Iran Update, August 21, 2025

Nidal Morrison, Ben Schmida, Avery Borens, Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, Adham Fattah, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Iraqi Popular Mobilization Committee (PMC) Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh defended the Popular Mobilization Authority Law against domestic critics during an interview with Iraqi media on August 20.[1] This law, which Parliament has yet to vote on, would likely increase Iran’s influence in the Iraqi political and security spheres by formalizing key structures of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) within the Iraqi security apparatus.[2] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service comprised of many militias, some of which report to Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani instead of Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani.[3] Fayyadh denied Iranian-backed Iraqi militia involvement in the law’s creation and added that the law has been in development for years with Iraqi Ministry of Defense support.[4] CTP-ISW is unable to verify Fayyadh’s claims about the militia's role in the law’s creation. The Council of Ministers, which is headed by Sudani and includes the Minister of Defense, approved the law and submitted it to Parliament in February 2025, which implies Ministry of Defense involvement, however.[5]  Fayyadh also claimed that the political debate over the Popular Mobilization Authority Law does not relate to the law’s “substance” but rather to his leadership.[6] This law would elevate Fayyadh’s role as head of the PMC to a cabinet-level position within the newly-created Popular Mobilization Authority, which surely, in part, explains Fayyadh’s support for the law.[7]

 Fayyadh’s interview comes as US political and economic pressure on the Iraqi government to curb Iranian influence in Iraq has sparked debate on the future and potential dissolution of the PMF.[8]  The US State Department spokesperson confirmed on August 12 that the United States opposes the Popular Mobilization Authority law.[9]  The law also faces domestic opposition from Sunni and Kurdish parliamentarians, who walked out of a July 16 parliamentary session to protest the reading of the law.[10] A Shia Coordination Framework parliamentarian told Iraqi media on August 18 that over 100 parliamentarians have signed a petition to vote on the law in the next Parliament session, but added that no Sunni or Kurdish parliamentarians have signed the petition.[11] The votes of these parliamentarians and the support of the Iraqi voters they represent are critical to passing the law.

Fayyadh attempted to portray the PMF as a responsible actor to defend it from critics. He noted that the Popular Mobilization Authority law would strengthen the separation between the PMC and unspecified armed groups, in reference to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that operate outside of the PMF.[12]   The PMC is formally responsible for ensuring that militias in the PMF answer to the Iraqi federal government, but has failed to enforce this requirement.  Fayyadh added that the PMF maintains a “high level of discipline,” which is false.[13] Some PMF groups have conducted attacks without orders from any government chain of command.[14] Militias within the PMF have explicitly rejected Iraqi government oversight.[15]

Fayyadh also said that the PMF has no ”hostility towards any party,” which ignores attacks that militias within the PMF have conducted targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria and the attempted assassination of former Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al Kadhimi by elements of a militia that is part of the PMF.[16] Fayyadh said that the PMF provides security to Iraqis, but he ignored the PMF’s efforts to commit sectarian cleansing in Sunni areas.[17] The PMF has prevented the return of residents who fled from al Awja, Salah al Din Province, in 2014 during the anti-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) fight, which is an act of sectarian cleansing.[18] Fayyadh claimed that the PMF is in the process of resolving the al Awja issue.[19]

Fayyadh also attempted to obfuscate the relationship between the IRGC and the PMF. He described the PMF as an “Iraqi force” with “no connection” to the IRGC, which is false.[20] Militias that comprise PMF brigades conducted hundreds of attacks that targeted US forces in Iraq and Syria between October 2023 to January 2024.[21] Those militias immediately stopped that campaign following direct intervention by IRGC Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani.[22] Fayyadh himself has also advanced Iranian objectives in Iraq. Fayyadh was part of a PMF ”crisis cell” formed in late 2019 to suppress mass Iraqi protests with the IRGC’s support.[23] Then-IRGC Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani supported this crisis cell.

