Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, and Alexander Richter of the Institute for the Study of War;Alexis Turek of the American Enterprise Institute
Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute
Data Cutoff: August 12, 2024 at 5pm ET
The
China–Taiwan Weekly Update is a joint product from the Institute for
the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute. The update
supports the ISW–AEI Coalition Defense of Taiwan project, which assesses
Chinese campaigns against Taiwan, examines alternative strategies for
the United States and its allies to deter the Chinese Communist Party’s
(CCP) aggression, and—if necessary—defeat the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA). The update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to
controlling Taiwan and cross–Taiwan Strait developments.
Key Takeaways
- The PRC released four members of a Taiwanese fishing boat on August 13, whom it detained near Kinmen on July 2. The crew’s release does not indicate a change in the PRC’s long-term coercion campaign against Taiwan, however.
- The PRC exempted Fujian residents from a travel ban covering Taiwan’s Matsu islands, possibly to make decoupling from the PRC a politically unpopular policy among Matsu residents.
- ROC officials warned that PRC outreach to religious groups in Taiwan is a national security risk.
- The PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused the National Endowment for Democracy of carrying out subversive activities against the PRC under the guise of democracy promotion.
- The PLA Air Force conducted unsafe and unprofessional maneuvers while intercepting a Philippine military transport plane over Scarborough Shoal. This was the first time that the Philippine–PRC disputes in the South China Sea led to an aerial confrontation.
- The PRC reiterated its support for Iran and called for Israel to end the war in Gaza following the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh.
Cross-Strait Relations
Taiwan
The PRC released four members of a Taiwanese fishing boat on August 13, whom it detained near Kinmen on July 2.[1] The crew’s release does not indicate a change in the PRC’s long-term coercion campaign against Taiwan, however. The
PRC continues to hold the Taiwanese captain of the crew and the boat,
with no confirmed date for their release. The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG)
detained the crew and boat for fishing in PRC waters during a seasonal
fishing moratorium. The crew’s release comes after the PRC and ROC made
progress in resolving the handling of the February 14 capsizing
incident, in which two PRC fishermen died while fleeing from a Taiwanese
Coast Guard pursuit near Kinmen. Kinmen is a group of Taiwan-controlled
islands with a large military garrison roughly 3 kilometers from the
coast of the PRC. The July 30 deal concludes lengthy backchannel
negotiations that stalled in early March, resulting in the ROC returning
the bodies of the deceased and paying restitution to their families.
The PRC released a Taiwanese former soldier that it held for nearly five
months on August 7 after the deal.[2]
Since
the February 14 capsizing incident, the CCG has conducted frequent
violations of Taiwan’s maritime jurisdiction in the waters around
Kinmen, which peaked in May around President Lai’s inauguration. Several
commercial PRC drones have also flown over Kinmen in recent months.[3]
This phenomenon has previously occurred during periods of high
cross-strait tensions, which suggests that it is a PRC-directed gray
zone warfare activity.[4]
The
capsizing incident triggered the PRC’s aggression around Kinmen, but
its coercive actions are part of a broader campaign to exert pressure on
Taiwan after the election of President Lai Ching-te. Since Lai’s
election, the PRC has conducted large-scale military exercises that
encircled Taiwan, nearly brought Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)
incursions to an all-time high, and announced legal guidelines that
threaten severe punishment for Taiwanese “separatists.”
