Johanna Moore, Kelly Campa, Kathryn Tyson, Carolyn Moorman, Annika Ga, Robert Moore, and Nicholas Carl
Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET
The
Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored
activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US
forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the
stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical
Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the
Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly
based on regional events. Click here
to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
CTP-ISW
defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that
Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came
to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state,
semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their
collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the
alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels
of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some
degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional
proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others
are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of
the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives,
which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from
the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these
objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have
become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.
We
do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are
well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military
operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn
violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and
crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these
reports.
Iran is likely trying to build operational surprise ahead of its expected attack on Israel. Iranian officials and state media have suggested repeatedly in recent weeks that an attack is imminent.[1]
They have likewise suggested that they are imminently delaying the
attack to create uncertainty about the timing of the attack and thus
stoke anxiety and fear among Israelis.[2]
An IRGC-affiliated outlet published a graphic on August 15, for
instance, boasting that the ambiguity surrounding the timing of the
attack is just as harmful as the strike itself will be.[3]
Iran has tried to build this operational surprise while forgoing having
any strategic surprise. Iranian officials have been clear in their
plans to attack likely in order to reduce the risk of miscalculation,
keep the escalation relatively contained, and to avoid an all-out war.
The
operational surprise that Iran is trying to build is meant to increase
the likelihood that an Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel would
inflict serious damage. John Kirby—the US White House National Security
communications advisor—warned on August 15 that Iran could launch a
strike with “little or no warning.”[4]
US officials speaking to Western media have indicated that there is no
consensus about when exactly an Iranian attack will occur.[5]
Iran likely seeks to exploit this lack of warning to help its drones
and missiles penetrate Israeli air defenses and strike some of their
intended targets within Israel. Iran has taken similar approaches in
previous attacks, such as the large-scale Iranian drone and missile
attack on Israel in April 2024 and the Iranian missile attack on US
forces in Iraq in January 2020.[6]
Iran in both instances had forgone strategic surprise but cultivated
operational surprise by threatening to attack and sending conflicting
messages and statements about when exactly it would occur.
CTP-ISW
continues to assess that the most likely course of action is that Iran
and its Axis of Resistance will conduct a coordinated drone and missile
attack on Israel. Senior Iranian officials have been consistent
in their statements saying that they will respond “forcefully” to
Israel killing Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran.[7] Western intelligence services have moreover observed Iranian preparations for an attack.[8]
CTP-ISW
continues to evaluate the likelihood of other courses of action in
which Iran does not launch a major, coordinated strike on Israel. Three
anonymous Iranian officials speaking to Reuters on August 13 claimed
that Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah would refrain from attacking Israel if
it reached a ceasefire-hostage agreement with Hamas.[9]
US President Joe Biden similarly said that he “expects” that a
ceasefire in the Gaza Strip achieved in the next few days would lead
Iran to refrain from attacking.[10]
CTP-ISW assesses that this course of action is unlikely at the moment
in part because the Iranian regime has not suggested this possibility
publicly and has instead maintained that it will attack. Hamas also
refused to participate in the latest round of negotiations in Qatar on
August 15, making this course of action even less likely.
