Authors: Matthew Sperzel and Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War
Alexis Turek of the American Enterprise Institute
Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute
Data Cutoff: August 7, 2024 at 5pm ET
The
China–Taiwan Weekly Update is a joint product from the Institute for
the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute. The update
supports the ISW–AEI Coalition Defense of Taiwan project, which assesses
Chinese campaigns against Taiwan, examines alternative strategies for
the United States and its allies to deter the Chinese Communist Party’s
(CCP) aggression, and—if necessary—defeat the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA). The update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to
controlling Taiwan and cross–Taiwan Strait developments.
Key Takeaways
Cross-Strait Relations
Taiwan
The
PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) and Ministry of Public Security (MPS)
listed the names of ten Taiwanese political figures in new website
sections devoted to punishing “Taiwan independence diehards.” The
postings are part of a pressure campaign targeted at Taiwan’s new
administration of Lai Ching-te and the ruling DPP. The TAO and
MPS posted the names on their websites with other information, such as
the text of the 2005 Anti-Secession law, legal guidelines about the
punishment of Taiwanese “separatists,” relevant statements from PRC
officials, and contact information for reporting separatist activities.[1] The names include the following Taiwanese political figures:
The
TAO originally published a list of “Taiwan independence diehards” in
2021 and included Su, You, and Wu, who at the time were Taiwan’s
Premier, Speaker of the LY, and Foreign Minister. It added the other
seven names in 2022.[2]
Nine of the ten people are prominent members of the DPP, including Su
and You who are considered founding members of the party. Chen Jiau-hua
was a legislator and chairwoman of the pan-Green (DPP-aligned) New Power
Party, a minor party that no longer holds any legislative seats. All
members of the list held government offices at the time they were
included, except Lin Fei-fan who was a founding member of the 2014
Sunflower Movement and held no political office. Taiwan President Lai
Ching-te and former president Tsai Ing-wen are not on the list even
though the PRC has repeatedly called them separatists.
The
TAO and MPS prominently published this list weeks after the PRC Supreme
People’s Court and other institutions issued an authoritative legal
opinion that threatened “diehard” advocates of Taiwanese independence
with criminal penalties up to life imprisonment and death. The opinion
is an authoritative legal interpretation of Article 103 of the PRC’s
criminal code, which delineates the crime of “splitting the State and
undermining the unity of the country” but does not specifically
reference Taiwan.[3]
The opinion clarifies how Article 103 should be applied to issues of
Taiwanese “separatism” and defines the types of actions that would be
subject to criminal prosecution under the criminal code.[4]
The PRC could use the policy to arrest pan-Green political figures and
activists who travel to the PRC. It can also try and convict suspects in
absentia, issue international arrest warrants, and pressure other
countries to extradite wanted Taiwanese “separatists” who travel to
those countries.
The PRC may add other prominent DPP
officials that it considers to be major “separatist” figures in the
coming months. It has strongly criticized new president Lai Ching-te as a
separatist and intensified its coercion against Taiwan since he took
office on May 20, including issuing the “legal opinion,” launching a
massive military exercise around Taiwan days after Lai’s inauguration,
and rapidly escalating incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defense
Identification Zone. TAO Spokesperson Zhu Fenglian clarified on June 28
that the new guidelines only target a “very small number of ‘Taiwan
independence’ diehards” and do not target the “vast majority” of
Taiwanese people, however.[5]
Zhu likely intended to reassure Taiwanese nationals who wish to work,
invest, and travel in the PRC that the “legal opinion” does not put them
in danger. Zhu made the comment after Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council
raised the severity of its travel warning for Taiwanese people
traveling to the PRC in response to the new legal opinion.[6]
Publishing the names of ten “diehard separatists” likely serves the
same purpose of reassuring Taiwanese people that the PRC’s
“anti-separatist” measures are targeted only at a very small number of
specific people.