The
PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) lodged diplomatic objections to
Japan’s detention of two ROC-registered fishing vessels on behalf of
Taiwan and denied the ROC government’s legitimacy. The Japanese
Fisheries Agency vessel detained an ROC fishing vessel on July 5 for
illegally fishing 1.5 nautical miles past a “designated enforcement
line” near Amami Oshima.[5]
The Japanese Coast Guard detained a second ROC fishing vessel on July
28 for illegally fishing inside Japan’s territorial waters near
Yonaguni.[6] Japanese authorities subsequently fined and released both vessels within two days of detention.[7]
The
PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) stated on August 9 that “Japan
has no right to take law enforcement measures against “Chinese fishing
vessels,” citing the China-Japan Fisheries Agreement.[8]
The PRC and Japan signed the agreement in 1975, which outlines
procedures for dispute settlements and fishing regulations in
agreed-upon waters.[9]
The ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) rebuked the PRC’s
interference and said that this case is a maritime matter between Taiwan
and Japan. MOFA stated that the matter has been resolved in accordance
with international maritime regulations and bilateral mechanisms. [10]
The PRC uses international dialogue to act as a voice for Taiwan and deny the legitimacy of the ROC government.[11]
The PRC Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN Geng Shuang thanked
the international community for its “sympathy and concern” on April 3
after Taiwan experienced a damaging earthquake.[12]
The ROC MOFA condemned “China’s shameless behavior” and stated that
“only Taiwan’s democratically elected government can represent Taiwan’s
23.5 million people internationally.”[13]
The
PRC exempted Fujian residents from a travel ban covering Taiwan’s Matsu
islands, possibly to make decoupling from the PRC a politically
unpopular policy among Matsu residents. Matsu (officially
Lienchiang County) is a Taiwan-controlled group of islands 10 kilometers
off the mainland coast at their closest point and home to roughly
13,000 people. The first mainland tour group since 2019 arrived in Matsu
on August 9. The PRC suspended individual tourism to Taiwan in 2019,
citing poor cross-strait relations.[14]
It then suspended group tours to Taiwan in 2020 during the pandemic and
maintained the restrictions on Taiwan despite resuming group travel to
more than 70 countries in August 2023.[15]
Matsu
is the target of a series of PRC economic integration programs that
likely aim to foster the islands’ economic dependence on the mainland
and build political support for cross-strait integration. The Fujian
provincial government in the PRC announced on April 28 the “Fuzhou-Matsu
City Pass,” a 300 RMB (approximately 42 USD) benefits card that
facilitates the travel and settlement of Matsu residents in Fuzhou, the
capital of Fujian province.[16]
The card offers Matsu residents discounted rides on transportation and
hotels in Fuzhou, free tours of Fuzhou's major cultural attractions,
housing benefits, and dedicated hotline consultation for children's
education, employment, and entrepreneurship. The Fujian government also
announced that it will promote the construction of transportation and
industrial infrastructure, such as airports, high-speed rails, highways,
and ports, to increase connectivity between Fuzhou and Matsu. The PRC
announced another batch of policies on May 16 that aim to strengthen
economic integration with trade, investment, and employment incentives.[17]
Tourism
is an important source of revenue for Matsu to offset lesser military
presence after significant force reductions in the past two decades,
which shrunk the county’s military garrison to just 2,000 people from
20,000.[18]
Lienchiang County Director of Transportation and Tourism Liu
Hsing-chien stated Matsu received approximately 22,000 tourists from the
PRC in 2019, representing approximately 10% of total tourist arrivals.[19]
Professor Huang Cheng-tsung of Providence University’s Department of
Tourism in Taiwan estimated that the potential daily tourism revenue
would be 260,000 USD if the islands’ hotels reached full capacity.[20]
ROC officials warned that PRC outreach to religious groups in Taiwan is a national security risk. President
Lai Ching-te spoke at a Buddhist temple in Taichung on August 9 and
warned that the PRC is using religious pretenses to lure Taiwanese
people to the mainland.[21] Lai stated that the exchanges are a risk to national security and urged people not to let the PRC swindle them. Taiwan’s
Ministry of Interior (MOI) warned on August 10 that an account on the
popular messaging platform LINE may be a CCP front carrying out United
Front activities.[22]
The United Front is a whole-of-government and society effort to advance
the CCP’s ideology and win the hearts and minds of Chinese-ethnic
people by forming a thorough alliance between the CCP and the rest of
society. The MOI stated that it contacted the Taiwan Taoist Provincial
Church, the supposed parent organization, which denied that it had
established a cross-strait youth league. Former Mainland Affairs Council
(MAC) Minister Chiu Tai-san stated in October 2023 that religious
exchanges enable the CCP to collect information on Taiwanese people and
learn which people hold influence in certain communities.[23]
The PRC Ministry of State Security (MSS) claimed it destroyed Taiwanese espionage networks in the PRC. The
MSS posted on the social media WeChat on August 13 that it discovered
over 1,000 instances of Taiwanese espionage during major operations in
recent years. It said that it severely punished “spies who carried out
intelligence theft, infiltration, and sabotage activities.” It
specifically mentioned Taiwanese political activist Yang Chih-yuan, who
was detained in August 2022 in Wenzhou, Zhejiang province, and charged
with secessionism in 2023. The MSS accused Yang of being a “Taiwan
independence” leader and claimed his arrest was a “heavy blow [and] a
strong deterrent” to Taiwanese pro-independence “separatists.”[24]
The MSS post is part of a trend of PRC crackdowns on Taiwanese
“separatism” following Lai Ching-te’s presidential election victory in
January and inauguration in May. The PRC released an authoritative
“legal opinion” in June that threatened “Taiwan independence diehards”
with penalties up to life imprisonment and death. The Taiwan Affairs
Office and Ministry of Public Security added website sections on August 7
with information about Taiwanese “separatism” and how to report it to
authorities. They included the names of ten Taiwanese political figures
that the PRC designated “Taiwan independence diehards” in 2021 and 2022.