The US, Egyptian, Israeli, and Qatari officials met in Doha for the latest round of ceasefire-hostage negotiations on August 15.[11] President Biden, Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad al Thani, and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al Sisi called
on both Israel and Hamas on August 8 to resume “urgent discussion” to
close remaining gaps in an agreement based on the US-backed, UN Security
Council-endorsed proposal.[12]
Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar expanded Hamas’ negotiating demands leading
up to the talks by insisting that Israel accept an earlier
Hamas-proposed ceasefire from July 2024.[13]
Hamas refused to attend ceasefire talks in Doha on August 15 on the
grounds that Israel is ”deceiving and evading. . . to prolong the war
and even expand it at a regional level. ”[14]
An unspecified source ”with knowledge of the issue” cited by Axios
claimed that Hamas officials were present in Doha during the
negotiations to participate in indirect talks.[15]
Hamas
met with three other Palestinian militias in the Gaza Strip on August
14 to discuss ceasefire-hostage negotiation and post-war governance.[16] These
militias included the Palestinian Mujahideen Movement, the Popular
Resistance Committees, and the Palestinian Freedom Movement. The four
Palestinian militias emphasized their unanimous support for Hamas’
public August 11 demand that international mediators “oblige” Israel to
work to implement a previous ceasefire proposal that Hamas submitted in
July 2024 instead of conducting further negotiations.[17]
The statement reiterated the groups’ support for the July 2024
proposal, which they claimed would implement a ceasefire, a complete
Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, the entry of humanitarian aid,
the reconstruction of the strip, and a “serious deal” to exchange
Palestinian prisoners for Israeli hostages.[18] The statement added that the “so-called day after the war” is a Palestinian national affair to be only decided by Palestinians.[19]
The statement denounced US, Israeli, and other international attempts
to create alternative governance plans for the Gaza Strip.[20]
The groups may be referencing recent attempts by US, Israeli, and Arab
nations to advance plans that would reportedly install vetted
Palestinian or multinational forces to temporarily provide security and
stability in the Gaza Strip.[21]
The statement also called for reforming the Palestinian Authority and
Palestine Liberation Organization to include “all national components,”
likely referring to Hamas‘ intent to maintain influence over the
Palestinian unity government formed with Fatah in July 2024.[22]
It
is notable that the Hamas meeting in the Gaza Strip did not include
several prominent Palestinian militias. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ),
the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP), and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (DFLP) were not present at the meeting nor included in the
joint statement. These Palestinian militias have actively supported
Hamas operations in the Gaza Strip since October 2023.
The
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) announced on August 15 the
death of an IRGC Aerospace Force colonel from injuries sustained in an
airstrike in Syria.[23] IRGC
Commander Major Hossein Salami stated that the colonel, Ahmad Reza
Afshari, was transferred to Iran between July 22 and August 5 for
medical treatment before he died.[24]
Iranian state media reported that the US-led International Coalition
was responsible for the airstrike that ultimately killed Afshari but did
not provide further details.[25]
The
killing of Ashari reflects the increasingly prominent role that the
IRGC Aerospace Force has adopted in Iranian extraterritorial operations
in recent years.[26]
The IRGC Aerospace Force is the principal operator of the Iranian drone
and missile arsenal and has had traditionally little involvement in
operations alongside the Axis of Resistance. But the IRGC Aerospace
Force has adopted some responsibility—in cooperation with the IRGC Quds
Force—for transferring drones and missiles to and through Syria.[27]
This expanding role of the IRGC Aerospace Force appears to have
accelerated since the United States killed Qassem Soleimani in 2020.[28]
Key Takeaways:
Gaza Strip
Axis of Resistance objectives:
The IDF 252nd Division continued to operate around the Netzarim Corridor on August 15. Israeli forces, including the IDF Air Force, killed a cell of Palestinian fighters and destroyed a weapons depot in the area.[29]
PIJ, the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, and the Martyr Abdul Qader al
Husseini Brigades—a splinter group of the al Aqsa Martyrs’
Brigades—fired rockets targeted Israeli forces there as well.[30]
The IDF 98th Division continued clearing operations in Khan Younis on August 15. The 98th Division forces and IDF Air Force killed several Palestinian fighters in a Hamas weapons depot.[31]
The IDF Air Force also struck and killed a PIJ fighter who fired
unspecified projectiles at Israeli forces and into southern Israel.[32] PIJ mortared Israeli forces near al Maari School in al Qarara.[33] Hamas said that it launched a drone targeting Israeli forces east of Khan Younis.[34]
The IDF issued evacuation orders for al Qarara, north of Khan Younis, on August 15.[35] The
IDF said that it would forcefully act against militia elements there
due to Hamas and other militias’ continuous rocket fire from the area.[36] The IDF ordered evacuations from these zones of al Qarara on August 8 before starting its re-clearing operation in Khan Younis.[37]
The IDF 162nd Division continued to operate in Rafah on August 15. The IDF Givati and Nahal brigades directed airstrikes that killed 20 fighters who posed a threat to Israeli forces in the area.[38] Israeli forces also destroyed a building where a tunnel shaft was being constructed.[39]
The
IDF Yahalom Engineering Corps and 605th Battalion have operated along
the Philadelphi Corridor in Rafah over the past month to identify and
destroy underground militia infrastructure.[40] Israeli forces located about 50 Hamas tunnels and underground routes along the corridor in this time.[41] The IDF did not specify how many of these tunnels were cross-border routes connecting Egypt and the Gaza Strip.
