Olivia Gibson, Daria Novikov, Jessica Sobieski, Justin Young, Jennie Olmsted, Karolina Hird and Frederick W. Kagan
August 21, 2025, 6:15 pm ET
Note:
The data cut-off for this product was 12 pm ET on August 21. ISW will
cover subsequent reports in the August 22 Russian Offensive Campaign
Assessment.
The Kremlin continues to
insist that the 2022 Istanbul negotiations are the only acceptable
departure point for potential future negotiations on the war in Ukraine,
thereby demanding that Russia and its allies reserve the right to veto
any Western military assistance to Ukraine and that Ukraine be left
neutered and defenseless against future Russian aggression. Russian
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated during a joint press conference
with Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar on August
21 that Russia will proceed on the issue of security guarantees for
Ukraine based on its experience with the 2015 Minsk II agreement and
2022 Istanbul negotiations.[1] Lavrov claimed that the 2022 Istanbul
negotiations were based on the concept of "eliminating the root causes"
of the war in Ukraine, referencing the Kremlin’s oft-evoked accusation
that the "root causes" of the war include NATO’s eastward expansion and
Ukraine’s alleged discrimination against Russian speakers and the
Moscow-linked Ukrainian Orthodox Church.[2] Lavrov claimed that the 2022
Istanbul negotiations would have ensured Ukraine’s security "honestly
and collectively" via a group of guarantor countries including United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) permanent members, Germany, and Turkey.
Lavrov similarly stated on August 20 during a meeting with Jordanian
officials that Russia was ready to sign on to an agreement based on the
2022 Istanbul negotiations and that those negotiations are a “good
example” of a way to negotiate an end to the war.[3]
Lavrov’s
recent statements lauding the 2022 Istanbul negotiations suggest that
the Kremlin has selected Lavrov to be the predominant amplifier of the
longstanding Russian narrative that the Istanbul negotiations are the
necessary starting point for negotiations. An agreement based on the
2022 Istanbul negotiations would have crippled Ukraine by permanently
banning it from joining NATO, imposing draconian limitations on the size
of the Ukrainian military, and prohibiting Ukraine from receiving any
Western military assistance.[4] The draft agreement also demanded that
Russia and the UNSC, including the People’s Republic of China (PRC, a
key Russian ally), be granted the status of guarantor states and that
guarantor states must act in concert in the event of a violation of the
agreement, which would allow Russia to veto Western military assistance
for Ukraine.[5] The draft Istanbul agreement notably imposes no
limitations on Russia’s military capabilities—effectively neutering
Ukraine politically and militarily while protecting Russia’s ability to
reinvade Ukraine in the future on much more favorable terms even than it
faced in 2022. The Kremlin likely understands that the 2022 Istanbul
framework is a non-starter for Kyiv and therefore continues to invoke it
in an effort to paint Ukraine as unwilling to negotiate while Moscow
continues to delay good-faith peacemaking efforts.
The
Kremlin continues to categorically reject US-backed security guarantees
for Ukraine and reveal its continued objectives of seizing control of
all of Ukraine. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson
Dmitry Medvedev explicitly rejected US- and European-led efforts to
provide Ukraine with reliable security guarantees by reiterating on his
English-language X (formerly Twitter) account on August 20 that "[Russia
has] explicitly stated: No NATO troops as peacekeepers" and that Russia
will not accept such a security guarantee.[6] Medvedev claimed that
Ukraine does not need such security guarantees, contrary to the Trump
administration's position on Ukraine's need for robust security
guarantees.[7] Russian State Duma Deputy Alexei Zhuravlev claimed on
August 21 that Ukraine should emulate Finland's negotiation model
following World War II and become a neutral state and cede part of its
territory and that negotiations will be based on battlefield
dynamics.[8] State Duma Deputy Dmitry Belik echoed Zhuravlev's
sentiments by claiming that Ukraine's attempts to alter its own
territorial borders ignores the realities on the ground.[9] Kremlin
officials often use the idea of "realities on the ground" to claim that
Russia is in a superior position on the battlefield and to demand that
Ukraine concede to Russia's demands.[10] Chairperson of the Russian
Federation Council Committee on International Affairs Grigory Karasin
claimed on August 21 that stakeholders must understand that Russia is
concerned about its strategic security vis a vis Europe and NATO and
that this raises questions about the overall viability of the entire
negotiation process.[11] Several Kremlin officials claimed that Russia
is defending new territories that are enshrined in Russia's Constitution
and therefore international recognition of Russia's annexation is
unnecessary, obfuscating the fact that Russia's occupation and
annexation of Crimea and Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk
oblasts is illegal under international law.[12] Kherson Oblast
occupation governor Vladimir Saldo claimed that Donbas and Novorossiya –
which Russian officials have defined as all of eastern and southern
Ukraine – are original Russian lands and cannot be part of any
territorial concession to Ukraine.[13] Russian reserve Colonel Viktor
Baranets claimed on August 20 that Russia may allow European
peacekeeping troops in Ukraine in exchange for Ukraine ceding all of its
southern oblasts, including Odesa, Mykolaiv, and perhaps Kharkiv, to
Russia.[14] Russia notably does not occupy any part of Odesa Oblast and
occupies slivers of Kharkiv and Mykolaiv oblasts.
