Iran Update, August 8, 2024

  Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Andie Parry, Kelly Campa, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, Siddhant Kishore, Carolyn Moorman, Emma Milchunes, and Brian Carter

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

CTP-ISW continues to assess that a coordinated large-scale drone and missile attack on Israel by Iran and its Axis of Resistance is the most likely Iranian response to Israel’s killing of senior axis leaders.[1]  CTP-ISW assessed on July 31 that a coordinated large-scale drone attack resembling the Iranian April 2024 attack on Israel was one of the most dangerous but not most likely courses of action.[2] The Iranian regime’s public descriptions of a direct attack on Israel, including statements from senior Iranian officials and armed forces-affiliated outlets, caused CTP-ISW to judge that the most dangerous course of action was more likely to occur. (The most dangerous course of action Iran and its partners could pursue would actually be a full-scale attack on Israel and on US forces, but CTP-ISWs assesses that neither Iran nor Lebanese Hezbollah is at all likely to pursue such a course of action.) CTP-ISW is providing a forecast of the likelihood of a given Iranian action based on available data in an open-source environment. CTP-ISW is not offering a definitive prediction that Iran and its proxies and partners will undertake any specific action.

Senior Iranian security officials and an Iranian armed forces-affiliated outlet have discussed a possible Iranian and Hezbollah drone and missile strike in notable detail, including discussions about the Iranian partners involved, lists of possible targets, and descriptions of methods to increase the likelihood of a successful strike.[3] Defa Press, an outlet run by an Iranian institution that reports directly to the Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS), published a list of potential targets and methods to increase the success of the attack, which increased CTP-ISW's confidence that Iran was considering a large-scale attack.[4] The AFGS would be responsible for planning and conducting a retaliatory strike against Israel. Statements from Iranian decisionmakers have also increased CTP-ISW’s confidence that Iran will choose this dangerous course of action. Iranian AFGS Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri stated on August 1 that both Iran and the Axis of Resistance will be involved in the retaliation, indicating that Iran will directly strike Israel.[5] Supreme National Security Council secretary and acting Iranian foreign affairs minister both suggested that Iran would directly participate in the retaliation in statements on August 1 and August 7 respectively.[6]

Iranian leaders may decide that Iran cannot successfully design and execute a strike that would penetrate Israeli air defenses to establish deterrence, despite strong statements by its officials and media. A second failure to penetrate Israeli air defenses would not restore deterrence and would therefore be counterproductive. Such a failure would demonstrate that Iran has limited effective answers to Israeli attacks on its senior leaders and inside its territory. Iranian decisionmakers could calculate that the negative effects of another failed attempt to strike Israeli territory outweigh the internal and regional reputational damage Iran would experience from not attacking Israel after openly discussing the attack. CTP-ISW assessed on August 1 that Iran is likely planning a retaliatory attack on Israel to restore deterrence after the unsuccessful Iranian April 2024 attack while simultaneously trying to avoid a large-scale war with Israel.[7] Iran and its allies fired around 170 one-way attack drones, 30 cruise missiles, and 120 ballistic missiles at Israel in the April 2024 attack.[8] The United States, Israel, and their allies intercepted most of the projectiles, and the Iranian attack did significantly less damage than Tehran intended.[9] Iranian leaders will likely want to be confident that Iran's munitions will penetrate Israeli air defenses and strike their intended targets to reestablish deterrence before authorizing a strike. Iranian leaders are also probably considering that Iran could establish nuclear deterrence in this direct attack on Israel by demonstrating an ability to strike Israeli territory with a delivery device capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. This requirement would not be satisfied if only drones or small missiles penetrated Israeli and partner air and missile defenses and would presumably need ballistic missiles to strike their targets.

Iranian leaders may additionally calculate that the risk of triggering a large-scale Israeli response is too high to justify conducting a coordinated large-scale missile and drone attack. Israeli military leaders’ public statements and back-channel messages from the United States have emphasized to both Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah that Israel would respond forcefully to an attack that kills Israeli civilians or causes significant damage.[10] Iran may calculate that the failure rate showed by Iranian missiles during the April 2024 attack makes the risk of causing unintentional casualties too great.[11] Technical errors could cause severe collateral damage, as demonstrated by the recent Hezbollah attack that killed 12 Israeli children in the Golan Heights.[12] This risk is higher given that many of the targets Iranian-armed forces affiliated sources have suggested are near densely populated areas.[13] Iranian leaders very likely assess that killing Israeli civilians or inflicting severe damage would trigger an expanded war, regardless of the intent of Iran's strike.

