Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, and Alexandros Tsipouras of the Institute for the Study of War
Alexis Turek of the American Enterprise Institute
Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute
Data Cutoff: July 31, 2024
The
China–Taiwan Weekly Update is a joint product from the Institute for
the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute. The update
supports the ISW–AEI Coalition Defense of Taiwan project, which assesses
Chinese campaigns against Taiwan, examines alternative strategies for
the United States and its allies to deter the Chinese Communist Party’s
(CCP) aggression, and—if necessary—defeat the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA). The update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to
controlling Taiwan and cross–Taiwan Strait developments.
Key Takeaways
Cross-Strait Relations
Taiwan
The
PRC attempted to prevent legislators from at least six countries from
attending an international parliamentary forum that works to counter the
Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) actions to subvert the international
order and democratic principles. The Inter-Parliamentary
Alliance on China (IPAC) was established in 2020 by a group of
legislators from the Five Eyes, Germany, Japan, Norway, and Sweden to
form a coordinated response between democracies to challenges that the
PRC’s expanding global influence poses to the free, open, and
rules-based international order.[1] IPAC holds an annual summit, which
Taiwan hosted this year. IPAC members at this year’s summit in Taiwan
launched the 2758 Initiative, which pledges to advocate for resolutions
in members’ home parliaments that counter the PRC’s efforts to suppress
Taiwan’s status and representation in the international community.[2]
The 2758 Initiative also serves as a joint statement that addresses the
PRC’s distortion of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758,
which established the PRC as the sole representative of China in the UN
in 1971, replacing Taiwan. The initiative highlights that the PRC
misrepresents UNGA 2758 as an international legal decision against
Taiwan’s participation in international organizations.
Eight
member legislators from Bolivia, Bosnia, Colombia, North Macedonia,
Slovakia, and an unspecified Asian country claimed that PRC diplomatic
officials contacted them before they traveled to Taipei and in some
cases attempted to prevent them from attending.[3] Some lawmakers
received inquiries about their plans to attend while others received
requests for meetings that would interfere with their travel plans. One
PRC diplomat contacted the head of the Bosnian Naša Stranka party to
prevent lawmaker Sanela Klarić from attending the IPAC summit.[4] These
actions are part of the PRC’s efforts to diplomatically isolate Taiwan,
degrade Taiwan’s legitimacy on the world stage, and facilitate
unification with Taiwan without resistance from the international
community.
PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson
Lin Jian responded to the reports of interference by condemning IPAC for
“maliciously hyping up issues and spring rumors about China.”[5] Lin
urged the attending parliamentarians to “abandon their ideological
prejudices” and expressed the PRC’s opposition to interference in its
internal affairs by conducting official exchanges with Taiwan.
IPAC
has been the target of PRC subversion in the past. The United States
indicted six PRC nationals affiliated with a Ministry of State Security
(MSS)-backed cyber threat actor Advanced Persistent Threat 31 (APT31)
for malign hacking activities that included inundating IPAC members from
European Parliament and the UK with emails that transmitted data back
to the PRC when opened.[6] The PRC has also sanctioned some members of
IPAC.[7]
2024 marks was first year that Taiwan was able to
formally join the organization, as a legislature’s representation
requires two co-chairs from “ideologically diverse political parties.”
Taiwan joined with co-chairs from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)
and the smaller Taiwan People’s Party (TPP). No legislators from the
Kuomintang (KMT), the main opposition party, have sought membership.
IPAC welcomed members from six other new countries this year, bringing
the total membership to 250 lawmakers from 40 parliaments.[8]
The
PRC and ROC made progress in resolving the handling of the February 14
capsizing incident. The deal is unlikely to result in the PRC decreasing
coercive actions against Kinmen. A PRC fishing boat capsized
in Taiwanese waters near Kinmen while fleeing from a legal Taiwan Coast
Guard pursuit, resulting in the death of two PRC fishermen. Kinmen is a
group of Taiwan-controlled islands with a large military garrison
roughly 3 kilometers from the coast of the PRC.[9] The PRC pledged after
the incident to strengthen law enforcement activities around Kinmen and
has since conducted repeated violations of Kinmen’s maritime boundaries
to normalize the presence of Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) ships. The PRC’s
violations have become more frequent over time and have expanded to
include other maritime agency-affiliated vessels and even naval
ships.[10]
The ROC agreed to return the bodies of the
deceased and pay restitution to their families. The details of the
accident will be handed over to a third party for investigation. CGA
Deputy Director-General Hsieh Ching-chin stated that the details of the
deal were not public out of respect for the victims’ families.[11]
Taiwan
has a stake in negotiations, including several ROC nationals detained
in the PRC. The Chairman of the MAC Chiu Chui-cheng stated that the SEF
is lobbying the PRC for the immediate release of the Taiwanese fishing
boat and its two Taiwanese crew members after the PRC detained them for
fishing in PRC waters on July 2.[12] The PRC has also kept an ROC
soldier from Kinmen in detainment since March after his boat ran out of
fuel and drifted into PRC waters.