Reuters,
citing three sources familiar with top-level Kremlin thinking, reported
on August 21 that Putin continues to demand that Ukraine cede all of
eastern Donbas, renounce ambitions to join NATO, and establish itself as
a neutral state and refuse to host Western troops.[15] The sources
added that Putin told US officials that he is willing to freeze Russian
offensive operations in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts in exchange as
well as return small unspecified parts of Kharkiv, Sumy, and
Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. The sources reported that Putin continues to
demand that NATO fundamentally alter one of its core tenets and commit
to a legally binding pledge to not expand eastward, a demand that would
require the renegotiation and re-ratification of the NATO treaty by all
NATO member states. Lavrov recently stated that the Kremlin's objective
is to politically control all of Ukraine rather than to seize select
Ukrainian territories such as Donetsk Oblast, further demonstrating that
Russia remains unwilling to accept any agreement that falls short of
Ukraine's full capitulation.[16] US President Donald Trump and US Vice
President JD Vance have recently expressed the United States'
willingness to contribute to the safeguarding of measures to prevent
Russia from resuming its war in Ukraine.[17]
Russia
is expending considerable diplomatic effort to court India, suggesting
that the Kremlin continues to fear the impact of secondary sanctions. Russian
President Vladimir Putin and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met
with Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar on August 21 to
discuss Russian-Indian relations and expanding economic investment in
energy, including the oil supply, hydrocarbons, and nuclear energy.[18]
Russian Deputy Energy Minister Roman Marshavin met with Indian deputy
minister of Petroleum and Natural Gas Pankaj Jain on August 20 to
discuss expanding cooperation in the energy trade.[19] Lavrov held a
joint conference with Jaishankar after the meeting and announced that
Putin would likely visit India before the end of 2025, and Jaishankar
stated that India ”believe[s] that relations between India and Russia
have been among the steadiest of the major relationships in the world
after the Second World War.”[20] Putin and other high-ranking Russian
officials are spending considerable amounts of time and energy to
stabilize and strengthen relationships with India, indicating that
Russia views India as a critical source of revenue. ISW continues to
assess that secondary sanctions will likely further impact the Russian
economy by undercutting Russian oil revenues which are essential for the
Kremlin's financing of its war against Ukraine.[21] Intensive Russian
outreach to India suggests that Moscow is attempting to ensure that New
Delhi does not curtail energy purchases from Russia because of these
potential secondary sanctions.
Russia launched the
third largest strike of the war thus far against Ukraine on the night
of August 20 to 21, targeting Western regions of Ukraine and causing
significant damage to civilian infrastructure. The Ukrainian
Air Force reported that overnight Russian forces launched 574
Shahed-type and decoy drones from over Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities,
Millerovo, Rostov Oblast, Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast, Primorsko
Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea; four Kh-47
Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles from over Lipetsk and Voronezh oblasts;
two Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from over Voronezh Oblast; 19
Kh-101 cruise missiles from over Saratov Oblast; 14 Kalibr cruise
missiles from over the Black Sea; and one unidentified missile from over
occupied Crimea.[22] Ukrainian forces reportedly downed 546 drones, one
Kh-47 Kinzhal aeroballistic missile, 18 Kh-101 cruise missiles, and 12
Kalibr cruise missiles.[23] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that drones
and missiles struck 11 locations throughout Ukraine.[24] Ukrainian
officials reported that Russian drones and missiles struck
infrastructure in Lviv City; Lutsk, Volyn Oblast; Rivne Oblast; and
Zakarpattia Oblast, causing civilian injuries and deaths.[25] Russia's
August 20-21 strike notably targeted several areas in Ukraine’s
far-western oblasts that border Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland. Russia
launched a cruise missile at Mukachevo, Zakarpattia Oblast, striking the
"Flex" US electronics manufacturing company and causing a massive fire
and injuring at least 19 employees.[26] Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky stated that "Flex" was a US-owned civilian enterprise that
manufactured household goods such as coffee machines.[27] Russia likely
struck the "Flex" enterprise to discourage the United States and
Ukraine's European allies from investing in Ukraine or opening
businesses within Ukraine.
