Kelly
Campa, Andie Parry, Ria Reddy, Kathryn Tyson, Siddhant Kishore,
Katherine Wells, Alexandra Braverman, Annika Ganzeveld, and Brian Carter
Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET
The
Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored
activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US
forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the
stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical
Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the
Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly
based on regional events. Click here
to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
CTP-ISW
defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that
Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came
to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state,
semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their
collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the
alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels
of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some
degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional
proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others
are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of
the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives,
which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from
the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these
objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have
become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.
We
do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are
well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military
operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn
violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and
crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these
reports.
US and international health
officials confirmed on August 29 that Israel has agreed to implement a
temporary humanitarian pause in the Gaza Strip to vaccinate children
against polio.[1]
The Israeli Prime Minister’s Office emphasized that the pause is not
related to the longer-term ceasefire proposal currently under discussion
in Doha.[2] The temporary humanitarian pause related to polio received support from the Israeli War Cabinet.[3]
The Gaza Health Ministry announced on August 16 that several
Palestinian children have presented symptoms consistent with polio and
that lab tests confirmed that one child had polio.[4]
The World Health Organization representative for the Gaza Strip said
that Israel agreed to suspend offensive operations for three days in
designated areas of the central Gaza Strip beginning on September 1 when
a large-scale vaccination campaign will begin.[5]
The IDF will pause operations from 0600 to 1500 local time in the
designated areas. Israel will also conduct three day pauses in
designated areas of the southern and northern Gaza Strip on later,
unspecified dates.[6]
Unspecified Egyptian officials told Arab media that the pause would not
include areas of the Gaza Strip where Israeli forces are actively
operating.[7]
Hamas initially welcomed the temporary pause in fighting but later
criticized the Israeli proposal for not encompassing the entire Gaza
Strip.[8]
A Hamas political bureau official confirmed that Hamas would cooperate
with international organizations for the successful implementation of
the campaign, however.[9]
A United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) official said on
August 26 that over 3,000 people in health teams would help deliver
polio vaccines to shelters, clinics, and schools, but that a
humanitarian pause was needed for locals to safely meet aid workers.[10]
Israeli military sources said that IDF operations in Rafah caused the “collapse” of Hamas’ Rafah Brigade.[11] An
Israeli military correspondent reported on August 29 that Hamas
fighters have increasingly attempted to flee Rafah via tunnels north to
the al Mawasi humanitarian zone, citing unspecified Israeli military
sources.[12]
This reporting follows Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant’s
announcement on August 21 that the IDF 162nd Division has defeated
Hamas’ Rafah Brigade.[13]
Hamas’
recent attack rate in Rafah indicates that the Rafah Brigade may be
severely degraded. CTP-ISW has observed Hamas’ weekly rate of attacks in
Rafah steadily decline since the IDF began its offensive in Rafah on
May 7, and Hamas attacks in August have continued to decline compared to
July’s rate of attacks. The rate of Hamas attacks began to decline
dramatically around August 13, however. Hamas did not claim an attack
for six days between August 13 and August 19 while the 162nd Division
conducted its multi-day clearing operation in Tal al Sultan. Hamas has
only conducted nine attacks targeting Israeli forces since August 19 as
of this writing.[14]
Hamas elements can still conduct attacks even if the Rafah Brigade is
severely degraded. Hamas has not conducted any attacks in the Rafah area
since August 23, however. CTP-ISW will continue to monitor the status
of the Rafah Brigade over the coming days.