Representatives from the
Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), Coast Guard Administration (CGA), and
Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) led Taiwan’s negotiating party. The
Deputy Director of the Quanzhou Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau Affairs
Office Li Zhaohui led the PRC side. PRC readouts referred to Li only as a
member of the Red Cross Society, however, as the PRC halted official
contact with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government in Taiwan
in 2016. The PRC alleges that the DPP is a separatist party.
The
resolution to the capsizing dispute is unlikely to result in a
de-escalation of the PRC’s erosion of ROC sovereignty around Kinmen. The
PRC’s activities around Kinmen foreshadow efforts to gradually wrest
control of Taiwan’s sea and air space. The capsizing incident triggered
the PRC’s aggression around Kinmen, but its coercive actions are part of
a broader campaign to exert pressure on Taiwan after the election of
President Lai Ching-te. Since Lai’s election, the PRC has conducted
large-scale military exercises that encircled Taiwan, near all-time high
Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) incursions, and announced legal
guidelines that threaten severe punishment for Taiwanese “separatists.”
The
PRC conducted at least 439 military incursions into Taiwan’s Air
Defense Identification Zone in July 2024, surpassing all previous months
except August 2022. PLA aircraft entered Taiwan’s ADIZ every
day of July except the four days of July 24-27, when Typhoon Gaemi
disrupted military operations.[13] 280 of the incursions (roughly 64
percent) occurred during the first two weeks of the month. The ADIZ
incursion numbers, which are reported by Taiwan’s Ministry of National
Defense, do not include activities around outlying islands such as
Kinmen and Matsu.
July is the third consecutive month of
significantly higher and rising numbers of ADIZ incursions and is part
of a trend of increased ADIZ violations after Lai Ching-te took office
as president of Taiwan on May 20.[14] The PRC considers Lai a dangerous
separatist. The heightened number of incursions reflects an intensified
PRC pressure campaign against Taiwan under the new administration. The
high frequency of incursions drains Taiwan’s resources, exhausts
military personnel, and degrades Taiwan’s threat awareness. Taiwan does
not scramble aircraft in response to all PRC ADIZ incursions, but it
does put military personnel on standby to respond quickly if needed.
August
2022 is the only month in which the PRC conducted more ADIZ incursions.
Most of the 446 incursions at that time were part of massive military
exercises in response to then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to
Taiwan.
China
|
US federal prosecutors
charged three people in two separate cases for operating as unregistered
PRC agents to harass Chinese dissidents and fugitives in the United
States. US federal prosecutors alleged on July 29 that Wang
Shujun, a naturalized US citizen and academic who emigrated from the PRC
in 1994, pretended to be a pro-democracy advocate against the PRC
government while spying on Chinese dissidents in New York. Wang was
arrested in March 2022 and pleaded not guilty to four charges that
include acting as an unregistered foreign agent and lying to US
authorities. The prosecutors said that Wang targeted Uyghur and Tibetan
activists, Hong Kong democracy activists, and advocates of Taiwan
independence from 2005 to 2022 at the direction of the Ministry of State
Security (MSS). Wang’s defense lawyer said Wang communicated with the
MSS agents to win their support for democratic movements, not to work
for the MSS.[15] The US Department of Justice also accused PRC nationals
and Los Angeles residents John Chen and Lin Feng of acting as
unregistered agents of the PRC and bribing an Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) agent in a plot to target practitioners of Falun Gong, a spiritual
practice banned in the PRC. Chen and Feng pleaded guilty on July
25.[16]
The PRC has been using agents in New York and
other cities around the world to spy on overseas Chinese and extend the
reach of the PRC’s law enforcement. The US Department of Justice charged
two Chinese nationals in April 2023 for setting up an illegal overseas
police station in New York on behalf of the Fuzhou branch of the PRC’s
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) in 2022.[17] A former NYPD officer was
convicted in June 2023 for working as a PRC agent to intimidate a PRC
fugitive in New York into returning home to face charges.[18] The 2022
report by the Spanish human rights group Safeguard Defenders found that
local branches of the MPS had set up at least 102 overseas police
stations in at least 53 countries to harass, threaten, intimidate, and
force targets to return to the PRC to face charges.[19]
Northeast Asia
Japan
The
PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused the United States and Japan of
inciting a “new Cold War” and exaggerating the threat from the PRC
following a US-Japan 2+2 dialogue on July 28. US Secretary of
State Blinken, US Secretary of Defense Austin, Japanese Minister for
Foreign Affairs Kamikawa, and Japanese Minister of Defense Kihara met in
Tokyo for the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) on July
28. Following the 2+2 meeting a joint statement was released reiterating
their shared stances on Indo-Pacific security issues.[20] This
statement made clear that the PRC’s recent actions in the East China Sea
and South China Sea were contributing to regional instability, and
decried PRC attempts to alter the status quo and “reshape the
international order for its own benefit.”