The PRC state-sponsored hacker
group APT41 likely stole passwords and documents from a Taiwanese
government-affiliated research center in July 2023. Cisco
Systems’ Talos Threat Intelligence Group released a report on August 1
that found a malicious hacking campaign compromised an unspecified
Taiwanese government-affiliated research institute on computing. Talos
said that the nature of the institute’s work makes it a valuable target
for threat actors wishing to obtain proprietary and sensitive
technologies. The breach happened in July 2023 and lasted 11 days. Talos
assessed with “moderate confidence” that the hackers were part of
APT41, also known as Double Dragon, a PRC state-sponsored hacker group
that US officials have linked to the PRC Ministry of State Security
(MSS).[7]
Talos researchers did not assess how much data the cyberattacks stole.
APT41 is connected to PRC state-sponsored espionage and financially
motivated hacking activities.[8]
A spokesperson for the PRC embassy in Washington accused the United
States of spreading disinformation and “groundless smears” against the
PRC. The spokesperson claimed that the PRC “does not encourage, support
or condone attacks launched by hackers.”[9]
The
US government and other authorities have designated other cyber threat
actors besides APT41, including Volt Typhoon, APT31, and APT40, as
affiliated with the MSS.[10]
US and foreign partner cybersecurity and intelligence agencies stated
on February 7 that Volt Typhoon infiltrated critical infrastructure
organizations in the continental United States and US territories. They
assessed with high confidence that Volt Typhoon’s goal was to develop
the capability to disrupt key operational technology functions in the
event of a conflict with the United States.[11] The US Department of Justice accused APT31 of targeting Chinese dissidents in the United States at the behest of the MSS.[12]
The
PRC released a Taiwanese former soldier it held for nearly five months a
week after Taiwan returned the bodies of two PRC fishermen who died in
the February 14 capsizing incident in Kinmen’s waters. This small
breakthrough in tense cross-strait relations is unlikely to change the
PRC’s long-term coercion campaign against Taiwan, however. The
Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) rescued the soldier, surnamed Hu, and another
man near Taiwan’s Kinmen islands on March 18 after their boat ran out of
fuel and drifted into PRC waters. Kinmen is located just 3 kilometers
from the PRC city of Xiamen. The CCG promptly released the second man
but continued to detain Hu after discovering he was a non-commissioned
officer of the Kinmen Defense Command. PRC officials claimed Hu tried to
conceal his identity as a soldier.[13] The ROC Army discharged Hu at his family’s request while he was in custody.[14] The PRC allowed him to return home on August 7 following lengthy backchannel negotiations.[15]
Hu’s
release was precipitated by successful ROC-PRC negotiations on July 30
on Kinmen that largely resolved a standoff related to the February 14
capsizing incident in Kinmen’s waters. The incident centered on a PRC
speedboat that capsized following a collision with a Taiwan Coast Guard
Administration (CGA) vessel, killing two PRC fishermen. The speedboat
was fleeing a legal CGA pursuit within Taiwan’s prohibited waters around
Kinmen. The PRC demanded during many rounds of negotiation that Taiwan
return the boat and bodies of the PRC fishermen, pay compensation to the
families, provide a full explanation of the incident, and apologize for
wrongdoing. Negotiations broke down in early March but resumed and
concluded on July 30, when Taiwan handed over the boat, bodies, and
monetary compensation as part of an undisclosed agreement with the PRC.[16]
Taiwan did not admit wrongdoing and has not concluded its investigation
into the incident. Taiwanese legislator Jessica Chen Yu-jen, who
represents Kinmen County, said the deadlock over the February 14
incident had hampered negotiations to secure Hu’s release. Chen was a
key figure in Taiwan’s efforts to free Hu.[17] PRC state media Xinhua claimed Hu was allowed to return after PRC authorities completed their investigations. It did not reference any negotiations.[18]
The
July 30 agreement and Hu’s release from PRC custody may open the path
for further negotiations on specific issues, such as securing the
release of a Taiwanese fishing crew that the PRC detained on July 2 for
illegal fishing in PRC waters. PRC and ROC government officials had a
rare face-to-face meeting during the negotiations on Kinmen, apparently a
quiet exception to a PRC policy since 2016 of not meeting with ROC
officials while the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is in power.[19]
The PRC considers the DPP a separatist party. The PRC did not announce
the participation of any PRC officials in the talks, however. PRC state
media described the head of the PRC delegation, Li Zhaohui, as a “senior
consultant” with a local branch of the Red Cross Society of China. It
did not mention his role as the deputy director of the Taiwan Affairs
Office of the city of Quanzhou.[20]
This
breakthrough in negotiations likely will not change the trajectory of
PRC coercion toward Taiwan and Kinmen, however. The PRC responded to the
February 14 capsizing incident by beginning regular CCG patrols around
Kinmen, including several incursions each month into Kinmen’s restricted
and prohibited waters to assert PRC authority there. The change in CCG
activity around Kinmen represents a long-term PRC effort to assert
sovereignty over the island and to erode Taiwan’s control of the
surrounding waters.
