Avery Borens, Ben Schmida, Carolyn Moorman, Adham Fattah, and Annika Ganzeveld
Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET
The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.
Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.
Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.
Hezbollah supporters held protests in 16 locations across Lebanon on August 7 in response to the Lebanese government’s support for disarming Hezbollah.[1] Public support for Hezbollah presents a significant obstacle to decreasing Hezbollah’s influence in Lebanon in the short term. The Lebanese Council of Ministers agreed on August 7 to the objectives of US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack’s proposal to disarm Hezbollah by December 31, 2025.[2] Hezbollah supporters protested in several Beirut suburbs, southern Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley, and other Hezbollah strongholds in Lebanon.[3] The majority of these areas are largely comprised of Lebanese Shia civilians, who have fervently backed Hezbollah since the 1980s.[4] Hezbollah has long exploited the Lebanese government’s shortcomings to deeply entrench itself in Lebanon.[5] Hezbollah was able to assuage domestic discontent and gain widespread support and influence following the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War despite suffering military losses.[6] Hezbollah has used financial incentives, including pensions for families of deceased fighters and compensation for individuals who lost their homes or property, and social services to retain its support base among Lebanese Shia civilians.[7]
The Lebanese government has undertaken steps to inhibit Hezbollah’s ability to provide financial benefits to its supporters, which could decrease support for Hezbollah in the mid- to long-term. The Lebanese government and the United States have taken steps to restrict the flow of money to Hezbollah to prevent its reconstitution since the end of the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in November 2024.[8] Hezbollah, which quickly rebuilt Lebanon and provided a social safety net for Lebanese civilians after the 2006 war, is struggling to reconstruct damaged infrastructure and reconstitute its forces following the conflict in late 2024.[9] Hezbollah has also struggled to maintain its financial commitments to fighters. Hezbollah’s primary financial institution, Al Qard al Hassan, claimed that it would continue to provide financial resources to its supporters despite restrictions placed on it by the Lebanese Central Bank. Al Qard al Hassan has not resumed payments to fighters since June 2025.[10] Disruptions to Hezbollah’s ability to provide its support base with promised benefits may not have an immediate effect on the population’s support for Hezbollah, but could diminish support for Hezbollah over time.
Key Takeaways
- Hezbollah supporters held protests in 16 locations across Lebanon on August 7 in response to the Lebanese government’s support for disarming Hezbollah. Public support for Hezbollah presents a significant obstacle to decreasing Hezbollah’s influence in Lebanon in the short term.
- State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki told Iranian Supreme Leader International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati during a phone call on August 8 that Iraq will not allow the United States or Israel to disarm the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).
Iran
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s representative to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, Abdollah Hajji Sadeghi, implicitly expressed support on August 8 for negotiations with the United States.[11] Sadeghi stated that “wise negotiations under the supervision of the Supreme Leader” could support Iran’s fight against Israel. Iran has not softened its stance on domestic uranium enrichment, which was the main sticking point between Iran and the United States in negotiations before the Israel-Iran War. Multiple Iranian officials, such as Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi and Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi, have insisted that Iran will continue domestic uranium enrichment despite the war.[12] The United States has maintained that domestic uranium enrichment is a non-starter in negotiations.[13]
Iraq
