Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Davit Gasparyan, and Frederick W. Kagan
August 17, 2024, 10:50pm ET
Click here
to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here
to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a
computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this
data-heavy tool.
Click here
to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain
map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will
update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note:
The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on August 17. ISW will
cover subsequent reports in the August 18 Russian Offensive Campaign
Assessment.
The Ukrainian incursion into
Kursk Oblast and Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine are
not in themselves decisive military operations that will win the war.
Both Russian and Ukrainian forces lack the capability to conduct
individual decisive war-winning operations and must instead conduct
multiple successive operations with limited operational objectives that
are far short of victory, but that in aggregate can achieve strategic
objectives. It is too early to assess the outcomes and operational
significance of the Ukrainian incursion into Russia and the ongoing
Russian offensive effort in eastern Ukraine. The significance of these
operations will not emerge in isolation, moreover, but they will matter
in so far as they relate to a series of subsequent Russian and Ukrainian
campaigns over time.
The scale of the war in Ukraine prevents either side from resolving the war in a single decisive campaign. ISW
recently published "Ukraine and the Problem of Restoring Maneuver in
Contemporary War," wherein Dr. Frederick W. Kagan and Dr. Kimberly Kagan
noted that Ukraine and Russia both have the ability to establish deep
defensive positions and reserves that will prevent any single campaign
from achieving strategic war aims before it culminates.[1]
Russia's and Ukraine's ability to generate enough combat power to man
continuous defensive positions with no open flanks and establish
tactical depth at significant points along the frontline has forced both
sides to attempt penetration battles that are so costly that subsequent
exploitation is often not feasible.[2]
(Ukraine, in fact, took advantage of a flank the Russians had left open
in Kursk Oblast, but Russia has enough combat power to cover its
frontiers if it so chooses at the cost of pursuing other objectives).
Russia and Ukraine can usually establish defensive positions at some
distance in the rear and sufficiently stabilize the frontline even in
the event of a successful penetration and exploitation.[3]
Effective Ukrainian and Russian campaign design therefore requires
forethought and planning for multiple successive operations that each
set conditions for the subsequent operation.[4]
Rarely has either side been able to conduct successive operations
without interruption, however, since operational pauses or decreased
operational tempo have offered the other belligerent the opportunity to
contest and seize the initiative.[5]
Russian
President Vladimir Putin and the Russian military command likely view
maintaining the theater-wide initiative as a strategic imperative to win
a war of attrition against Ukraine, and both the Ukrainian incursion in
Kursk Oblast and the Russian offensive effort in eastern Ukraine will
impact whether Russian forces can retain the initiative in the
short-term. Russian forces seized the theater-wide initiative
in November 2023 and have since conducted consistent offensive
operations throughout eastern and northeastern Ukraine as part of a
campaign designed to stretch Ukrainian forces and prevent Ukraine from
accumulating the resources necessary to contest the initiative.[6]
The Russian military has not pursued a new large-scale offensive
operation in recent months in order to maintain a consistent offensive
tempo in Ukraine, particularly in Donetsk Oblast, and Putin and the
Russian military command have accepted that months of fighting will
continue to result in marginal tactical gains.[7]
Putin has expressed a theory of victory in Ukraine that posits that
Russian forces will be able to continue these gradual creeping advances
indefinitely, however, while preventing Ukraine from conducting
successful operationally significant counteroffensive operations.[8]
Putin likely assesses that as long as Russia can retain the initiative
and prevent Ukraine from conducting operationally significant
counteroffensive operations, Russia can inflict decisive losses on
Ukraine over the long-term while outlasting Western security assistance
to Ukraine and Ukrainian efforts to mobilize more of Ukraine's economy
and population for the war effort.[9]
The
Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast has temporarily allowed Ukrainian
forces to seize the battlefield initiative on one sector of the
frontline and begin contesting Russia's theater-wide initiative.[10]
The Russian military appears to be attempting to maintain its offensive
pressure in Donetsk Oblast, especially its offensive operation to seize
Pokrovsk, and likely hopes that sustained offensive tempo in Donetsk
Oblast will draw enough Ukrainian resources to defensive operations in
the area to prevent Ukraine from contesting the battlefield initiative
elsewhere by exploiting the theater-wide impacts of the incursion into
Kursk Oblast.[11]
Just because Russian forces are prioritizing the offensive operation on
Pokrovsk does not mean that Ukraine must decide to prioritize the
defense of Pokrovsk over efforts elsewhere, however.
Putin
and the Russian military command appear to measure success in eastern
Ukraine in explicitly territorial terms and have likely pursued efforts
to create wider operational pressures solely to support efforts to
achieve stated territorial objectives. Russian forces currently
aim to seize all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, and the Russian
military likely measures the success of Russian offensive operations in
eastern Ukraine by how much closer they bring Russian forces to this
goal. ISW has long assessed that the Russian efforts to seize Chasiv Yar
or push Ukrainian forces off the east bank of the Oskil River in
Kharkiv Oblast are pursuing operationally significant objectives, but
Russian forces have instead increasingly prioritized the efforts to
seize Pokrovsk and advance west and southwest of Donetsk City, an
objective that is of relatively less operational significance.[12]
Russian forces may be focusing on advancing in these areas because
these sectors of the front provide opportunities for greater territorial
gains and because these areas allow Russian forces to advance closer to
the borders of Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces have sought to create
theater-wide pressures on Ukrainian forces similar to the ones that
Ukraine is now inflicting on Russia with the incursion in Kursk Oblast,
but Putin and the Russian military command have only sought to leverage
these pressures to pursue limited territorial objectives and have
forgone pursuing more operationally significant objectives or wider
attempts to generate more significant theater-wide effects.
Ukrainian
officials have indicated that Ukraine's operation in Kursk Oblast does
not have long-term territorial objectives but instead aims to generate
theater-wide operational and strategic pressures on Russian forces. Ukrainian
officials have publicly stated that Ukraine is not interested in
holding territory in Kursk Oblast over the long term and aims in part to
protect itself from Russian strikes while forcing Russian forces to
redeploy forces from elsewhere in the theater and complicating Russian
logistics.[13]
There are no discernable operationally significant territorial
objectives in the area where Ukraine launched the incursion into Kursk
Oblast, and Ukraine has not committed the resources to the operation
necessary to pursue actual operationally significant territorial
objectives further into Kursk Oblast, such as seizing Kursk City. The
success of the Ukrainian incursion should thus not be evaluated in terms
of Russian territory seized by Ukrainian forces.