The Kuomintang (KMT) denied a
Taiwanese media report it did not send representatives to the July
Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC) conference in Taipei
because of CCP lobbying efforts and threats. IPAC is an
international group of legislators that lawmakers from the United
States, Canada, UK, Japan, and other allied democracies established in
2020. The organization aims to coordinate an international response to
what it perceives as the threats to global trade, security, and human
rights posed by the PRC’s rise.[21]
The organization now has 250 members from 40 countries including
Taiwan. Taiwan joined IPAC during the conference on July 30–31 with
co-chairs from the ruling DPP and the smaller Taiwan People’s Party
(TPP).[22]
No representatives from the KMT attended the IPAC conference. The PRC
opposes Taiwan’s participation in most international organizations and
considers IPAC to be an “extreme anti-China” group.[23]
Taiwan’s
Up Media reported on August 1 based on unspecified sources that the PRC
pressured the KMT to skip the conference. It said the PRC’s Taiwan
Affairs Office (TAO) and United Front Work Department jointly lobbied
individual KMT legislators and even threatened to suspend KMT-CCP
exchanges at all levels if the KMT attended the IPAC conference.[24] Secretary-general of the KMT legislative caucus Hung Mong-kai denied the report as a malicious smear.[25]
KMT officials cited a preexisting policy of not sending an official
delegation to IPAC meetings but said the party would not prevent members
from going if they wished.[26]
A
report by Taiwan’s National Audit Office (NAO) showed that foreign
vessels including the PRC damaged submarine cables between Taiwan and
its outlying islands 36 times from 2019 to 2023. 12 incidents
occurred in 2023, the highest number ever in one year. In the most
serious case, a PRC fishing boat and a PRC cargo ship damaged both of
the submarine cables connecting Taiwan and the Matsu islands on February
2 and February 8, 2023. The damage caused an Internet outage that
affected Matsu’s 13,000 residents for 50 days, seriously disrupting
communications as well as government services, financial transactions,
medical services, and transportation.[27]
Taiwan’s government did not claim the cables were severed intentionally
or at the direction of the PRC, though some local officials speculated
that may be the case.[28] It is unclear which other countries’ vessels have damaged Taiwan’s submarine cables.
Submarine
cables are a critical infrastructure that ensure Taiwan’s
communications with its outlying islands. Taiwan has ten submarine
cables, including two that connect Taiwan to the archipelagos of Kinmen
and Matsu. Damage to these submarine cables, whether intentional or
accidental, can impair Taiwan’s ability to effectively govern its
outlying island territories by cutting off communications and government
services. It could also seriously disrupt economic activity in the
affected areas. Taiwan is exploring ways to safeguard its connectivity
by protecting its cables, laying additional redundant cables, shortening
repair times, and setting up satellite communications networks.[29]
China
The
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Eastern Theater Command (ETC) released a
video on the PLA’s 97th anniversary that depicts an assault on Taiwan.[30]
The video, set to rock and roll music, depicts a simulated sequence in
which PLA ships and aircraft surround Taiwan as a barrage of missiles
strike the island’s major cities. The words that accompanied the video
included themes that allude to unification with Taiwan, including
“prosperity and unity are linked by the blood of compatriots” and
“steadfastly protect national unity and territorial integrity.”
The
PLA’s use of imagery of violence against Taiwan is an example of
cognitive warfare designed to threaten and intimidate the ROC to deter
it from practicing policies that support Taiwanese sovereignty. The ETC
released footage in May from large-scale military exercises that
encircled Taiwan after President Lai Ching-te’s inauguration, which the
PRC claimed was punishment for Lai’s “independence provocations.”[31]
The ETC released similar content on the PLA’s anniversary in 2023 that
included footage from earlier military exercises around Taiwan that the
PLA conducted after then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in
2022.