The
IDF Air Force have struck over 30 Hamas infrastructure targets over the
past day, including rigged buildings, underground infrastructures, and
weapons depots.[42]
Hamas fired rockets from the Khan Younis area targeting Israeli forces in southern Israel on August 15.[43] The IDF said that two rockets fell in open areas near Kissufim.[44]
Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.
West Bank
Axis of Resistance objectives:
The IDF conducted a “counterterrorism” operation in Nablus overnight on August 14.[45] The
al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired small arms and detonated improvised
explosive devices (IED) targeting the IDF in three locations in Nablus
during the operation.[46]
The IDF conducted a drone strike killing one Hamas fighter and one
fighter from the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades in the Balata refugee camp in
Nablus.[47] Hamas and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades acknowledged the deaths of the two fighters.[48]
Israeli
Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich said on August 14 that Israel
published plans for a new Israeli settlement in the West Bank.[49] Smotrich
said that the new settlement, Nachal Heletz, will comprise part of the
Gush Etzion settlement and connect the area with Jerusalem. Smotrich
said in June 2024 that Israel agreed to legalize five new settlements in
the West Bank and approved plans to build thousands of new settlement
homes there.[50]
This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.
Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights
Axis of Resistance objectives:
- Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
- Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
- Expel the United States from Syria
Iranian-backed
militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least nine
attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on August
14.[51] Iranian-backed
militias fired at least one drone and two rocket barrages into northern
Israel and the Golan Heights on August 15.[52] The IDF intercepted the drone and some of the rockets, and the rest of the rockets fell in open areas.[53]
Israeli
forces have conducted exercises over the past week at the Haifa Naval
Base to increase military readiness in northern Israel.[54] The
IDF 146th Division, 9th Brigade, Home Front Command’s Search and Rescue
Brigade, and Israeli police participated in the drills. The IDF said
that the exercises simulated “defense and attack scenarios in the
northern maritime space.”
Iran and the Axis of Resistance
The
Iraqi Foreign Affairs Ministry released a statement claiming that the
announcement of the end of the US-led coalition’s mission to defeat ISIS
has been postponed due to “recent developments.”[55]
The statement confirmed that the US-Iraqi Higher Military Committee’s
recent focus has been to assess the danger of ISIS in Iraq so that
coalition advisers of “all nationalities” would leave Iraq and
coalition’s mission would end.[56]
The statement added that the date of the announcement and other
logistical elements must still be determined, but an Iraqi foreign
ministry official told Reuters that the announcement on the end of the
“coalition’s presence” will likely occur in early September 2024.[57]
The ministry’s statement was a direct response to an “inaccurate
answer” given by US State Department spokesperson Vedant Patel to a
journalist’s question about the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq during
an August 12 press briefing.[58]
Patel clarified that the United States is in discussion regarding a
“bilateral security partnership” with the Iraqi federal government but
denied discussions about a US withdrawal. The Iraqi Foreign Affairs
Ministry clarified that US forces are only present in Iraq as military
advisers within the coalition.[59]
The US Treasury Department sanctioned on August 15 several entities for their involvement in shipping Iranian commodities.[60] These
commodities include oil and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) to Yemen and
the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on behalf of IRGC Quds Force and the
Houthis. The United States has also designated Hong Kong-based Kai Heng
Long Global Energy Limited for its role in shipping tens of millions of
US dollars worth of Iranian LPG to Lebanese Hezbollah through the
Hezbollah-controlled Talaqi Group.