Subsequent US
Department of Defense (DOD) press releases also built upon the April 10
official visit of Japanese Prime Minister Kishida to the United States
and earlier statements on upgrading the US-Japan alliance.[21] These
alliance upgrades include facilitating greater US and Japan force
interoperability as part of the establishment of the Japanese Self
Defense Forces Joint Operations Command (JJOC), increasing the
production of key military technology, and expanding bilateral
cooperative efforts to include other partners and allies in and beyond
the Indo-Pacific region.
PRC MFA spokesperson Lin Jian
responded to the US-Japan Joint Statement in a press conference on July
29.[22] Lin denounced the US-Japan joint statement, seeing it as an
attack on PRC foreign policy and an exaggeration of regional tensions
and the “threat” posed by the PRC. Lin reiterated that the PRC is a
force for peace in the Indo-Pacific region, and instead blamed the US
and Japan for inciting a “new Cold War” and undermining regional peace
and stability.
North Korea
The
United States Department of Treasury announced sanctions on July 24
targeting five Chinese companies and six Chinese nationals accused of
supporting North Korean ballistic missile programs. The US
Department of Treasury stated that these individuals and companies
participate in a large overseas network of missile component suppliers
to North Korea.[23] The US has identified Chinese national Shi Qianpei
as organizing efforts to transfer restricted missile technology to North
Korea.[24]
South Korean Defense Minister Shin
Wok-sik stated the day after the United States announced its sanctions
that North Korea is in the final stages of developing a tactical nuclear
weapon. It is unclear whether the ballistic missile program
procurement targeted by the sanctions is connected to North Korea's
nuclear program. Short-range ballistic missiles can be used to deliver
tactical nuclear warheads.[25] While tactical nuclear weapons have a
lower yield, the South Korean Ministry of Defense stated that this
tactical nuclear weapon has the range to strike US bases in Japan.[26]
Southeast Asia
US
Secretary of State Antony Blinken and PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi met
on the sidelines of the annual Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) Regional Forum on July 27. Wang called on ASEAN to resist US-
and NATO-led “external interference” in the region. A US
readout said Blinken and Wang had “open and productive discussions on
key bilateral, regional, and global issues” at the event in Laos. The
readout said Blinken acknowledged recent steps by the PRC to advance
counternarcotics cooperation and to enhance military-to-military
communication. He raised concerns about the PRC’s “destabilizing
actions” in the South China Sea, including at Second Thomas Shoal, the
PRC support for Russia’s defense industrial base, and North Korea’s
“provocative actions.”[27] An unspecified senior US State Department
official said Blinken also expressed concern about the PRC’s
“provocative actions” around Taiwan, including a simulated blockade of
Taiwan during the Joint Sword-2024A exercise after Lai Ching-te’s
presidential inauguration in May.[28] A PRC readout said Wang criticized
the United States for intensifying its “containment and suppression of
China” and called on the United States to “return to a rational and
pragmatic policy toward China.” Wang claimed the United States persists
in a “wrong perception of China” that “reflects China with its own
hegemonic logic.” He claimed the PRC does not seek hegemony or power and
is the “major country with the best record in the world on peace and
security issues.” Wang also called on the United States to stop “fanning
the flames” of the PRC-Philippines disputes and to stop “smearing” the
PRC and “abusing unilateral sanctions” on the issue of the war in
Ukraine.[29]
Wang Yi attended the ASEAN Regional Forum’s
Foreign Ministers’ Meeting and a series of other regional forums on the
same day and urged ASEAN states to reject “external interference.” Wang
said the US-led Indo-Pacific Strategy “exacerbates the security dilemma
and runs counter to the vision of long-term peace and prosperity in the
region” and that “NATO's intervention in the Asia-Pacific region is
bound to trigger confrontation and intensify tensions. All parties must
be highly vigilant and resolutely oppose it.” He urged continued
dialogue and consultation and stressed that “external interference
cannot solve problems.”[30] Wang also stressed on several occasions that
the “Taiwan issue” is a matter of China’s internal affairs and that