The PRC is presenting itself as a responsible nuclear power to deflect criticism for its expanding nuclear arsenal. The
PRC submitted a working paper to the United Nations that calls on
states with nuclear weapons to follow the PRC in adopting a “no first
use” policy.[32] The
document highlighted the PRC’s commitment and consistent adherence to
this policy and stated the PRC’s willingness to engage in discussions
with states on the issue.
The PRC’s self-portrayal as a
responsible nuclear state and framing of its no first use policy as an
example for others to follow aims to counter criticism of unwillingness
to meaningfully engage in nuclear arms control talks with the US while
it forges ahead with building its nuclear weapons arsenal. The PRC
submitted the document on July 12 before suspending arms control and
non-proliferation talks with the United States on July 17, citing US
arms sales to Taiwan.[33] PRC
MFA spokesperson Lin Jian highlighted the PRC’s no first use policy in
response to a joint statement from the US and Japan that expressed
concern over the PRC’s lack of transparency and rapid expansion of its
nuclear weapons arsenal.[34]
Lin stated that the PRC maintains its nuclear arsenal at a minimum
level for its own national security and does not engage in arms
competition with other countries.[35]
US
National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan commented on the PRC’s
disinterest in “substantive dialogue” on arms control and nuclear
non-proliferation prior to the two countries holding rare, semi-official
talks in June.[36]
Sullivan stated that the PRC had little willingness to
“compartmentalize strategic stability from broader issues in the
relationship.”[37]
The United States and the PRC last held official arms control
negotiations in Washington in November 2023 after a five-year hiatus.[38] The
meeting occurred a week before President Joe Biden and CCP General
Secretary Xi Jinping held a summit in San Francisco to stabilize
bilateral relations. An unnamed US official familiar with the talks
described the PRC’s level of engagement during that meeting as not
substantive.[39] The
US Under Secretary for Arms Control Bonnie Jenkins stated in
Congressional testimony in May that the PRC declined a follow-on meeting
and did not provide a substantive response to the risk reduction
suggestions that the US side put forth during that meeting.[40]
The PRC MFA rejected the notion that the PRC was dragging its feet and
stated that the PRC is willing to uphold communication with the US on
arms control on the condition that the US respects its “core interests.”[41]
The PRC imposed export controls on a range of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technologies that will take effect on September 1.[42] The
restrictions apply to radio communication equipment to control drones,
infrared imaging equipment for target indication, civilian anti-drone
jamming equipment greater than 5 kilometers, high-powered anti-drone
lasers, and more. The announcement added that exporters of drone
technology shall not export any items that are not included in the list
if they know that the technology will be used for the proliferation of
weapons, terrorism, or military purposes. Some commercial drones are
also subject to the export controls.[43] The PRC also canceled a temporary ban on the exports of consumer drones that it imposed last year.[44]
The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), the General Administration of
Customs (GAC), and the Equipment Development Department of the Central
Military Commission jointly issued the new controls.
MOFCOM
stated in a press release that the controls reflect the PRC’s principle
of coordinating economic development with national security, which is
conducive to better safeguarding the PRC’s safety and interests.[45] This suggests that the PRC aims to tighten oversight over the sales of its domestically developed drone technology.
The
PRC is simultaneously taking steps to promote sales of its military
drones. A PRC aviation and aerospace exhibition scheduled for November
in Guangdong province will feature a dedicated area for unmanned systems
for the first time, including a demonstration area for UAVs and
unmanned surface vessels, according to the state-owned tabloid Global
Times.[46]
The PRC’s spotlight on its drone technology signals its interest in
promoting its domestic drone industry to foreign consumers, who will
attend the expo.