Fayyadh tried to justify the PMF’s continued role as a security force by asserting that the PMF would adhere to orders to dissolve by the Shia religious authority, despite having previously rejected such orders.[24] Ayatollah Ali al Sistani, Iraq’s highest religious figure, said in November 2024 that arms should be confined to the Iraqi state.[25] Some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, denied that Sistani’s call was directed at the militias.[26]

The continued survival of Assad-era Captagon smuggling networks, which helped Assad’s economy, demonstrates the economic interests that continue to animate internal conflict in Syria. These networks have the potential to destabilize Syria, as demonstrated in violent flare-ups throughout 2025.[27] Captagon and other smuggling networks long helped sustain the Assad regime during the war. The regime profited 3 to 5 billion USD annually from the Captagon trade.[28] Many of these networks continue to survive in Syria because, while Assad’s collapse destroyed the regime, it did not destroy many of the disparate networks that helped the regime survive for as long as it did. The transitional government began a counter-narcotics campaign in January 2024 that has naturally spurred a violent reaction from many of these networks.[29] This campaign has reduced Captagon production by approximately 80%, according to the Financial Times on August 21.[30]

The Captagon trade and other Assad-era criminal enterprises are almost certainly driving some—but not all—of the violence in Syria. Some of the violence along the Syria-Lebanon border and in western Syria in early 2025 appeared to be part of efforts by smuggling networks to defend their ratlines.[31] Not all of these criminal enterprises were allied with Assad, of course. Local reporting suggests that three key groups—the Bedouin Sunni tribes, Druze militias, and networks loyal to the Assad regime—have competed for control of the smuggling networks in southwestern Syria.[32] The divisions between the three groups are not purely identity-based, but competition over economic interests can rapidly take on an intercommunal bent as Bedouin Sunni fighters kill Druze or vice versa.  Many Assad-era Captagon smuggling networks persist, however, in areas that have little to no transitional government control, including within Suwayda Province, the Kurdish-controlled northeast, the Syrian coast, and the Syria-Lebanon border.[33] The Financial Times reported that Assad-linked criminal networks and Bedouin tribes sustain the drug trade in Suwayda Province by exploiting local poverty and the continued employment of Assad-era border guards on the Jordanian border.[34]

Key Takeaways

• Captagon Networks in Syria: The continued survival of Assad-era Captagon smuggling networks, which helped Assad’s economy, demonstrates the economic interests that continue to animate internal conflicts in Syria. These networks have the potential to destabilize Syria, as demonstrated in violent flare-ups throughout 2025.
• Justifications for the PMF: Iraqi Popular Mobilization Commission head Faleh al Fayyadh defended the Popular Mobilization Authority Law against domestic critics during an interview with Iraqi media on August 20. This law, which Parliament has yet to vote on, would likely increase Iran’s influence in the Iraqi political and security spheres by formalizing key structures of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) within the Iraqi security apparatus.
• IAEA Inspections in Iran: Iran continues to block International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) access to its damaged nuclear facilities and highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile after the 12-day war. Iran’s 409 kg HEU stockpile remains in one or several unspecified locations, and Iran’s access to the stockpile is unclear.

Iran

Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani and Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Majid Takht Ravanchi discussed Iranian nuclear issues with Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs' International Security Division Head Ambassador Gabriel Lüchinger in Tehran on August 2.[35] Switzerland traditionally facilitates diplomatic communication between Iran and the United States because the United States does not maintain a diplomatic presence in Iran.[36] An unspecified US official rejected an August 20 report from Hezbollah media claiming that Lüchinger conveyed a message from US Special Envoy to the Middle East and lead nuclear negotiator Steve Witkoff to the Iranian government.[37]

Iran continues to block International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) access to its damaged nuclear facilities and highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile after the 12-day war. Iran’s 409 kg HEU stockpile remains in one or several unspecified locations, and Iran’s access to the stockpile is unclear. Unspecified diplomats told Bloomberg on August 21 that IAEA officials will confer with US officials next week after IAEA inspectors failed to secure Iran’s approval to resume monitoring.[38] The unspecified diplomats added that Iranian officials told IAEA Deputy Director General Massimo Aparo during meetings in Tehran on August 12 that inspections could potentially occur at undamaged sites like Bushehr while Iran‘s main nuclear-fuel complex would remain closed.[39] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi stated on August 20 that the SNSC will decide whether inspections can resume.[40] Araghchi emphasized that Iran cannot cut cooperation entirely because activities like fuel replacement at Bushehr require IAEA oversight.[41] Araghchi stressed that any new cooperation must account for safety and security concerns after the recent strikes, however.[42] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu previously told Israeli media on August 12 that Iran retains about 400 kilograms of enriched uranium.[43] This amount is consistent with the IAEA’s June estimate that Iran retains 408.6 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium, though Iran may not have physical access to all of the uranium, which could be buried at Fordow or Esfahan.[44]