Recent Hamas
attacks have also appeared to lack clear tactical or operational
objectives, unlike Hamas actions in May, June, and July. The IDF
identified in late July, for example, that several Hamas fighters
planned to take control of a humanitarian aid route in Rafah.[15]
Hamas has previously also conducted numerous attacks in the Rafah area
in which it used sophisticated weaponry or demonstrated significant
planning, coordination, and organization.[16]
Such planning and coordination would be consistent with an effective
military unit. Recent Hamas activity in the month of August have
demonstrated neither clear objectives nor sophisticated weaponry or
planning, suggesting that Hamas has lost the capabilities to conduct
these types of attacks. These attacks appear to be largely simple
attacks that targeted Israeli forces operating in Tal al Sultan with
rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) or improvised explosive devices (IED).[17]
The IDF has continued to clear Tal al Sultan in recent days and killed
dozens of Palestinian fighters without any claimed Hamas attacks.[18]
Smaller Palestinian militias allied with Hamas have continued to target
Israeli forces in the area, however, and can continue to target Israeli
forces along the Philadelphi Corridor, even if Hamas is severely
degraded.
Iran has increased its stockpile of
uranium enriched to near weapons-grade levels, according to an
unreleased International Atomic Energy Agency report obtained by the
Associated Press.[19]
The Associated Press reported on August 29 that Iran possesses 164.7
kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent, citing an unreleased
IAEA report.[20]
This amount marks a 22.6 kilogram increase in Iran's stockpile of 60
percent enriched uranium since the IAEA published its last report in May
2024.[21]
The IAEA report also verified that Iran has completed the installation
of eight cascades of IR-6 centrifuges at Fordow and 10 out of 18 planned
cascades of IR-2m centrifuges at Natanz.[22]
The Fordow cascades are not yet operational. The IAEA noted that the
installation of two new cascades at Natanz is ongoing and that Iran
continues to increase the number of operating cascades of IR-2m and IR-4
centrifuges.[23]
Unspecified diplomats told Reuters on June 12 that Iran is installing
new centrifuges at its nuclear facilities at Natanz and Fordow, which
increases the Iranian capacity to enrich uranium.[24]
These diplomats and the IAEA report are presumably referring to the
same cascades of centrifuges. The IAEA report said that Iran's overall
stockpile of enriched uranium is 5,751.8 kilograms as of August 17.[25]
This report follows continued statements from senior Iranian officials
since early 2024, including a statement from a top foreign policy
adviser to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, that have begun to normalize
discussions about Iran's ability to procure nuclear weapons.[26]
Unspecified
sources familiar with the ongoing ceasefire-hostage negotiations told
Israeli media on August 28 that Israeli mediators have made “progress”
during negotiations in Doha.[27]
The Israeli sources said that mediators discussed a hostage-prisoner
exchange and the future of the IDF’s deployment in the Gaza Strip.[28] The sources claimed that Israel demanded that Hamas release 20 to 25 Israeli hostages during the first stage of the ceasefire.[29] Hamas reportedly only agreed to release 12 living hostages.[30]
The sources said that discussions about the IDF’s presence along the
Philadelphi and Netzarim Corridors–which have been the two primary
sticking points of the negotiations so far–will take place in the later
stages of the negotiations.[31]
Key Takeaways:
Gaza Strip
Axis of Resistance objectives:
The IDF 252nd Division continued clearing operations along the Netzarim Corridor in the central Gaza Strip on August 29.[32] Israeli
forces conducted targeted raids and directed an airstrike targeting
Palestinian fighters in the area. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades mortared
an Israeli headquarters along the Netzarim Corridor on August 29.[33]
The IDF 98th Division continued clearing operations in Khan Younis and on the outskirts of Deir al Balah on August 29.[34] Israeli forces directed airstrikes targeting Palestinian fighters and killed dozens of fighters over the past day.[35]
The IDF said on August 29 that residents are allowed to return to parts
of southern Deir al Balah and areas between Deir al Balah city and the
al Mawasi humanitarian zone.[36] A Palestinian journalist reported on August 29 that the IDF conducted a limited withdrawal from eastern Deir al Balah.[37]
The
al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades and Nasser Salah al Din Brigades conducted a
combined mortar attack targeting Israeli forces in eastern Deir al Balah
on August 29.[38]
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) detonated a house-borne improvised
explosive device (HBIED) targeting Israeli ground forces in eastern Deir
al Balah.[39]
The IDF 162nd Division continued clearing operations in Rafah on August 29.[40]
Israeli forces killed dozens of Palestinian fighters in the area over
the past day. Israeli forces directed an airstrike that killed a PIJ
military intelligence commander who participated in the October 7, 2023,
attack against Israel.