Divergent goals and priorities between Iran and Hezbollah could create friction between the two and disagreement on the timing and coordination of an attack. Unspecified US officials told Axios on August 5 that the US intelligence community expects Iran and its Axis of Resistance to conduct two waves of attacks against Israel.[14] Unspecified sources ”familiar with the intelligence” speaking to CNN have similarly claimed that Hezbollah is prepared to strike Israel independent of Iran.[15] These divisions may be appearing because Hezbollah and Iran have different constraints and goals for a retaliatory attack on Israel. Both groups want to establish deterrence with Israel but may have differing urgency. Hezbollah may feel increasing pressure to retaliate given Israeli operations targeting Hezbollah commanders in southern Lebanon and Syria since the targeted killing of Fuad Shukr in Beirut on July 30.[16] Hezbollah is also constrained by the Lebanese political scene. Hezbollah leaders are likely additionally considering how a Hezbollah  retaliatory strike on Israel will effect if and when the IDF launches a major military operation into Lebanon. A Hezbollah retaliation that triggers an Israeli ground operation could be perceived as dragging all of Lebanon into Hezbollah’s war. Iranian decisionmakers are not under the same temporal pressure as Hezbollah given that Israel has not continued to conduct attacks in Iran or against Iranian targets since killing Haniyeh on July 31. Iranian leaders are likely incentivized to carefully and slowly assemble a strike package that both hurts Israel and avoids escalation into a wider war. 

Multiple Axis groups are noting that the delay in their retaliation against Israel for the targeted killing senior Hezbollah commander Fuad al Shukr and Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh is a tactical decision. Houthi supreme leader Abdulmalik al Houthi warned that a Houthi response to Israel is “on the way” and that “the delay in the axis’s response is only tactical, and no pressure or intimidation can dissuade from the decision to respond” on August 8.[17]  Abdulmalik’s statement echoes statements made by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and senior Iranian officials. Nasrallah said on August 6 that the Axis of Resistance will respond, and that ”the state of waiting is part of the battle,” ”part of the punishment, [and] part of the response.”[18] The Iranian Supreme Leader’s representative to the IRGC said on July 31 that Israel should wait for a ”crushing answer” and that Iran will send a message that will ”put [Israel] in fear and worry for several days“. [19]The Iranian official compared Iran’s decision to delay with the delay between Israel’s strike targeting IRGC Quds Force senior commander Mohammad Reza Zahedi on April 1 and the Iranian retaliation against Israel on April 13.[20]

Iranian Acting Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Bagheri Kani met with several foreign officials on the sidelines of the emergency Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on August 7.[21] Bagheri Kani met separately with Jordanian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister Ayman al Safadi and Saudi Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Walid al Khariji.[22] Bagheri Kani called on OIC member states to condemn Israel’s targeted killing of Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh and Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip.  Bagheri Kani recently held two phone calls with Safadi on August 2 and 4, during which Safadi underlined the necessity to prevent a wider regional war.[23] Safadi then traveled to Iran on August 4, reportedly as part of a “last-ditch effort” to dissuade Iran from attacking Israel.[24] Jordan’s efforts to prevent an Iranian attack were likely unsuccessful given that Iranian officials have repeatedly emphasized since July 31 the need to retaliate against Israel for killing Haniyeh in Iranian territory.[25] Bagheri Kani argued that Iran “has no choice” but to exercise its right to self-defense and restore deterrence against Israel at OIC meeting.[26] Bagheri Kani may have warned Jordan and Saudi Arabia on August 8 not to defend Israel in an impending Iranian attack as they did during Iran’s April 13 drone and missile attack.[27] This is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that Iran is likely planning a retaliatory attack on Israel to restore deterrence after the failed Iranian April 2024 attack while Iran simultaneously tries to avoid a large-scale war with Israel.[28] Bagheri Kani also met with his Algerian and Pakistani counterparts on the sidelines of the OIC meeting.[29]

An unspecified informed source told IRGC-affiliated media on August 8 that Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has nominated his foreign affairs, defense, and intelligence ministers. [30] Pezeshkian very likely had to receive approval from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei prior to nominating these ministers given the sensitive nature of their positions. The source claimed that Pezeshkian nominated the following individuals:

• Foreign Affairs Minister: Abbas Araghchi. Araghchi played a prominent role in the nuclear negotiations with the West under the Hassan Rouhani administration and served as Rouhani's deputy foreign affairs minister for policy between 2017 and 2021.[31] Pezeshkian’s nomination of Araghchi would therefore signal his intent to seriously pursue nuclear negotiations with the West. Iranian and Western media previously reported that Pezeshkian had nominated Araghchi as his foreign affairs minister, although Pezeshkian has not publicly confirmed Araghchi’s nomination.[32]
• Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister: Aziz Nasir Zadeh. Nasir Zadeh currently serves as the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces.[33] Nasir Zadeh is a former F-14 pilot who served as the commander of the Artesh Air Force from 2018 to 2021.[34] Nasir Zadeh began his military career as a pilot in the Artesh Air Force during the Iran-Iraq War.[35]
• Intelligence Minister: Esmail Khatib. Khatib served as the intelligence minister under former Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi.[36] Khatib has close ties to both Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the IRGC.[37] Khatib previously headed the security department of the US-sanctioned bonyad Astan Quds Razavi. Khatib recently claimed that Israel killed Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran “with the green light of the United States.”[38]
  

An Israeli military correspondent and local sources reported the IDF re-entered Khan Younis to conduct a new clearing operation on August 8, two weeks after the IDF withdrew from the area.[39]

The IDF issued evacuation orders for civilians in central and eastern Khan Younis on August 8.[40] Local videos showed thousands of Palestinians evacuating west to al Mawasi humanitarian zone.[41] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that the IDF ground forces began operating in eastern Khan Younis on the evening of August 8.[42] Local Palestinian sources reported IDF artillery shelling and helicopter fire in the eastern Khan Younis neighborhoods of Qarara, Abasan, and Zanna.[43]  The re-entry of ground forces into Khan Younis marks the IDF’s third clearing operation there.[44] The IDF 98th Division previously operated in Khan Younis for eight days at the end of July 2024.[45] The IDF reported that on July 22 that Hamas fighters had infiltrated into previously cleared areas of Khan Younis and had re-established militia infrastructure in the area, necessitating the re-clearing operation.[46] The IDF has not confirmed its current operation in Khan Younis or its purpose as of this writing.

The Hamas Khan Younis Brigade is building improvised explosive devices from unexploded ordinance as part of its effort to regenerate forces there. Hamas claimed that its Khan Younis Brigade used unexploded ordinance from an F16 to manufacture an IED that they used in an attack in al Faraheen, east of Khan Younis, on August 5.[47] Repurposing unexploded ordinance and then using the ordinance as an improvised explosive device requires some level of explosives expertise to deconstruct a live munition and then reconstruct the explosives into an IED. This Hamas report is consistent with a report from Israeli Army Radio, which is a state-owned news outlet run by the IDF. Israeli Army Radio reported on June 24 that Hamas is establishing small weapons manufacturing sites across the Gaza Strip to replenish its stockpiles of military equipment and weapons.[48] This process—exemplified both by the Israeli Army Radio report and the Hamas claim about the attack in al Faraheen—is one component of regeneration.[49] Regeneration, which is part of reconstituting military units, is a resource-intensive, and time-intensive process that requires large-scale replacement of personnel, equipment and supplies and involves replenishing reserves of weapons and other materiel.[50] The manufacture of IEDs on a small scale, however, does not indicate full or large-scale reconstitution of forces to fully supplied or manned levels.

US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that US Air Force F22 Raptors arrived in the Middle East on August 8 as part of US force posture changes ahead of Iran’s and Iranian-backed groups’ expected attack on Israel.[51] CENTCOM said that the US aircraft would “mitigate the possibility of regional escalation” by Iran or Iranian-backed groups.[52] CENTCOM Commander General Michael Kurilla visited Israel on August 8 to meet senior Israeli security officials.[53] Kurilla previously visited Israel on August 5 to finalize US-Israeli defense coordination.[54]

Key Takeaways: 