The
Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast has already generated theater-wide
operational and strategic pressures on Russian forces, and subsequent
phases of fighting within Russia will likely generate even greater
pressures on Putin and the Russian military. The Ukrainian
incursion into Kursk Oblast has prompted the Russian military to
redeploy up to 11 battalions from within Kursk Oblast and four Russian
force groupings elsewhere in the theater to the frontline in Kursk
Oblast so far.[14] US officials reportedly told the New York Times
in an article published on August 15 that Russia has committed reserves
to Kursk Oblast that it otherwise would have committed to grinding
offensive operations in eastern Ukraine in the coming months.[15]
The redeployment of Russian forces and the commitment of elements of
operational reserves has allowed Russian forces to slow initially rapid
Ukrainian gains in Kursk Oblast and start containing the extent of the
Ukrainian incursion.[16]
Containment is only the first and likely least resource-intensive phase
of the Russian response in Kursk Oblast, however. Putin and the Kremlin
will almost certainly endeavor to retake Russian territory in Kursk
Oblast that Ukrainian forces have seized, as persisting Ukrainian
occupation of Russian territory would be a strategic blow to Putin's
decades-long effort to cement a legacy of Russian stability, security,
and geopolitical resurgence.[17]
A
Russian counteroffensive operation to retake territory seized by
Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast will very likely require even more
manpower, equipment, and materiel. Russian sources have claimed that
Ukrainian forces are consolidating their positions within Kursk Oblast
and building fortifications, although it is too early to assess how hard
Ukraine forces will defend occupied positions within Russia against
likely Russian counteroffensive operations.[18]
It is also too early to assess when Russian forces will stop Ukrainian
advances in Kursk Oblast completely and seize the battlefield initiative
to launch a larger counteroffensive operation. Russian forces have
expended considerable combat power on the effort to seize Pokrovsk,
which they began in mid-February 2024 after seizing Avdiivka, and have
since advanced roughly 23 kilometers in the area over six months of the
most intense fighting in Ukraine in 2024.[19]
The current Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast appears to be roughly 56
kilometers wide and up to 28 kilometers deep, although the area where
Ukrainian forces are consolidating positions is likely smaller in size.
Russian forces will likely have to conduct a prolonged counteroffensive
effort to retake all of the territory seized by Ukrainian forces in
Kursk Oblast unless they bring overwhelming force to bear, and the
Russian military command will likely have to commit additional
operational reserves and newly generated forces to sustain the effort.
The
Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast has also forced a decision point on
Putin about the long-term strategic requirements of defending the
thousand-kilometer-long international border with northeastern Ukraine,
and it is unlikely that Russia will conduct intensive counteroffensive
operations to push Ukrainian forces back across the border only to
neglect the international border area once again and leave it vulnerable
to future Ukrainian incursions.[20]
Putin will likely order the Russian military command to consider the
manpower and materiel requirements for defending the international
border, although it is unclear how he will weigh these requirements
against Russian military requirements in Ukraine. The Russian military
will have to consider manpower and materiel requirements for defending
the international border as part of its theater-wide campaign design,
which will impose long-term operational planning constraints that Russia
previously did not face.[21]
Russian
forces will not be able to retain the initiative throughout eastern
Ukraine indefinitely, and the culmination of Russian offensive
operations will present Ukrainian forces with opportunities to contest
the initiative further. Russia's possession of the theater-wide
initiative has allowed Russia to determine the location, time,
intensity, and requirements of fighting in Ukraine, and Russian forces
have leveraged these benefits to determine an offensive tempo in Ukraine
that has allowed the Russian military to conduct more sustainable
offensive efforts and largely avoid culmination.[22]
Russian forces pursued a prolonged effort to establish strategic and
operational reserves ahead of Summer 2024 to support ongoing offensive
efforts, and the Russian military has likely expended and committed many
of these reserves to offensive operations throughout eastern and
northeastern Ukraine in Spring 2024 and over the course of this summer.[23]
The Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast and the heightened Russian
priority of maintaining the tempo of offensive operations in Donetsk
Oblast will likely place greater strain on Russia's remaining
operational reserves and likely begin to impact Russia's ability to
sustain consistent offensive operations throughout the theater. Further
Russian redeployments to Kursk Oblast would also further weaken Russia's
ability to sustain offensive operations in northeastern and eastern
Ukraine, although Russian forces are more likely to begin decreasing
offensive activity on lower-priority sectors of the front than to do so
equally throughout the frontline.
The Russian
offensive operation to seize Pokrovsk is emblematic of the Russian
approach to the war in Ukraine that embraces positional warfare for
gradual creeping advances and seeks to win a war of attrition. The
Russian military command tasked the Central Grouping of Forces with
identifying and exploiting weaknesses in Ukraine's defensive line
following the Russian seizure of Avdiivka in mid-February 2024.[24]
Mechanized elements of the Central Grouping of Forces achieved a
notable tactical breakthrough northwest of Avdiivka in mid-April 2024 by
exploiting exhausted and poorly equipped Ukrainian forces, and the
Russian military command continued to invest additional manpower from
Russia's operational reserves to prevent offensive operations east of
Pokrovsk from culminating for several months.[25]
Russian forces applied consistently intense offensive pressure all
along the front east and southeast of Pokrovsk and opportunistically
exploited weaknesses in Ukraine's defenses to advance in this direction,
and the Russian military command has tolerated significant manpower
losses in exchange for advancing roughly two square kilometers per day
(roughly 406 square kilometers in total) in Pokrovsk Raion over the last
six months. Russian forces in the Pokrovsk direction have focused on
frontal infantry assaults from small village to small village in their
gradual advance to Pokrovsk and have spent weeks at times trying to
seize small villages in the area without attempting advance by maneuver.
The
Russian military command appears to have abandoned its efforts to make
rapid tactical gains in the Pokrovsk direction and embraced positional
warfare.[26]
Putin's calculus that Russia can continue gradual creeping advances
indefinitely during a prolonged state of positional warfare is
predicated on Russia's manpower and materiel advantage.[27]
Russia's ongoing force generation rates have allowed Russian forces to
sustain their current tempo of offensive operations throughout the
frontline by generating roughly as many new forces as the Russian
military loses in a given period.[28]
Russia's defense industry is reportedly capable of producing or
refurbishing enough armored vehicles to sustain Russia's current rate of
armored vehicle losses in Ukraine for at least two or three years.[29]
Putin's theory of victory rests on the assumption that Ukrainian forces
cannot acquire and sustain the manpower and material required to
prevent indefinite, gradual Russian advances or contest the initiative,
and Ukrainian forces appear to be actively challenging this assumption
in Kursk Oblast.[30]
Ukraine's
incursion into Kursk Oblast illustrates how Ukrainian forces can use
maneuver warfare to offset Russian manpower and materiel advantages.