external forces have no right to intervene. He highlighted the temporary
agreement between the PRC and the Philippines to allow the delivery of
“humanitarian supplies” to Philippine personnel on Second Thomas Shoal
and called on the Philippines to stop “going back on its words” and
“causing unnecessary trouble.”[31]
Philippines
The
CCG claimed to monitor a Philippine resupply mission to Second Thomas
Shoal. The Philippines confirmed that the CCG was present but disputed
that it inspected the Philippines ships. The Philippine Coast
Guard conducted its first resupply mission since the “provisional
agreement” with the PRC on July 22. The Philippine Coast Guard (PCG)
vessel MV Lapu-Lapu delivered supplies and new troops to the grounded warship BRP Sierra Madre
on July 27 in the disputed Second Thomas Shoal while PRC forces
observed nearby.[32] The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed the CCG
conducted an “on-site” inspection of the Philippine vessel and allowed
the vessel to complete its mission.[33] Philippine officials denied that
they sought the PRC’s permission or that the PRC boarded any Philippine
vessels in the supply mission.[34] The Philippine Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA) stated that the PRC “mischaracterized” the South China
Sea agreement and requested that the PRC stick to the agreed
provisions.[35] Neither side has released the text of the agreement.
Video evidence provided by the Philippines Coast Guard confirmed that
PRC Coast Guard vessels were present nearby during the resupply mission
but did not show PRC personnel boarding the Philippine vessels.[36]
The Sierra Madre
is a derelict warship that acts as a Philippine military outpost on the
Second Thomas Shoal, a submerged reef within the disputed Spratly
Islands in the South China Sea. The PRC claims nearly all islands and
maritime features within the South China Sea, including the Spratly
Islands, as part of its “Nine Dash Line” territorial claims. The PRC has
deployed coast guard, maritime militia, and naval vessels using a
variety of “gray zone” tactics including physically surrounding,
ramming, and firing water cannons at Philippine vessels to contest
Philippine control over several PRC-claimed features including Second
Thomas Shoal. It uses such tactics to gain control of the territories
without provoking US intervention or outright war. The PRC claims to
“allow” Philippine supply missions to Second Thomas Shoal to give the
impression that it has legal jurisdiction over the shoal while pursuing
de-escalation and humanitarian aims. The PRC opposes the delivery of any
construction materials to reinforce the Sierra Madre, however, in hopes that the ship will eventually become incapable of supporting the Philippine presence.
The
PRC MFA criticized the deployment of US intermediate-range missiles in
the Philippines and a $500 million US military aid package to the
Philippines. PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi warned the
Philippines during an ASEAN summit in Laos on July 27 that allowing the
United States to deploy intermediate-range missiles to Philippine
territory would “create tension and confrontation in the region and
trigger an arms race,” against the interest of the Filipino people.[37]
The United States deployed its intermediate-range Typhon missile system
to Luzon in April for annual bilateral exercises. The Philippines
announced that the missiles would return to the United States in
September, however.[38] Philippine Foreign Minister Enrique Manalo
denied the missile deployment would lead to an arms race and said the
deployment was purely for defensive purposes.[39] MFA spokesperson Lin
Jian claimed on July 30 that the Philippines allowing the deployment of
the missiles is a “perverse act of cooperating with extra-regional
forces to fuel regional tensions and confrontations, provoke
geopolitical confrontation and arms races.” He urged the withdrawal of
the missiles as soon as possible.[40]
Lin also criticized a
$500 million military aid package that the United States announced
during the 2+2 ministerial dialogues with the Philippines.[41] Lin said
the United States is not a party to the South China Sea issue and has no
right to intervene in the maritime issues between the PRC and the
Philippines. He warned the Philippines that “wooing countries outside
the region to provoke confrontation in the South China Sea” will only
undermine regional stability, aggravate tensions, and make the
Philippines into a “pawn.”[42]
Russia
The PRC is appealing to the “Global South” to legitimize its position as a mediator of Russia’s war in Ukraine.