State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki told Iranian Supreme Leader International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati during a phone call on August 8 that Iraq will not allow the United States or Israel to disarm the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[14] Velayati expressed Iranian support for the Axis of Resistance. The phone call occurred amid ongoing discussions about restricting arms to the Iraqi state and dissolving the PMF.[15] The Iraqi parliament is yet to vote on a law that would likely increase Iran’s influence in the Iraqi political and security spheres by formalizing the PMF’s structure and responsibilities.[16] Maliki and Velayati’s phone call also comes after the Lebanese Council of Ministers agreed on August 7 to disarm Hezbollah.[17] Maliki emphasized the importance of the PMF’s existence in the face of US and Israeli efforts to disarm Hezbollah.[18] CTP-ISW assessed on July 29 that Iran likely seeks to preserve the strength of its Iraqi partners in the Axis of Resistance in the wake of almost two years of conflict, which has severely weakened Iran and other Axis of Resistance members.[19]
The Ya Ali Popular Formations, which is likely an Iranian-backed Iraqi militia, announced on August 7 that it met with Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sarkhat al Quds to discuss the presence of US forces in Iraq.[20] The Ya Ali Popular Formations stated that it has “adopted the file” of US bases in Iraq. The Ya Ali Popular Formations announced its establishment in March 2025 and attacked individuals accused of being affiliated with Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) in Baghdad amid the March 2025 Syrian coastal violence.[21] The Ya Ali Popular Formations did not provide any evidence that the individuals it attacked were affiliated with HTS. The Ya Ali Popular Formations and Kataib Sarkhat al Quds released a joint statement on August 7 that discussed a variety of issues, including these militias' support for the Popular Mobilization Forces.[22]
Syria
The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) held a conference on August 8 in which it reaffirmed its goal to establish a decentralized system under the Syrian transitional government. AANES is the governing authority in northeastern Syria and is affiliated with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). AANES held the “Unity of Position for the Components of Northeastern Syria” conference in Hasakah City on August 8, which was attended by over 400 AANES representatives, tribal leaders, and religious figures.[23]The participants released a statement calling for a new democratic constitution to guarantee political pluralism, the equal participation of all Syrian communities in the government, and a decentralized governance system that respects northeastern Syria’s cultural and geographic differences.[24] The Syrian transitional government and SDF signed an eight-point framework agreement in March 2025 that outlined principles for the SDF’s integration into the Syrian state, but have not made meaningful progress toward integrating the SDF into the government.[25] The Syrian transitional government continues to demand that the SDF dissolve prior to integrating into the Syrian state, unlike other armed factions that have joined the Syrian Defense Ministry without adjusting their command structures.
The participation of Druze and Alawite leaders in the August 8 conference highlights that these communities share many of the demands and grievances that the Syrian Kurdish community has toward the Syrian transitional government. Druze spiritual leader Hikmat al Hijri and Alawite leader Ghazal Ghazal attended the conference remotely.[26] Hijri emphasized in a pre-recorded statement that "Syria’s future can only be achieved through dialogue among its components.”[27] The Druze, Kurdish, and Alawite communities have a shared distrust of the transitional government given that they are skeptical of the government’s willingness and ability to protect their respective communities. This distrust, compounded by the transitional government’s failure to hold its forces accountable for abuses against minority communities, has deterred Druze militias and Kurdish groups from disarming and integrating into the Syrian state. Hijri has rejected unification with the Syrian transitional government and established a “temporary” autonomous government in Suwayda Province on August 6.[28] The participation of Druze and Alawite leaders in the AANES conference may be meant to try to place pressure on the Syrian transitional government to accept these communities’ demands.
Arabian Peninsula
Nothing significant to report.
Palestinian Territories and Lebanon
See topline section.