• Iranian Retaliation: CTP-ISW continues to assess that a coordinated large-scale drone and missile attack on Israel by Iran and its Axis of Resistance is the most likely Iranian response to Israel’s killing of senior axis leaders. Iranian leaders may decide that Iran cannot successfully design and execute a strike that would penetrate Israeli air defenses to establish deterrence, despite strong statements by its officials and media. Iranian leaders may additionally calculate that the risk of triggering a large-scale Israeli response is too high to justify conducting a coordinated large-scale missile and drone attack.
• Hezbollah Retaliation: Divergent goals and priorities between Iran and Hezbollah could create friction between the two and disagreement on the timing and coordination of an attack. These divisions may be appearing because Hezbollah and Iran have different constraints and goals for a retaliatory attack on Israel. Both groups want to establish deterrence with Israel but may have differing urgency.
• Iranian Government Formation: An unspecified informed source told IRGC-affiliated media on August 8 that Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has nominated his foreign affairs, defense, and intelligence ministers. Pezeshkian very likely had to receive approval from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei prior to nominating these ministers given the sensitive nature of their positions. The intelligence minister also served under former hardline President Ebrahim Raisi.
• Gaza Strip: The Hamas Khan Younis Brigade is building improvised explosive devices from unexploded ordinance as part of its effort to regenerate forces there. This report is consistent with a June 2024 report from Israeli Army Radio, which is a state-owned news outlet run by the IDF, that said Hamas is establishing small weapons manufacturing sites across the Strip. The manufacture of IEDs on a small scale, however, does not indicate full or large-scale reconstitution of forces to fully supplied or manned levels.
  
  

 

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip
  
  

The IDF confirmed it struck and killed senior Hamas West Bank Headquarters official Nael Sakhel in the Gaza Strip on July 24.[55] The West Bank Headquarters is a Hamas unit based in the Gaza Strip that plans attacks against Israel from or within the West Bank.[56] The IDF said that Sakhel directed attacks in the West Bank in his position for over a decade.[57] Sakhel also supplied weapons to Hamas fighters and funded operations against Israelis and the IDF in the West Bank.[58] The IDF sentenced Sakhel to life in prison in 2003 for his involvement in a suicide bombing in Israel.[59] Sakhel was exiled to the Gaza Strip in the 2011 Gilad Shalit deal, in which Israel traded 1,027 Palestinian prisoners for an IDF soldier captured in 2006 by Palestinian militias.[60]

The IDF Air Force struck two Hamas command and control sites in schools in Tuffah and Daraj, eastern Gaza City, on August 8.[61] The IDF struck Abdel Fattah Hamoud school in Tuffah and al Zahraa school in Daraj.[62] The IDF said that Hamas used the school complexes for fighters and commanders to plan and carry out attacks against Israeli forces and Israel.[63] The IDF said it took steps to reduce civilian harm including the use of certain munitions and aerial surveillance.[64] Palestinian media reported that at least 15 Palestinians were killed in the strikes.[65] A local Palestinian journalist reported that the IDF struck the Abdul Fattah Hamoud school a second time on August 8 without any reported casualties.[66]

The IDF 252nd Division continued clearing operations along the Netzarim Corridor, south of Gaza City on August 8. The IDF 16th Infantry Brigade (Res.), 10th Infantry Brigade (Res.), and 454th Artillery Brigade (Res.) continued to operate along the corridor.[67] The IDF 16th Brigade directed an airstrike against an observation post used by Palestinian fighters.[68] A local Palestinian journalist reported that Israeli armor operated near Wadi Gaza, along the border of the Central and Gaza governorates.[69] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fired rockets targeting Israeli positions along the Netzarim Corridor.[70]

The IDF 162nd Division continued clearing operations in Rafah on August 8. The IDF Givati and Nahal brigades raided military sites in Rafah.[71] The IDF Nahal Brigade killed Palestinian fighters in close range engagements and destroyed infrastructure in the area, including a building rigged to explode in Tal al Sultan.[72] The Nahal Brigade directed an airstrike targeting a militia cell inside an apartment used as a command base.[73] The IDF said the attack killed the deputy commander of the Rafah Brigade's Air Unit.[74] The Nahal Brigade also located passageways between residential houses that militants used to avoid detection in dense neighborhoods and ambush Israeli forces.[75] Israeli forces located a tunnel shaft in a bathroom in central Rafah.[76]

