By Tom Ramage
Key Takeaway: The U.S.-led coalition’s fight against ISIS in Syria is in jeopardy as Turkey threatens an offensive against the U.S.’s primary partner force on the ground, the Syrian Democratic Forces. Turkey has stated its intent to shift its focus from ISIS to the Syrian Kurds after the seizure of the ISIS-held town of al Bab in Northern Aleppo Province, which ISW forecasts is likely in the coming weeks. If the U.S. fails to protect its partner force, the Syrian Kurdish-led de facto government of Northern Syria may pursue closer cooperation with Russia, which could hinder the U.S.’s ability to influence the outcome of the Syrian Civil War and continue its operations in the country. Conflict between the U.S.’s allies in Northern Syria will also relieve pressure on ISIS in Raqqa Province and thereby allow ISIS to seize territory from the Syrian regime or reinforce its core terrain in Iraq.
Turkey’s threat
to launch an offensive against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) after the
impending seizure of al Bab endangers the U.S.-led coalition’s fight against ISIS
in Syria. Turkish Armed
Forces (TSK) and Turkish-backed opposition groups entered the ISIS-held town of al Bab in Northern Aleppo Province on
February 9 following a two and a half month offensive on the town. Pro-regime forces severed ISIS’s last remaining ground line of communication south of al
Bab on February 6, and ISW forecasts that the city will likely fall in the coming
weeks. Turkish
President Recep Erdogan stated on January 27 that the Turkish Armed Forces and Turkish-backed
opposition groups will not advance further
south following the seizure of al Bab, but rather will launch an offensive against the SDF in Manbij City to
push the SDF east of the Euphrates. The U.S. is relying on the SDF as the only U.S.-led coalition partner force currently
capable of isolating ISIS’s de-facto capital in Syria – ar-Raqqah City. A Turkish
offensive that both distracts and weakens the U.S.’s partner force in Syria
will diminish the U.S.’s ability to combat ISIS in Syria.
Turkish officials have consistently announced their hostility towards the dominant group in the political alliance behind
the SDF, the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), due to its links to
the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a U.S.-designated terrorist organization. Turkey
launched Operation Euphrates Shield, currently a TSK and Turkish-backed
opposition offensive against ISIS in Northern Aleppo Province, in large part to prevent the formation of a contiguous zone of
control along the Syrian-Turkish border de facto governed by the PYD. In
addition, TSK and Turkish-backed forces recently increased attacks against the SDF in Northern Aleppo Province, indicating that
Turkey is preparing to escalate its currently low-scale conflict with the SDF. Turkey
is also using arrests of alleged ‘PYD militants’ in Turkish-held Northern Aleppo
Province and Turkey to reinforce Turkey’s designation of the PYD as a terrorist
organization and legitimize their potential offensive.
Turkish President Recep Erdogan is likely timing
its assault on the SDF in Northern Aleppo Province in conjunction with preparations
to hold a referendum on a constitutional amendment package that
would increase his executive powers. A Turkish offensive on the SDF will demonstrate
Erdogan’s commitment to Turkey’s ongoing anti-PKK campaign, which is likely to increase
popular support for the proposed constitutional amendments. Turkish officials
likely also see U.S. President Donald Trump’s reported rejection of previous plans to increase support for the SDF as well as his recent
phone conversation with Erdogan as indicators that the new administration is
open to sacrificing support for the SDF in exchange for a closer partnership with
Turkey in Syria.
A Turkish offensive to drive the SDF east
could divert Turkish and SDF resources from combatting ISIS for months. The
U.S. will likely attempt to hedge this effect by offering Turkey a leading role
in operations to seize ar-Raqqah City. A Turkish offensive would require SDF
approval to traverse Kurdish-held terrain, however, otherwise Turkish forces would
have to advance approximately 100 miles through ISIS-held territory before
attacking ar-Raqqah City. The PYD is opposed to allowing Turkey to establish a governing
structure in ar-Raqqah City that is hostile to its goal of establishing a
federal system in post-war Syria. The PYD is currently creating local governance structures for the city and the surrounding
region with the support of local Arab tribal leaders in order to demonstrate the viability
of its proposed governance structure and establish allied control over the
region. Moreover, the extended Turkish assault on the ISIS-held town of al Bab demonstrates that
Turkish-backed opposition forces are not independently combat capable of
seizing ISIS-held urban terrain. A successful Turkish assault on ar-Raqqah City
would require an increased commitment of TSK troops or the use of prominent Salafi-jihadi group Ahrar al Sham in addition to the
full support of the U.S.-led coalition. Most dangerously, a halt to the SDF’s
operations against ISIS could allow the group to retake territory in Northern
Syria, divert forces to its assault on pro-regime held Deir ez-Zour City, or send
reinforcements to defend Mosul City in Iraq.
The PYD may turn to Russia as an alternate
patron if the U.S. fails to prevent an offensive against the SDF or attempt to
allow Turkey a greater role in the ar-Raqqah offensive. Russia has attempted to
reconcile the PYD with its rival Syrian Kurdish political parties in the
Kurdish National Council and the Syrian regime in the past. Russia is also hosting a pan-Kurdistan meeting in Moscow on February 15 to reportedly
discuss ways to foster Kurdish unity and PYD requirements for a post-war Syrian
constitution. The PYD has already allowed Russian military police to patrol its controlled districts within
Aleppo City and currently shares territory with pro-regime forces in Northern
Aleppo Province west of the town of al Bab. The regime also reportedly delivered twenty-five tons of ammunition to the SDF
on October 13 before the SDF launched operations against ISIS in ar-Raqqah City.
Russian mediated reconciliation between the regime and the PYD would be a major
political coup against U.S. influence in Syria, effectively pushing the U.S.
further out into the fringes of being able to affect both the Syrian Civil War
and the fight against ISIS in Syria.
Turkey may indicate an upcoming offensive
by deploying further TSK reinforcements to the towns of Jarablus and Azaz in Northern
Aleppo Province. An escalation in clashes between Turkish-backed opposition
groups and the SDF in Northern Aleppo Province will also indicate that Turkey
is shifting the focus of its operations in Syria from ISIS to the SDF. Syrian
Kurds could show signs of drifting to Russia’s sphere of influence by accepting
Russia’s offered concessions in a potential post-war Syrian constitution or taking increasingly
frequent meetings with Russian officials.
