By Christopher Kozak
The Trump administration reportedly seeks to drive
a wedge between Russia and Iran in Syria. Officials have suggested that the
U.S. could exploit natural tensions between the two states and persuade Russia
to check
Iran in the Middle East. This notion assumes that cooperation between the two
countries is limited to tactical efforts in Syria and misses the deep strategic
convergence between Moscow and Tehran. Iran and Russia share many fundamental
and enduring common interests and strategic objectives, most notably the
expulsion of the U.S. from the Middle East.
Iran and Russia are historic
rivals and dissimilar regimes. Each poses a unique threat to the existing
international order. Russia aims to reestablish itself as a global superpower
and restore the multipolar world of the Cold War at the expense of the U.S. and
Europe. Iran aims to become a regional hegemon by expelling the U.S. from the Middle
East, undermining Saudi Arabia, and eliminating Israel. These aims do not
diverge over the short to medium term. Iran remains far from its goal of
regional hegemony – a position that would likely draw concern from Moscow.
Russia is also not close to achieving parity with the U.S. and NATO. Russia and
Iran will thus likely continue to partner closely until one or the other comes
within striking distance of its goals – a condition unlikely to emerge in the
foreseeable future.
Strategic Convergence
Syria - Iran and Russia
support the Syrian regime against all its opponents.
Iran needs a
friendly regime in Damascus to provide a secure base from which it can support Lebanese
Hezbollah and conduct
operations against Israel. Russia requires a regime willing and able to guarantee
long-term access to its air
and naval bases on the Mediterranean Sea from which to challenge the U.S.
and NATO. Minor divergences between Iran and Russia in their approach to the
Syrian Civil War reflect the friction normal to any coalition rather than signs
of fragility. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei appears to view the
continued
rule of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad as a matter of personal honor while
Russian President Vladimir Putin does not. Even if Putin agreed to abandon
Assad, however, there is no reason to imagine that the partnership between
Russia and Iran would collapse given their numerous other grounds for
cooperation.
Iraq and Afghanistan –
Iran and Russia seek to expel the U.S. from both Iraq and Afghanistan.
Russia
and Iran both seek to eliminate the U.S. military presence in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Tehran aims to prevent Iraq from becoming a hostile base of attack,
remembering the existential struggle of the Iran-Iraq War against former Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein. Tehran uses political
parties and militias to pressure
the weak government of Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi, periodically threatening
to replace him with a pro-Iranian leader who might order the U.S. out of Iraq. Meanwhile,
Russian outreach in Iraq has been opportunistic. Russia formed a joint
intelligence-sharing cell with Iran, Iraq, and Syria and stands ready to further
increase
its involvement with support from political
actors aligned with Iran in Baghdad. Iran and Russia both also desire a
stable buffer state in Afghanistan that excludes the U.S. and NATO. Both countries
prefer to work with the same set of allies on the ground within the Northern
Alliance as well as the Afghan
Taliban.
Turkey - Iran and
Russia desire to peel Turkey away from the U.S. and NATO.
Iran and Russia
both seek to pull Turkey out of the orbit of the U.S. and NATO while ending Ankara’s
support to opposition groups in Syria. Both countries also oppose Turkish
President Recep Erdogan’s Neo-Ottoman
strategic vision to reassert Turkish economic, cultural, and military
dominance over the Middle East. Russia and Iran also have major economic
interests in Turkey as a transit
route for natural gas pipelines and a buyer
of energy resources. Moscow and Tehran have coopted Turkey into diplomatic
initiatives
to end the Syrian Civil War that exclude the U.S. Both countries jointly took
advantage of tensions
between the U.S. and Turkey over coalition support for the Syrian Kurdish YPG,
which Turkey considers to be an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).
Erdogan has expressed a willingness to pursue membership in the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization, the rival to NATO led by Russia and China.
Egypt – Iran and Russia
aim to accelerate Egypt’s drift away from the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.
Russia and Iran encourage
Egypt’s movement away from the U.S. and Gulf States. Russia likely seeks new
military basing on the Mediterranean Sea and Red Sea in Egypt that would
give it control over the Suez Canal. Iran needs new points of access to support
its illicit networks throughout Africa after losing its partners in Sudan
and Eritrea. Both countries likely view Cairo as an acceptable
counterweight to Saudi Arabia for leadership of Sunni Arabs in the Middle
East. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has voted
for Russian initiatives on Syria at the UN Security Council and reportedly sent a limited number of troops
to Syria on behalf of the Russia and Iran.
Caucasus – Russia and
Iran back Armenia against Azerbaijan and Turkey.
Russia maintains
a strong alliance with Armenia that spans centuries. Moscow has sold billions
of dollars’ worth of weapons
to Yerevan over the past two decades and has permanent military bases in
Yerevan and Gyumri. Iran supports Armenia as a counterweight
to Azerbaijan. Tehran fears that Baku could support a secessionist movement within
its own domestic Azeri population and accuses Azerbaijan of providing Israel with
a base
for intelligence-gathering and military training.
Global Stage – Russia
and Iran seek to weaken and divide the EU and NATO.
Russia and Iran view
the EU and NATO as tools of U.S. domination in Europe. Russia pressures NATO
through continuous
military exercises and violations of airspace
or territorial waters as well as attacks against pro-Western governments in
the former Soviet Union, with Ukraine being the most notable example. Russia supports extremist
political parties in Europe that seek to devolve power from the EU to
national governments. Iranian rhetoric has recently begun incorporating greater
criticism of the EU, including public
expressions of support for Brexit.
Divergences
Russia and Iran diverge on only a
few key points. Russia does not seek to usurp the regional and religious influence
of Saudi Arabia or destroy the state of Israel. Iran’s quest for regional
hegemony also likely poses a problem for Moscow, which would prefer a regional
balance among Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt as well as positive
relations with Israel. Putin has done nothing to protest or contain Iranian efforts
against Israel, however, even in the numerous instances when weapons Russia
gave to Syria were reportedly transferred
to Lebanese Hezbollah. Russia seems willing to accept increased tensions with
Saudi Arabia and Israel in exchange for its partnership with Iran.
Russia and Iran also diverge on their stance towards the Kurds. Iran fears
separatism among Kurds in Northern Iran amidst an increase in low-level
domestic attacks over the past year. Russia by contrast views the Kurds as a
source
of leverage against regional and international powers including the U.S., Turkey,
Iran, and Iraq. Moscow has nevertheless offered no meaningful support for an
independent Kurdistan – the one item that might fully draw the Kurds into the
orbit of Russia. Iran and Russia seem quite capable of managing these differences
to sustain their pursuit of common goals.
Conclusion
There is nothing unnatural, artificial, or inherently temporary about
the coalition between Russia and Iran. Their relationship rests on a deep foundation
of common strategic objectives and interests. The two countries are building a
military coalition that can operate across the region – including a potential anti-access,
area-denial zone stretching from the Mediterranean Sea to the Persian Gulf. Meaningful
divisions between Moscow and Tehran will only materialize under extreme conditions
when either or both are on the verge of victory or collapse, forcing the other to
make hard choices about its long-term regional interests. The foreseeable
future offers little prospect of any such development. The inflation of minor disagreements
in Syria into opportunities to split Russia from Iran misses the depth of this alignment
and opens the U.S. up to strategic surprise by a rising coalition that is
already rewriting the rules of the game in the Middle East.