Russian forces have overall occupied 1,175 square kilometers of
territory throughout the entire Ukrainian theater in the seven months
from January and July 2024, as ISW recently assessed.[31]
In stark contrast, ISW has observed claims that Ukraine's operation in
Kursk Oblast advanced roughly 800 square kilometers over six days from
August 6 to 12 and advanced roughly 28 kilometers deep as of August 17.[32]
Again, the size of the area seized by Ukrainian forces is not an
indicator of the success of that operation--it is offered here to show
that restoring maneuver can produce much more rapid advances than
positional warfare. The initial Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast
attacked largely unprepared, unequipped, and unmanned Russian defensive
positions along the border, but Ukraine has continued to leverage
maneuver to make rapid advances in Kursk Oblast following the deployment
of Russian reinforcements to the area.[33]
Ukraine's use of maneuver in Kursk Oblast serves as an example of how
Ukrainian maneuver, coupled with operational surprise, can result in
comparably sized gains in significantly shorter periods of time with
less manpower and materiel. Prolonged positional warfare, in contrast,
will only make Ukraine's resource disadvantages more pronounced and
protracted war will increase the costs to Ukraine and its partners.[34]
Drs. Frederick and Kimberly Kagan noted that the challenge of restoring
operational maneuver to the war remains the central problem for both
sides at the operational level of war, and Ukraine's ability to achieve
rapid maneuver in Kursk Oblast suggests that Ukrainian forces have
internalized lessons from the past months of positional warfare that may
help Ukraine leverage maneuver warfare in the future.[35]
It
is simply too early to draw dispositive conclusions about the lasting
effects that the two very different Russian and Ukrainian efforts will
have on the course of the war. ISW will continue to refrain
from commenting on Ukrainian operational intent in Kursk Oblast or
elsewhere in the theater beyond what Ukrainian officials themselves have
said in order to protect Ukrainian operational security, but it is safe
to conclude that the operational significance of the incursion in Kursk
Oblast will depend on how Ukrainian forces leverage the theater-wide
pressures the operation has created in subsequent operations that pursue
operationally significant objectives. ISW also considers assessments
about the operational significance of the possible Russian seizure of
Pokrovsk to be premature given the possibility that Russian offensive
operations throughout Donetsk Oblast will culminate in the coming weeks
and months at yet-to-be-determined positions. The operational
significance of Pokrovsk will likely depend on Russia's ability to
leverage the seizure of the city in wider maneuver in Donetsk Oblast,
which will be extremely difficult for Russian forces if offensive
operations elsewhere in Donetsk Oblast culminate and in the absence of
large operational reserves. It also remains unclear if Russian forces
will be able to seize Pokrovsk before Russian forces culminate on this
sector of the front.
ISW offers these observations
about the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast and the months-long
Russian offensive effort in eastern Ukraine to provide a balanced
framework for assessing the significance of the current Russian and
Ukrainian operations on the course of the entire war, which will remain
uncertain for the foreseeable future.
Russia
and Ukraine were reportedly planning to meet in Qatar in August 2024 to
discuss a possible moratorium on Ukrainian and Russian strikes on
energy infrastructure, but Russia temporarily postponed the summit after
the start of the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast. The Washington Post
reported on August 17 that unspecified officials and diplomats familiar
with the matter stated that Ukraine and Russia were planning to send
delegations to Doha in August 2024 to attend Qatari-mediated discussions
about the proposed moratorium.[36] An unspecified diplomat reportedly told the Washington Post
that Russia postponed the meetings following Ukraine's incursion into
Kursk Oblast but did not call off the talks entirely. The Washington Post reported
that two sources familiar with the talks stated that unspecified senior
Ukrainian officials believed that the summit had a 20 percent or less
chance of succeeding even if Ukrainian forces had not conducted the
operation into Kursk Oblast. Russia and Ukraine have reportedly been
discussing such a moratorium since June 2024 following Qatari proposals
to both Ukraine and Russia. The Washington Post's diplomatic
source stated that after Russia postponed its participation in the
talks, Ukraine wanted to hold bilateral meetings with Qatar, but that
Qatar did not view one-sided meetings as beneficial. The Washington Post reported
that the Ukrainian presidential office stated that the meetings in
Qatar were postponed "due to the situation in the Middle East" and that
the discussions would take place via videoconference on August 22. It is
unclear if the discussions on August 22 will include the Russian
delegation or not.
Russia remains uninterested in
any broader, meaningful negotiations regardless of Russia's willingness
to entertain or agree to a possible moratorium on energy infrastructure
strikes. The Washington Post reported that unspecified
officials stated that some people involved in the negotiations hoped
that discussions in Qatar could lead to a more comprehensive agreement
to end the war.[37]
A source identified only as a Russian academic with close ties to
unspecified senior Russian diplomats reportedly stated that the Kremlin
would be less motivated to agree to the moratorium on energy
infrastructure strikes since Russia assesses it can more significantly
damage Ukraine's energy infrastructure than Ukraine can damage Russian
oil refineries. The Russian academic reportedly stated, however, that
Russia may be more willing to consider the energy strike moratorium to
push Ukraine to engage in negotiations on a broader ceasefire.
ISW
has repeatedly assessed that despite the Kremlin's longstanding
information operations feigning interest in meaningful negotiations,
Russia is not interested in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine to end
the war.[38]
Putin and the Kremlin have notably intensified their expansionist
rhetoric about Ukraine since December 2023 and have increasingly
indicated that Russia intends to conquer more territory in Ukraine and
is committed to destroying Ukrainian statehood and identity.[39]
Russia has been preparing for a possible conventional war with NATO in
the future, and the Kremlin likely views anything short of Ukrainian
capitulation as an unacceptable threat to Russia's ability to fight such
a war.[40]
Putin outlined uncompromising demands on June 14 for Ukrainian
capitulation as prerequisites for any "peace" negotiations, including
Ukraine's recognition of Russian control over the entirety of Luhansk,
Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts – including the areas of these
oblasts that Russian forces currently do not occupy.[41]
Putin outright rejected any negotiated ceasefire during a press
conference with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban on July 5,
claiming that a ceasefire would allow Ukraine to regroup and rearm.[42]
Putin stated that Russia instead favors a "complete" and "final" end to
the war. Putin continued to demonstrate his unwillingness to negotiate
with Ukraine during a meeting on August 12, during which he portrayed
Ukraine as an actor with whom Russia is not interested in negotiating.[43]
Russia
would likely continue strikes against deep-rear military objects and
industrial enterprises in Ukraine even if it were to agree to a
moratorium on strikes against energy infrastructure. The
Russian strike campaign targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure is at
least in part meant to constrain Ukraine's defense industrial production
capacity and degrade Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian
aggression.[44]
Russia would likely continue to pursue this objective even if it were
to agree to the moratorium on strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure
and may resort to striking Ukrainian defense industrial enterprises
more directly to achieve the same effect. Russia would likely also
continue its large-scale strike series to force Ukraine to use a
considerable portion of its air defense missile stockpile and fix
limited air defense systems away from frontline areas to protect
Ukrainian cities in the rear, allowing Russian aviation to more securely
strike Ukrainian frontline forces.[45]
Russia
is almost certainly only considering a possible moratorium on energy
strikes due to Ukraine's months-long strike campaign against Russian oil
refineries — demonstrating a secondary effect of Ukraine's strike
campaign. The Washington Post noted that Ukraine was
open to the moratorium discussions because Kyiv viewed such discussions
as part of Ukraine's 10-point peace plan, which includes calls for
Russia to stop striking Ukrainian civilian and energy infrastructure.[46] The Washington Post,
however, did not offer an explanation for Russia's interest in the
discussions. Ukraine has been conducting a strike campaign against
Russian oil refineries since at least late January 2024.[47]
Russia's reported temporary postponement — as opposed to complete
cancellation — of the discussions in Qatar demonstrates that Russia is
likely still interested in the possible moratorium and that the Kremlin
views the Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil infrastructure as
significant and distressing.
