Iraq Government Collapse Likely as a Rump Parliament Calls for Resignations

By Patrick Martin with Emily Anagnostos, Rachel Bessette, and Hannah Werman

Key Take-away: Iraq Prime Minister Haidar al Abadi faces new calls for his resignation as a rump parliament of roughly 131 members, falsely claiming a quorum, has begun to ouster its sitting leaders. The rump Council of Representatives (CoR) barricaded itself in the Parliament building after an overnight sit in on April 13 to 14. The parliamentary remnant illegally convened a session, voted amongst itself to dismiss CoR Speaker Salim al-Juburi, and elected a new provisional speaker. Party discipline and cohesion is devolving, though the Kurdistan Alliance, ISCI, and Badr Organization – each of which has received benefits in the evolving cabinet reshuffle – appear to have retained control of their members. Senior political leaders are meeting. Longtime allies Ammar al-Hakim and Jalal Talabani met in Suleimaniyah on April 13, presumably to discuss ISCI cooperation with the Kurdish Alliance, while rumors state that Muqtada Sadr is in Lebanon, as is Jawad al-Sharistani, the son-in-law and representative of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. Although these leaders may be trying to stave off government collapse, they may not be able to overcome the parliamentary entropy. Street protests have reignited in advance of Friday prayers. Parliamentary means, protests, or force may topple the current government.

[Above: Rebelling CoR members swarm the CoR Speaker's podium and chant for an end to political quotas in government on April 12.]

Introduction

Prime Minister Abadi’s cabinet reshuffle has floundered as political blocs hijacked the initiative in a bid to preserve their representation and access to patronage within the cabinet. PM Abadi announced the cabinet reshuffle on February 9 in an effort to improve government performance, remove political interests from the cabinet, and reassert control over the government. ISW assessed on February 15 that PM Abadi’s attempt to reshuffle the cabinet might lead to his ouster.

Abadi’s efforts this spring have largely failed, as they did in August 2015. Members of political blocs, including Former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law Alliance (SLA), have more openly discussed whether PM Abadi should remain premier. Others, primarily those that are opposed to SLA leader Nouri al-Maliki, have insisted that PM Abadi cancel his membership in the Dawa Party, nominally to have an “independent” Prime Minister, but actually in order to pry PM Abadi away from Maliki and his grip on the Dawa Party. Meanwhile, Maliki and pro-Iranian elements within the pan-Shi’a political body, the National Alliance, worked to prevent PM Abadi from conducting any meaningful reforms. Most notably, the National Alliance formed a unique sub-committee on March 27 composed of a senior ISCI member, Hamid Maleh, and two Iranian proxy actors, Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri and Popular Mobilization Commission chairman Faleh al-Fayadh. Maliki and pro-Iranian elements likely wanted to control the direction of PM Abadi’s reforms, while ISCI’s representation was likely more a product of its fence-sitting position as it attempts to re-position itself as a more powerful force within Iraqi politics, as outlined in ISW’s March 25 assessment.

Iraq’s political situation has degenerated spectacularly. Political blocs have been unable to select a new cabinet despite weeks of negotiations and horse-trading, leading to frustration not just among the Iraqi populace, but within the political blocs themselves. On April 12, several political blocs fractured as CoR members rebelled against the apparent wishes of their respective leaders, barricading themselves within the CoR building, forming a rump CoR, and illegally voting a new CoR Speaker to replace current Speaker Salim al-Juburi. The situation has degenerated to the point that party discipline among a large number of political blocs has collapsed, with rebelling CoR members taking positions dramatically different from those of their bloc leaders. The current political crisis threatens the stability of Iraq in an unprecedented manner, and the crisis could see the government collapse. 