The Iranian Artesh Navy conducted its first military exercise since the Israel-Iran War in the northern Indian Ocean and Sea of Oman on August 21.[45] The Artesh Navy tested multiple anti-ship cruise missiles, including the Nasir, Ghadir, and Ghadeer,[46] during the exercise.[47] The ”Bavar-5,” which is an Iranian drone that can be launched from naval vessels, reportedly destroyed a target after traveling 400 kilometers.[48] The naval exercise also included surface and subsurface vessels, aerial units, and electronic warfare units.[49]

The United States imposed additional sanctions targeting Iranian oil trade networks and their international facilitators on August 21.[50] The US Treasury Department sanctioned Greek national Antonios Margaritis and five Marshall Islands-registered companies in Margaritis’ shipping network for facilitating the trade of Iranian oil products for “many years.”[51] The US Treasury Department previously sanctioned three shipping companies in Margaritis' network in December 2024.[52] The United States separately sanctioned six entities and eight affiliated vessels outside of Margaritis’ network for transporting Iranian oil to China and conducting ship-to-ship transfers with vessels already sanctioned by the United States.[53]

Iraq

See topline section.

Syria

A Syrian transitional government source denied any plans for a humanitarian corridor across Syria’s borders, which represents an implicit rejection of a humanitarian corridor between Suwayda City and Israel.[54] The source stated that the Syrian transitional government will coordinate the delivery of all humanitarian aid, including to areas beyond Suwayda Province.[55] The United States is attempting to broker a deal that would establish a humanitarian corridor between Suwayda City and Israel to deliver aid to the Druze community there, according to US and Israeli officials speaking to Axios on August 12.[56] An unspecified source separately told Saudi media that Israel and Syria agree on “80 percent of the points” after talks between Israeli and Syrian officials in Paris on August 19, which may indicate that both countries have agreed to continue negotiations.[57] The source also said that unspecified security arrangements between Israel and Syria regarding southern Syria “are almost complete.”[58] Saudi media claimed that Israel and Syria reached an agreement during the meeting in Paris on August 19 to de-escalate tensions and for Israel to refrain from interfering in internal Syrian affairs.[59] Saudi media added that Israel and Syria agreed to continue to stabilize and monitor the July 18 ceasefire between the transitional government and Druze militias within Suwayda Province.[60] An agreement between Israel and Syria was reportedly reached to reactivate the 1974 disengagement treaty between Israel and Syria.[61] Israel previously declared the disengagement treaty void after the Assad regime collapsed in December 2024.[62]

Arabian Peninsula

Nothing significant to report.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Palestinian leaders in the Burj al Barajneh refugee camp in Beirut and the al Bass refugee camp in Tyre turned over the first collection of medium and heavy weapons to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) on August 21.[63] Saudi media reported on August 21 that the collected weapons belong to the security unit of the Palestinian Authority (PA)-controlled embassy in Lebanon.[64] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify this claim. The office of Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam stated that this weapons handover marks the start of a broader effort to disarm all armed groups in Lebanon.[65] Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee Head Ambassador Ramez Dimashqieh noted that the LAF will receive additional batches of weapons from the Burj al Barajneh camp and other Palestinian camps in the coming weeks.[66] Palestinian militias have long operated with relative autonomy in the 12 Palestinian refugee camps throughout Lebanon.[67]

Salam and PA President Mahmoud Abbas previously agreed in May 2025 to disarm all Palestinian militias in Lebanon.[68] Saudi media reported on August 21 that members of Abbas’s Fatah and the Palestine Liberation Organization are handing over their weapons.[69] Fatah is the dominant political party in the PA, which governs the West Bank.[70]