Russia likely prepared for this
strike for several weeks, stockpiling drones and missiles over the
backdrop of ongoing US-Russian negotiations and the August 15 Alaska
summit.[28] ISW observed that Russia was launching much smaller strike
packages in the weeks leading up to the Alaska summit in order to
posture itself to the United States as a good-faith negotiator, and
assessed that Russia was likely to leverage the smaller-scale strikes to
stockpile drones and missiles for renewed massive strikes on Ukraine
following the summit.[29] The size and composition of the August 20-21
strike package suggests that Russia successfully stockpiled significant
numbers of both drones and missiles in the lead-up to the Alaska summit.
Russian forces most recently launched Kalibr cruise missiles on July 21
and Kinzhals on August 4, suggesting that efforts to stockpile these
munitions allowed Russian to use them in greater quantities during the
August 20-21 strike series.[30]
The Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) continues to innovate and scale production of long-range weapons. US
President Donald Trump stated on August 21 that it is impossible for
Ukraine to achieve victory against Russia if Ukraine is only able to use
defensive weapons and systems and is “not allowed to play offense.”[31]
The Associated Press (AP) reported on August 21 that Ukraine has
launched mass production of its new FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles which
have a range of up to three thousand kilometers and can carry warheads
up to 1,150 kilograms.[32] The AP reported that Ukraine currently
produces one FP-5 cruise missile per day and aims to increase daily
production capacity to produce seven FP-5 cruise missiles per day by
October 2025. Ukraine continues to successfully invest in and expand the
Ukrainian DIB capacity for producing medium- to long-range weapons
systems capable of striking military and DIB facilities within Russia.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in December 2024 that
Ukraine would work to scale its production capacity of Palyanytsya,
Peklo, Ruta, Neptune, and Sapsan missiles.[33] Ukraine notably succeeded
in increasing the range of Neptune anti-ship missiles to allow
Ukrainian forces to strike military and DIB facilities located deeper
within Russia.[34]
The Russian Ministry of Defense
(MoD) officially confirmed that it replaced former Northern Group of
Forces and Leningrad Military District (LMD) Commander Colonel General
Alexander Lapin with Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces Colonel
General Yevgeny Nikiforov.[35] The Russian
Ministry of Defense (MoD) posted video footage of Nikiforov briefing
Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov on August 21, confirming
milblogger claims that Nikiforov replaced Lapin on August 8.[36] The
Russian military command’s belated replacement of Lapin reflects Russian
President Vladimir Putin’s reluctance to dismiss commanders despite
displayed command deficiencies, as the Russian military command
reappointed Lapin to another high-profile command post despite prominent
protest in the Russian information space highlighting Lapin's
significant battlefield failures.[37] A Russian milblogger noted that a
scandal involving the embezzlement of money allocated for fortifications
in Kursk Oblast and the August 2024 Ukrainian incursion into the oblast
marred Lapin’s tenure in command of the Northern Group of Forces.[38]
Russian milbloggers recently criticized Lapin due to Russia’s failure to
establish a buffer zone in northern Sumy and Kharkiv Oblasts.[39]
Nikiforov, who began Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine as chief of
staff of the Eastern Military District (EMD), commanded the Western
Group of Forces and Western Military District from December 2022 and was
appointed Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces in Spring
2024.[40] The Russian MoD sent Nikiforov to assist Lapin and organize
efforts to stop the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast in August
2024.[41] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian
Northern Group of Forces claimed on August 8 that Nikiforov is a relic
of the “parquet army” of the 2000s who criticizes subordinates over
minor mistakes.[42] ISW assesses that Nikiforov is unlikely to make any
major changes, given his presence in the Northern Group of Forces sector
for more than a year.
Key Takeaways:
- The Kremlin continues to insist that the 2022 Istanbul negotiations are the only acceptable departure point for potential future negotiations on the war in Ukraine, thereby demanding that Russia and its allies reserve the right to veto any Western military assistance to Ukraine and that Ukraine be left neutered and defenseless against future Russian aggression.
