By: Caitlin
Forrest and Richard DeKold
Key Takeaway: ISIS Wilayat Khorasan may be
developing a regional powerbase in northwestern Afghanistan. Former Taliban militants
operating in the name of ISIS executed international aid workers and held
others captive in a prison in Jowzjan Province in February 2017, a step change
in ISIS’s operations in Afghanistan. ISIS may increasingly use this hub to regenerate
manpower as it suffers losses elsewhere, threatening US and NATO interests in
multiple regions across Afghanistan. Malign external actors like Russia and
Iran could also use ISIS’s expansion in the region to validate their support of
Taliban militants and undermine the U.S. and NATO.
Tripwire: The Jowzjan Provincial Governor claimed
ISIS-linked militants killed six International Committee for the Red Cross
(ICRC) workers on February 8 in Qush
Tepah District. Militants are holding two more ICRC workers captive
in an ISIS prison in Qush Tepah District, Jowzjan Province
according to a local news source. This report comes one month after local
officials and elders separately claimed that ISIS members destroyed homes in Darzab
District,
Jowzjan Province and forced up to 60 families to leave their homes in Sayad
District, Sar-e Pul Province in December 2016. Another report emerged on
February 8 that the son of the slain
leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which pledged to ISIS
in August 2015, is leading efforts to resettle up to 650 foreign Pakistani and
Uzbek militants and their families in Jowzjan, Sar-e Pul, and Faryab Provinces.
ISW is issuing a warning based on these reports that ISIS may be developing a
regional power base in northwestern Afghanistan. Neither ISIS Wilayat Khorasan
nor ISIS’s central media has claimed the aforementioned events.
Pattern: The execution of international aid
workers is a step change for ISIS in Afghanistan. The establishment of
a prison and population displacement are new developments for ISIS in northwest
Afghanistan, but typical of ISIS generally. ISIS militants previously used resettlement efforts
to increase presence in Kunar in March 2016, and also established multiple prisons in
their strongholds in Nangarhar Province. Reporting of ISIS-linked activity in northwestern
Afghanistan accelerated in February 2017 compared to previous trends, but early
indicators corroborate the presence of ISIS-linked fighters in this zone. Local
security officials first claimed ISIS
was recruiting and raising “black flags” in Jowzjan and Sar-e Pul Provinces in
January 2015. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which historically
operates in northern Afghanistan and the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area,
pledged to ISIS in August 2015. ISIS militants reportedly clashed with security
forces in Qush
Tepah District, Jowzjan province in July 2016. Another report in August
2016 alluded to a local ISIS
commander in Jowzjan. ISIS militants clashed again with security forces in Darzab
District, Jowzjan Province in October 2016. ISIS-linked groups also killed a
local prayer leader in for assaulting minors in Darzab
District in October 2016.
Timing: ISIS
may be exploiting a gap in security by Dostum’s Junbish Militia in northwestern
Afghanistan. ISIS’s expansion in the region comes as First Vice President Abdul Rashid
Dostum, who maintains significant influence in the North through his Junbish
Militia, remains confined to his home
surrounded by his militia in Kabul City following a scandal involving the
alleged assault of former Jowzjan Provincial Governor Ahmad Eschi in November
2016 by his bodyguards. The lack of reported Junbish militia action to combat
ISIS-linked militants in Northern Afghanistan may represent the absence of
Junbish militias. Alternatively, Dostum may be sanctioning the expansion of
ISIS in the region in order to demonstrate his significance to Afghan security
in an attempt to relieve the political pressure to prosecute him for the
alleged assault. Meanwhile, the ANSF is currently undergoing a U.S.-led force
regeneration process during their 2016-2017 winter campaign. The Afghan
National Unity Government has historically relied on a joint force of ANSF
units and Junbish militiamen to provide security in northwestern Afghanistan.
The lessened presence of Dostum’s militia while the ANSF rests and refits units
may be granting ISIS-linked militants increased freedom of movement in the
region.
Assessment: The prison in Qush Tepah District, Jowzjan province is the first indicator of social control by ISIS in Afghanistan outside of its strongholds in eastern Afghanistan. The prison is run by former Taliban shadow governor Qari Hekmat, who reportedly joined ISIS in mid-2016 a few months after he was expelled from the Taliban due to his excessive brutality. Qari Hekmat is one of several ISIS-linked groups operating in the area, including Abdul Rahman Yuldash, the son of the slain leader of the IMU, who has also been implicated by local sources in recent reporting. The Jowzjan Provincial Governor claimed on February 8 that five ISIS factions with up to 200 fighters are present in Qush Tepah District alone. The successful recruitment of former-Taliban and IMU militants in Jowzjan, Sar-e Pul, and Faryab Provinces will allow ISIS to regenerate manpower and absorb losses incurred in its strongholds in eastern Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. ISIS seeks to take advantage of the vast ungoverned and remote spaces in Afghanistan to establish camps where it can recruit, train, and deploy local and foreign fighters. ISIS Wilayat Khorasan has trained recruits from India, planned successful attacks in Kabul, and deployed expeditionary recruiters to remote provinces from its strongholds in Nangarhar and Zabul according to local sources. ISIS will likely use its growing presence and influence in the northwestern provinces to establish an additional regional base in which it can implement social control and expand ISIS’s Caliphate as it loses territory in core terrain.
Implications: The expansion of ISIS’s
Caliphate in Afghanistan would grant ISIS an additional logistical hub to
receive and train foreign fighters as it becomes more difficult for foreign
fighters to join ISIS in Iraq and Syria. ISIS Wilayat Khorasan is likely strengthening its ties with IMU
militants in order to expand its regional network and coopt local groups and
fighters. Russia may use the expansion of ISIS in northwestern Afghanistan,
which borders former Soviet satellite states Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and
Tajikistan, to continue undermining the U.S. and NATO by supporting Taliban militants
and claiming that Taliban militants are fighting ISIS rather than the U.S. The
expansion of ISIS outside of its bases in eastern Afghanistan will also strain
the ongoing U.S. counterterrorism mission as it will have to shift resources to
remote northwestern provinces. This shift may allow ISIS in Nangarhar to
reconstitute sanctuaries lost to joint U.S.-ANSF operations in 2016. Any
remaining Junbish militias under Dostum’s control in the area would further
complicate U.S. response if Dostum faces backlash from his alleged assault against
Eschi and orders his militias not to cooperate with the U.S. as a result. Both
ISIS and Russia stand to benefit from the expansion of ISIS into the northwest
at the expense of the U.S.
Indicators: Increased reports of ISIS conducting
executions and establishing courts or prisons in the northwestern provinces
would indicate ISIS is solidifying social control in the region. Reports that
the group is suddenly flush with cash or is able to procure explosive materials
may indicate a transfer of capabilities from either ISIS in core terrain, ISIS
militants in eastern Afghanistan, or both. Any recognition of these ISIS-linked
groups in official ISIS media, either coming from core or with official ISIS
Wilayat Khorasan branding, would indicate ISIS is consolidating ties with these
groups and attempting to expand the Caliphate in northwestern Afghanistan. The
continued successful recruiting of former-Taliban militants would increase the
likelihood that ISIS will establish a regional stronghold as it coopts is main
competitors in the area. If Dostum’s militia remains disengaged, it could
further deteriorate security in the northwestern provinces and allow ISIS to
make significant gains in the region. These gains may prompt Russia to take
action against ISIS in the northwest, which would severely undermine and
complicate the U.S. and NATO missions.
