh-zasidok-na-vovchanskomu-napryamku/

[68] https://t.me/bear007/73394; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175105

[69] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32152

[70] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32178

[71] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27514; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15176; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40084; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32178; https://t.me/rybar/72676; https://t.me/dva_majors/76903

[72] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13772

[73] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27514; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15176

[74] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32180; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66487; https://t.me/milinfolive/154239; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97240; https://t.me/tass_agency/329635

[75] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97240

[76] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27514; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15176; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66487; https://t.me/wargonzo/28324; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32180; https://t.me/DeepStateUA/22276; https://t.me/milinfolive/15423; https://t.me/dva_majors/76903; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97240

[77] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/07/prosto-jdut-u-pustyh-bronikah-poblyzu-lymanu-rosiyany-pryrecheno-chvalayut-vmyraty-z-minimumom-amunicziyi/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GuRX3eyVWyA&ab_channel=%D0%A1%D1%83%D1%81%D0%BF%D1%96%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%9D%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8

[78] https://t.me/voin_dv/16354

[79] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27514; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15176

[80] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/07/u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-yak-vorog-zastosovuyu-taktyku-tysyachi-poriziv/

[81] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40119

[82] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66512

[83] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27514; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15176

[84] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1953363367231377818; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/30102; https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/1449; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9761

[85] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66512; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40100; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40137; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175106; https://t.me/dva_majors/76903; https://t.me/wargonzo/28324

[86] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27514; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15176; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66512

[87] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/07/zayihaty-na-bud-yaki-pozycziyi-cze-fart-na-toreczkomu-napryamku-drony-lyutuyut-v-kilzoni/

[88] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175132

[89] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2907

[90] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14157

[91] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40100

[92] https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/379

[93] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97261

[94] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40144

[95] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2907

[96] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-26-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2025

[97] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40106

[98] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27514; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15176; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40106; https://t.me/wargonzo/28324; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2907

[99] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2907

[100] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/07/drg-ta-vulychni-boyi-okupanty-namagayutsya-vzyaty-pokrovsk-v-kilcze/

[101] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/07/probuvav-na-mylyczyah-prosuvatysya-pid-pokrovskom-menshaye-rosiyan-vidpravlyayut-atakuvaty-poranenyh/

[102] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/07/maskarad-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-protyvnyk-pochav-chastishe-zminyuvaty-taktyku/

[103] https://casebook dot icrc.org/a_to_z/glossary/perfidy?afd_azwaf_tok=eyJraWQiOiJCMERCQzkzNTgwRTlCM0FCNzJBRUMyRDQ4RjU0MDYwRkI5Rjc2ODIzMEE5OUJDOEEyQUE0MUEwMkE0RjIzNTUzIiwiYWxnIjoiUlMyNTYifQ.eyJhdWQiOiJjYXNlYm9vay5pY3JjLm9yZyIsImV4cCI6MTc1NDYxMTExNywiaWF0IjoxNzU0NjExMTA3LCJpc3MiOiJ0aWVyMS04NGZiZjk3ODU5LXZoOTI0Iiwic3ViIjoiMTI2OjUyMDE6MjAyOmQwZDY6OWM3Yjo4OTgyOjVjYmE6NTg2IiwiZGF0YSI6eyJ0eXBlIjoiaXNzdWVkIiwicmVmIjoiMjAyNTA4MDdUMjM1ODI3Wi0xODRmYmY5Nzg1OXZoOTI0aEMxQkwxcTMwczAwMDAwMDA2ZjAwMDAwMDAwMDd2cjAiLCJiIjoieEJoNDRvS0VKcUFFSktkVWMzMm1fUkJreEZqLTE2enJIZk41a0RQU1VhRSIsImgiOiJtUkdoZzJvaUNsSU9SSzJwanctNmFieFYyUmRjZXVqRWpyTnhacEZybHlNIn19.be5B7dfTWqsKZ1MIYH9FAs3_CFJZKwKIls7kBcCyi8vpWduHztz9L0jZiMePWLKGugJqmVuikjuvgBT8m9_jviF1Sr76dx3HCdSW6E0Tb6RVCiUCHfp9moi3eZCaN3rlsnC2Rz_CaJP8XUuC79BWRp5_fBZ34MWIKgoebYcTJJwqZ4knKkt-0PaoGLx2J1cXQU_POnMu6nXPg6NZKogtmVnLlm_xg-hHx6L8k7_deyyAO1teP5ddja7_GENEslr4QrL6Xc8wHkFx9odDVG06UxlCTgFmf47DB6Le4VueZrDgqWMK0g7L_sEKDUHEZ7DeTWASBkREiJRoOlZem-R6Og.WF3obl2IDtqgvMFRqVdYkD5s

[104] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2907

[105] https://t.me/basurin_e/20296

[106] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32154

[107] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27514; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15176; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32154

[108] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32154; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2908

[109] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2908

[110] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2909

[111] https://t.me/dva_majors/76913

[112] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2909

[113] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27514; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15176; https://t.me/wargonzo/28324

[114] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2909

[115] https://t.me/voin_dv/16357; https://t.me/voin_dv/16357

[116] https://t.me/voin_dv/16363

[117] https://t.me/wargonzo/28324; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175106; https://t.me/rusich_army/25089

[118] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://t.me/dva_majors/76903; https://t.me/rusich_army/25089; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32192  

[119] https://t.me/rusich_army/25089; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32192

[120] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97260

[121] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32192

[122] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02hpJQkC51M21tFvcKjfmJrfmWXHk6G2JtK9np1WBQTkFATLwDdmdzTX5ocZPqaEhQl

[123] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32163

[124] https://t.me/DIUkraine/6583; https://suspilne dot media/crimea/1085223-gur-pokazalo-rezultati-roboti-u-krimu-urazeno-bazu-ppo-na-aj-petri-desantnij-kater-ta-radiolokacijni-stancii/; https://gur dot gov.ua/content/vorozhi-rls-u-kupolakh-desantnyi-kater-baza-ppo-na-aipetri-cherhova-zdobych-rozvidnykiv-u-krymu.html

[125] https://t.me/kpszsu/40028

[126] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/23430; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1084861-masovana-dronova-ataka-po-dnipropetrovsini-cetvero-poranenih-gorili-avto-i-budinki-zniseno-33-bpla/

[127] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15537

[128] https://belta dot by/society/view/deputat-polozhenija-voennoj-doktriny-budut-zakrepleny-zakonodatelno-730736-2025/