Russia has pulled out
of past wartime agreements with Ukraine, and Ukraine is reportedly
planning to create conditions to prevent Russia from terminating another
Ukrainian-Russian agreement. A Ukrainian official familiar
with the potential moratorium agreement reportedly stated that Ukraine
would "talk with [its] partners to be sure that the deal will work" and
would not only speak "one-to-one with Russia."[48]
Ukraine's efforts to include unspecified partners to enforce the deal
are likely aimed at preventing Russia from using false justifications to
terminate any future agreement - as Russia has done in the past. Russia
refused to renew the Black Sea Grain Initiative in July 2023, but
Ukraine has been able to continue exports through its grain corridor due
to Ukraine's missile and drone campaign targeting Black Sea Fleet (BSF)
assets and vessels and inhibiting Russia's ability to halt maritime
activity in the western Black Sea.[49] The Washington Post noted
that Russia attempted to justify its suspension of the grain deal with
claims that only a small percentage of the exported grain went to the
states that needed it the most – despite data from the United Nations
(UN) to the contrary.[50]
Ukrainian
forces continue to marginally advance in Kursk Oblast amid ongoing
Russian efforts to stop further Ukrainian advances and begin to push
Ukrainian forces back across the international border. Russian
milbloggers claimed on August 17 that Russian forces destroyed several
bridges across the Seim River in Tetkino and Popovo-Lezhachi (both
southwest of Korenevo and along the international border) in order to
stop Ukrainian forces advancing from the international border and that
Ukrainian forces have consolidated positions in Otruba and up to the
west bank of the river.[51]
A prominent Kremlin propagandist claimed that Ukrainian forces
continued unspecified activity near Tetkino, suggesting that Ukrainian
forces may have been operating in the Tetkino area previously, and
several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces maintain
positions in Tetkino itself.[52]
The propagandist claimed that Ukrainian forces are conducting an
offensive operation from the international border towards Troitskoye
(south of Korenevo and one kilometer from the international border) and
that Ukrainian forces advanced west and south of Snagost (south of
Korenevo).[53]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed
that Ukrainian forces are also conducting assaults northeast of
Korenevo, including near Kauchuk and Alekseyevsky, but the exact
contours of Ukrainian operations in this area remain unclear.[54]
Geolocated footage published on August 17 indicates that Ukrainian
forces continue to operate in western Russkoye Porechnoye (north of
Sudzha).[55]
Russian milbloggers also claimed that Ukranian forces recently advanced
northeast of Sudzha in Mykhailovka and southeast of Sudzha in Ulanok
and Nizhnemakhovo and that fighting is ongoing southeast of Sudzha along
the Kamyshnoye-Krupets-Giri line.[56]
Russian milbloggers suggested that Russian forces operating southeast
of Sudzha may have recently retaken Ozerki, Kamyshnoye, and Giri.[57]
The
United Kingdom (UK) is reportedly waiting for US approval before
greenlighting Ukrainian forces to use UK-provided Storm Shadow missiles
for long-range strikes against military targets in Russia. UK outlet The Times reported
on August 16 that an unnamed source within the UK government stated
that the UK submitted a request for US approval over a month ago
(roughly mid-July 2024) and is still waiting for a response from the
Biden Administration.[58] A second source within the UK government told The Times
that discussions about Storm Shadows are "ongoing" with the UK's
allies, and a third source described the approval process as "routine." The Times
stated that the UK, US, France, and another unspecified NATO ally must
unanimously approve the policy change. The UK's policy on Ukraine's
ability to use Storm Shadow missiles to strike military targets in
Russia has grown increasingly unclear in recent months following several
contradictory statements by UK officials.[59]
The
Kremlin has revived its absurd information operation claiming that
Ukrainian forces are preparing false-flag attacks, potentially with
"dirty bombs," against Russia's Kursk Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP) and the
occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), likely to undermine
broader Western support of Ukraine amid Russian battlefield setbacks in
Kursk Oblast. Several prominent Russian authorities, including
the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), nuclear energy operator Rosatom,
Russian diplomats, and occupation authorities claimed on August 17 that
Ukrainian authorities are preparing a false-flag attack against the KNPP
and ZNPP.[60] Russian state news outlet RIA Novosti
claimed, citing a source in Russian law enforcement, that Ukrainian
forces are planning to conduct this attack with warheads containing
radioactive material, and several Russian milbloggers and prominent
Kremlin mouthpieces broadly amplified this "dirty-bomb" narrative.[61]
Russian authorities, most notably then-Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu,
last pushed the dirty bomb narrative at this scale in October 2022 amid
Ukraine's ongoing counteroffensive efforts in southern Ukraine and just
weeks before those efforts forced Russian forces to withdraw from west
(right) bank Kherson Oblast.[62]
Shoigu's October 2022 statements also intended to scare Western
officials into withholding support from Ukraine amid Russian battlefield
setbacks, and this objective remains unchanged.
The
Russian false-flag information operation rests on assumptions that
contradict or undermine this narrative and ignores the fact that Russia
has proven itself an unsafe operator of the ZNPP. Ukrainian
forces have consistently demonstrated their ability to conduct rear area
strikes within Russia and occupied Ukraine at distances farther than
the roughly 60 kilometers between the KNPP and the international border
or the roughly 30-40 kilometers from the current limit of claimed
Ukrainian advances within Kursk Oblast with their current capabilities.[63]
Prominent Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers undermined this information
operation, noting that Ukrainian forces have the capability to strike at
this distance already and assessing that a dirty bomb would be "too
complicated."[64]
The Kremlin is also trying to turn legitimate complaints about Russia's
militarization of the ZNPP back against Ukraine. Russian forces fired
at the ZNPP during their seizure of the plant in March 2022 and since
occupying the plant have stored and operated military equipment within
the ZNPP.[65]
Russian forces reportedly recently set a tire fire at one of the ZNPP's
cooling tower in an apparent attempt to intimidate Ukraine following
the start of the incursion into Kursk Oblast.[66]
Russian forces continue to commit war crimes against Ukrainian soldiers. Ukrainian
Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets stated on August 16 that he has appealed to
the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) concerning a Russian video of a Russian serviceman
demonstratively displaying the desecrated body of a Ukrainian
servicemember.[67]
Lubinets called the desecration of the Ukrainian's body a violation of
international humanitarian law and stated that Russian forces often
record and spread such videos to intimidate and demoralize Ukrainians.
The Ukrainian Prosecutor's Office announced on August 17 that it has
opened an investigation into the case and that Ukrainian law enforcement
are in the process of authenticating the video and the circumstances
surrounding it.[68]
A Ukrainian source claimed on August 16 that Russian forces recorded
the video at the Kolotilovka border checkpoint in Belgorod Oblast on
August 12 and that the video has the logo of the Russian 155th Naval
Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) elements of which have previously
operated in Bucha.[69]
It is unclear whether this soldier was a Ukrainian prisoner of war
(POW), and ISW is unable to verify the Ukrainian source's claims.
Russian
President Vladimir Putin promoted his "niece" (first cousin once
removed) Anna Tsivileva to the position of State Secretary and Deputy
Defense Minister.[70] Putin
signed the decree on August 17 relieving Tsivileva of her former Deputy
Defense Minister post. Tsivileva's new position is likely a promotion.
Independent Russian-language outlet Meduza noted on August 17
that each Russian federal agency has several deputies but only one State
Secretary. Tsivileva will be responsible for the Ministry of Defense's
(MoD) communication with parliament, other governmental agencies, and
public organizations.[71]
Tsivileva's promotion is the latest in Putin's recent efforts to place
his relatives and the children of other senior Russian officials in
Russian government positions.[72]
Key Takeaways:
- The
Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and Russian offensive operations
in eastern Ukraine are not in themselves decisive military operations
that will win the war. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces lack the
capability to conduct individual decisive war-winning operations and
must instead conduct multiple successive operations with limited
operational objectives that are far short of victory, but that in
aggregate can achieve strategic objectives.