- The Kremlin continues to categorically reject US-backed security guarantees for Ukraine and reveal its continued objectives of seizing control of all of Ukraine.
- Russia is expending considerable diplomatic effort to court India, suggesting that the Kremlin continues to fear the impact of secondary sanctions.
- Russia launched the third largest strike of the war thus far against Ukraine on the night of August 20 to 21, targeting Western regions of Ukraine and causing significant damage to civilian infrastructure.
- The Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) continues to innovate and scale production of long-range weapons.
- The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) officially confirmed that it replaced former Northern Group of Forces and Leningrad Military District (LMD) Commander Colonel General Alexander Lapin with Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka. Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar.
We
do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities
are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the
military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue
to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on
the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on
combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations
of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Fighting continued in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 21.[43]
The
Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 21 that elements of
Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), along with other unspecified
Ukrainian forces, conducted long-range drone strikes against the
Novoshakhtinsky Oil Refinery in Novoshakhtinsk, Rostov Oblast, which
supplies Russian forces operating in Ukraine and is one of southern
Russia’s largest oil product producers.[44] Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi reported
on August 21 that the Novoshakhtinsky Oil Refinery can process 7.5
million tons of oil annually.[45] The Ukrainian General Staff also
reported that Ukrainian forces struck an unspecified military fuel and
lubricant base in Voronezh Oblast overnight on August 20 to 21.[46]
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
(Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine
along the international border and approach to within tube artillery
range of Sumy City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Sumy direction on August 21 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, Novokostyantynivka, and Yablunivka on August 20 and 21.[47]
The
spokesperson for a Ukrainian detachment operating in the Sumy direction
stated that Russian forces launch roughly five daily assaults and
conduct 30 to 50 KAB guided glide bomb strikes daily.[48] The
spokesperson stated that Russian forces only conducted one infiltration
attempt in this direction so far in August 2025 due to Ukrainian
fortifications and combat positions in this area.
Sumy
Oblast Head Oleh Hryhorov stated on August 21 that Russian drones struck
a Ukrainian medical vehicle in Seredyna-Buda (northwest of Sumy
City).[49]
Order of Battle: Anti-aircraft gunners of the
Russian 137th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) and elements
of the 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in
the Sumy direction.[50] Elements of the 51st VDV Regiment (106th VDV
Division) are reportedly operating in Sadky (northeast of Sumy
City).[51] Drone operators of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Aida
Detachment are reportedly operating near Kindrativka (north of Sumy
City).[52] Drone operators of the Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly
coordinating strikes on Ukrainian positions near Nova Sich (north of
Sumy City) with Akhmat Spetsnaz elements.[53] Drone operators of the
30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military
District [LMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions in the Sumy
direction.[54] Elements of the 83rd Separate Guards VDV Brigade are
reportedly operating south of Yunakivka.[55] Elements of the 810th
Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly
operating in Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City).[56]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian
objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border
with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of
Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 21 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in
forest areas west of Synelnykove (northeast of Kharkiv City).[57]
Russian
forces continued ground attacks north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and
northeast of Kharkiv City within Vovchansk and near Synelnykove on
August 20 and 21.[58]
A Ukrainian company commander
operating in the Kharkiv direction stated on August 21 that Russian
forces in this direction have not used armored equipment “for a long
time” and occasionally assault Ukrainian positions using
motorcycles.[59] The company commander noted that Ukrainian forces’ use
of drones in the Kharkiv direction has prevented Russian forces from
accumulating equipment as far as 30 kilometers away from the frontline.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 21 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced one
kilometer in forest areas towards Khatnie (northeast of Velykyi
Burluk).[60]
Russian forces continued ground attacks
northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Khatnie and Ambarne and southeast of
Velykyi Burluk toward Katerynivka on August 20 and 21.[61]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 21 but did not advance.