Voice of America reported that
the PRC lifted sanctions on US telecommunications company Viasat because
the company’s services are irreplaceable for distant-water
communications. The PRC imposed sanctions on Viasat in January
2024 in response to the United States announcing a $300 million sale of
equipment to Taiwan to help maintain Taiwan’s tactical information
systems.[47]
The PRC lifted the sanctions on Viasat on July 22, claiming that “the
circumstances based on which the countermeasures were issued have
changed.”[48]
This is the first time the PRC publicly announced the lifting of
sanctions on a firm that has sold military equipment to Taiwan.[49]
Voice of America cited Taiwanese and US experts who said that PRC
vessels operating far from the PRC, including fishing boats and research
vessels, rely on services from the Viasat subsidiary Inmarsat. The PRC
has communications satellites that cover the entirety of PRC territory
and offshore areas, but it cannot replace Inmarsat’s services in the
short term for distant-water communications.[50]
There is no evidence that the PRC sanctions on Viasat forced the
company to change its behavior, such as canceling contracts with Taiwan.
The
PRC criticized Canada on July 31 for “undermining peace and stability”
in the Taiwan Strait after a Canadian warship transited the strait.[51]
Canadian Defense Minister Bill Blair stated that Canada was increasing
the presence of the Royal Canadian Navy in the Indo-Pacific region, in
line with its Info-Pacific Strategy, which it released in 2022.[52]
PRC Ministry of Defense spokesperson Zhang Xiaogang accused Canada of
sending “wrong signals to ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces” and
making excuses to justify its wrongful presence in the strait.[53]
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Eastern Theater Command (ETC)
spokesperson Li Xi stated that the ETC organized naval and air forces to
monitor Canada’s HCMS Montreal during its transit.[54]
The
PRC has used confrontational intimidation tactics to deter foreign
military presence in waters it deems to be its neighborhood, which has
resulted in several tense encounters with the Canadian military. The
Canadian Ministry of Defense claimed that a PRC fighter jet launched
flares in front of one of its military helicopters near the Paracel
Islands in the South China Sea on October 29, forcing the helicopter to
take evasive maneuvers.[55] The PLA Navy destroyer Luyang III came within 150 yards of the USS Chung-Hoon destroyer and Canadian HMCS Montreal frigate as they transited through the Taiwan Strait in June 2023.[56]
The PRC’s aggression towards foreign militaries in the region has also
instigated dangerous encounters with US and Australian military craft in
recent months.[57]
The
United States imposed sanctions on five individuals and seven entities
in Iran and the PRC for facilitating the procurement of components for
Iran’s ballistic missile and UAV programs.[58]
The PRC-based entities included Hong Kong resident Thomas Ho Ming Tong
and his four companies, which procure components for a subsidiary
of Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) that
produces Shahed-series UAVs for Russian use against Ukraine. The
sanctions also include a Shenzhen-based supplier for a MODAFL front
company in Beijing.
Hong Kong has emerged as a hub for PRC
companies to circumvent sanctions on Iran, Russia, and North Korea.
Hong Kong’s lenient regulatory environment facilitates relatively easy
concealment of corporate ownership and the rapid creation and
dissolution of shell companies. Iran relies on Hong Kong companies as
transshipment intermediaries to obtain Western parts for its UAVs.[59]
Hong
Kong Chief Executive John Lee stated in October 2022 that the territory
would not implement unilateral sanctions on Russia after the US warned
that Hong Kong’s status as a financial center could be affected if it
acted as a haven for sanctions evasion.[60]
Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba appealed to the Hong Kong
government in July not to allow Russian companies to use Hong Kong
companies to evade sanctions.[61] The US sanctioned approximately 20 PRC and Hong Kong entities on May 1 for supporting Russia’s military-industrial base.[62]
Southeast Asia
Vietnam
The
PRC flew two UAVs near the Vietnamese coast after Vietnam and the
Philippines announced joint coast guard exercises in Manila Bay. The
South China Sea Chronicle Initiative (SCSCI), a Vietnamese research
group, tracked a WZ-10 UAV that flew from the PRC’s Hainan island to
roughly 100 km (62 miles) from Vietnam’s coastline to the city of Nha
Trang before returning to Hainan on August 2.[63]
The UAV’s tracker was on throughout the course of the journey. Aircraft
tracking data showed that a second WZ-10 flight along a similar path
occurred on August 7.[64]
The SCSCI and other South China Sea researchers confirmed that this was
the first time that the PRC had made such a voyage visible to the
Vietnamese. Neither Vietnam’s nor the PRC’s foreign and defense
ministries have released comments on the flights.