Background

PM Abadi’s reform initiative has benefited from the support of Sadrist Trend leader Muqtada al-Sadr, who has positioned himself as the head of a popular anti-corruption and pro-reform movement in the wake of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s withdrawal from Iraq’s political scene in early February. Sadr’s support has come largely in the form of popular street demonstrations and a large sit-in organized in front of the entrance to the Green Zone in central Baghdad. Thousands of Sadrist supporters have called for reforms, and Sadr himself even joined the sit-in movement, setting up a tent in the Green Zone on March 27 to pressure the political blocs to conduct reforms and select a new cabinet of technocrats. Sadr’s personal sit-in put heavy pressure on the political blocs to acquiesce to PM Abadi’s demands to select a new cabinet to PM Abadi’s specifications.

March 31: PM Abadi’s Technocratic Cabinet Nominations

PM Abadi, bolstered by Sadrist Trend leader Muqtada al-Sadr and large demonstrations in favor of reform, sent a list of potential replacements for his cabinet to the CoR on March 31. In defiance of Maliki and the preferences of pro-Iranian interests, the list was almost entirely composed of technocrats and had no major political party members represented. The only exceptions were Defense Minister Khalid al-Obeidi, a member of the Sunni Etihad bloc, and Interior Minister Muhammad al-Ghabban, a member of the Badr Organization, citing the need to maintain stability in these ministries due to the ongoing fight against ISIS. Cleverly, the technocrats included independent Kurds as nominees for the important Oil and Housing Ministries in a bid to win the support of the Kurdistan Alliance. The Kurdish blocs had previously insisted on the need for current Kurdish ministers to retain their positions in order to preserve Kurdish representation within the government. 

While presenting the list at the CoR, PM Abadi deliberately thanked Sadr, who ended the pro-reform sit-in his followers had been conducting in front of the Green Zone since March 18, even though Sadr did warn that he would withdraw confidence from if the cabinet reshuffle did not succeed. PM Abadi likewise noted that the CoR needed to vote on the new cabinet within 10 days, though at some point, the voting session was delayed two additional days to April 12 for unclear reasons.

Multiple parties opposed the new cabinet that cut them out of government. Sunni blocs complained that the new cabinet was not representative of the people. The Kurdistan Alliance had insisted on the need for the Kurdish blocs to be consulted before any Kurd was nominated, but later simply resorted to intimidation to force the Kurdish technocrats to withdraw their nominations in a bid to force PM Abadi to keep the current Kurdish ministers in the government. 

ISCI, on the other hand, recommended a “National Reform Initiative” aimed at building an advisory council to PM Abadi composed of the leaders of all major political blocs, as well as a committee representative of the political blocs to advise PM Abadi on the new cabinet’s composition. The ISCI meeting formed the basis for future efforts by political blocs to come to a consensus agreement on how to approach the reform process, as it effectively recommended a cross-party power-sharing agreement within the government and constraints on PM Abadi’s powers. 

The cabinet reshuffle process also sparked a flurry of meetings between political bloc leaders as they attempted to find a solution to the protracting political crisis. The meetings were not just among political allies, but among prospective allies as well; ISCI’s Ammar al-Hakim met with Badr Organization, Etihad members met with al-Ahrar Bloc members, and all blocs met with some combination of the three presidencies: Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi, President Fuad Masoum, and CoR Speaker Salim al-Juburi. These meetings were likely conducted for the primary purpose of negotiating the outcome that would bring the most benefit to the political blocs.

Political pressure eventually led PM Abadi to retreat, and he invited political blocs to submit their own technocratic nominations for consideration. Political blocs inevitably submitted new political candidates for the technocratic cabinet, though not all party members accepted their nominations, indicating that party discipline was breaking down. One member of the Sunni bloc Iraqiyya Alliance, Qutaiba al-Juburi, stated he withdrew his nomination after Iraqiyya selected him for a ministerial position, citing the need to have a non-partisan cabinet. The Kurdistan Alliance did not even bother to submit nominations and remained the strongest opponents of the concept of the cabinet reshuffle, insisting that their current ministers retain their positions.