- It
is too early to assess the outcomes and operational significance of the
Ukrainian incursion into Russia and the ongoing Russian offensive effort
in eastern Ukraine. The significance of these operations will not
emerge in isolation, moreover, but they will matter in so far as they
relate to a series of subsequent Russian and Ukrainian campaigns over
time.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin and the
Russian military command likely view maintaining the theater-wide
initiative as a strategic imperative to win a war of attrition against
Ukraine, and both the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast and the
Russian offensive effort in eastern Ukraine will impact whether Russian
forces can retain the initiative in the short-term.
- Ukrainian
officials have indicated that Ukraine's operation in Kursk Oblast does
not have long-term territorial objectives but instead aims to generate
theater-wide operational and strategic pressures on Russian forces.
- The
Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast has already generated theater-wide
operational and strategic pressures on Russian forces, and subsequent
phases of fighting within Russia will likely generate even greater
pressures on Putin and the Russian military.
- Russian
forces will not be able to retain the initiative throughout eastern
Ukraine indefinitely, and the culmination of Russian offensive
operations will present Ukrainian forces with opportunities to contest
the initiative further.
- The Russian offensive
operation to seize Pokrovsk is emblematic of the Russian approach to the
war in Ukraine that embraces positional warfare for gradual creeping
advances and seeks to win a war of attrition.
- Ukraine's
incursion into Kursk Oblast illustrates how Ukrainian forces can use
maneuver warfare to offset Russian manpower and materiel advantages.
- It
is simply too early to draw dispositive conclusions about the lasting
effects that the two very different Russian and Ukrainian efforts will
have on the course of the war.
- ISW offers these
observations about the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast and the
months-long Russian offensive effort in eastern Ukraine to provide a
balanced framework for assessing the significance of the current Russian
and Ukrainian operations on the course of the entire war, which will
remain uncertain for the foreseeable future.
- Russia
and Ukraine were reportedly planning to meet in Qatar in August 2024 to
discuss a possible moratorium on Ukrainian and Russian strikes on
energy infrastructure, but Russia temporarily postponed the summit after
the start of the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast.
- Russia
remains uninterested in any broader, meaningful negotiations regardless
of Russia's willingness to entertain or agree to a possible moratorium
on energy infrastructure strikes.
- Russia is
almost certainly only considering a possible moratorium on energy
strikes due to Ukraine's months-long strike campaign against Russian oil
refineries — demonstrating a secondary effect of Ukraine's strike
campaign.
- Ukrainian forces advanced within
Chasiv Yar, and Russian forces recently marginally advanced near
Kreminna, Pokrovsk, and Donetsk City.
- The
Russian government continues efforts to use the "Time of Heroes" program
to integrate trusted Russian military veterans into Russian government
roles.
We
do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities
are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the
military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue
to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on
the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on
combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations
of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian
objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border
with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of
Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued ground
assaults north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and Hlyboke and northeast of
Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on August 16 and 17.[73]
Ukraine's Kharkiv Group of Forces reported on August 17 that Russian
forces are reinforcing assault groups of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle
Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) near
Lyptsi and that elements of the Russian 4th Volunteer Assault Brigade
and 1009th Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], LMD)
are coordinating operations in Vovchansk.[74]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast
(Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push
westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian
forces made marginal advances near Kreminna amid continued fighting
along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on August 17. Geolocated
footage published on August 17 indicates that Russian forces marginally
advanced within northeastern Makiivka (northwest of Kreminna).[75]
Russian forces attacked southeast of Kupyansk near Hlushkivka,
Kruhlyakivka, Berestove, and Stelmakhivka; northwest of Kreminna near
Makiivka, Hrekivka, Nevske, and Novoyehorivka; west of Kreminna near
Terny and Torske; and southwest of Kreminna near Dibrova on August 16
and 17.[76]
Elements of the Russian 375th Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion (47th Tank
Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD])
are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction, and elements of the
Russian 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) are reportedly
fighting near Makiivka.[77]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian
forces continued ground attacks in the Siversk direction on August 17,
but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian forces
continued assaults northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka, east of
Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, southeast of Siversk near Spirne and
Vyimka, and south of Siversk near Pereizne on August 16 and 17.[78] Assault units of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Pereizne.[79]
Ukrainian
forces marginally advanced within eastern Chasiv Yar amid continued
Russian assaults in the area on August 17. Geolocated footage published
on August 17 indicates that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced on the
west (right) bank of the Siverskyi-Donets Donbas Canal in Chasiv Yar.[80]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are also trying to
retake positions in a forest area west of Klishchiivka (southeast of
Chasiv Yar).[81]
Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are also
advancing in Chasiv Yar's Zhovtnevyi Microraion, but ISW has not
observed visual confirmation of this claim.[82] Russian forces also continued offensive operations north of Chasiv Yar near Hryhorivka on August 16 and 17.[83]
Russian
forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on
August 17, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian
milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced further along
Tsentralna Street towards Toretsk from western Pivnichne (east of
Toretsk) and further towards Nelipivka (south of Toretsk) from Zalizne
(southeast of Toretsk).[84]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing in Niu
York (south of Toretsk) and control roughly 80 percent of the
settlement, although ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[85]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces also continued
assaults north of Toretsk near Bila Hora and Dyliivka and south of
Toretsk near Panteleymonivka on August 16 and 17.[86]
Elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk
People's Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC]) reportedly continue to operate
near Niu York.[87]
Russian
forces recently advanced southeast of Pokrovsk amid continued fighting
east and southeast of the settlement on August 17. Geolocated footage
published on August 17 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally
advanced southeast of Zhelanne (southeast of Pokrovsk).[88]
Additional geolocated footage published on August 17 shows Ukrainian
forces repelling an unsuccessful reinforced platoon-sized Russian
mechanized assault southeast of Lozuvatske (east of Pokrovsk) on the
night of August 16 to 17, and Russian forces did not make confirmed
advances during this assault.[89]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Novozhelanne
(east of Pokrovsk) and that Russian forces are also advancing east of
Pokrovsk into Krutyi Yar and further into Hrodivka and southeast of
Pokrovsk towards Novohrodivka.[90]
ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. A Ukrainian
brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that the Russian
military command has not transferred forces en masse from the Pokrovsk direction and that Russia's main force concentrations remain in eastern Ukraine.[91]
Russian forces also continued offensive operations east of Pokrovsk
near Vozdvyzhenka, Myrolyubivka, and Mykolaivka and towards Zelene Pole
and southeast of Pokrovsk near Zhuravka, Zavitne, and Ptyche on August
16 and 17.[92]
Russian
forces marginally advanced during a mechanized assault southwest of
Donetsk City amid additional mechanized assaults and offensive
operations in the area on August 16 and 17. Geolocated footage published
on August 16 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced during a
reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault northwest of Pobieda
(southwest of Donetsk City).[93]
A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kurakhove direction (west and
southwest of Donetsk City) published footage on August 16 showing
Ukrainian forces repelling a reduced battalion-sized Russian mechanized
assault in an unspecified area of the Kurakhove direction on the night
of August 15 to 16.[94]
The brigade reported that Russian forces attacked with three tanks, 25
armored vehicles, and a buggy and that Ukrainian forces struck one tank,
five armored vehicles, and the buggy before Russian forces retreated
from the area. Russian forces have previously taken higher armored
vehicle losses during recent roughly battalion-sized mechanized
assaults, and the Russian military command seems to have called off this
assault before risking similar losses.[95]
Russian forces also continued offensive operations west of Donetsk City
near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near
Kostyantynivka on August 16 and 17.[96]
Unspecified elements of the Russian 18th Combined Arms Army (CAA)
(Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near
Mykilske (southwest of Donetsk City).[97] ISW has previously only observed elements of the 18th CAA operating in the Kherson direction.[98]
Russian and Ukrainian sources did not comment on the situation in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on August 17.