China
The
PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) accused the National Endowment
for Democracy (NED) of carrying out subversive activities against the
PRC under the guise of democracy promotion. The MFA released a
report on August 9 entitled “The National Endowment for Democracy: What
it is and what it does,” accusing the NED of implementing US
government-supported infiltration, subversion, and sabotage operations
around the world.[25]
The NED is a US non-governmental organization focused on promoting
democracy around the world that receives a portion of its funding from
the US Congress. In 2019 the MFA released a report accusing the NED of
being a front for US intelligence operations and funding anti-PRC groups
in Hong Kong.[26]
The NED was one of several US NGOs to be sanctioned by the PRC for
“instigating extremely violent criminal activities” in Hong Kong.
The
most recent MFA report accuses the NED of instigating “color
revolutions,” cultivating pro-US forces in foreign countries,
interfering in foreign elections, and working to undermine stability in
foreign states. The MFA accuses the NED of working to “incite division”
within the PRC by supporting Taiwan independence forces, colluding with
anti-China forces in Hong Kong, providing support to a number of Uyghur
activists and organizations, and meeting with the Tibetan
government-in-exile. The MFA accuses the NED of engaging in subversion
utilizing a number of capabilities in the information, economic,
diplomatic, and political domains for the purpose of inciting change in
unfriendly regimes. Representatives from the NED have not released a
statement responding to the MFA’s accusations.
Southeast Asia
Philippines
The
PLA Air Force (PLAAF) conducted unsafe and unprofessional maneuvers
while intercepting a Philippine military transport plane over
Scarborough Shoal. This was the first time that Philippine–PRC disputes
in the South China Sea led to an aerial confrontation. Philippine
military officials stated that two PLAAF aircraft flew very close to a
Philippine Air Force (PAF) light transport plane that was on patrol near
Scarborough Shoal on August 8 and launched at least eight flares in the
flight path of the PAF plane, putting the plane at risk.[27]
The Philippines’ National Task Force for the West Philippine Sea
condemned the PLA’s “irresponsible, unprofessional, illegal and
dangerous acts” and called on the PRC to cease “all forms of provocative
and hazardous acts that could undermine the safety of Filipino military
and civilian personnel in the waters or in the skies, destabilize
regional peace, and erode the trust and confidence of the international
community in the PRC.”[28] The Philippines filed a diplomatic protest against Beijing on August 13 over the incident.[29]
PRC
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Lin Jian claimed the
Philippines intruded into the “adjacent airspace of Huangyan Dao”
(Scarborough Shoal) on August 7 and August 8, which infringed on PRC
sovereignty and international law. He claimed the PLA took “necessary
and lawful measures in response” and called the PLAAF maneuvers
“professional” and “consistent with Chinese and international law.” Lin
accused the Philippines of sending its aircraft into Scarborough Shoal’s
airspace as a “deliberate provocation” during a joint patrol with US,
Australian, and Canadian forces in the South China Sea.[30]
A statement from the PLA’s Southern Theater Command, which is
responsible for the South China Sea, likewise accused the Philippines of
illegally intruding into PRC airspace and said that the incursion
disrupted a PLA training exercise.[31]
The
PRC and the Philippines both claim Scarborough Shoal as their
territory. The PRC has maintained de facto control of the shoal since
2012 but has not built any infrastructure on it. The PRC conducted a
joint air and sea combat patrol around Scarborough Shoal on August 7 on
the same day as the Philippines, United States, Canada, and Australia
held joint drills in the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).[32] The Philippine government said the PLA Navy sent three ships to tail its joint exercises with its partners.[33]
The aerial confrontation is the first since PRC–Philippine hostilities in the South China Sea began to heat up in 2023.[34]
Some Philippine and other Southeast Asian analysts assess that the PRC
may begin to employ military harassment and gray-zone tactics against
the Philippines in the aerial domain, in the latest escalation of the
two countries’ territorial disputes.[35]
Philippine Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Maria Theresa Lazaro said
the Philippines will review a provisional agreement the two sides
reached on July 22 regarding resupply missions in the South China Sea.