Other Palestinian factions, like Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), are unlikely to turn over their weapons. These Palestinian groups are not beholden to Abbas. Hamas and factions closely aligned to it have continued to reject any disarmament.[71] An unspecified Hamas spokesperson, speaking on behalf of ”the Palestinian factions in Lebanon," stated on August 21 that this weapons handover only applied to Fatah.[72] Hamas’ statement added that the unspecified ”Palestinian factions in Lebanon”  will keep their weapons as long as Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip continue.[73] Disagreements among Palestinian militias in Lebanon regarding the mechanism to hand weapons over to the LAF have previously delayed the Lebanese government’s attempts to disarm these groups.[74]

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[1] https://almadapaper dot net/411316/ ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/leadership-and-purpose-iraq%E2%80%99s-popular-mobilization-forces

[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-6-2025  ; https://www.rudaw dot net/Library/Files/Uploaded%20Files/07/NewFolder/175%20175%20175%20(1).pdf 

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/leadership-and-purpose-iraq%E2%80%99s-popular-mobilization-forces 

[4] https://almadapaper dot net/411316/

[5] https://www.rudaw dot net/english/middleeast/iraq/250220253

 

[6] https://almadapaper dot net/389291/ ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B0%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-10-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B6%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA

[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-19-2025

[8] https://almadapaper dot net/389291/ ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B0%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-10-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B6%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA

[9] https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-august-12-2025/

[10] https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/middleeast/iraq/140720255 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-16-2025

[11] https://www.rudaw dot net/sorani/middleeast/iraq/180820257

[12] https://almadapaper dot net/411316/

[13] https://almadapaper dot net/411316/

[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Iraq%20-%20ISF%20PMF%20Orders%20of%20Battle_0_0.pdf 

[15] https://t.me/abualaskary/137 

[16] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/tracking-anti-us-and-anti-israel-strikes-iraq-and-syria-during-gaza-crisis ; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/what-next-after-assassination-attempt-mustafa-al-kadhimi

[17] https://almadapaper dot net/411316/

[18] https://www.bic-rhr.com/sites/default/files/inline-files/BIC%20March%202023_Wilson%20fache_Commentary.pdf  ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-18-2025    

[19] https://almadapaper dot net/411316/

[20] https://almadapaper dot net/411316/

[21] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/tracking-anti-us-and-anti-israel-strikes-iraq-and-syria-during-gaza-crisis ; https://isw.pub/IranUpdate100424

[22] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%A7-%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D8%B1%D9%89-%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B9-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7-%D9%84-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AE%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B6-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%B6%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%A7

[23] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1231

[24] https://almadapaper dot net/411316/

[25] https://shafaq dot com/en/Report/Ayatollah-Al-Sistani-s-seven-commandments-Lessons-from-the-past-for-Iraq-s-better-future

[26] https://shafaq dot com/en/Iraq/Exclusive-Al-Sistani-s-call-to-limit-arms-to-state-does-not-apply-to-Resistance-Groups

[27] https://www.ft.com/content/d81e3c6c-c157-4281-92ec-135d70b497cb

[28] https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/how-the-assad-regime-made-billions-producing-and-exporting-party-drugs

[29] ttps://www.ft.com/content/d81e3c6c-c157-4281-92ec-135d70b497cb

[30] https://www.ft.com/content/d81e3c6c-c157-4281-92ec-135d70b497cb 

[31] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-6-2025

[32] https://en.majalla dot com/node/326719/politics/illicit-economies-play-big-role-syria%E2%80%99s-post-assad-flashpoints

[33] https://www.ft.com/content/d81e3c6c-c157-4281-92ec-135d70b497cb 

[34] https://www.ft.com/content/d81e3c6c-c157-4281-92ec-135d70b497cb 

[35] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/29/3380622; https://nournews dot ir/en/news/240657/

[36] https://www.eda dot admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/foreign-policy/human-rights/peace/switzerland-s-good-offices/protective-power-mandates.html

[37] https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/1958196817432096953

[38] h https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-08-21/iran-s-freeze-on-nuclear-inspections-prompts-un-us-crisis-talks

[39] h https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-08-21/iran-s-freeze-on-nuclear-inspections-prompts-un-us-crisis-talks

[40] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/29/3380412/

[41] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/29/3380412/

[42] https://www.i24news dot tv/en/news/israel/defense/artc-pm-netanyahu-we-would-have-struck-iran-even-without-the-us ;