The
flights occurred after Vietnam and the Philippines announced joint Coast
Guard exercises, which are scheduled to begin on August 9 in Manila
Bay.[65]
Vietnam and the Philippines signed two agreements in January that
expanded cooperation between their coast guards to prevent incidents in
the South China Sea.[66]
Vietnamese Coast Guard ships arrived in Manila on August 5 and are
scheduled to remain there until August 10. The Philippine Coast Guard
(PCG) reported that these exercises will focus on search and rescue and
fire and explosion prevention operations.
The flights also
took place after Vietnam filed a claim at the United Nations to extend
its continental shelf in the South China Sea in July.[67]
While the Philippines and Vietnam still hold competing territorial
claims in the South China Sea, these types of joint efforts are likely
to be interpreted by the PRC as a cooperative effort to challenge the
PRC within what it sees as its sovereign territory.
Philippines
The Philippines and Germany committed to sign a defense agreement this year. On
August 4 the Philippines and Germany committed to sign a defense
cooperation agreement this year during a meeting between German Defense
Minister Boris Pistorius and Philippine Defense Minister Gilberto
Teodoro.[68]
The two Ministers agreed to expand training, bilateral exchanges,
bilateral armaments cooperation, and other joint projects. Both sides
agreed to uphold the international rules-based order. Pistorius
specifically reaffirmed the validity of the 2016 Permanent Court of
Arbitration decision denying the legal basis of China’s claims in the
South China Sea and stressed the importance of strengthening these
maritime borders.[69]
This
meeting marks the first visit of a German Defense Minister to the
Philippines, marking 70 years of diplomatic relations between the two
states and following several violent clashes between Philippine and
Chinese coast guard vessels in Philippine territory in the South China
Sea. Pistorius stated that Germany’s commitments were not directed at
any particular country but rather to protect trading routes and ensure
freedom of navigation. Teodoro stated that its agreements with Germany
were not intended to provoke the PRC and blamed the PRC for increasing
tensions. PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Mao Ning
denied that the PRC was responsible for recent disputes, stating that
PRC behavior was all in accordance with international law.[70] The MFA did not comment on Germany’s actions, but did accuse the Philippines of “stirring up trouble” in the South China Sea.
The
United States, Australia, Canada, and the Philippines conducted joint
maritime activity within the Philippines’ EEZ while the PRC held a joint
combat patrol near Scarborough Shoal on August 7.[71]
US Indo-Pacific Command stated that the joint activities focused on
enhancing interoperability among the four armed forces. It also
reiterated the US and allied commitment to upholding international law
regarding freedom of navigation and the 2016 South China Sea Arbitral
Tribunal Award that rejected PRC territorial claims in the South China
Sea. The PRC’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) simultaneously conducted
combat patrols over the sea and airspace near the Scarborough Shoal.[72]
The Scarborough Shoal is a disputed territory within the South China
Sea, located about 120 nautical miles from the Philippine Island of
Luzon.[73]
Information released by the PRC Ministry of National Defense stated
that the joint patrol was carried out by the PLA’s Southern Theater
Command and focused on training early warning, rapid mobility, and joint
strike capabilities.[74]
The Philippine government released a statement in response, accusing
the PLA of sending three of its ships to tail their joint exercises
instead of conducting Shoal.[75]
Oceania
The
PRC MFA criticized the United States and Australia for cooperating to
upgrade the latter’s military facilities on the Cocos Islands in the
Indian Ocean. PRC MFA spokesperson Mao Ning stated the PRC’s
conviction that defense cooperation should be conducive to regional
stability and not be targeted at or harm the interests of “third
parties,” which references PRC interests.[76] Mao urged the “relevant countries,” meaning the United States and US allies, to do more to maintain peace in the Indo-Pacific.