Yet going into the April 12 CoR session, the political blocs and the three presidencies appeared to have an agreement with one another, even signing a document on April 11 laying out the framework for a national reform initiative similar to the ISCI reform initiative, laying out the cabinet reshuffle process, and identifying key legislation that needed to pass in the CoR. They even appeared to agree to preserve political interests in the cabinet; they reportedly agreed to do away with the March 31 nominations and keep 22 ministries instead of the proposed 16 in an attempt to ensure that all blocs had representation – and thus, access to patronage – in the cabinet. This contrasted with the weeks leading up to the March 31 CoR session that saw different political blocs leaking different lists of cabinet members to the media in a bid to influence the direction of the reform process. However, several unspecified blocs reportedly boycotted the meeting.

Week of March 31: Maliki Attempts to Oust PM Abadi 

The leader of the SLA, Vice President Nouri al-Maliki, attempted to oust PM Abadi. The U.S. and Iran were meanwhile applying leverage to ensure that PM Abadi did not leave office. U.S. support for PM Abadi during the reshuffle has been particularly strong and visible; U.S. officials, including Secretary of State John Kerry, met with the leaders of numerous political blocs in Iraq on April 8, and U.S. Vice President even phoned PM Abadi multiple times to express his support. The U.S. reached out to political blocs, including ISCI and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), to discourage any attempt to remove PM Abadi. For the U.S., retaining PM Abadi in his position is critical for maintaining ongoing anti-ISIS efforts. PM Abadi willfully accepts U.S. and Coalition assistance as far as is possible without sparking the ire of Iran and its proxies. He also actively resists pressure to conform to Iranian directives, albeit weakly. More importantly, there are no obvious candidates to replace PM Abadi should he leave the premiership for any reason, and a political crisis stemming from a collapsed government could severely undermine anti-ISIS efforts, reversing progress and allowing ISIS to take advantage of the unrest to re-establish its capabilities and launch attacks.

Iran also blocked efforts to oust PM Abadi, reportedly sending its top regional power-broker, Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-Quds Force commander Qassim Suleimani to rein in Maliki’s initiative. For Iran, keeping PM Abadi maintains stability at a time when it is preoccupied with events in Syria. Iran may also benefit from Abadi’s weakness, which allows it to maintain its status as a powerbroker among Iraq’s Shi’a factions. Maliki, in contrast, is a centralizer and consolidator of power. Finally, the Iraqis may not be able to push a more pro-Iranian premier through the confirmation process. 

It is not clear when Maliki attempted to replace PM Abadi, and it is unclear whether or not Maliki attempted to replace PM Abadi before or after the March 31 CoR session that saw PM Abadi submit his list of technocratic nominations. But Maliki’s attempt to remove PM Abadi, and the cabinet’s change from a technocratic one to one of political party interests, demonstrated PM Abadi’s vulnerability and his inability to impose his will on the political blocs. 

April 12: The CoR Collapses

The crisis over the cabinet reshuffle escalated even further on April 12, when PM Abadi submitted his new list of nominations to the CoR for a vote. The new list was a compromise between PM Abadi’s March 31 list, which consisted entirely of technocrats, and the appointments of political blocs. The April 12 list recommended that: four of the original 16 nominated technocrats stay in the new cabinet; a number of new technocrats take other positions; and that the Interior and Defense positions remain untouched due to their importance in the ongoing fight against ISIS. Yet the new cabinet also retained a number of senior political actors. The Kurdistan Alliance had collectively threatened to boycott the CoR session or even withdraw from government if their ministers did not remain in their current positions, so PM Abadi had to concede positions to the bloc in order to secure their votes. Current Culture Minister Fariyad Muhammad Rawanduzi and Finance Minister Hoshyar Zebari therefore kept their positions, and a third position, the Migration Ministry, went to a PUK member. The new list also recommended Faleh al-Fayadh, the National Security Adviser and the Chairman of the Popular Mobilization Committee (PMC), as the new Foreign Minister. Fayadh, a figure who is close to both Maliki and Iran, is the polar opposite of a technocrat, and was likely pushed on PM Abadi by Maliki. The new cabinet thus represented a step back from the March 31 list that sought to remove political interests from government.