The National Resistance Brigades mortared Israeli forces in the Yabna camp in eastern Rafah on August 29.[41]
Palestinian militias conducted two indirect fire attacks into southern Israel on August 29.[42] Hamas fired rockets targeting Israeli forces at the Mars military site in the Gaza Envelope.[43] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades launched rockets targeting Israeli forces in Kissufim.[44]
Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.
The
World Food Programme (WFP) paused aid activities in the Gaza Strip on
August 28 following a “security incident” involving a WFP vehicle.[45] WFP stated that
one of its teams “came under fire” several meters from an IDF
checkpoint in Wadi Gaza on August 27. The incident occurred after the
WFP escorted a humanitarian aid convoy to the central Gaza Strip. WFP
indirectly accused the IDF of firing at the vehicle even after Israeli
authorities gave multiple clearances to WFP to approach the checkpoint.
WFP Executive Director Cindy McCain described the incident as “unacceptable“ and said that it marked the latest security incident affecting WFP
in the Gaza Strip. McCain called on Israeli authorities to act
immediately to ensure the safety of aid workers in the Gaza Strip. The
IDF said on August 28 that the incident is “under review.”[46]
Unspecified
sources familiar with the ongoing ceasefire-hostage negotiations told
Israeli media on August 28 that Israeli mediators have made “progress”
during negotiations in Doha.[47]
The Israeli sources said that mediators discussed a hostage-prisoner
exchange and the future of the IDF’s deployment in the Gaza Strip.[48] The sources claimed that Israel demanded that Hamas release 20 to 25 Israeli hostages during the first stage of the ceasefire.[49] Hamas reportedly only agreed to release 12 living hostages.[50]
The sources said that discussions about the IDF’s presence along the
Philadelphi and Netzarim Corridors–which have been the two primary
sticking points of the negotiations so far–will take place in the later
stages of the negotiations.[51]
West Bank
Axis of Resistance objectives:
The
IDF conducted raids in Tulkarm and Jenin for the third consecutive day
on August 29 as part of the IDF effort to degrade Palestinian militia
networks in the West Bank.[52]
The IDF engaged a Palestinian militia cell in Nour Shams refugee camp
in Tulkarm and killed five fighters, including Palestinian Islamic Jihad
(PIJ) Tulkarm Battalion Commander Abu Shuja.[53]
The IDF stated that Shuja was responsible for conducting a shooting
attack targeting an Israeli civilian in Qalqilya in June 2024.[54]
Palestinian and Israeli media previously reported in April 2024 that
the IDF had killed Shuja, but Shuja reappeared three days later and
resumed militia activities.[55] PIJ acknowledged Shuja’s death and conducted a “complex ambush” targeting Israeli forces in Tulkarm in response to his death.[56]
The IDF separately conducted a raid in Tulkarm refugee camp on August
29, killing five Palestinian fighters and detaining a local militia
battalion commander.[57]
The IDF concluded a two-day raid in al Fara refugee camp in the Jordan Valley on August 28 .[58] The IDF killed four Palestinian fighters and discovered an IED production site in a mosque during the raid.[59]
The IDF was unable to safely remove the IEDs from the mosque and
conducted a controlled detonation of the devices that caused a fire in
the mosque.[60]
This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.
Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights
Axis of Resistance objectives:
Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least ten attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on August 28.[61]
The
IDF Home Front Command announced on August 29 that schools in several
un-evacuated communities in northern Israel and the Golan Heights will
begin classes on September 1.[62] Class sizes will be restricted in some areas, including Nahariya, Katzrin, and Maalot.[63]
The Home Front Command also said that schools can only hold educational
activities in areas where it is possible to reach a shelter.[64]
Israeli Education Minister Yoav Kisch announced in July 2024 that
schools in evacuated communities in northern Israel operate remotely in
Fall 2024.[65]
Iran and Axis of Resistance
Iranian
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Masoud Pezeshkian met with
Turkmen People’s Council Chairman Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov on August
29.[66] Khamenei
and Berdymukhamedov discussed the construction of a gas pipeline
between Iran and Turkmenistan and the International North-South Transit
Corridor. Iran and Turkmenistan signed an agreement in July 2024 under
which Iranian companies will construct a 125-kilometer gas pipeline
between Iran and Turkmenistan to increase Turkmenistan’s gas
transmission capacity.[67] Pezeshkian and Berdymukhamedov oversaw the signing of four cooperation agreements on August 28.[68]
The
Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi
militias—claimed a drone attack targeting the Alon Tavor Power Plant in
Haifa, Israel, on August 28.[69] The IDF intercepted a drone that was heading toward Israel from Syria on August 29.[70]
The drone did not enter Israeli airspace. The IDF reported the
interception approximately seven hours after the Islamic Resistance in
Iraq claimed the drone attack, so it is unclear whether the IDF
intercepted a drone that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq launched toward
Haifa.
Russian and Iraqi Popular
Mobilization Forces (PMF) media officials met in Baghdad on August 28,
possibly to share techniques for combatting Western media reporting
about Russia and the PMF.[71] Representatives
of a Kremlin-linked Telegram channel discussed Western “propaganda”
targeting Russia and the PMF during a meeting with PMF Media Director
Muhannad al Aqabi.[72]
Aqabi claimed that only Russian, Chinese, and South American media
accurately portrayed the events that took place in Iraq during the fight
against ISIS.[73] The meeting between Aqabi and the Russian media officials is part of ongoing cooperation between the PMF and Russia.[74]
Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh previously
discussed security and counterterrorism cooperation with the Russian
ambassador to Iraq in Baghdad in February 2024.[75]
Senior
Iranian officials discussed regional tensions and the possibility of
nuclear negotiations with European officials on August 28.[76]
Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi discussed nuclear
negotiations and the Russian invasion of Ukraine during a phone call
with his Dutch counterpart.[77]
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian criticized the reimposition of
sanctions on Iran following the US withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal
in 2018 and claimed that Iran seeks to spread ”peace and friendship” in
the Middle East during a phone call with the prime minister of Norway.[78]
Iranian Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad appointed Hamid Boord as the CEO of the National Iranian Oil Company on August 29.[79] Boord will serve a two-year term. Boord previously headed the Maroun Oil and Gas Company.[80]
Iranian
authorities arrested five police officers for torturing and killing a
man at a police station in Gilan Province on August 29.[81] Law Enforcement Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Reza Radan ordered an investigation into the incident. President Masoud Pezeshkian also ordered Interior Minister Eskandar Momeni to form a committee to investigate the incident.[82]
The
United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported Global
Position Systems (GPS) disruptions in the Persian Gulf southwest of
Asalouyeh, Bushehr Province, Iran on August 29.[83] UKMTO reported a similar GPS interference in early April 2024.[84]
Houthi
spokesperson Yahya Sarea published a video on August 29 of Houthi
fighters boarding and setting off seven explosive devices on the
Greek-flagged Sounion oil tanker.[85] CTP-ISW cannot determine when the Houthis boarded the Sounion.