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Positional
fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast near Mala Tokmachka
(northeast of Robotyne) on August 16 and 17, but there were no confirmed
changes to the frontline.[99]
Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Dmytro Lykhovyi
stated on August 17 that Russian forces have conducted "some movement"
at the brigade or lower unit level but that Russian forces in southern
Ukraine have not redeployed to Kursk Oblast en masse.[100]
Lykhovyi noted that there are about 75,000-90,000 Russian troops in
occupied Zaporizhia Oblast and that about 1,000-2,000 Russian soldiers
from Zaporizhia Oblast have redeployed to defend in Kursk Oblast.
Elements of the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined
Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue
operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[101]
Russian forces continued attacks in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on August 16 and 17 but did not make confirmed advances.[102]
Lykhovyi indicated that elements of the Russian 28th Motorized Rifle
Regiment (70th Motorized Rifle Division, 18th CAA, SMD) are fighting
near Krynky, and elements of the Russian 337th Airborne (VDV) Regiment
(104th VDV Division) are reportedly fighting near islands in the Dnipro
River delta.[103]
The
Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on August 17 that elements of
the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) destroyed two Ukrainian naval drones,
likely near occupied Crimea.[104]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian
forces conducted missile and drone strikes against rear areas of
Ukraine overnight on August 16 to 17. Ukrainian Air Force Commander
Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk reported that Russian forces
targeted Sumy City with an Iskander-K cruise missile launched from
Voronezh Oblast and broader Ukraine with 14 Shahed-136/131 drones from
Primorsko-Akhtarsk and Yeysk, Krasnodar Krai and Kursk Oblast.[105]
Oleshchuk stated that Ukrainian forces downed all 14 Shahed drones in
Mykolaiv, Cherkasy, Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, and Kyiv
oblasts. Sumy Oblast officials reported that the Russian Iskander-K
missile struck a civilian object within Sumy City.[106]
Russian sources claimed that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian multiple
launch rocket system (MLRS) or an IRIS-T air defense system in Sumy
Oblast.[107]
Russian sources claimed that Russian forces conducted missile strikes
against Ukrainian Patriot air defense systems, a Ukrainian Su-24
aircraft, and ammunition depots in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on August 16.[108]
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
The
Russian government continues efforts to use the "Time of Heroes"
program to integrate trusted Russian military veterans into Russian
government roles. Kremlin newswire TASS reported on August 16
that Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed a decree allocating
more than 562 million rubles (over $6 million) to the Russian
Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration
(RANEPA) and the Russian Federal Agency of Youth Affairs (Rosmolodezh)
for the Time of Heroes program in 2025.[109]
The Time of Heroes program began in April 2024 and aims to train
Russian military veterans to hold positions in the Russian government.[110]
Russian President Vladimir Putin has previously promoted the Time of
Heroes program and likely aims to leverage this program to appease
Russian military personnel and domestic supporters of the war in
Ukraine.[111]
The
Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to posture itself as
providing sufficient training and social benefits for Russian soldiers.
Newly appointed Russian State Secretary-Deputy Defense Minister Anna
Tsivileva visited personnel of the Russian Southern Military District
(SMD) in Stavropol Krai, including a Russian military camp, family
members of servicemembers, a military hospital, and a military-patriotic
education center that offers military training to Russian students,
contract personnel, and reservists.[112]
Tsivileva noted that the Russian MoD will renovate the Stavropol
military hospital by January 1, 2025 and that the MoD is working to
improve housing allotments for Russian servicemembers.
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
Nothing significant to report.
Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts
(Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become
more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international
partners)
ISW is suspending publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts until further notice.
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
(Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed
areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural,
economic, military, and governance systems)
ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Russian
authorities are likely attempting to tie the West directly to the
Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast to undermine ongoing Western
military support for Ukraine. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MFA) summoned the Italian ambassador on August 16 in response to
Italian journalists covering the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast
from within Sudzha, and Russian authorities opened a criminal
investigation on August 17 regarding the Italian journalists' presence
in Kursk Oblast.[113] A formal Ukrainian military escort accompanied the Italian journalists within Sudzha.[114] The Kremlin is likely grasping at excuses to formally present alleged Western connections to the Ukrainian incursion.