It is not clear if PM Abadi ever wanted to submit the April 12 list; an anonymous source “close to PM Abadi” stated that PM Abadi submitted both the April 12 compromise list and re-submitted the March 31 technocrats list, but that somehow only the April 12 list was brought to a vote.

The April 12 CoR session represented a flurry of confusion and delay tactics. Speaker Juburi stated that PM Abadi needed to submit either the resignations or the notifications of dismissal for the current ministers before the new ministers could be selected, likely in an attempt to delay the vote, though CoR members called for the new list regardless. The CoR session briefly adjourned, and PM Abadi, Speaker Juburi, and the heads of political blocs met in private to discuss the reform process. The blocs could not come to an agreement on the new cabinet, and so Speaker Juburi, after reconvening the CoR session, announced that the vote would be delayed until April 14. 

[Above: A comparison of the current cabinet, the March 31 list, and the April 12 list. Click to zoom.]

Juburi’s announcement led to mayhem in the CoR. Members swarmed the Speaker’s podium, yelling and chanting against political quotas and protesting the delay. One outraged CoR member even threw several chairs at the podium. In a bizarre spectacle, several CoR members staged a farcical vote and half-jokingly selected a new CoR Speaker, a senior SLA member from Babil Province, as well as a Speaker’s deputy and rapporteur. Shortly thereafter, protesting members of the SLA, Etihad, and al-Ahrar barricaded themselves inside of the CoR building and announced a sit-in inside the CoR hall to force an emergency CoR session to convene on April 13. Some protesters also called for the CoR to vote on the original technocratic list instead of the April 12 compromise nominations. An al-Ahrar member stated that 115 CoR members, including 40 female members, stayed in the CoR overnight in protest.

One of the other demands of the protesters was the removal of the three presidencies from their positions and the dissolution of government. Shortly before PM Abadi presented the list of new nominations, a movement began within the CoR to collect signatures for the removal of the three presidencies. Ahmed al-Juburi, a member of the Iraq Alliance, a primarily Sunni bloc, stated during the CoR session that 33 CoR members had signed a document calling for the removal of the three presidencies and the dissolution of the government for failing to meet the demands of the people and dragging the country into a “spiral of crises.” Throughout the course of the day, the number of signatures fluctuated from anywhere from 105 and 114 to 150 and 164. 

April 13: Political Party Discipline Breaks Down

The sit-in and protest appeared to be less of an initiative organized by political blocs’ leadership and more of an emotional response to the crisis. There did not appear to be any one bloc that showed up in their entirety to the CoR sit-in, which saw several competitors sitting in solidarity with one another; Hakim al-Zamili, a senior member of the Sadrist Trend, and members of al-Ahrar Bloc sat next to Aliyah Nassif, a key ally of Maliki, Sadr’s primary rival, as well as Hassan Salim, a CoR member affiliated with the Iranian proxy militia Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, a rival of Sadrist militias. Similarly, members of other blocs, such as the Kurdistan Alliance and ISCI, did not appear to participate in the sit-in. This indicates that these blocs maintained party discipline and stuck with the directives of the political blocs’ leadership, which likely agreed to delay the CoR vote. 

Discipline broke down in other blocs. The leadership of the political blocs, if they commented at all, voiced disapproval of the CoR protest. The Sunni Mutahidun party condemned efforts to undermine procedure in the CoR, though members appeared to participate in the sit-in. While Sadrist Trend members participanted in the CoR sit-in, members of a Sadrist demonstration that reached into the thousands occurring in Tahrir Square on the same day shied away from supporting the prospect of removing the three presidencies.