Russian
forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk near Holubivka;
and northeast of Kupyansk near Fyholivka on August 20 and 21.[62] A
Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in
Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk).[63]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Borova direction on August 21 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Hrekivka (southeast of Borova).[64]
Russian forces attacked southeast of Borova toward Olhivka on August 20.[65]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on August 21 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized
Serednie (northwest of Lyman) and advanced west of Kolodyazi (northeast
of Lyman).[66]
Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman
near Shandryholove and Serednie; north of Lyman near Karpivka, Zelena
Dolyna, and Ridkodub; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Myrne; east
of Lyman near Torske and Dibrova; and southeast of Lyman toward Yampil
and in the Serebryanske forest area on August 20 and 21.[67]
Ukrainian
Dnipro Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on
August 21 that Russian forces in the Lyman direction have accumulated
significant manpower and continue to launch traditional mass frontal
assaults on Ukrainian positions in the Serebryanske forest area
(southeast of Lyman).[68] The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade
operating in the Lyman direction stated that Russian forces in this
direction continue to conduct small infantry assaults on Ukrainian
positions and have recently increased their use of Lancet, Molniya, and
other unspecified reconnaissance and first-person view (FPV) drones.[69]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on August 21 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Vyimka (southeast of Siversk).[70]
Russian
forces attacked near Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk toward
Dronivka; north of Siversk near Serebryanka; northeast of Siversk near
Hryhorivka; east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske and Novoselivka;
southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; south of Siversk near Pereizne; and
southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka on August 20 and 21.[71]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction.
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 20 indicates
that Russian forces recently advanced west of Klishchiivka (southeast of
Chasiv Yar).[72]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger
claimed that Russian forces entered the dacha area near Kostyantynivka
(southwest of Chasiv Yar) from the east but that Ukrainian drone
activity forced them to retreat.[73] Another milblogger refuted claims
that Russian forces entered Predtechyne (south of Chasiv Yar) and
eastern Kostyantynivka and advanced west of the Siverskyi-Donetsk Donbas
Canal (south of Chasiv Yar), claiming that Russian staff officers above
the brigade echelon systemically embellish reports of Russian gains for
the Russian high command.[74]
Russian forces attacked
south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and Predtechyne and southwest of
Chasiv Yar near Kostyantynivka on August 20 and 21.[75]
Kramatorsk
City Military Administration Head Oleksandr Honcharenko stated on
August 21 that Russian forces struck Kramatorsk (northwest of Chasiv
Yar) overnight with an FAB-250 unguided glide bomb, damaging civilian
infrastructure.[76]
Order of Battle: Geolocated footage published on August 18 and geolocated on August 20 shows drone operators of the Russian 8th CAA (SMD), including its 439th Rocket Artillery Brigade and 238th Artillery Brigade, coordinating Lancet drone strikes against Ukrainian positions southeast of Kostyantynivka.[77]Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including drone operators and sniper elements, are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[78] Drone operators of the Grachi detachment of the 346th Separate Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) and the 77th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 7th Military Base, 49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Kostyantynivka (Chasiv Yar) direction.[79]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on August 21 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian
forces seized Oleksandro-Shultyne (north of Toretsk) and credited
elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, formerly
2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) with using small
group tactics to seize the settlement.[80] A Russian milblogger refuted
the Russian MoD’s claims of the seizure of Oleksandro-Shultyne and
claimed that Russian forces are only fighting on the approaches to the
settlement.[81] Another milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian
103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA,
SMD) seized and advanced north of Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk);
elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) advanced
west and south of and within southwestern Katerynivka (northwest of
Toretsk); and that unspecified Russian forces advanced south of
Nelipivka (northwest of Toretsk).[82]
Russian forces
attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Oleksandro-Shultyne;
west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka; and northwest of Toretsk near
Nelipivka, Kleban-Byk, Yablunivka, Popiv Yar, Poltavka, and
Pleshchiivka, and toward Stepanivka on August 20 and 21.[83]
A
Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction stated on August
20 that Russian forces in this direction launch small fireteam-sized
infantry assaults with two personnel using anti-drone thermal imaging
cloaks.[84] The brigade added that Russian infantry advance under the
cover of windbreaks and ruins before reaching a designated rally point,
where they hide while awaiting reinforcements.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on August 21 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced
northeast of Pokrovsk into eastern Zolotyi Koldyaz; into southwestern
Hruzke and southern Vesele; east of and into southwestern Krasnyi Lyman;
and west of Zapovidne.[85] A milblogger also claimed that Russian
forces advanced north of Pokrovsk to southern Petrivka, and interdicting
the T-0514 Dobropillya-Kramatorsk highway.[86]
Russian
forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske
and toward Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Krasnyi Lyman,
Zapovidne, Kucheriv Yar, Novoekonomichne, Mykolaivka, Myrolyubivka,
Zatyshok, Volodymyrivka, and Fedorivka; east of Pokrovsk near Promin and
toward Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk
near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne,
Udachne on August 20 and 21.[87]
Ukrainian Dnipro Group of
Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported that Russian
forces are simultaneously exerting pressure on Pokrovsk itself and on
Kostyantynivka and Dobropillya with the aim of identifying and
exploiting weaknesses in Ukrainian defenses.[88] Trehubov reported that
Ukrainian fires are complicating Russian forces' ability to accumulate
forces within the Dobropillya penetration.
Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that the Russian 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) leveraged elements of its 1st Motorized Rifle Brigade to expand the penetration near Dobropillya westward toward Zapovidne and eastward toward western Shakhove.[89] Mashovets reported that elements of the 8th CAA (SMD) are expanding the left flank of the penetration. Mashovets’s reporting indicates that the Russian military command may be improving command coherence along its command seams in a mutually reinforcing effort to expand the Russian forces' penetration and consolidate positions. Drone operators of the Russian 80th Sparta Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions near Myrnohrad.[90]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.
Assessed
Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 21 shows
Ukrainian forces raising a flag in central Tovste (southwest of
Novopavlivka), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently retook the
settlement.[91]
Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka
itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka; southeast of
Novopavlivka near Horikhove, Novoukrainka, and Dachne; south of
Novopavlivka near Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Tovste on
August 20 and 21.[92] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces
counterattacked near Novomykholaivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[93]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army
(Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are
reportedly conducting FAB unguided glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian
forces within Ivanivka (southwest of Novopavlivka).[94]
Russian
forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka
direction on August 21 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west
of Novoheorhiivka (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[95] The milblogger
also claimed that Russian forces consolidated positions in eastern
Oleksandrohrad (east of Velykomykhailivka).[96]
Russian
forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Andriivka-Klevtsove
and toward Lisne; east of Velykomykhailivka near Voskresenka and
Sichneve; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Vilne Pole,
Novoheorhiivka, and Shevchenko and toward Komyshuvakha on August 20 and
21.[97]
Trehubov reported that Russian forces are actively
conducting FAB unguided glide bomb strikes in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast,
likely to prepare the battlefield for ground assaults.[98]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on August 21 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Olhivske, Zelene Pole, and toward Novohryhorivka on August 20 and 21.[99]
Order
of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 336th Naval Infantry Brigade
(Baltic Fleet), the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms
Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]), and the Nemets group of
the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th
CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian
positions in the Zaporizhia direction.[100]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 21 but did not advance.
Russian
forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; west of
Orikhiv near Plavni, Stepnohirsk, and Kamyanske; and northwest of
Orikhiv toward Prymorske on August 20 and 21.[101]
Ukraine's
Southern Operational Command reported on August 21 that Russian forces
launched 40 unguided aerial rockets (NARs) at Bilohirya (southeast of
Orikhiv).[102]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian
70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA,
SMD) are reportedly operating in Mala Tokmachka.[103]
Russian forces continued limited attacks east of Kherson City near the Antonivsky road and railway bridges on August 21 but did not advance.[104]
Ukraine's
Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on August 21 that
Ukrainian forces struck a Russian boat in the Black Sea near occupied
Zaliznyi Port, Kherson Oblast, with an unspecified high-precision
missile.[105]
Ukraine’s Special Operation Forces (SOF)
reported that overnight on August 20-21 SOF elements struck Russian rail
cars near occupied Dzhankoi, Crimea, which were carrying fuel and
lubricants for Russian forces operating in southern Ukraine.[106]
Geolocated footage published on August 21 indicates that Ukrainian
drones struck the base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s 95408th military
unit in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea, overnight on August 20 to 21.[107]
Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi reported on August 21 that the base currently houses elements of the Russian General Staff's Main Directorate (GRU).[108]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
See topline text.
