By Tom Ramage
Key Takeaway: The Syrian Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have seized
the majority of ISIS-held territory in the eastern countryside of ar-Raqqah and
is positioned to complete the isolation of the city in coming months. The
U.S.’s main partners in Syria, the SDF and Turkey, are competing to lead the
next phase of operations to seize ar-Raqqah City and thereby solidify their
influence over post-ISIS governance. The SDF are currently the U.S. partner
force best positioned to seize the city and have begun establishing governance
structures comprised of local allied Arab leaders. Turkey’s alternative
proposals for a Turkish-approved force to seize ar-Raqqah City risk an armed
conflict with the SDF or pro-regime forces as well as the empowerment of
Salafi-Jihadi group Ahrar al-Sham. The U.S. must work with its allies to both
prevent an armed conflict between Turkey and the SDF that would detract from
current anti-ISIS operations and while simultaneously setting conditions to
ensure a representative governance structure for post-ISIS ar-Raqqah City.
The Syrian Kurdish-led
Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have seized the majority of ISIS-held territory
in the eastern countryside of ar-Raqqah in ongoing efforts to isolate the city.
The SDF launched the third phase of Operation Euphrates Wrath on February 4 with the stated objective of seizing the eastern countryside of ar-Raqqah City. The SDF attacked south
towards ar-Raqqah City along two axes from SDF-held territory east of the town
of Ayn Issa, reportedly seizing 98 villages and hamlets northeast of ar-Raqqah City by February
12. The SDF connected these two axes on February 11 and was approximately 5 km northeast of ar-Raqqah City as of February 17. The SDF subsequently announced the second stage of phase three on February 17 and launched two axes of attack in a pincer movement to seize the Raqqa-Hasakah highway and
encircle ISIS-held territory in Northern Deir ez Zour Province. The SDF
simultaneously advanced south from newly seized territory on the Raqqah-Hasakah
highway and seized the village of Judaydat Khabour on February 21, thereby weakening ISIS’s ability to resupply
ar-Raqqah City. The SDF are now positioned to complete the isolation of
ar-Raqqah City and subsequently transition to the next phase of seizing the
city.
The U.S.’s main partners
in Syria, the SDF and Turkey, are competing to lead operations to seize
ar-Raqqah City and solidify their influence over post-ISIS governance. The SDF
are currently advancing towards the city with increased U.S. material support, and have requested heavy weapons and additional armored vehicles to counter ISIS’s
strength in urban combat. The SDF and affiliated political parties have also
begun solidifying relationships and alliances with local Arab tribal leaders in order to create a governance structure of SDF-friendly local notables similar to the structure
established by the SDF in Manbij City. Turkey, meanwhile, has demanded that the U.S. end its support for the SDF and proposed two alternative plans for a Turkish approved force to seize
ar-Raqqah City. Turkey’s plans, however, will likely not beas effective in
combating ISIS in ar-Raqqah City as a U.S.-supported SDF assault on the city
and will fail to achieve U.S. strategic objectives for Syria. The first plan to
advance along a 12-mile wide corridor from the town of Tal Abyad to ar-Raqqah
City would bisect SDF-held territory east of the Euphrates. The SDF will not
concede to this plan without major U.S. guarantees or Turkish concessions, and
may launch counter-attacks if Turkey proceeds unilaterally. Turkey’s second
proposal is an offensive from the recently seized town of al Bab, which would require Turkish troops to advance approximately 100
miles and seize at least two heavily fortified ISIS-held towns before reaching
ar-Raqqah City. This second proposal violates a reported agreement between Turkey and Russia preventing Turkish troops from
advancing south of al Bab, and pro-regime forces have already begun advancing east towards Lake Assad in an effort to prevent Turkish-backed
opposition groups from seizing vast territory.
Turkish-backed
opposition groups acceptable to the U.S. likely [DS1] cannot seize ar-Raqqah
City without additional support from prominent Salafi-Jihadist group Ahrar al
Sham. Turkey used Ahrar al Sham during the offensive on al Bab to seize
territory when other Turkish backed opposition groups proved unable to
effectively combat ISIS in and around the urban terrain. Turkey will likely
utilize Ahrar al Sham in a leading role in a Turkish offensive on ar-Raqqah City.
Ahrar al Sham’s seizure of the city would likely allow the group to dictate the
composition of ar-Raqqah City’s governance structure, effectively trading
control of ar-Raqqah from one Salafi-Jihadist group to another. A governance
structure established by Ahrar al Sham is antithetical to U.S. strategic
interests in Syria.
A U.S. failure to
prevent conflict between its Kurdish- and Turkish-led partner forces in Syria
could jeopardize the anti-ISIS mission in Syria. A Turkish attack on Manbij City or an attempt to bisect Kurdish territory could
instigate a wider armed conflict that would distract both major U.S.-partner
ground forces from the anti-ISIS fight in ar-Raqqah City. The U.S. must also
set conditions to prevent the resurgence of Salafi-Jihadism after the seizure
of ar-Raqqah City by ensuring that the city is governed by representatives of
its population rather than another Salafi-Jihadist group or a Kurdish puppet.