The overnight sit-in forced Speaker Juburi to call an emergency CoR session to vote on the new cabinet on April 13. He reportedly planned to present both the March 31 and the April 12 list to the CoR for voting. Only 174 CoR members were present – barely over a quorum, which requires 163. However, no vote could be held as the CoR again fell into chaos. An al-Ahrar Bloc member, Awad al-Awadi, demanded at this point that Speaker Juburi “act with courage” and present the motion to dismiss the three presidencies, reportedly signed by 171 CoR members, after which CoR members began chanting for Speaker Juburi’s removal. At some point, a physical altercation between Aliyah Nassif and PUK member Ila Talabani broke out – reportedly because Nassif was sitting in Talabani’s chair – that led to CoR members to throw punches and bottles of water at each other. The chaos led Juburi to suspend the April 13 CoR session, though CoR members continued to protest inside of the CoR building. 

Speaker Juburi, in a bid to end the demonstration, went to President Masoum and recommended that he dissolve the CoR and call for early elections. The move represented a bid by Speaker Juburi to re-impose discipline in the CoR and – it would have been highly unlikely for Iraq to be able to conduct any elections given the security environment. Speaker Juburi also met with political bloc leaders and with PM Abadi to discuss the ongoing crisis.

The CoR protest movement was bolstered even further when Iyad Allawi, the leader of the secular Wataniya Bloc, joined the protesters in the CoR building. Allawi has been one of PM Abadi’s strongest critics, and has called for PM Abadi’s removal on numerous occasions in the past. Allawi likely joined the demonstrators in a bid to boost his political stature, as he has declined as a relevant political figure in recent years, going from nearly capturing the premiership in 2010 to holding only 21 CoR seats today. It thus appears that Wataniya and al-Ahrar are the two blocs that have wholly joined the CoR protesters, as these are the only two blocs whose senior leaders have participated in the CoR sit-in. 

April 14: The Rebel CoR Bloc Illegally Ousts Speaker Juburi 

Events came to a head when, on April 14, Speaker Juauri did not attend the CoR to call for its scheduled session. Neither did PM Abadi nor President Masoum, who were supposed to attend, nor, for that matter, members of political blocs who had not joined the protest movement. The notable absences indicate that the political bloc leaders and the three presidencies decided to delay the CoR session until they could re-impose discipline on the protesting CoR members. Political blocs, who had been attempting to preserve their interests within the new cabinet, were losing control over their ability to insert political candidates into the new cabinet, as the rebelling members of their own blocs had begun actively resisting partisan nominations and were actively calling for a technocratic government and new political leadership. The leadership of the political blocs were thus confronted with the problem of a cohesive protest movement working against their own parties’ interests and threatening the stability of the government. The biggest problem was that the rebelling CoR members were acting as a single bloc, larger than any other in the CoR by at least 40 seats and taking up more than a third of the CoR’s seats, making them the most powerful force in CoR decision-making. 

The April 14 CoR session thus did not reach quorum – according to the Parliamentary Media Directorate, only 131 rump CoR members were present, below the 163 members necessary for quorum. This number was not confirmable, particularly because security forces prevented the Parliamentary Media Directorate employees from entering the building for an unspecified reason. The lack of quorum did not stop the rebel CoR members from holding an illegal session under the chairmanship of Adnan al-Janabi, a leader in a prominent Sunni tribe in Babil Province and a member of Iyad Allawi’s Wataniya, who stated that 171 members attended the session, enough for quorum. Another CoR member, SLA member Kadhim al-Sayyadi – an unhinged SLA member best known for attempting to shoot another CoR member during a television interview in November 2015 –stated that the April 14 CoR session was a continuation of the previous day’s CoR session, and that because quorum was reached in the previous day’s CoR session, the April 14 session was legal. It is most likely that quorum was not reached. 

The CoR members effectively formed a rump parliament, a parallel CoR with shrunken membership, and upended the sitting leadership of the properly elected and constituted CoR. They voted to remove Speaker Juburi, First Deputy Humam Hamoudi of ISCI, and Second Deputy Aram Sheikh Muhammad of the Kurdistan Alliance, according to their spokesperson, Haitham al-Juburi, a member of a small party within the SLA. The rebelling CoR members unanimously selected Wataniya member Adnan al-Janabi as interim CoR Speaker. They also formed a committee of three unspecified people to select a new CoR Speaker for the April 16 CoR session. The parallel CoR insisted that it was formed without political party interference. All of the CoR members participating in the rump parliament – a term referring to a parliament that exists parallel to the legal parliament but also composed of legal parliament members – are members of political blocs, and are therefore making a deliberate break with their parties’ leadership. They are attempting to form a new political bloc. 