The US-sanctioned entities are the following:
Houthi Shipping:
Hezbollah LPG Shipments:
Chinese Ambassador to Iran Cong Pei Wu discussed Sino-Iranian relations in an interview with Iranian state media on August 14.[62] The
ambassador stated that Iran and China are “important strategic
partners” and highlighted that China is Iran’s biggest trading partner.
The ambassador hailed efforts to expand Sino-Iranian cooperation through
multilateral institutions, such as the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO). The ambassador also called on Israel to “avoid
escalating tensions” in the Middle East. These comments echo Chinese
Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Yi’s remarks about the strategic value of
Sino-Iranian relations during a phone call with Iranian Acting Foreign
Affairs Minister Ali Bagheri Kani on August 12. Wang Yi stated that
China supports Iran’s right to defend its “sovereignty, security, and
national dignity” and claimed that Israel killing Hamas Political Bureau
Chairman Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran “undermined regional peace and
stability.”[63]
Iranian Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi visited Saravan city, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on August 15.[64]
Vahidi noted significant improvements in migration and transportation
at the Mirjaveh crossing on the Iran-Pakistan border. The Artesh and Law
Enforcement Command Border Guard are continuing efforts to secure the
southeastern border region amid an uptick in anti-regime militancy there
since December 2023.[65]
These security initiatives include Law Enforcement Commander Brigadier
General Ahmed Reza Radan's announcement on August 7 that Iran plans to
deport all illegal migrants by the end of the current Persian calendar
year, which ends in March 2025.[66]
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian appointed Kamel Taghavi Nejad as the secretary of his cabinet of ministers on August 12.[67] Taghavi Nejad previously served as the CEO of Sepah Bank and headed the Iranian National Tax Administration.[68] Ali Bahadori Jahromi previously held this role under President Ebrahim Raisi.[69]
[1] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/31/world/middleeast/iran-orders-attack-israel.html?smid=url-share ; https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/27512/ ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-leaders-order-harshly-punish-israel-will-be-carried-out-guards-deputy-chief-2024-08-09/ ; https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/683579 ; www.iribnews dot ir/fa/news/4296884
[2]
https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/681848/ ; https://defapress dot
ir/fa/news/684267 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot
com/fa/news/1403/05/21/3138094
[3] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/05/24/3139860
[4] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/us-says-iran-attack-may-come-soon-and-with-no-warning-but-no-definitive-info/
[5] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/us-iran-missteps-middle-east-conflict-455c0be4?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1
[6]
https://www.iranintl.com/en/202404105217 ;
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-khamenei-says-israel-must-be-punished-syria-embassy-attack-2024-04-10/
[7] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-leaders-order-harshly-punish-israel-will-be-carried-out-guards-deputy-chief-2024-08-09/ ; https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/683579 ; https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/27512/
[8] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-faces-new-challenges-as-potential-iran-attack-on-israel-nears-8af9309a?mod=world_lead_story ; https://www.axios.com/2024/08/12/iran-israel-white-house-us-intelligence-attack
[9] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/only-gaza-ceasefire-can-delay-irans-israel-response-sources-say-2024-08-13/
[10] https://www.axios.com/2024/08/13/iran-israel-attack-gaza-hostage-ceasefire-deal-biden
[11] https://www.cnn.com/2024/08/13/middleeast/gaza-ceasefire-talks-resume-main-obstacles-intl/index.html ; https://www.axios.com/2024/08/14/gaza-ceasefire-hostage-deal-talks-us-pressure
[12]
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/08/08/joint-statement-from-the-leaders-of-the-united-states-egypt-and-qatar/
[13] https://t.me/hamaswestbank/52928
[14]
https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/08/13/world/israel-iran-hamas-gaza-war?smid=url-share#hamas-sends-the-signal-a-breakthrough-is-unlikely-in-negotiations
[15] https://www.axios.com/2024/08/14/gaza-ceasefire-hostage-deal-talks-us-pressure
[16] https://t.me/hamaswestbank/52975
[17] https://t.me/hamaswestbank/52975 ; https://t.me/hamaswestbank/52928
[18] https://t.me/hamaswestbank/52975
[19] https://t.me/hamaswestbank/52975
[20] https://t.me/hamaswestbank/52975
[21]
https://www.iswresearch.org/2024/07/iran-update-july-23-2024.html ;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-25-2024
[22] https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/china-hamas-fatah-declaration-ending-decadeslong-rift-israel-hamas-war-rcna163166
[23] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/05/25/3142270