The IDF Combat Engineering Corps’ 605th Battalion operated along the Philadelphi Corridor to locate and destroy militia infrastructure over the past week.[77] Israeli forces located and destroyed a rocket launch site on August 7 along the Philadelphi Corridor in southeastern Rafah.[78] The IDF said the rocket launch site was located “tens of meters” from the largest fuel reserve in the Gaza Strip.[79] The IDF said that any damage from the nearby launch site could have endangered the lives of tens of thousands of Gazans located near the reserve.[80] The IDF said it did not damage the fuel tanks while destroying the launch site.[81]

 

Hamas deputy leader for Gaza Khalil al Hayya and Hamas leader for the West Bank Zaher Jabarin will both reportedly play larger roles within Hamas leadership due to their strong relations with Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah.[82] Reuters reported that Hayya and Jabarin’s positive relationship with Iran and Hezbollah will lead both men to assume bigger roles within Hamas, citing a source close to Hamas deliberations.[83] Hayya, who will continue to lead Hamas’ ceasefire negotiation team, has maintained close ties to Iran and accompanied Ismail Haniyeh to Iranian President Pezeshkian’s funeral in Tehran on July 30.[84] Jabarin, who leads Hamas in the West Bank from abroad, reportedly manages Hamas’ financial relationship with Iran and facilitates the transfer of funds from Tehran to the Gaza Strip.[85] Hamas’ reported promotion of Hamas officials with ties to Iran is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that pro-Iran elements within Hamas continue to ascend and that Hamas is likely accelerating its descent deeper into Iran’s orbit following Sinwar’s appointment.[86]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel
  
  

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters attempted a complex attack targeting Israeli forces stationed near the Beka’ot settlement in the Jordan Valley, West Bank on August 6.[87] CTP-ISW reported on August 7 that the IDF killed two Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters who attempted to shoot at the Beka’ot settlement. The IDF reported on August 7 that the two PIJ fighters attempted to “lure” IDF personnel into an area in which PIJ fighters had set improvised explosive devices (IEDs).[88] The IDF reportedly discovered and destroyed four IEDs.[89] Israeli forces closed the area to traffic and ambushed the fighters after the incident.[90] The IDF 636th Combat Intelligence Collection eliminated one PIJ fighter during separate clashes on August 6.[91] A Times of Israel military correspondent claimed that two PIJ fighters returned to the area after the August 6 attack to attempt a second attack.[92]

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least four locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on August 7.[93] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades detonated an IED targeting Israeli forces in Balata refugee camp in Nablus.[94] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades separately fired small arms targeting Israeli forces in Nablus’ Askar refugee camp and Qalqilya in the West Bank.[95]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
• Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
• Expel the United States from Syria
  
  

Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least eight attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on August 7.[96] Hezbollah launched rockets targeting Iron Dome platforms and IDF artillery positions in Khirbet Manut in the Western Galilee.[97] The IDF detected 15 rockets from Lebanon that fell in open areas in nearby Kabri in the Western Galilee, suggesting Hezbollah did not strike the Iron Dome platform.[98] Hezbollah launched two heavy payload Burkan rocket attacks from Lebanon targeting the Zar’it and Branit Barracks.[99]

The IDF struck and destroyed a Hezbollah air unit’s drone launch site in Sejoud, near Nabatieh, on August 7.[100] The IDF said that Hezbollah’s air unit used the site to launch drones towards the northern Golan Heights earlier on August 7.[101]

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant released a letter in Arabic addressed to Lebanese civilians on August 8.[102] Gallant said that Iran and Hezbollah have taken Lebanon and its people “hostage” in service of their narrow interests.[103] Gallant warned Lebanese civilians that Israel will respond harshly to Hezbollah if Hezbollah continues its “aggression” and invoked the destructive aftermath of the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War.[104] An Israeli military correspondent reported that Israeli officials are attempting to pressure Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah by turning the Lebanese population against Hezbollah.[105] Gallant previously warned that Nasrallah may drag Lebanon into ”paying extremely heavy prices” on August 7 while visiting Israeli forces.[106]

Iran and the Axis of Resistance

Iranian Atomic Energy Organization head Mohammad Eslami boasted that Iran is the “top producer” of heavy water in the world during a health conference on August 8.[107] Heavy water is a substance that serves as a moderator and coolant in nuclear reactors. It is possible that Eslami was directing this statement toward an external audience in order to try to promote Iranian heavy water exports. Eslami previously claimed in late July 2024 that Iran has exported domestically produced heavy water to other countries, without providing further details.[108]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) destroyed two Houthi drones, one Houthi ground control station, and three Houthi anti-ship cruise missiles in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen on August 7.[109] CENTCOM determined that these Houthi systems presented a clear and imminent threat to US and coalition forces and merchant vessels in the region. Houthi media confirmed two US-UK airstrikes near al Jabana, Hudaydah governorate, Yemen, on August 8, but did not provide specific details of the targeted sites.[110]

The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported an incident 45 nautical miles south of al Mokha, Yemen, on August 8.[111] UKMTO reported that two small crafts carrying four unidentified individuals launched a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) at an unnamed vessel. The vessel did not report any casualties or damage to the vessel.