A rebel Etihad member, Ahmed Jarba Mutlak, demanded that President Masoum withdraw confidence from PM Abadi, a move that would collapse the government. Masoum would thus, in accordance with the constitution, need to give the right to form a new government to the largest bloc. Jarba noted that the largest bloc was composed of rebelling members of the rump. This indicates that there are efforts to coalesce the rebelling CoR members into a cohesive political force at odds with the leadership of the political blocs. According to Wataniya Bloc chairman Hassan Chuwairid, a participant in the CoR protest, the rebelling CoR members would even hold talks with other blocs to choose the new Speaker.

The backlash from the political blocs against the attempt to oust Speaker Juburi was swift. The Speaker stated that the session was not legitimate as no quorum had been reached. The Kurdistan Alliance and Etihad, of which Speaker Juburi is a member, also rejected the motion as unconstitutional, though the Etihad CoR Bloc chairman, Ahmed al-Masari, continued to insist on the need to question PM Abadi and sack him if necessary. The leader of Badr Organization’s CoR bloc, Qassim al-Araji, called for the need to maintain “social cohesion” and warned that “significant differences” between political blocs could result in a degenerating security situation. 

Seeking Stability amongst the Shi’a

The prospect of a collapse in government unnerves the regime in Iran, and the position of the Badr Organization, an Iranian proxy group, is indicative of Iran’s unease about Iraq’s political crisis. Though PM Abadi is unpalatable to Iran due to his willingness to accept large amounts of U.S. support in the fight against ISIS and his unwillingness to willingly bow to Iranian directives, Iran presently favors stability in Iraq over a change in government, in large part because Iranian military forces and its Iraqi proxy militias are preoccupied with fighting in Syria. 

It is also possible that Muqtada al-Sadr has become unnerved by the direction of events. Sadr publicly distanced himself from al-Ahrar Bloc during his sermon in Tahrir Square on February 26, even referring two of its most senior members for investigation on corruption charges and detaining another. The Sadrist sit-in in front of the Green Zone was marked by a lack of participation by al-Ahrar Bloc members and a reliance on Sadr’s charitable foundation, the Office of the First Martyr al-Sadr, a further indication of separation between Sadr and al-Ahrar. It is thus possible that Sadr has lost control over al-Ahrar Bloc, as he has conspicuously issued no statement in support of the rebelling CoR members, despite the prominent participation of al-Ahrar Bloc members in the protest. It is important to note that Sadr did warn that he would withdraw confidence from PM Abadi on March 31 if the cabinet reshuffle did not succeed. However, Sadr’s behavior indicates that al-Ahrar Bloc may have misinterpreted or gone against Sadr’s orders in some measure; al-Ahrar Bloc in all likelihood remains loyal to Sadr, but may not necessarily be under Sadr’s full control. 

Much of the Shi’a political establishment will seek stability, as will the Iranian regime. Iraq’s most prominent Shi’a powers are thus likely seeking a way to defuse the situation before the government collapses. On April 13, an anonymous political source stated that Sadr arrived in Beirut on an “unofficial visit,” reportedly to “consult” with Lebanese Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Sadr reportedly joined SLA leader Nouri al-Maliki, Sadr’s rival, who had arrived in Beirut on April 11. In addition, their meeting coincided with a visit to Lebanon by Jawad al-Shahristani, the representative and son-in-law of Iraq’s highest Shi’a religious authority, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who led a delegation to Lebanon on April 14. There is no confirmation that these figures met, either separately or all together, but it is highly unlikely that these arrivals were coincidental. It is more likely that Iraq’s major Shi’a powers arrived in Beirut to discuss a way to address the crisis in Iraq, possibly with Nasrallah or a representative of the Iranian regime, such as IRGC – Quds Force leader Qassim Suleimani Iran’s favorite power-broker for the region. 