The
Ukrainian Center for Strategic Communications warned on August 17 that
Russian propagandists are running an information operation designed to
portray Ukraine as a failed state and undermine Western confidence in
the Ukrainian government.[115]
Significant activity in Belarus
(Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and
further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner
Group activity in Belarus)
Russia is reportedly
using aspects of the Belarusian defense industrial base (DIB) to
camouflage Iranian-produced Shahed-136/131 drones with black paint due
to insufficient Russian domestic capabilities. The Ukrainian Resistance
Center reported on August 17 that an unspecified Belarusian DIB plant in
Gomel City has begun camouflaging Russian Shahed drones with black
paint in order to disguise nighttime launches and to avoid overwhelming
the Yelabuga production facility where Russia assembles Shahed drones.[116]
The
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) reported on August 17 that
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin met with Belarusian
Ambassador to Russia Alexander Rogozhnik on August 15 to discuss
implementing bilateral agreements, drafting additional agreements
through the Union State framework, and scheduling further diplomatic
meetings.[117]
Note:
ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only
publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian,
Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as
commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as
the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided
in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-and-problem-restoring-maneuver-contemporary-war ; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Ukraine%20and%20the%20Problem%20of%20Restoring%20Maneuver%20in%20Contemporary%20War_final.pdf
[2]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-and-problem-restoring-maneuver-contemporary-war
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Ukraine%20and%20the%20Problem%20of%20Restoring%20Maneuver%20in%20Contemporary%20War_final.pdf
[3]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-and-problem-restoring-maneuver-contemporary-war
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Ukraine%20and%20the%20Problem%20of%20Restoring%20Maneuver%20in%20Contemporary%20War_final.pdf
[4]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-and-problem-restoring-maneuver-contemporary-war
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Ukraine%20and%20the%20Problem%20of%20Restoring%20Maneuver%20in%20Contemporary%20War_final.pdf
[5]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-and-problem-restoring-maneuver-contemporary-war
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Ukraine%20and%20the%20Problem%20of%20Restoring%20Maneuver%20in%20Contemporary%20War_final.pdf
[6] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv
[7] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv
[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060724
[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060724
[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081124
[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-15-2024
[12] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-winter-spring-2024-offensive-operation-kharkiv-luhansk-axis
[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081324 ;
[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081124
[15] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/15/us/politics/ukraine-incursion-russia-kursk.html
[16] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081624 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-15-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081424 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081324 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081224
[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar080824
[18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar080824
[19] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv
[20] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081124
[21] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081124
[22] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv
[23] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060824 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032124 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-14-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020424 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011924
[24] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031324 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv
[25] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031324 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv
[26] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072624
[27] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060724
[28] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072424
[29] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021324
[30] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060724
[31] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081224
[32] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081224
[33] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-7-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-15-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081324
[34]
https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Ukraine%20and%20the%20Problem%20of%20Restoring%20Maneuver%20in%20Contemporary%20War_final.pdf
[35]
https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Ukraine%20and%20the%20Problem%20of%20Restoring%20Maneuver%20in%20Contemporary%20War_final.pdf
[36] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/08/17/kursk-ukraine-russia-energy-ceasefire/
[37] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/08/17/kursk-ukraine-russia-energy-ceasefire/
[38] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/why-putin-remains-uninterested-meaningful-negotiations-ukraine; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040424 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020824
[39]
https://isw.pub/UkrWar112823 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120123 ;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar120823 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121023 ;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar121323 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121423 ;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar121723 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121923 ;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar010224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012724; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/why-putin-remains-uninterested-meaningful-negotiations-ukraine
[40] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/why-putin-remains-uninterested-meaningful-negotiations-ukraine
[41] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2024
[42] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-5-2024
[43] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081224
[44] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/special-report-russian-strikes-more-effective-ukraine-exhausts-defenses ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-12-2024
[45] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/special-report-russian-strikes-more-effective-ukraine-exhausts-defenses
[46] https://www.president dot gov.ua/storage/j-files-storage/01/19/53/32af8d644e6cae41791548fc82ae2d8e_1691483767.pdf; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/08/17/kursk-ukraine-russia-energy-ceasefire/
[47] https://isw.pub/UkrWar012524; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020324; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031324 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031524; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031724; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032324 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040224; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050124; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051124; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-12-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051924 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072724; https://isw.pub/UkrWar080324
[48] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/08/17/kursk-ukraine-russia-energy-ceasefire/
[49] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-strikes-have-changed-russian-naval-operations-black-sea
[50] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/08/17/kursk-ukraine-russia-energy-ceasefire/
[51] https://t.me/divgen/52849 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/133956 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1824769383907864880; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/11196; https://t.me/alehingennadiy ; https://t.me/milinfolive/128668
[52] https://t.me/wargonzo/21615; https://t.me/wargonzo/21616; https://t.me/mig41/36255 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/17190
[53] https://t.me/yurasumy/17190
[54] https://t.me/yurasumy/17190 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1824723375035465846; https://t.me/rusich_army/16594 ; https://t.me/rybar/62863 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/42269 ; https://t.me/rybar/62852 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74994
[55] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6421; https://t.me/iamsniper/6369; https://x.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1824782731718353087; https://x.com/alexskichambe/status/1824606808880947250; https://x.com/alexskichambe/status/1824605627093750265 ; https://t.me/rybar/62855
[56] https://t.me/rybar/62863 ; https://t.me/rybar/62855 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74994 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/17177
[57] https://t.me/rybar/62863 ; https://t.me/rybar/62855 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74994
[58] https://www.thetimes.com/world/russia-ukraine-war/article/us-blocks-ukraine-from-firing-british-missiles-into-russia-9wq6td2pw
[59] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-15-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071224 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050324
[60]
https://iz dot
ru/1744065/2024-08-16/kharkovskaia-vga-zaiavila-o-planakh-kieva-nanesti-udary-po-kurskoi-i-zaporozhskoi-aes;
https://t.me/tass_agency/266770; https://t.me/tass_agency/266773; https://t.me/tass_agency/266855; https://t.me/tass_agency/266856; https://t.me/tass_agency/266862; https://t.me/tass_agency/266863 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/42267
[61] https://ria dot ru/20240816/vedomstvo-1966702970.html; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74977; https://t.me/tass_agency/266780; https://t.me/dva_majors/50017; https://t.me/rogozin_do/6310; https://t.me/dva_majors/50018; https://t.me/dva_majors/50022;
[62] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-23