The publication of the video followed statements from Houthi and
Iranian officials on August 28 that the Houthis will permit third
parties to tow the oil tanker to safety.[86] The European Union’s military mission to the Red Sea sighted fires on the Sounion but did not observe any signs of an oil spill or the tanker drifting on August 29.[87]
Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi confirmed that the Houthis
boarded the vessel in a speech on August 29 and warned of further
attacks targeting vessels transiting the Red Sea.[88]
US and coalition forces conducted a live fire training exercise in Deir ez Zor Province in eastern Syria on August 29.[89]
Local Syrian sources reported explosions near the Conoco Mission
Support Site, which were likely a product of the training exercise near
this site.[90]
[1] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/08/28/israel-polio-pause-gaza/
[2]
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/08/28/israel-polio-pause-gaza/
; https://www.ynet dot co.il/news/article/hkl2r36ic#autoplay ;
[3] https://t.me/moriahdoron/13281
[4] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/08/17/gaza-strip-polio-case-confirmed/ ; https://www.cnn.com/2024/08/16/middleeast/10-month-old-polio-gaza-intl-hnk/index.html
[5]
https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/08/29/world/israel-hamas-gaza-war/hfo-israel-has-emphasized-the-move-is-not-the-first-step-to-a-cease-fire?smid=url-share
[6]
https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/08/29/world/israel-hamas-gaza-war/hfo-israel-has-emphasized-the-move-is-not-the-first-step-to-a-cease-fire?smid=url-share
[7]
https://www.alaraby dot
co.uk/politics/%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B5-%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%82%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%A5%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AF%D8%A9-7-%D8%A3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%BA%D8%B2%D8%A9
[8]
https://www.alaraby dot
co.uk/politics/%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B5-%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%82%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%A5%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AF%D8%A9-7-%D8%A3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%BA%D8%B2%D8%A9
; https://t.me/hamaswestbank/53191
[9] https://apnews.com/article/israel-gaza-polio-vaccinations-who-042fcd390bda4bb84d429ae3239c5883
[10] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/26/world/middleeast/gaza-polio-vaccine.html
[11] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1829143254018715821
[12] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1829143254018715821
[13] https://www.mako dot co.il/news-military/2024_q3/Article-1d897266f917191026.htm?sCh=31750a2610f26110&pId=173113802
[14] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2958;
https://t.me/qassambrigades/31638;
https://t.me/qassambrigades/31639;
https://t.me/qassambrigades/31640;
https://t.me/qassambrigades/31641;
https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2985;
https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2986;
https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2987
[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-22-2024
[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-20-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-10-2024
[17] https://t.me/qassambrigades/31638; https://t.me/qassambrigades/31641
[18] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1827971169187692960; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1827238484441981278
[19]
https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-iaea-enriched-uranium-stockpile-9c86e5788a8bb45eab1337d5f6c10121
; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-21-2024
[20] https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-iaea-enriched-uranium-stockpile-9c86e5788a8bb45eab1337d5f6c10121
[21] https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-iaea-enriched-uranium-stockpile-9c86e5788a8bb45eab1337d5f6c10121 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-28-2024
[22] https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-iaea-enriched-uranium-stockpile-9c86e5788a8bb45eab1337d5f6c10121
[23] https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-iaea-enriched-uranium-stockpile-9c86e5788a8bb45eab1337d5f6c10121
[24] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-expanding-enrichment-capacity-after-iaea-resolution-diplomats-say-2024-06-12/
[25] .https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-iaea-enriched-uranium-stockpile-9c86e5788a8bb45eab1337d5f6c10121 ; https://apnews.com/article/iaea-iran-nuclear-enrichment-stockpile-2190f0d7247a6160fb13f28304d4b6ad ; https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/documents/gov2024-7.pdf
[26] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-9-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-13-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-21-2024
[27] https://www.ynet dot co.il/news/article/hkl2r36ic#autoplay
[28] https://www.ynet dot co.il/news/article/hkl2r36ic#autoplay
[29] https://www.ynet dot co.il/news/article/hkl2r36ic#autoplay
[30] https://www.ynet dot co.il/news/article/hkl2r36ic#autoplay
[31] https://www.ynet dot co.il/news/article/hkl2r36ic#autoplay