The provisional agreement, which Lazaro helped negotiate, was aimed at
de-escalating tensions in the South China Sea after a series of violent
confrontations surrounding Philippine missions to resupply soldiers at
Second Thomas Shoal, another South China Sea maritime feature that both
countries claim.[36] The PRC observed but did not impede a Philippine resupply mission to Second Thomas Shoal on July 27.[37]
Indonesia
The
PRC is taking steps to deepen diplomatic and defense ties with
Indonesia, likely to counter Western influence with the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The PRC held its first “2+2” diplomatic and military dialogue with Indonesia in Jakarta on August 12. PRC
Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Sun Weidong and Deputy Director of the
Office for International Military Cooperation of the Central Military
Commission Zhang Baoqun met with their Indonesian counterparts Abdul
Kadir Jailani, Director General of Asia-Pacific and African Affairs at
the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Brigadier General
Oktaheroe Ramsi, Secretary of the Directorate General for Defense
Strategy at the Indonesian Ministry of Defense. Sun also met with
Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi and Deputy Foreign Minister
Pahala Mansury on the same day. A PRC readout said the two sides
discussed diplomatic and defense strategic cooperation and reached a
series of “common understandings.” They also discussed issues of common
concern including management of differences in the South China Sea
through peaceful negotiations. The readout also said this inaugural 2+2
dialogue marks a new level of strategic mutual trust between the two
countries.[38]
The
PRC also has proposed naval sales to Indonesia in recent months.
Representatives from the China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC)
have traveled to Indonesia to propose discounted offers on PRC S26T
diesel-electric submarines (SSK) and guided-missile destroyers. The South China Morning Post
(SCMP) reported that the offer is in the “proposal” stage but would be
Indonesia’s largest purchase of PRC defense equipment if it goes
through. Indonesia has procured anti-ship missiles, drones, and
self-propelled air defense systems from the PRC. It has procured most of
its military equipment from France, Italy, Sweden, Belgium, the United
States, and South Korea, however. PRC-produced equipment has made up
less than 0.1% of Indonesia’s defense acquisitions since 2014. The SCMP
cited analysts who said Indonesia has been “lukewarm” about developing a
defense partnership with the PRC, even as its defense minister and
president-elect Prabowo Subianto has pushed for military modernization.[39]
Some
PRC media and analysts are presenting PRC–Indonesia cooperation as a
model of PRC–ASEAN relations in contrast to the hostile PRC–Philippines
relationship. PRC state-owned media Global Times cited Chen Xiangmiao,
director of the World Navy Research Center at the National Institute for
South China Sea Studies (NISCSS), who said the PRC and Indonesia were
likely to discuss negotiations on the South China Sea Code of Conduct.
NISCSS is a government-affiliated think tank. Chen said Indonesia was
concerned that tensions in the South China Sea, particularly between the
PRC and the US-aligned Philippines, may force members of ASEAN to
choose sides in the US–PRC geopolitical contest. He said Indonesia may
wish to play a mediating role in the South China Sea.[40]
Indonesia is a minor player in the multinational South China Sea
dispute, as its EEZ extending from the Natuna Islands overlaps with the
PRC’s Nine Dash Line claims that cover most of the South China Sea.[41]
Russia
The
PRC and Russia may begin barter trade to evade payment issues related
to Western sanctions on Russia. 98 percent of PRC banks are rejecting
payments in Chinese yuan from Russia. Reuters cited three
unspecified Russian sources who are closely involved in Russia–PRC trade
and payments, who claimed that the PRC and Russia expect to reach deals
involving barter trade as soon as this autumn. The sources said that
Russia is developing regulations for barter trading and assumed the PRC
is doing the same. One source said Russia is discussing ways to export
food products to the PRC using a barter system. Another source said
companies were discussing trading metal from Russia for machines from
the PRC. Barter trade circumvents the use of payment systems that
Western regulators monitor, allowing traders from the two countries to
do business without fear of stopped payments or secondary sanctions.
