By Jonathan Mautner
Russia resumed its aggressive air
campaign in northern Syria in a renewed attempt to defeat the acceptable
opposition and coerce the integration of its remaining fighters into
Salafi-jihadi groups, demonstrating its unfitness to serve as a U.S.
counter-terrorism partner. Russia conducted airstrikes against ISIS in Deir ez Zour City and its environs
in eastern Syria from January 26 – 31 and February 3 – 6, vying to blunt the
jihadist group’s ongoing
offensive against pro-regime forces in the besieged Deir ez Zour Military
Airport. Russia nonetheless belied its alleged commitment to the anti-ISIS
fight by deliberately targeting acceptable opposition forces during this
period, aiming to enhance the Salafi-jihadi makeup of the opposition and
thereby bolster the purported counter-terrorism mandate of the pro-regime
alliance. In pursuit of that objective, Russian warplanes targeted opposition
terrain behind front lines in northern
Hama, western Aleppo,
and southern Idlib Provinces
from January 26 – February 7, resuming air operations in those areas just two
days after the conclusion of Russia-sponsored peace
negotiations on the Syrian Civil War in Astana, Kazakhstan. Notably, Russia
repeatedly targeted current and former U.S.-backed opposition forces during the
course of those operations. Russia, for instance, conducted airstrikes against a
Jaysh al Mujahideen
headquarters in western Aleppo Province on January 19 and a Jaysh al Aza headquarters
in northern Hama Province on January 29, continuing its campaign to eliminate
U.S. ground partners in Syria. Likely by design, such strikes have rendered the
targeted groups increasingly vulnerable to the attacks of al Qaeda affiliate
Jabhat Fatah al Sham as it also works to defeat the acceptable opposition. Russia also
delivered a shipment of fifty SS-21 ‘Scarab’ short-range
ballistic missiles to the Port of Tartus in western Syria on or around
February 6, firing
at least two ‘Scarab’ and four SS-26 ‘Iskander’ ballistic missiles against
opposition terrain in Idlib Province over the next forty-eight hours,
according to anonymous U.S. officials. This missile capability will likely
advance the deliberate targeting campaign against the acceptable opposition,
which will continue until Russia dismantles these groups and compels their
remnants to cooperate more closely with Salafi-jihadi forces out of military
necessity. In the process, Russia will in effect enhance a Salafi-jihadi threat
in Syria that it has little intent to counter.
The following graphic depicts ISW’s
assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian
activist networks, statements by Russian and Western officials, and
documentation of Russian airstrikes through social media. This map represents
locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of
individual strikes or sorties. The graphic likely under-represents the extent
of the locations targeted in Eastern Syria, owing to a relative lack of
activist reporting from that region.
High-Confidence Reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated by
documentation from opposition factions and activist networks on the ground in
Syria deemed to be credible that demonstrate a number of key indicators of
Russian airstrikes.
Low-Confidence Reporting. ISW places low confidence in reports corroborated only
by multiple secondary sources, including from local Syrian activist networks
deemed credible or Syrian state-run media.