[24] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/05/25/3142275
[25] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/05/25/3142275
[26] https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Pivot-to-Offense-How-Iran-Is-Adapting-for-Modern-Conflict-and-Warfare.pdf
[27] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-11-2023
[28] https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Pivot-to-Offense-How-Iran-Is-Adapting-for-Modern-Conflict-and-Warfare.pdf
[29] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1823979260949729497
[30] https://t.me/nedalps/4357, https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7105, https://t.me/sarayaps/18475
[31] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1823979256939991242
[32] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1823979256939991242
[33] https://t.me/sarayaps/18474
[34] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2931
[35] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1823989077600833709
[36] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1823989077600833709
[37] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1821501809824854077
[38] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1823979225545654404
[39] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1823979225545654404
[40] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1824070121331040628
[41] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1824070121331040628; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1824073197509087406 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/12896
[42] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1823979260949729497
[43] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2930; https://t.me/moriahdoron/12879
[44] https://t.me/moriahdoron/12879
[45] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1823932168118149470
[46] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7097; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7099; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7100
[47] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1823932168118149470; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-drone-kills-two-palestinian-gunmen-west-bank-military-says-2024-08-15/
[48] https://t.me/hamaswestbank/52983; https://t.me/hamaswestbank/52982; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7102
[49] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-publishes-plan-new-west-bank-settlement-regional-tensions-simmer-2024-08-14/
[50]
htttps://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-808129;
https://www.timesofisrael dot
com/cabinet-okays-legalizing-5-outposts-sanctioning-pa-officials-minister-says/
[51] https://t.me/mmirleb/6114; https://t.me/mmirleb/6116; https://t.me/mmirleb/6118; https://t.me/mmirleb/6120; https://t.me/mmirleb/6105; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1823810148001046935; https://t.me/mmirleb/6123; https://t.me/mmirleb/6125; https://t.me/mmirleb/6127
[52] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/drone-and-over-25-rockets-fired-by-hezbollah-at-north-no-casualties-idf/; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/firefighters-battling-blaze-in-north-sparked-by-hezbollah-rocket-attack/
[53] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/drone-and-over-25-rockets-fired-by-hezbollah-at-north-no-casualties-idf/; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/firefighters-battling-blaze-in-north-sparked-by-hezbollah-rocket-attack/
[54] www.idf dot il/223785
[55]
https://ina dot
iq/eng/34165-due-to-recent-eventsthe-international-coalition-missions-end-announcement-will-be-postponed-said-mofa.html
[56]
https://ina dot
iq/eng/34165-due-to-recent-eventsthe-international-coalition-missions-end-announcement-will-be-postponed-said-mofa.html
[57]
https://ina dot
iq/eng/34165-due-to-recent-eventsthe-international-coalition-missions-end-announcement-will-be-postponed-said-mofa.html;
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraq-says-announcement-date-end-us-led-coalition-mission-postponed-2024-08-15/
[58] https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-august-14-2024/#post-579199-IRAQ
[59]
https://ina dot
iq/eng/34165-due-to-recent-eventsthe-international-coalition-missions-end-announcement-will-be-postponed-said-mofa.html
[60] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2538
[61] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2125
[62] www.mehrnews dot com/news/6196738
[63] https://www.reuters.com/world/china-supports-iran-defending-security-says-foreign-minister-2024-08-11/
[64] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/684892
[65] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-august-14-2024 ; https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/808986 ; https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/680114/ ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-july-24-2024 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-4-2024
[66]
https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-august-13-2024 ;
https://www.radiofarda dot
com/a/iranian-police-and-illegal-immigrants/33068841.html
[67] https://www.imna dot ir/news/780351
[68] https://www.imna dot ir/news/780351
[69] https://www.isna dot ir/news/1403052416638