[63] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-15-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-27-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-14-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-16-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-19-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-31-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-5-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-9-2024;
[64] https://t.me/rybar/62848; https://t.me/dva_majors/50021
[65] https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/03/04/russia-ukraine-zaporizhzhia-nuclear/; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120223; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111623; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070423; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120822; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignSept4; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignAugust25; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120822; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignJuly12; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignJuly21; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignAugust3; http://isw.pub/RusCampaignAugust6
[66] https://www.ukrinform dot net/rubric-economy/3895017-iaea-experts-denied-access-inside-russianoccupied-znpps-cooling-tower-energy-ministry.html
[67] https://t.me/dmytro_lubinetzs/6472 ; https://suspilne dot media/815427-v-merezi-zavilos-video-z-vidrizanou-golovou-nibito-ukrainskogo-vijskovogo-lubinec-vidreaguvav/ ; https://t.me/sotaproject/85386
[68]https://www.facebook.com/pgo.gov.ua/posts/pfbid062ZgP19jnokiN7HZQYsXbLXBYxNX4YfYnce2aQipczeCEKXqHcEXkvSn3ym8n4wfl
; https://suspilne dot
media/815665-prokuratura-vidkrila-spravu-cerez-video-z-obezgolovlennam-jmovirno-ukrainskogo-vijskovogo/;
https://t.me/bbcrussian/69192
[69] https://t.me/sotaproject/85386 ; https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-155th-brigade-destroyed-ukraine-poor-reinforcements-vuhledar-bucha-pavlika-2023-3
[70]
https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/17/08/2024/66c0a6cc9a7947242ec83ab5;
https://t.me/tass_agency/266883 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/42276 ;
https://t.me/sotaproject/85413; https://t.me/bbcrussian/69197
[71]
https://meduza dot
io/news/2024/08/17/putin-povysil-svoyu-plemyannitsu-annu-tsivilevu-do-stats-sekretarya-do-etogo-ona-byla-obychnym-zamministra-oborony
[72] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-17-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060724
[73]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qiM5MsrhToH94sTzWuoVhV7WiSXtWLUcgh1qZ3EDiQ2Rr9g2tGqKbn42Hek1bKnul; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CTQZEvZFerTCcT5QepADiJxNW2wM96QyUizSS5GKNzj4CBDdRupW2tkmnr3mA1cRl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid07qdC5Cr2ipZWNgG2FViGdQ7PbWrqGhkErFrNBKNMPikfkc1yceRGk1hQtMerbJhsl; https://t.me/wargonzo/21607
[74] https://t.me/otukharkiv/777
[75] https://t.me/ZSU_115OMBr/395; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6428
[76]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qiM5MsrhToH94sTzWuoVhV7WiSXtWLUcgh1qZ3EDiQ2Rr9g2tGqKbn42Hek1bKnul; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CTQZEvZFerTCcT5QepADiJxNW2wM96QyUizSS5GKNzj4CBDdRupW2tkmnr3mA1cRl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid07qdC5Cr2ipZWNgG2FViGdQ7PbWrqGhkErFrNBKNMPikfkc1yceRGk1hQtMerbJhsl
[77] https://t.me/epoddubny/20741; https://t.me/rusich_army/16592
[78] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qiM5MsrhToH94sTzWuoVhV7WiSXtWLUcgh1qZ3EDiQ2Rr9g2tGqKbn42Hek1bKnul ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CTQZEvZFerTCcT5QepADiJxNW2wM96QyUizSS5GKNzj4CBDdRupW2tkmnr3mA1cRl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid07qdC5Cr2ipZWNgG2FViGdQ7PbWrqGhkErFrNBKNMPikfkc1yceRGk1hQtMerbJhsl ; https://t.me/rusich_army/16593
[79] https://t.me/rusich_army/16593
[80] https://x.com/Map_Hargoo/status/1824726723407032506; https://t.me/rusich_army/16593; https://x.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1824784219156947095
[81] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/14151
[82] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74997
[83] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CTQZEvZFerTCcT5QepADiJxNW2wM96QyUizSS5GKNzj4CBDdRupW2tkmnr3mA1cRl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid07qdC5Cr2ipZWNgG2FViGdQ7PbWrqGhkErFrNBKNMPikfkc1yceRGk1hQtMerbJhsl
[84] https://t.me/z_arhiv/27659?single ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27664?single ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74997
[85] https://t.me/wargonzo/21612 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21607
[86] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qiM5MsrhToH94sTzWuoVhV7WiSXtWLUcgh1qZ3EDiQ2Rr9g2tGqKbn42Hek1bKnul ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CTQZEvZFerTCcT5QepADiJxNW2wM96QyUizSS5GKNzj4CBDdRupW2tkmnr3mA1cRl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid07qdC5Cr2ipZWNgG2FViGdQ7PbWrqGhkErFrNBKNMPikfkc1yceRGk1hQtMerbJhsl
[87] https://t.me/wargonzo/21612
[88] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6429; https://t.me/brygada47/978
[89] https://t.me/rubpak/177 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1824808010436506028 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1824847361061106063
[90] https://t.me/wargonzo/21607 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/14106 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27653 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/133930 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27668 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/26262
[91] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1233711057980426 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/08/17/bradley-ryatuye-vykosyv-posadku-z-okupantamy-i-vyviz-bijcziv-47-brygady/
[92] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qiM5MsrhToH94sTzWuoVhV7WiSXtWLUcgh1qZ3EDiQ2Rr9g2tGqKbn42Hek1bKnul ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CTQZEvZFerTCcT5QepADiJxNW2wM96QyUizSS5GKNzj4CBDdRupW2tkmnr3mA1cRl ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/14106 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74997
[93] https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/1824549678567862455; https://x.com/klinger66/status/1824632625396420834; https://x.com/klinger66/status/1824621668758614408 ; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1964355087348615
[94] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=842431041292361 ; https://suspilne dot media/815435-zsu-prosuvautsa-v-kurskij-oblasti-u-rosii-zaavili-nibito-ukraina-gotue-udari-po-aes-905-den-vijni-onlajn/
[95] https://isw.pub/UkrWar073024
[96] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qiM5MsrhToH94sTzWuoVhV7WiSXtWLUcgh1qZ3EDiQ2Rr9g2tGqKbn42Hek1bKnul ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CTQZEvZFerTCcT5QepADiJxNW2wM96QyUizSS5GKNzj4CBDdRupW2tkmnr3mA1cRl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid07qdC5Cr2ipZWNgG2FViGdQ7PbWrqGhkErFrNBKNMPikfkc1yceRGk1hQtMerbJhsl
[97] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/133994
[98] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-14-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-15-2024
[99] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CTQZEvZFerTCcT5QepADiJxNW2wM96QyUizSS5GKNzj4CBDdRupW2tkmnr3mA1cRl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CTQZEvZFerTCcT5QepADiJxNW2wM96QyUizSS5GKNzj4CBDdRupW2tkmnr3mA1cRl; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/10976
[100]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg ; https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2024/08/17/na-pivdni-nemaye-masshtabnogo-vidvedennya-vorozhyh-vijsk-ouv-tavriya/
[101] https://t.me/dva_majors/50037
[102] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qiM5MsrhToH94sTzWuoVhV7WiSXtWLUcgh1qZ3EDiQ2Rr9g2tGqKbn42Hek1bKnul; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CTQZEvZFerTCcT5QepADiJxNW2wM96QyUizSS5GKNzj4CBDdRupW2tkmnr3mA1cRl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid07qdC5Cr2ipZWNgG2FViGdQ7PbWrqGhkErFrNBKNMPikfkc1yceRGk1hQtMerbJhsl
[103]
https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2024/08/17/u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-pro-ridkisnyj-vypadok-poblyzu-krynkiv/;
https://t.me/dva_majors/50063
[104] https://t.me/mod_russia/42266; ttps://t.me/boris_rozhin/133965; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58315
[105]
https://t.me/kpszsu/17883 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/16729 ;
https://suspilne dot
media/815499-povitrani-sili-vnoci-zbili-14-sahediv-po-sumah-rf-udarila-raketou/
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0kKF2L3w1FtonxEyfnCbq33tUn2fj9DYVuVoPQ6iViziTsZdzZDtTQpY33xsc9XfYl
[106] https://t.me/insiderUKR/81026; https://t.me/drozdenko_sumy/1217; https://t.me/bbcrussian/69178
[107] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74978 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/133894 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/42250; https://t.me/mod_russia/42280; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27657
[108] https://t.me/mod_russia/42248 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/42252; https://t.me/rybar/62841; https://t.me/tass_agency/266749; https://t.me/tass_agency/266750 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/42241; https://t.me/rybar/62846; https://t.me/mod_russia/42248 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/42252
[109] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/21623057; https://t.me/tass_agency/266752
[110] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-27-2024
[111] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-2024
[112] https://t.me/mod_russia/42228 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/42237 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/42238 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/42239 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/42240
[113]
https://t.me/tass_agency/266763; https://t.me/tass_agency/266764;
https://t.me/dva_majors/50011; https://t.me/MID_Russia/44202 ;
https://meduza dot
io/news/2024/08/16/mid-rossii-vyzval-posla-italii-iz-za-reportazha-italyanskogo-telekanala-snyatogo-v-sudzhe-kurskoy-oblasti;
https://t.me/tass_agency/266891; https://t.me/sotaproject/85416
[114] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/italian-reporters-return-after-russian-anger-kursk-report-2024-08-17/; https://www.rainews
dot
it/video/2024/08/lavanzata-di-kiev-verso-la-russia-linviata-del-tg1-con-lesercito-ucraino-in-viaggio-verso-sudzha-6dfe7cc8-4f72-421e-a32a-6b81596de311.html
[115]
https://t.me/spravdi/40872 ; https://suspilne dot
media/815525-rospropaganda-posirue-fejk-so-ssa-nibito-hocut-usunuti-zelenskogo-na-tli-kurskoi-operacii-spravdi/
[116] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/bilorus-dopomagaye-rf-modernizovuvaty-iranski-bezpilotnyky/
[117] https://t.me/MID_Russia/44208