Unspecified Russian sources said that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s
visit to Beijing in May helped to facilitate alternative payment means
between the two countries to some extent, but major difficulties and
political problems remain.[42]
The
PRC and Russia’s attempts to implement barter trade show both the
effectiveness and the limits of Western-led sanctions on Russia over
Russia’s war in Ukraine. The PRC is Russia’s largest trading partner and
faces criticism for its support of Russia’s defense industrial base.
However, PRC banks have increased restrictions on trade with Russia
since at least December 2023, after the European Union imposed its 12th
sanctions package against Russia and the United States authorized
secondary sanctions on financial institutions that help Russia evade
sanctions. Three of the PRC’s “Big Four” state banks and many smaller
PRC banks began rejecting payments from sanctioned Russian financial
institutions since the start of 2024. Russian newspaper Izvestia reported on August 12 that 98% of PRC banks are now rejecting yuan payments from Russia.[43] Russian business newspaper Kommersant reported on July 29 that around 80 percent of payments in Chinese yuan are being returned to Russia.[44]
Besides bartering, Russian companies are being forced to use "trading
houses” as intermediaries or to make use of small local banks or
PRC-based subsidiaries of Russian banks that are not significantly
involved in trade with the United States. These workarounds enable some
trade but increase the cost and difficulty of trade compared to normal
transactions without sanctions.[45]
Iran
The
PRC reiterated its support for Iran and called for Israel to end the
war in Gaza following the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh.
Israel killed Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran
on July 30. The PRC condemned the assassination and expressed concern
that it would result in further regional upheaval.[46]
PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi called acting Iranian Foreign
Minister Ali Bagheri Kani on August 11 to reiterate the PRC’s support
for Iran’s defense of its sovereignty.[47]
Wang condemned the assassination, blaming those responsible for
undermining ceasefire negotiations and increasing tensions. Bagheri Kani
stated that he hoped the PRC would play a bigger role in de-escalating
tensions in Gaza.
Wang’s comments are part of a broader
PRC effort to more closely align itself with Iran. The PRC’s rhetoric
has remained consistent since the start of the war, centering on calls
for a ceasefire in Gaza and blaming Israel for the increase in regional
tensions.[48]
PRC responses to attacks on Israel have thus far been muted. Following
Iran’s April 13 strike on Israeli territory, the PRC MFA did not condemn
Iran’s strike, instead calling for Israel to bring an end to the
conflict in Gaza and avoid further spillover of conflict.[49]
The
PRC has used the Israel–Hamas war to build better relations with the
Arab States, likely to cement the PRC as a key player in the Middle East
and present itself as a potential economic and diplomatic partner for
states seeking to distance themselves from the US due to its alliance
with Israel. The PRC has been working to foster negotiations and peace
deals since the outbreak of conflict, with the most recent instance
being the July 23 signing of the Beijing Declaration between Hamas and
Fatah.[50]
The Arab League (AL) expressed support for the Beijing Declaration and
the PRC’s peace efforts. The AL stated that the PRC’s support for
Palestine was commendable and showed the strength of relations between
the Arab States and the PRC.[51]
Wang also had similar conversations with leaders in Egypt and Jordan,
calling for joint efforts to pursue de-escalation and ceasefire in Gaza.[52]
[1] https://focustaiwan dot tw/cross-strait/202408130017
[2] https://www.cna.com dot w/news/acn/202408070234.aspx
[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-may-30-2024
[4] https://indsr dot org.tw/respublicationcon?uid=12&resid=1912&pid=3403&typeid=3
[5] https://focustaiwan.tw/society/202407050013
[6] https://focustaiwan.tw/society/202407290010
[7] https://en.rti.org.tw/news/view/id/2011496
[8] https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202408/t20240809_11468833.shtml
[9] https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/LIS-70.pdf
[10] https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202408090346.aspx
[11] https://apnews.com/article/taiwan-earthquake-tsunami-f086aac0c3082036d1ca77c01828fb28
[12] http://un.china-mission.gov.cn/hyyfy/202404/t20240404_11276438.htm
[13] https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4630741