 

 

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[1] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-4-2024

[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-31-2024

[3] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/683007/ ; https://defapress dot ir/en/news/84861/the-list-of-possible-targets-of-the-axis-of-resistance-in-the-occupied-territories

[4] https://defapress dot ir/fa/about; https://web.archive dot org/web/20230106230508/defapress.ir/fa/about

[5] https://www.tasnimnews

dot com/fa/news/1403/05/11/3132376

[6] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/183841/ ; www.mashreghnews dot ir/news/1631080

[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-1-2024

[8] https://x.com/IDF/status/1779503384434819454

[9] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/04/13/iran-israel-hamas-war-news-gaza-palestine/#link-LFWWPTKAPZFTXDUVQCTFH6HSM4

[10] https://www.axios.com/2024/08/07/israel-hezbollah-attack-civilians-us ; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-warns-iran-of-serious-risk-if-it-conducts-major-attack-on-israel-fddd0715 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/12673

[11] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/israel-iran-strikes-live-coverage/card/many-iranian-missiles-failed-to-launch-or-crashed-before-striking-target-u-s-officials-say-TCd4YP2fiODhl1t9QDrL

[12] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate072924

[13] https://defapress dot ir/en/news/84861/the-list-of-possible-targets-of-the-axis-of-resistance-in-the-occupied-territories

[14] https://www.axios.com/2024/08/06/iran-attack-israel-biden-briefed-details

[15] https://www.cnn.com/2024/08/07/politics/hezbollah-iran-israel-possible-strikes/index.html

[16] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-7-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-6-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-5-2024

[17] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1821550581720215725;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1821547231264059436

[18] www.almanar dot com.lb/12317659

[19] www.almanar dot com.lb/12317659

[20] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/681848/

[21] www.mfa dot ir/portal/NewsView/751260;

www.iribnews dot ir /fa/news/4303154;

www.mfa dot ir/portal/NewsView/751259;

www.mfa dot ir/portal/NewsView/751258

[22] www.mfa dot ir/portal/NewsView/751260;

www.iribnews dot ir /fa/news/4303154

[23] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-2-2024;

https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/682096/;

https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-4-2024;

https://mfa dot ir/portal/NewsView/750917

[24] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-4-2024; https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/aug/04/jordan-foreign-minister-visit-iran-haniyeh-killing

[25] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-4-2024;

[26] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-7-2024

[27] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-13-2024;

https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/jordanian-jets-shot-down-dozens-of-iranian-drones-flying-toward-israel-sources-say/;

https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/iran-attack-israel-hamas-war-saudi-arabia-jordan-uae-coalition-rcna147965

[28] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-7-2024

[29] www.mfa dot ir/portal/NewsView/751259;

www.mfa dot ir/portal/NewsView/751258

[30] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/05/18/3136338

[31] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-27-2023 ; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-07-10/iran-president-eyes-nuclear-deal-broker-for-top-diplomat-tasnim?srnd=politics-vp#:~:text=Araghchi%20was%20Iran's%20chief%20negotiator,in%20exchange%20for%20sanctions%20relief.

[32] https://amwaj.media/media-monitor/scoop-ex-nuclear-negotiator-named-as-iran-s-foreign-minister-sources-say ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-29-2024

[33] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/05/18/3136338

[34] https://safheeghtesad dot ir/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%DB%8C-89/230403-%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B9%D8%B2%DB%8C%D8%B2-%D9%86%D8%B5%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%87-%D9%88%D8%B2%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%AA-%D9%BE%D8%B2%D8%B4%DA%A9%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86-%DA%A9%DB%8C%D8%B3%D8%AA