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2042424/
[2] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1989213/; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081725
[3] https://mid dot ru/ru/press_service/minister_speeches/2042165/; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-20-2025
[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/fact-sheet-istanbul-protocol-draft-document-april-15-2022
[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/fact-sheet-istanbul-protocol-draft-document-april-15-2022
[6] https://x.com/MedvedevRussiaE/status/1958204624713748972
[7] https://tass dot ru/politika/24833405
[8] https://t.me/DeputatZhuravlev/13543 ; https://news dot ru/vlast/v-gd-prizvali-zelenskogo-posledovat-sovetu-stubba-po-resheniyu-konflikta?ysclid=mel0z3ushu641003976 ; https://news dot ru/vlast/nelepaya-hitrost-v-gd-vyskazalis-ob-izmenenii-granic-na-ukraine
[9] https://www.gazeta dot ru/politics/news/2025/08/21/26544752.shtml
[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060825
[11] https://lenta dot ru/news/2025/08/21/zhelanii-moskvy/
[12] https://lenta dot ru/news/2025/08/21/regiony/ ; https://news dot mail.ru/politics/67542829/ ; https://lenta dot ru/news/2025/08/21/zhelanii-moskvy/
[13] https://tass dot ru/politika/24834625
[14] https://www dot kp.ru/daily/27741/5130745/ ; https://news dot ru/russia/ekspert-raskryl-chto-mozhet-vzyat-rf-v-obmen-na-vvod-vojsk-nato-na-ukrainu
[15] https://archive.ph/A0AqV ; https://www.reuters.com/world/china/putins-demand-ukraine-give-up-donbas-no-nato-no-western-troops-sources-say-2025-08-21/
[16] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-19-2025
[17] https://suspilne dot media/1095396-rosiani-vdarili-po-rinku-ta-budinkah-u-konstantinivci-urad-vprovadiv-ecergu-do-tck-na-postijnij-osnovi-1275-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1755752509&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081825 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-08-21/jd-vance-says-russia-wants-territory-that-s-under-ukraine-s-control ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081625
[18] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77831; https://t.me/MID_Russia/64166; https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2042424/
[19] https://t.me/MID_Russia/64097
[20] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2042424/; https://www.ndtv dot com/world-news/foreign-minister-s-jaishankar-meets-russian-president-vladimir-putin-in-moscow-9132385
[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-20-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071725 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-6-2025
[22] https://t.me/kpszsu/40795
[23] https://t.me/kpszsu/40795
[24] https://t.me/kpszsu/40795
[25] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9657; https://x.com/andrii_sybiha/status/1958400557007138983; https://t.me/andriysadovyi/3056 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/21/rosiya-zavdala-kombinovanogo-udaru-po-lvovu-ye-postrazhdali/; https://t.me/kozytskyy_maksym_official/23497; https://www.facebook.com/MyroslavBiletskyi.official/posts/pfbid0bxEHRmstnZMDYXpb7dxCNjRxEatxykxA5zurGbKqrgUDbWqTizBjsndLXBfDcgj5l?locale=uk_UA ; https://t.me/UA_National_Police/47093 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/21/mukachevo-rosiyany-atakuvaly-raketamy-zavod-amerykanskoyi-kompaniyi/
[26] https://www.facebook.com/MyroslavBiletskyi.official/posts/pfbid0bxEHRmstnZMDYXpb7dxCNjRxEatxykxA5zurGbKqrgUDbWqTizBjsndLXBfDcgj5l?locale=uk_UA ; https://t.me/UA_National_Police/47093 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/21/mukachevo-rosiyany-atakuvaly-raketamy-zavod-amerykanskoyi-kompaniyi/; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9659 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1958431237036536151; https://x.com/StratcomCentre/status/1958435925769220322; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russia-strikes-american-flex-factory-in-zakarpattia-region/; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176732; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/25319; https://x.com/Grimm_Intel/status/1958395505932915016
[27] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15707; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1958603266134024247
[28] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081425; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-13-2025
[29] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081425; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-13-2025
[30] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-21-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-4-2025
[31] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/115067017601499775
[32] https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-drones-weapons-industry-russia-7201ab851544c394ee454407058b10ba;
[33] https://isw.pub/UkrWar010225
[34] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061824
[35] https://t.me/mod_russia/55752
[36] https://t.me/mod_russia/55752; https://t.me/dva_majors/77968; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176783 ; https://t.me/istories_media/10235; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-9-2025
[37] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-10-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2024
[38] https://t.me/dva_majors/77968
[39] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-9-2025
[40] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-general-officer-guide-may-11; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-30-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-3-2024
[41] https://t.me/dva_majors/77968; https://t.me/arbat/2133; https://t.me/dva_majors/77070; https://t.me/arbat/1860
[42] https://t.me/severnnyi/4773
[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28098 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28068 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28064
[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28096
[45] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/drones-strike-novoshakhtinsk-oil-refinery-in-rostov-region/
[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28096
[47] https://t.me/severnnyi/4898 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/4886 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32728 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/77930 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28641;
[48] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/21/zhodnyh-bufernyh-zon-sumshhyna-zalyshayetsya-polem-aktyvnyh-boyiv/
[49] https://t.me/grigorov_oleg/490
[50] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32728
[51] https://t.me/severnnyi/4898
[52] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5921
[53] https://t.me/dva_majors/77970
[54] https://t.me/armycorp44/14
[55] https://t.me/severnnyi/4898
[56] https://t.me/severnnyi/4899
[57] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32717
[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28098; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28068; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28064; https://t.me/dva_majors/77930; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32717; https://t.me/severnnyi/4886