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u8xhaxo2JJY&t=83s

[43]  https://www.i24news dot tv/en/news/israel/defense/artc-pm-netanyahu-we-would-have-struck-iran-even-without-the-us ; 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u8xhaxo2JJY&t=83s  

 

[44] https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-iaea-uranium-7f6c9962c1e4199e951559096bcf5cc0?taid=683ae0271dc7320001739354&utm_campaign=TrueAnthem&utm_medium=AP&utm_source=Twitter

[45] https://apnews.com/article/iran-navy-drill-israel-war-f9b2057a6162ab3466af95220d2e70d3

[46] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85919119

[47] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85919119 

[48] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/30/3381009 ; https://nournews dot ir/en/news/240729/ 

[49] https://nournews dot ir/en/news/240729/

[50] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0229

[51] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0229

[52] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2758

[53] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0229

[54] https://www.facebook.com/sana.gov/posts/pfbid02P7JiQvHu76dxrbT832C1DvVredTjnCSjRRKihgNNp2UB7Ra6nB7t7RgvjweNBkGgl?rdid=Eu6M0ekcIjusk8Sf#

[55] https://www.facebook.com/sana.gov/posts/pfbid02P7JiQvHu76dxrbT832C1DvVredTjnCSjRRKihgNNp2UB7Ra6nB7t7RgvjweNBkGgl?rdid=Eu6M0ekcIjusk8Sf ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1958222116102541625

[56] https://www.axios.com/2025/08/12/israel-syria-corridor-suwayda-tom-barrack

[57] https://www.alhadath dot net/syria/2025/08/20/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%82-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-80-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B7

[58] https://www.alhadath dot net/syria/2025/08/20/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%82-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-80-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B7

 

[59] https://www.alhadath dot net/syria/2025/08/20/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%82-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-80-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B7

 

[60] https://www.alhadath dot net/syria/2025/08/20/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%82-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-80-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B7

 

[61] https://www.alhadath dot net/syria/2025/08/20/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%82-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-80-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B7 ; https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v26/d88

 

[62] https://x.com/netanyahu/status/1865757924594786810 ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/un-slams-violation-of-1974-disengagement-deal-as-israel-acts-in-syria-buffer-zone/

[63] https://x.com/nawafsalam/status/1958560091428249977 ; https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5177683-انطلاق-عملية-تسليم-السلاح-الفلسطيني-إلى-الجيش-اللبناني ; https://apnews.com/article/lebanon-palestinian-refugees-camp-weapons-disarmament-e5f4158261635c2ce54e2cd196198758

[64] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5177683-انطلاق-عملية-تسليم-السلاح-الفلسطيني-إلى-الجيش-اللبناني

[65] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanon-says-it-is-beginning-disarmament-palestinian-factions-refugee-camps-2025-08-21/

[66] https://x.com/nawafsalam/status/1958560091428249977 ; https://x.com/grandserail/status/1958512728605438255

[67] https://thisisbeirut dot com.lb/articles/1316380/what-are-the-12-palestinian-camps-in-lebanon#:~:text=Following%20the%20creation%20of%20Israel,)%2C%20spread%20across%20the%20country. ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanon-says-it-is-beginning-disarmament-palestinian-factions-refugee-camps-2025-08-21/

[68] https://x.com/grandserail/status/1958512728605438255 ; https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5177683-انطلاق-عملية-تسليم-السلاح-الفلسطيني-إلى-الجيش-اللبناني

[69] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5177683-انطلاق-عملية-تسليم-السلاح-الفلسطيني-إلى-الجيش-اللبناني

[70] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-31-2025

[71] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5177683-انطلاق-عملية-تسليم-السلاح-الفلسطيني-إلى-الجيش-اللبناني

[72] https://apnews.com/article/lebanon-palestinian-refugees-camp-weapons-disarmament-e5f4158261635c2ce54e2cd196198758

[73] https://apnews.com/article/lebanon-palestinian-refugees-camp-weapons-disarmament-e5f4158261635c2ce54e2cd196198758

[74] https://apnews.com/article/lebanon-palestinian-refugees-camp-weapons-disarmament-e5f4158261635c2ce54e2cd196198758