[32] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1829066945905168454
[33] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7278
[34] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1829066945905168454
[35] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1829066945905168454
[36] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1829115649714487673
[37] https://t.me/hamza20300/288180
[38] https://t.me/nedalps/4377; https://t.me/alwya2000/6735
[39] https://t.me/sarayaps/18529
[40] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1829066925185335458
[41] https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4397
[42] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/3033; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7295
[43] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/3033
[44] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7295
[45] https://www.wfp.org/news/wfp-temporarily-suspend-staff-movement-across-gaza-following-security-incident-targeted-wfp
[46] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/29/world/middleeast/un-world-food-program-gaza.html
[47] https://www.ynet dot co.il/news/article/hkl2r36ic#autoplay
[48] https://www.ynet dot co.il/news/article/hkl2r36ic#autoplay
[49] https://www.ynet dot co.il/news/article/hkl2r36ic#autoplay
[50] https://www.ynet dot co.il/news/article/hkl2r36ic#autoplay
[51] https://www.ynet dot co.il/news/article/hkl2r36ic#autoplay
[52] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1829142180134314414
[53] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1829018051854967018
[54] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1829018054686323201 ; https://www.israelnationalnews dot com/en/news/391936
[55] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/senior-pij-terrorist-killed-in-idf-raid-of-tulkarem-this-morning-reports/ ; https://x.com/ytirawi/status/1781319844534624693 ; https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/01/world/middleeast/palestinian-fighters-west-bank.html?searchResultPosition=2
[56] https://t.me/sarayaps/18530
[57] https://t.me/moriahdoron/13284
[58] https://t.me/moriahdoron/13294
[59] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1828875663123570970
[60] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1828908935757332984
[61] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1828874399153561690; https://t.me/mmirleb/6460; https://t.me/mmirleb/6462; https://t.me/mmirleb/6464; https://t.me/mmirleb/6466; https://t.me/mmirleb/6468; https://t.me/mmirleb/6470; https://t.me/mmirleb/6472; https://t.me/mmirleb/6474; https://t.me/mmirleb/6476
[62] https://t.me/moriahdoron/13303; https://t.me/moriahdoron/13304
[63] https://t.me/moriahdoron/13303; https://t.me/moriahdoron/13304
[64] https://t.me/moriahdoron/13304; https://t.me/moriahdoron/13303
[65] https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-811535; https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/hkl3z00pur
[66]
https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/27582 ; https://english.khamenei
dot ir/news/11067/Expanding-relations-with-Turkmenistan-a-top-priority
[67] https://apnews.com/article/turkmenistan-iran-iraq-gas-4043948de1333f7cc2f503ae8a3f6530;
[68] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-august-28-2024
[69] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1240
[70] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1829078489196024075
[71] https://t.me/rybar/63111
[72] https://t.me/rybar/63111
[73] https://t.me/rybar/63111
[74] https://www.ninanews dot com/Website/News/Details?Key=1104265
[75] https://www.ninanews dot com/Website/News/Details?Key=1104265
[76] https://mfa dot ir/portal/newsview/752495 ; https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/687628
[77] https://mfa dot ir/portal/newsview/752495
[78] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/687628/
[79] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-appoints-national-oil-company-ceo-shana-says-2024-08-29/
[80] https://nabzebourse dot com/fa/news/81350
[81] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/06/08/3150240;
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-president-calls-investigation-into-case-death-custody-2024-08-29/;
[82] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-president-calls-investigation-into-case-death-custody-2024-08-29/
[83] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/1829182927433019550
[84] https://gcaptain.com/vessel-reports-electronic-interference-incident-in-persian-gulf/;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-1-2024
[85] https://x.com/army21ye/status/1829190629076963667
[86] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-says-houthis-agree-truce-so-boats-can-reach-damaged-oil-tanker-2024-08-28/;
https://english.alarabiya
dot
net/News/middle-east/2024/08/28/iran-says-houthis-agree-to-truce-so-boats-can-reach-damaged-oil-tanker-;
https://x.com/abdusalamsalah/status/1828878937453408377
[87] https://x.com/EUNAVFORASPIDES/status/1829153560996504036
[88] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1829214775290544395;
https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1829165765553205499
[89] https://www.inherentresolve.mil/NEWSROOM/News-Articles/Stories-Display/Article/3857483/live-fire-exercises-in-syria-for-august/
[90] https://x.com/OALD24/status/1829219844194967949 ; https://x.com/SAMSyria0/status/1829235332971393404