Conclusion 

Iraq’s political crisis has reached a dangerous threshold – political blocs still have not reached an agreement on the new cabinet and are experiencing internal fracturing. The result could be a collapse of the Iraqi government: the CoR could vote no-confidence in PM Abadi or he could resign. The CoR could lose a quorum and cease to function as it did in 2006. The rump CoR could persist and create a parallel government. A judicial challenge to the constitutional crisis that ensues would likely favor Maliki, as long as Medhat Mahmoud, the head of the Judiciary and a longtime Maliki ally, remains. CoR Speaker could also dissolve the CoR and call for early elections at the threat of facing mounting protests and instability across the country. Any of these prospects practically ensures that there will be no possibility of recapturing Mosul in 2016.

The consequences of Abadi’s fall or a constitutional crisis could be disastrous for the stability of the country. Ongoing street demonstrations and confusion surrounding the process of selecting a new government could expose the country to attacks by ISIS aimed at further exacerbating the situation. The security situation could worsen as Iraqi Shi’a militias descend on Baghdad in a bid to influence the political climate, an outcome that could increase the possibility of intra-political party violence in Baghdad. Alternatively, formal institutions of the Iraqi Security Forces could become involved, although ISW has observed no such indicators as of April 14. Iraq’s Kurds could take concrete steps towards secession if efforts to form a new government exclude Kurdish blocs. The government will make no progress in addressing the worsening economic situation, the return of internally-displaced persons to their homes, or the reconstruction of damaged parts of the country. Moreover, the progress of the war against ISIS will be suspended in limbo, as the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) will be conducting operations for a failed government, and make it far more difficult for the U.S. to conduct anti-ISIS operations.

ISW previously assessed that a vote of no-confidence against PM Abadi was the most dangerous rather than the most likely course of action because no compromise candidates exist to take his place. It is still unclear if the political blocs could get behind any political leader. Maliki will not likely be able to form a government because of the degree of animosity other political blocs have towards him. National Alliance chairman Ibrahim al-Jaafari, a close ally of Iran, is the closest thing to a consensus candidate amongst the Shi’a parties, but even he would face serious obstacles as a candidate. These establishment figures remain possible candidates for the premiership only if the political blocs manage to rein in their rebelling CoR members. Time will tell if the rebelling CoR members will coalesce into a functioning political bloc capable of challenging others in the CoR. But the formation of a rump CoR and growing calls for the dissolution of government, in defiance of the wishes of the political bloc leaders, Iran, and the U.S., bode ill for PM Abadi’s ability to remain in office and effective. Political blocs may still put their differences aside and vote to retain confidence in PM Abadi by selecting a new cabinet, but that remains unlikely, as political blocs remain undecided on what the new cabinet should look like. A vote of no-confidence or a constitutional crisis in which the formal, elected parliament no longer functions are more likely scenarios. The U.S. must therefore prepare for the possibility that the post-Abadi Iraq will arrive sooner than expected, with all of the instability that will follow.

Afghanistan Partial Threat Assessment: April 12, 2016

By Caitlin Forrest with Harleen Gambhir

ISW last published its Afghanistan Threat Assessment on February 23, 2016.

The ANSF is unprepared to counter the Taliban militants’ summer campaign. Northern warlords will take advantage of Taliban militants’ gains to establish themselves as security providers and gain leverage against the fragile National Unity Government.

Readiness gaps challenge the assumptions behind the U.S.’s current plan to draw down from 9,800 to 5,500 troops by the end of January 2017. General John W. Nicholson took command of U.S. and NATO Forces in Afghanistan from General John Campbell on March 2. On April 4, GEN Nicholson stated the U.S. is behind schedule to train a self-sufficient Afghan security force. The ANSF will be particularly pressed as the Taliban intensify their operations under the banner of their summer campaign, “Operation Omari,” which they announced on April 12. Taliban militants seek to degrade the ANSF, discourage foreign presence, and demonstrate the weakness of the unity government during Operation Omari. They will achieve these objectives through increased insider attacks, assassination campaigns, and attacks against Western and diplomatic targets in Kabul City and beyond. Taliban militants also seek to gain control of additional territory, for which they have already set conditions over the winter.