[1] https://x.com/ME_Observer_/status/1953534237522481419 ; https://x.com/AlArabiya_Eng/status/1953561857337254340 ; https://x.com/Osint613/status/1953595314365247607 ; https://x.com/MonitorX99800/status/1953536549876117882
[2] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-7-2025
[3] https://x.com/SprinterObserve/status/1953545830390284792 ; https://x.com/ME_Observer_/status/1953534237522481419 ; https://x.com/AlArabiya_Eng/status/1953561857337254340 ; https://x.com/Osint613/status/1953595314365247607 ; https://x.com/MonitorX99800/status/1953536549876117882 ; https://x.com/SprinterObserve/status/1953574932597842375 ; https://x.com/theGeoView/status/1953542467422498895
[4] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/the-role-of-hezbollah-among-its-shia-constituents/ ; https://omerjournal.com/2023/10/11/dahieh-a-visit-to-beiruts-southern-suburbs/ ; https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/04/world/middleeast/hezbollah-weapons-lebanon.html ; https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/27/world/middleeast/bekaa-valley-lebanon-hezbollah.html
[5] https://www.stimson.org/2024/how-hezbollah-grew-over-four-decades-profiting-from-chaos/
[6] https://carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/diwan/2024/09/hezbollah-is-in-a-bind?lang=en
[7] https://ict.org dot il/hezbollahs-financing-ecosystem-crime-families-as-a-case-study/ ; https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hezbollah
[8] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-7-2025
[9] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-27-2024
[10] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-22-2025
[11] https://x.com/IranIntl_En/status/1953765275138150891, https://www.khabaronline dot ir/news/2099732
[12] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c20r18x8x05o, https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/02/3361438, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-june-30-2025, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-july-24-2025
[13] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/trump-iran-israel-nuclear-program-693a4e2a?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=ASWzDAhVWvFqThnDkBKG2IwF5kYQN5HhFrrxoRR1EEN3LPPY8QM4rT4ZT6P5zKmgf-Q%3D&gaa_ts=68965197&gaa_sig=Lpvs6UCBVrZ9vvE_pwpJOyO1Nj458Iq2bj6NSYZzut5F8uI5WB-YyofW9g4dsXfSU1vHJ2CoWLi19rI5Y-CZwg%3D%3D
[14] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/768583/
[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-7-2025
[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-6-2025
[17] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-plan-sees-hezbollah-disarmed-by-year-end-israeli-withdrawal-2025-08-07/
[18] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/768583/
[19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-29-2025
[20] SITE Intelligence Group, ”Iraq-based Shi’ite Militant Group Says It ’Adopted File’ on US Bases in Country,” August 8, 2025, available by subscription at https://www.siteintelgroup.com.
[21] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/138168
[22] SITE Intelligence Group, ”Iraq-based Shi’ite Militant Group Says It ’Adopted File’ on US Bases in Country,” August 8, 2025, available by subscription at https://www.siteintelgroup.com.
[23] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/768283/%d9%85%d8%a4%d8%aa%d9%85%d8%b1-%d9%85%d9%83%d9%88%d9%91%d9%86%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d8%b4%d9%85%d8%a7%d9%84-%d8%b4%d8%b1%d9%82%d9%8a-%d8%b3%d9%88%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%a7-%d9%8a%d8%af%d8%b9%d9%88-%d9%84%d8%af%d8%b3/
[24] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/768283/%d9%85%d8%a4%d8%aa%d9%85%d8%b1-%d9%85%d9%83%d9%88%d9%91%d9%86%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d8%b4%d9%85%d8%a7%d9%84-%d8%b4%d8%b1%d9%82%d9%8a-%d8%b3%d9%88%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%a7-%d9%8a%d8%af%d8%b9%d9%88-%d9%84%d8%af%d8%b3/ ; https://npasyria dot com/en/128103/
[25] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-10-2025
[26] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/768283/%d9%85%d8%a4%d8%aa%d9%85%d8%b1-%d9%85%d9%83%d9%88%d9%91%d9%86%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d8%b4%d9%85%d8%a7%d9%84-%d8%b4%d8%b1%d9%82%d9%8a-%d8%b3%d9%88%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%a7-%d9%8a%d8%af%d8%b9%d9%88-%d9%84%d8%af%d8%b3/ ; https://npasyria dot com/en/128103/
[27] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/768283/%d9%85%d8%a4%d8%aa%d9%85%d8%b1-%d9%85%d9%83%d9%88%d9%91%d9%86%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d8%b4%d9%85%d8%a7%d9%84-%d8%b4%d8%b1%d9%82%d9%8a-%d8%b3%d9%88%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%a7-%d9%8a%d8%af%d8%b9%d9%88-%d9%84%d8%af%d8%b3/ ; https://npasyria dot com/en/128103/
[28] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-7-2025