PRC MFA spokesperson Mao Ning announced a new round of “shuttle
diplomacy” by Special Representative for Eurasian Affairs Li Hui on July
28, who will visit Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia to confer with
“important members of the Global South” on how to work toward
establishing peace talks.[43] Mao claimed that the PRC and Brazil’s
six-point “consensus” received widespread support from the international
community, referring to a joint document that outlines vague steps
toward peace, but fails to meet Ukraine’s base condition of Russia’s
withdrawal from occupied territory.[44]
The PRC’s focus on
ingratiating itself with non-European countries offers an alternative
path to gaining recognition for its role as a conflict mediator despite
failing to make headway with Ukraine-aligned countries. PRC Foreign
Minister Wang Yi met with EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy Josep Borrell at the ASEAN regional forum on July 26.
The PRC readout of the meeting claimed that Borrell stated that the EU
attaches importance to the PRC-Brazil peace initiative.[45] The EU
readout of the meeting negated the PRC’s claim, stating that Borrell
asked the PRC to use its influence on Russia to contribute to ending the
war, but that “the joint statement with Brazil of May 2024 does not go
in that direction.”[46] The PRC made a similar claim after Wang met with
Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmitry Kuleba on July 24.[47]
The
PRC did not attend a peace summit in Switzerland on June 15-16 due to
Russia’s exclusion from the event.[48] Mao Ning stated that the summit
does not meet the PRC’s three conditions for a peace conference, which
include “recognition by both Russia and Ukraine, equal participation by
all parties, and fair discussion of all peace plans.”[49] Mao stated
that the PRC would continue to promote dialogue and lasting peace in
“its own way.”
PRC banks have tightened restrictions on payments from Russia in response to Western sanctions. Russian business newspaper Kommersant reported
on July 29 that around 80 percent of payments in Chinese yuan are being
returned to Russia. PRC banks have increased restrictions on trade with
Russia since at least December 2023, after the European Union imposed
its 12th sanctions package against Russia and the United States
authorized secondary sanctions on financial institutions that helped
Russia evade sanctions. Three of the PRC’s “Big Four” state banks and
many smaller PRC banks began rejecting payments from sanctioned Russian
financial institutions since the start of 2024.[50]
The
PRC’s tightening of restrictions on transactions with Russia shows the
effectiveness of Western sanctions even as the PRC faces criticism for
its support of Russia’s defense industrial base. PRC officials have
repeatedly denounced unilateral sanctions as “illegal,” but PRC
businesses and financial institutions are nonetheless deterred by the
potential consequences of violating the sanctions on Russia. The
restrictions by PRC banks in response to Western sanctions do entirely
block transactions with Russia but can make them more difficult and
expensive. Kommersant reported that Russian companies are being
forced to use "trading houses” as intermediaries, which increases
transactional costs by up to 10 percent. Cross-border trade can also
make use of small local banks that are not involved in trade with the
United States, or use PRC-based subsidiaries of Russian banks such as
VTB Bank.[51]
[1] https://www.ipac.global/statement
[2] https://www.ipac.global/news/ipac-taipei-2024-taiwan-joins
[3]
https://www.ipac.global/news/ipac-condemns-prc-interference-in-its-taipei-summit-announces-network-expansion-in-bri-strongholds
[4] https://apnews.com/article/taiwan-xi-jinping-china-beijing-william-lai-a4dc59a25bce5315f8446587bab0d652
[5] https://www.fmprc dot gov.cn/fyrbt_673021/202407/t20240730_11463119.shtml
[6] https://www.justice.gov/opa/media/1345141/dl?inline
[7] https://www.voanews.com/a/foreign-lawmakers-shine-light-on-china-tensions-over-taiwan/7718548.html
[8] https://www.ipac.global/news/ipac-taipei-2024-taiwan-joins
[9] https://www.chinatimes dot com/realtimenews/20240730004144-260407?chdtv
[10] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7-8Ppsit9nI
https://www.cga dot gov.tw/GipOpen/wSite/ct?xItem=160424&ctNode=650&mp=999
[11] http://www.news dot cn/tw/20240730/db33372bbace43478dfaca7ff1f74c85/c.html
https://www.ocac.gov dot tw/OCAC/Eng/Pages/Detail.aspx?nodeid=329&pid=66922811
[12] https://news.ltn dot com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4724039
[13]
https://x.com/MoNDefense?ref_src=twsrc
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1qbfYF0VgDBJoFZN5elpZwNTiKZ4nvCUcs5a7oYwm52g/edit?pli=1&gid=1953673365#gid=1953673365