The
planned upgrades are funded under the US Pacific Deterrence Initiative,
which directs investments to enhance US military infrastructure,
presence, and readiness, as well as that of regional allies, to counter
the PRC’s expanding military presence in the Indo-Pacific.[77]
Former Australian Assistant Secretary for Force Development Ross
Babbage stated that the upgrades would allow reconnaissance planes,
early warning aircraft, and aerial refuelers to operate from the
islands, which would extend the range and operability of US and
Australian aircraft in the Indo-Pacific.[78]
Europe
Germany
accused PRC state-sponsored cyber threat actors of infiltrating the
Federal Agency for Cartography and Geodesy to conduct espionage in 2021.[79]
Germany accused the PRC actors of exploiting individuals and companies
to obfuscate its own presence in federal networks. The PRC embassy in
Germany dismissed the accusation and accused the German government of
misusing cybersecurity issues to defame the PRC, which undermines the
international community’s efforts to jointly combat such challenges.[80]
The embassy urged Germany to stop “political smearing” and highlighted
the PRC’s responsible approach to preventing malign cyber activities.
The
PRC has consistently denied accusations of state-sponsored hacking amid
Western countries’ vocal condemnation and coordination to expose the
PRC’s malign cyber activities. The United States, United Kingdom, and
New Zealand accused PRC-state-sponsored cyber threat actors of
conducting malicious cyber operations against democratic institutions in
March.[81]
Palau, one of Taiwan’s twelve remaining diplomatic allies, announced in
March that the PRC was the culprit behind a major cyber incident in
which threat actors stole over 20,000 government documents.[82]
The PRC conducted the operation as Palau finalized a deal with the US
to renew the latter’s military access to the archipelago in exchange for
financial aid.
The extensive accusations against the
PRC’s violation of other countries’ cyber sovereignty highlight that the
PRC exploits cyber tools to advance national interests that it cannot
achieve through legitimate and transparent statecraft.
Russia
PRC
Special Representative for Eurasian Affairs Li Hui traveled to Brazil,
South Africa, and Indonesia to generate support for the PRC’s efforts to
mediate the war and promote peace talks. PRC MFA spokesperson
Mao Ning announced the new round of shuttle diplomacy last week and
stated that Li would confer with “important members of the Global
South.” Li’s trip comes after a June 21 announcement from the Ukrainian
Deputy Head of the Office of the President that a “Global South” country
would likely host a second peace summit, which Ukraine aimed to hold
before the end of the year.[83] The PRC did not participate in the first peace summit in Switzerland on June 15–16 because the summit excluded Russia.[84]
Mao Ning stated that the summit did not meet the PRC’s three conditions
for a peace conference, which include “recognition by both Russia and
Ukraine, equal participation by all parties, and fair discussion of all
peace plans.”[85] 90 countries and organizations attended the summit.
The
PRC MFA readout of Li’s meeting with Brazilian diplomats stated that
the PRC-Brazil joint statement on reaching a political solution to the
crisis received a positive response from more than 110 countries.[86]
The PRC and Brazil released a joint statement outlining a series of
vague steps to deescalate the war in May. The joint statement does not
meet Ukraine’s base condition of Russia’s withdrawal from occupied
territory.[87]
Readouts from Li’s meetings in all three countries stated that the host
country appreciated the PRC’s role in mediating the crisis.[88] PRC readouts made similar claims from high-level meetings with other countries’ officials, including Hungary and Ukraine.[89]
The
PRC’s efforts to ingratiate itself with leading Global South countries
aim to curry early support for its peace efforts before the next peace
summit, which European countries and other stakeholders will likely
attend. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated on July 15 that
Russian representatives should be present at the next peace summit.[90]
The PRC’s previous peace plans, including its joint statement with
Brazil and a 12-point plan from February 2023, failed to gain traction
with Ukraine, the US, and most European countries.[91]
An EU readout from a July 26 meeting between EU High Representative for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell and PRC Foreign
Minister Wang Yi stated that Borrell asked the PRC to use its influence
with Russia to contribute to ending the war, but that “the joint
statement with Brazil of May 2024 does not go in that direction.”[92]
This statement contradicted the PRC readout from the meeting, which
claimed that Borrell stated that the EU “attaches importance to the
PRC-Brazil peace initiative.”[93]
[1] http://www.gwytb.gov dot cn/zccs/zccs_61195/cjtdwgfz/md/202408/t20240801_12639616.htm
https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202408/1317592.shtml
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