by: Jennifer Cafarella and Elizabeth Teoman with
Bradley Hanlon
Key Takeaway: Turkey launched an air-ground
operation against the American partner force in Syria, the Kurdish People’s
Protection Units (YPG), in Afrin district northwest of Aleppo City on January
20th, 2018. Turkey’s goal is to extend its buffer zone along the Syrian-Turkish
border. Turkey may subsequently attack the town of Manbij, east of Afrin on the
banks of the Euphrates River. Turkey’s operations threaten to provoke a widening
Turkish-Kurdish war that could unravel the U.S. stabilization effort in eastern
Syria, place U.S. service members in Manbij at risk, and force the U.S. to
reconsider support for the YPG.
Turkey launched
an air-ground operation against the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units
(YPG) to extend Turkey’s buffer zone along the Syrian-Turkish border. Forces from
Turkey’s Second Army launched a three-pronged ground attack – “Operation Olive Branch” – against
YPG forces northwest of Aleppo City on January 20th, 2018. The Turkish
Air Force and Syrian
armed opposition groups are supporting the operation. Turkey cited the right to self-defense
in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter as a legal justification for its
operation. Turkey’s immediate objective
is to extend its buffer zone to sever the YPG’s access to the Turkish border
northwest of Aleppo City. Turkey previously seized
and secured a buffer zone from the outskirts of Afrin to the east bank of the
Euphrates River in northern Aleppo Province beginning on August 24th, 2016.
Turkey may pursue the full defeat of YPG forces in the Aleppo countryside after
securing the border. Turkey may attack terrain east of Afrin that YPG forces
seized in 2016 while the Syrian opposition attempted to defend Aleppo City
against a Russian- and Iranian-backed Bashar al Assad regime offensive. Initial
Turkish airstrikes targeted the
YPG-held Menagh airbase north of Aleppo City on January 20th. These strikes may
indicate Turkish intent to seize the airbase and the nearby city of Tel Rifaat.
Turkey secured Russia’s permission for the
operation and likely negotiated a new “de-escalation” line north of Aleppo City.
Turkish Chief of the General Staff Hulusi Akar and Turkey’s National
Intelligence Organization head Hakan Fidan met
with Russian Chief of the General Staff General Valery Gerasimov and Russian
Minister of Defense Sergey Shoigu in Moscow on January 18th to coordinate the
operation. Turkey’s air operations on January 20th demonstrate that Turkey
secured Russian permission
to conduct close air support in Syrian airspace. Turkey also took steps in
coordination with Russia to mitigate the risk of a Syrian regime escalation.
Assad threatened
to shoot down Turkish warplanes on January 18th while Turkey and Russia were
de-conflicting operations. Turkish Defense Minister Nurettin Canikli dismissed
the regime’s threats as “mere thoughts” of a state with “limited capacity” and
signaled that the Russian anti-air systems in Syria were Turkey’s only concern.
Turkey deployed
electronic warfare systems
to counter possible regime anti-air attacks and to enable Turkey to respond
to YPG artillery fire against Turkish territory. Turkey likely cleared the
deployment of these systems with Russia during the Moscow visit. Turkey and
Russia likely also agreed on a future “de-escalation” line of contact that
balances their interests in Aleppo Province. The exact location of this future
line of contact is unclear from openly available information. Russia withdrew
its forces from
Afrin district, likely to Aleppo City. Russia’s goal in the negotiation
with Turkey was likely to ensure that pro-regime forces can secure and defend
Aleppo City against possible future attack.
Erdogan may next attack Manbij, where U.S. forces
operate. Erdogan demanded a “handover” of Manbij on January 14th and reiterated
his intent to take
the city by force after operations in Afrin conclude on January 20th. He is
likely providing covert support to Arab resistance against YPG dominance in
Manbij that escalated alongside his demand for the handover of the city. Arab
tribal leaders in Manbij issued a list of demands to the SDF on January 16th
that amount to the dismantlement
of the existing YPG-dominated governing structure in the city. The tribal
demands followed the outbreak of large-scale protests
against the YPG in Manbij beginning on January 12th, which the SDF blamed on Turkey.
A car bomb targeted
senior SDF military figures in Manbij on January 20th. The combination of
tribal pressure and targeted attacks could reflect covert Turkish efforts to
set conditions for future military operations to seize Manbij with local
support.
The U.S. strategy for de-escalation with Turkey has failed. Turkey’s operations
threaten to provoke a widening Turkish-Kurdish war that could unravel the U.S.
stabilization effort in eastern Syria and force the U.S. to reconsider support
for the YPG. Possible Turkish follow-on operations against Manbij put U.S. forces
directly at risk. American military forces are patrolling
front lines in Manbij as part of a U.S.
effort “to prevent security incidents from occurring, to observe and report
whatever security situation that they saw and to reassure” both Turkey and the
SDF. The U.S. must abandon this tactical approach to de-escalation and
acknowledge the scale of the rift with Turkey. The U.S. cannot prevent ISIS’s
resurgence, pivot toward countering Assad, contain Iran, or pursue a negotiated
settlement of the Syrian civil war if Turkey’s priority remains thwarting U.S.
policy.