[59] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/21/na-nogah-na-plechah-zanosyat-po-inshomu-niyak-na-harkivshhyni-vazhka-tehnika-voroga-boyitsya-i-hovayetsya/
[60] https://t.me/dva_majors/77930; https://t.me/dva_majors/77930
[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28098; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28068; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28064
[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28098; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28068; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28064
[63] https://t.me/wargonzo/28641
[64] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32765
[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28064
[66] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41143;
[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28098; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28068; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28064; https://t.me/wargonzo/28641; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41143
[68] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1095760-taktika-rosian-na-strategicnomu-vistupi-poblizu-dobropilla-provalilasa-rf-tisne-na-limanskomu-napramku-osuv-dnipro/
[69] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1095496-60-ombr-ta-3-j-armijskij-korpus-zsu-strimuut-tisk-dvoh-rosijskih-divizij-na-limanskomu-napramku/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vnsq2tu2Oo0&ab_channel=%D0%A1%D1%83%D1%81%D0%BF%D1%96%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%9D%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/21/pihota-ne-mozhe-nichogo-vony-pochynayut-zlytysya-poblyzu-lymana-rosijska-taktyka-buksuye/
[70] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32757
[71] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28098; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28068; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28064; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32757
[72] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1958456251118989664; https://t.me/ua_marines_36brigade/3479
[73] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32750
[74] https://t.me/rybar/72998
[75] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28098; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28068; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28064; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32750
[76] https://www.facebook.com/alexander.vasilyevich.goncharenko/posts/pfbid0Uk4gfkzr4KqYxA1k5AUR9Yn6TRepCT9S24FavEPZbB65PWQGcsUH3zR1Q5zkg8Cpl
[77] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1958231350227665047; https://t.me/RtrDonetsk/31777
[78] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32728
[79] https://t.me/dva_majors/77914; https://t.me/milinfolive/155126
[80] https://t.me/mod_russia/55746; https://t.me/mod_russia/55760; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41174 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/98195 ; https://t.me/sashakots/55720
[81] https://t.me/rybar/72998
[82] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41174 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41164; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41183
[83] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28098; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28068; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28064; https://t.me/wargonzo/28641; https://t.me/rybar/72990
[84] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/20/zamaskuvalysya-pid-fantomiv-ale-staly-mishennyu-proval-okupantiv-u-charivnyh-plashhah/; https://www.facebook.com/share/v/16Vgppgnv8/
[85] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32750 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41180 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66874
[86] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66874
[87] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28064 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28068 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28098
[88] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1095760-taktika-rosian-na-strategicnomu-vistupi-poblizu-dobropilla-provalilasa-rf-tisne-na-limanskomu-napramku-osuv-dnipro/
[89] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2938
[90] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14204
[91] https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1958396925813706784; https://t.me/OVMBr_5/271; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9839; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/30393; https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1958396925813706784 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1958455468956995990
[92] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28064 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28068 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28098
[93] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41145
[94] https://t.me/voin_dv/16548
[95] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176758
[96] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176791
[97] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28064 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28068 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28098 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28641 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/77930
[98] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1095760-taktika-rosian-na-strategicnomu-vistupi-poblizu-dobropilla-provalilasa-rf-tisne-na-limanskomu-napramku-osuv-dnipro/
[99] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28098; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28068; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28064
[100] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176778; https://t.me/voin_dv/16544; https://t.me/wargonzo/28655; https://t.me/dva_majors/77966 ; https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/59812
[101] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28098; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28068; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28064; https://t.me/wargonzo/28641; https://t.me/dva_majors/77930; https://t.me/rusich_army/25313
[102] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12873
[103] https://t.me/rusich_army/25313
[104] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28098; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28068; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28064; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12873
[105] https://t.me/DIUkraine/6694; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/21/raketa-i-lazerna-pidsvitka-yak-bijczi-gur-znyshhyly-rosijskyj-kater-bilya-zaliznogo-portu/
[106] https://t.me/ukr_sof/2028; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28095
[107] https://t.me/exilenova_plus/11676 ; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/1958377943690039750
[108] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/drones-strike-military-unit-in-sevastopol-triggering-fire/;