[35] https://safheeghtesad dot ir/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%DB%8C-89/230403-%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B9%D8%B2%DB%8C%D8%B2-%D9%86%D8%B5%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%87-%D9%88%D8%B2%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%AA-%D9%BE%D8%B2%D8%B4%DA%A9%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86-%DA%A9%DB%8C%D8%B3%D8%AA

[36] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/05/18/3136338

[37] https://besacenter dot org/esmaeil-khatib-iran-intelligence/

[38] https://www.iranintl.com/202408028211

[39] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1821570080225873971 ;  https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1821577763536486580;

[40] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1821501809824854077; https://t.me/hamza20300/279960

[41] https://t.me/hamza20300/279889 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/279878 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/279852 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/279931

[42]https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1821570080225873971

[43] https://t.me/hamza20300/279925; https://t.me/hamza20300/279977; https://t.me/hamza20300/279946; https://t.me/hamza20300/279946

[44] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-22-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-24-2024

[45] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-30-2024

[46] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-22-2024

[47] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2871; https://t.me/QudsN/447040 

[48] https://t.me/moriahdoron/11297

[49] https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/publications/20-01.pdf 

[50] https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/publications/20-01.pdf

[51] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1821575929036185892

[52] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1821575929036185892

[53] https://t.me/moriahdoron/12707

[54] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1820491275998822666 ; https://www.axios.com/2024/08/05/iran-hezbollah-attack-israel-monday-blinken

[55] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1821396843839848898; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1821421395701584056

[56] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1821402770886557967

[57] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1821396843839848898

[58] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1821396846700269868

[59] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1821402770886557967

[60] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1821402770886557967

[61] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1821528166038376518

[62] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1821528166038376518; https://t.me/hamza20300/279858

[63] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1821528168554967451

[64] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1821528171457519826

[65]  https://x.com/ytirawi/status/1821542970744607183; https://t.me/moriahdoron/12695; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1821530142977511670

[66] https://t.me/hamza20300/279982

[67] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1821448667028468105

[68] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1821448667028468105

[69] https://t.me/hamza20300/279761

[70] https://t.me/sarayaps/18449

[71] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1821448621524431093

[72] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1821448621524431093

[73] www dot idf.il/222160 

[74] www dot idf.il/222160 

[75] www dot idf.il/222160 

[76] www dot idf.il/222160 

[77] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1821566546218508400

[78] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1821566546218508400

[79] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1821566546218508400

[80] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1821566550228267107

[81] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1821566550228267107

[82] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-hayya-seen-key-role-under-new-leader-sinwar-sources-say-2024-08-07/

[83] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-hayya-seen-key-role-under-new-leader-sinwar-sources-say-2024-08-07/

[84] https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2024-08-05/strong-iran-ties-emerge-as-factor-in-hamas-leader-choice-analysts-say; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-hayya-seen-key-role-under-new-leader-sinwar-sources-say-2024-08-07/

[85] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/r1bkzjvut#:~:text=Jabarin%2C%2055%2C%20manages%20Hamas%27%20financial%20ties%20with%20Iran.,businessmen%20who%20funnel%20money%20to%20the%20terror%20organization

[86] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-6-2024

[87] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1821272965641859307 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-7-2024

[88] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1821276660898922692 ; https://t.me/sarayatulkarm/540

[89] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1821272972193378533

[90] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1821272968703701369

[91] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1821272968703701369

[92] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1821276660898922692

[93] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7031 ; https://t.me/QudsN/447069 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7032 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7033

[94] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7031

[95] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7032 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7033

[96] https://t.me/mmirleb/5953 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/5955 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/5957 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/5959 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/5961 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/5963 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/5965 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/5972

[97] https://t.me/mmirleb/5959 , https://t.me/moriahdoron/12697

[98] https://t.me/moriahdoron/12697 , https://t.me/mmirleb/5959

[99] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1821582456551833937 , https://t.me/mmirleb/5965 , https://t.me/mmirleb/5961

[100] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1821275733907665222

[101] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1821275733907665222

[102] https://x.com/yoavgallant/status/1821578176323272875

[103] https://x.com/yoavgallant/status/1821578176323272875

[104] https://x.com/yoavgallant/status/1821578176323272875

[105] https://t.me/moriahdoron/12706

[106] https://t.me/moriahdoron/12680 ; https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1821168237012291662

[107] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/184593

[108] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-july-25-2024

[109] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1821324824259571936

[110] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1821546367782633828

[111] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/1821593797115117593