[14]
https://x.com/MoNDefense?ref_src=twsrc
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1qbfYF0VgDBJoFZN5elpZwNTiKZ4nvCUcs5a7oYwm52g/edit?pli=1&gid=1953673365#gid=1953673365
[15] https://www.reuters.com/legal/trial-begins-us-citizen-accused-acting-chinese-agent-2024-07-29/
[16] https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-men-plead-guilty-acting-illegal-agents-chinese-government-and-bribery
[17] https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-arrested-operating-illegal-overseas-police-station-chinese-government
[18] https://www.reuters.com/world/us/former-ny-police-sergeant-convicted-acting-chinese-agent-fox-hunt-trial-2023-06-20/
[19] https://safeguarddefenders.com/sites/default/files/pdf/Patrol%20and%20Persuade%20v2.pdf
[20] https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3852169/joint-statement-of-the-security-consultative-committee-22/
[21]
https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3852200/fact-sheet-joint-statement-of-the-security-consultative-committee-22/
[22] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202407/t20240729_11462477.shtml#
[23]
https://www.scmp dot
com/news/china/article/3271768/us-sanctions-china-based-network-over-links-north-korea-space-and-missile-programmes?module=top_story&pgtype=section
[24] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2482
https://www.reuters.com/world/us-imposes-sanctions-china-based-network-helping-north-korea-2024-07-24/
[25] https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/2023/08/01/ending-tactical-nuclear-weapons/
[26]
https://www.newsweek.com/north-korean-tactical-nuclear-weapon-final-stages-1930006
https://www.reuters.com/world/us-imposes-sanctions-china-based-network-helping-north-korea-2024-07-24/
[27]
https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-meeting-with-peoples-republic-of-china-prc-director-of-the-ccp-central-foreign-affairs-office-wang-yi-3/
[28]
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/australias-wong-presses-myanmar-generals-change-tack-ahead-laos-summits-2024-07-27/
https://apnews.com/article/us-china-blinken-83a98c83af72335e3f321a375ea26a3c
[29] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/web/wjbz_673089/xghd_673097/202407/t20240727_11461711.shtml
[30] http://www.xinhuanet dot com/asia/20240728/cdbe59a496db4aa5adf72edbe2d9d716/c.html
[31] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202407/t20240729_11462477.shtml
[32] https://www.newsweek.com/china-watches-philippines-resupply-grounded-warship-1931278
[33] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202407/t20240727_11461676.shtml
[34] https://www.newsweek.com/china-watches-philippines-resupply-grounded-warship-1931278
[35]
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/philippines-says-china-mischaracterised-south-china-sea-resupply-mission-deal-2024-07-28/
[36] https://x.com/jaytaryela/status/1817466877570117981
[37] https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-foreign-minister-warns-philippines-over-us-missile-deployment-2024-07-27/
[38]
https://www.scmp dot
com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3272130/chinas-wang-yi-warns-philippines-deploying-us-missiles-could-trigger-arms-race
[39]
https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3855034/secretary-antony-j-blinken-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-philippine-s/
[40] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/202407/t20240731_11463810.shtml
[41]
https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3854902/joint-statement-on-the-philippines-united-states-fourth-22-ministerial-dialogue/
[42] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/202407/t20240731_11463810.shtml
[43] https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202407/t20240726_11461079.shtml
[44] https://www.gov dot cn/yaowen/liebiao/202405/content_6953287.htm
[45] https://www.fmprc dot gov.cn/wjbzhd/202407/t20240726_11461339.shtml
[46] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/china-high-representative-borrell-met-foreign-minister-wang-yi_en
[47] https://www.fmprc dot gov.cn/wjbzhd/202407/t20240724_11459443.shtml
[48] https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202405/t20240531_11367990.shtml
[49] https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202405/t20240531_11367990.shtml
[50] https://www.newsweek.com/china-russia-ruble-yuan-banks-return-decline-transactions-1931494
https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6863025
[51] https://www.newsweek.com/china-russia-ruble-yuan-banks-return-decline-transactions-1931494
https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6863025