[14] https://www.nia dot gov.cn/n794014/n1050181/n1050489/c1118378/content.html
[15] https://zwgk.mct dot gov.cn/zfxxgkml/scgl/202308/t20230810_946592.html
[16] https://www.fuzhou dot gov.cn/zwgk/gzdt/rcyw/202405/t20240509_4821118.htm
[17] http://www.gwytb dot gov.cn/m/jljw/202405/t20240516_12620736.htm
[18] https://www.storm dot mg/article/4646471
[19] https://udn dot com/news/story/124023/7929208#:~:text=%E5%8A%89%E6%80%A7%E8%AC%99%E8%A1%A8%E7%A4%BA%EF%BC%8C%E4%BB%A52019%E5%B9%B4,%E5%B0%B1%E4%B8%8D%E9%96%8B%E6%94%BE%E9%99%B8%E5%AE%A2%E3%80%82
[20] https://udn dot com/news/story/124023/7928859
[21] https://www.cna dot com.tw/news/aipl/202408090203.aspx
[22] https://www.moi dot gov.tw./News_Content.aspx?n=4&s=318807
[23] https://news.ltn dot com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4475914
[24] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/politics/article/3274300/beijings-spy-agency-destroyed-large-number-taiwan-intelligence-networks?module=top_story&pgtype=section
[25] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/eng/xw/wjbxw/202408/t20240809_11468618.html
[26] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/china-announces-sanctions-against-us-based-nonprofits-in-response-to-congresss-hong-kong-legislation/2019/12/02/9f414616-14e0-11ea-80d6-d0ca7007273f_story.html
[27] https://apnews.com/article/south-china-sea-disputed-scarborough-shoal-philippines-0c8efebe75799482ea01f907cac38131
[28] https://x.com/jaytaryela/status/1822881622360019260
[29] https://apnews.com/article/south-china-sea-disputed-scarborough-shoal-philippines-0c8efebe75799482ea01f907cac38131
[30] https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/mfa_eng/xw/fyrbt/fyrbt/202408/t20240813_11471923.html
[31] http://www.news dot cn/politics/20240810/4d5906ffb20a47b1a0d0dce848b81845/c.html
[32] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-holds-joint-combat-patrol-near-scarborough-shoal-south-china-sea-2024-08-07/
[33] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/philippines-us-australia-canada-hold-first-joint-exercises-south-china-sea-2024-08-07/
[34] https://apnews.com/article/south-china-sea-disputed-scarborough-shoal-philippines-0c8efebe75799482ea01f907cac38131
[35] https://www.scmp dot com/week-asia/politics/article/3274215/south-china-sea-how-will-manila-answer-beijing-shifts-tactics-water-sky
[36] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/philippines-says-chinese-air-force-actions-scarborough-shoal-coercive-aggressive-2024-08-13/
[37] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/philippines-completes-first-south-china-sea-resupply-mission-since-deal-with-2024-07-27/
[38] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/wjbxw_new/202408/t20240813_11471968.shtml
[39] https://www.scmp dot com/week-asia/politics/article/3273869/china-floats-submarine-offer-indonesia-geopolitical-calculations-weigh?module=top_story&pgtype=section
https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2024/03/11/next-indonesian-president-may-be-boon-to-military-buildup-expert-says/
[40] https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202408/1317907.shtml
[41] https://www.channelnewsasia dot com/asia/indonesia-china-natuna-islands-tensions-south-china-sea-geopolitics-3676876
[42] https://www.reuters.com/markets/first-russia-china-barter-trade-may-come-this-autumn-sources-say-2024-08-08/
https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-china-find-payments-workaround-us-sanctions-net-widens-sources-say-2024-06-20/
[43] https://www.newsweek.com/chinese-banks-turn-away-russian-traders-1938330
https://iz dot ru/export/google/amp/1741316
[44] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6863025
[45] https://www.newsweek.com/china-russia-ruble-yuan-banks-return-decline-transactions-1931494
https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6863025
[46] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/202408/t20240801_11464132.html
[47] https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3274087/china-voices-support-irans-sovereignty-assassinations-aftermath?campaign=3274087&module=perpetual_scroll_0&pgtype=article
[48] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/tracking-chinese-statements-hamas-israel-conflict
[49] https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202404/t20240414_11281441.shtml
https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202407/t20240723_11458788.html#:~:text=On%20July%2023%2C%202024%2C%20Member,Ending%20Division%20and%20Strengthening%20Palestinian
[51] https://english.news dot cn/20240725/de59b5a603d646f3938c8d377b1e4141/c.html;
https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202408/1317537.shtml
