by: Jennifer Cafarella and
Kaitlynn Menoche
Russia shifted military assets into Eastern Homs Province in
response to an ISIS offensive against pro-regime forces south of Homs City that
began on November 1, 2015. Russia positioned at
least five attack helicopters at the T4 (Tiyas) military
airbase and additional rotary wing aircraft at the Shayrat military east of
Homs City by November 4. Russia is also operating rotary wing aircraft out of
the Hama military airport, while their fixed
wing aircraft remain based at the Bassel al-Assad military airbase in Latakia.
Russia has also deployed an additional
2,000 personnel to Syria since the start of its air campaign on September 30, according to
U.S. security officials, though it is unclear whether these personnel are
located at these bases in Eastern Homs Province. Russia also maintains a
military base at the Hama
municipal stadium, which likely houses Russian military personnel. The Russians have
spoken of the plus-up. Russian Air Force Commander Viktor Bondarev, in an
interview on November 5, stated “we
sent not just fighter planes, strike aircraft, and helicopters but also
anti-aircraft rocket systems” because “we took into account every possible
threat.” It is unclear whether Bondarev’s remarks indicate that Russia has deployed
additional
anti-aircraft Systems to Syria since the start of Russian airstrikes in Syria
on September 30, 2015.
An ISIS offensive against pro-regime forces south of Homs City
prompted some of the Russian deployment into Eastern Homs Province. ISIS captured
the desert city of Palmyra in May 2015 and has been positioning itself for
further offensives toward Homs. ISIS advanced westward from the town of
Quryatayn in southeastern Homs Province on November 1. It seized the
regime-held town of Mahin and attacked the
neighboring town of Sadad, located less than 15 km. east of the M5 highway. ISIS
likely seeks to seize portions of the M5 highway south of Homs City, possibly
by seizing the town of Hasiya and the adjacent industrial city on the highway. Capturing
the town would sever the regime’s ground line of communication (GLOC) from Homs
City to Damascus, limiting the regime’s ability to move forces between fronts
in southern and central Syria.
ISIS may be pursuing other operational level goals with the new
offensive. It could seek to fix regime
forces away from the regime-held T4 (Tiyas) airbase east of Homs City. ISIS has
launched periodic attacks
against the airbase since the capture of Palmyra
and has stated its intent to capture it. ISIS could instead intend to seize the Shayrat
military airbase, located less than 30 kilometers northwest of Mahin. ISIS will
likely attack pro-regime forces on multiple axes in a future offensive against
any of these regime-held positions and is .
positioned to conduct a pincer
movement on any of the objectives listed here. ISIS has a support zone in the northeastern
corner of Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley, bordering Syria, and could simultaneously attack
Hezbollah forces concentrated south of Homs City from Lebanon in order to
disrupt the ability of pro-regime forces to respond. ISW
forecasted in mid-September that ISIS would most likely launch a multi-pronged
offensive to seize either the T4 or Shayrat military airbases, and most
dangerously attack south of Homs near Qusayr.
ISIS has been conducting mutually supporting operations to thwart
the Russian-backed ground advance in several locations. ISIS had severed the
regime’s ground line of communications (GLOC) from Hama to Aleppo City on
October 23, before its assault south of Homs City, and had seized multiple
checkpoints along the road between the towns of Ithriya and Khannaser. ISIS
also attacked the
regime’s command and control node in Safira, southeast of Aleppo City along the
GLOC, on October 28. Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) members in
Northern Syria appear
to headquarter in Safira, as evidenced by the death of multiple IRGC officers in
the area since 2012. Russian special
forces are coordinating airstrikes on behalf of the regime in Syria, and
could also be present in Safira. ISIS’s attack against Safira forced the regime
to abandon an ongoing
offensive to break ISIS’s siege on the Kuweiris airbase east of Aleppo City.
Pro-regime forces repelled ISIS from Safira and regained
control of the GLOC by November 4 with the support of Russian airstrikes
in Aleppo.
The Russian deployment to the T4 and Shayrat airbases positions
Russia to blunt the ISIS advance using airpower. Russia has also increased the
defensive fortifications of both bases, likely including
heavy artillery. Russia conducted airstrikes
against ISIS in Eastern Syria from November 2-3, including positions near Quryatayn
and Palmyra. These strikes did not directly target the ISIS forces attacking
Sadad and are not the first Russian airstrikes against ISIS in Eastern Syria.
It is possible, however, that Russia will shift fixed wing aircraft to either
the T4 or Shayrat military airbases in order to increase its air sorties
against ISIS in Eastern Syria. The forward deployment of attack helicopters in
Homs could also support a future regime offensive to retake the ISIS-held city
of Palmyra, although such an offensive appears unlikely in the near term.
ISIS’s attacks in Aleppo and Homs Provinces demonstrate that ISIS
remains capable of launching offensive operations in Western Syria in November
2015. ISIS attacked strategic regime terrain in both Northern and Central Syria
in quick succession, forcing the regime and its Russian backers to alter their
deployment. ISIS is likely setting conditions for a major offensive by stressing
the regime’s ability to defend core terrain on numerous fronts. ISIS has thus
far focused its major attacks on pro-regime forces but will likely attack
rebel-held terrain in Western Syria if the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces
(SDF) successfully isolates ar-Raqqa City from the north. The current strategy
of the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition does not adequately account for this risk;
the U.S. does not have sufficient ground partners in Western Syria to prevent
further expansion by ISIS. The U.S. must develop an alternate strategy to
prevent ISIS from expanding into Western Syria in order to preserve the impact
of counter-ISIS operations in Northern Syria on ISIS's overall strength in Syria.