The National Unity Government ordered the ANSF on April 6 to adopt a more offensive strategy by consolidating forces in strategic areas instead of defending static check posts, a shift supported by NATO forces. Preliminary applications of this strategy allowed Taliban militants to solidify control in the areas abandoned by the ANSF, specifically in Musa Qal’ah and Now Zad Districts in Helmand and Shahid-e Hassas District in Uruzgan in late February and early March. This consolidation will likely mitigate actual and potential manpower losses. It will not counter the Taliban militants’ summer offensive, as militants currently threaten Helmand’s provincial capital Lashkar Gah despite the ANSF’s attempts to reinforce the city in late February. 

Taliban militants are also consolidating power under leading Taliban commander Mullah Akhtar Mansour. He has reconciled with the late Taliban leader Mullah Omar’s brother and son, who originally challenged Akhtar Mansour’s claim to power. Haqqani Network leader and Mansour’s deputy emir Sirajuddin Haqqani allegedly brokered this mediation, indicating the Haqqani Network’s stake in a unified Taliban front. This reconciliation follows Pakistan’s rumored arrest of leading dissident Taliban commander Mullah Rasul Akhund on March 22. The mediation and possible arrest suggest that Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) aim to present a united Taliban militant force this summer.

Northern warlords and political opposition groups are increasing pressure on the fragile National Unity Government in the face of these security challenges, hindering the administration’s ability to respond to insurgent offensives. Northern warlords are taking advantage of this pressure to extract concessions. General Atta Noor and General Abdul Rashid Dostum preemptively activated their competing personal militias in Balkh, Faryab, and Jowzjan Provinces in late February and early March in order to counter the Taliban militants’ summer campaign. Atta and Dostum seek to establish themselves as leading security providers, challenging national institutions and one another. Political opposition groups like the Afghanistan Protection and Stability Council (APSC) and the newly formed National Solidarity parliamentary bloc continue to criticize the National Unity Government for its inability to provide security or enact electoral reforms, pressuring the Ghani-Abdullah administration. President Ashraf Ghani has responded to this criticism by dismissing several significant government officials in late March in a struggle over cabinet composition and electoral reform with CEO and rival Abdullah Abdullah. Atta is Abdullah Abdullah’s primary backer, and his saber rattling is aimed at President Ghani. Dostum, the sitting First Vice President, recently reconciled with Ashraf Ghani and returned to participating actively in government. He has mobilized to counter Atta, as well as the Taliban.

1. Militants attacked heavily fortified areas in Kabul City, launching four explosive attacks against security and diplomatic targets from March 25 to 29. ISIS Wilayat Khorasan militants also indicated intent to attack Kabul City by claiming two unconfirmed attacks in southern Kabul on April 6. These attacks will likely increase following the announcement of the Taliban militants’ summer offensive “Operation Omari” on April 12.

2. Clearing operations continued to displace ISIS Wilayat Khorasan militants from Nangarhar Province into other eastern provinces. ISIS’s militants reportedly moved to Sar Kani District, Kunar Province following ANSF clearing operations in Nangarhar Province in late March. ISIS militants also conducted their first attack in Ghazni Province north of Ghazni City on March 11 and reportedly continued recruiting in Ghazni and Zabul Provinces, including Gelan, Jaghuri, and Khak-e Afghan Districts in early April. Some ISIS militants remain in southern Nangarhar despite a significant increase in U.S. airstrikes and ANSF clearing operations, with some allegedly pledging allegiance to Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mansour on April 11.

3. ANSF retook Reg-e Khan Neshin District Center in Helmand Province with support from US airstrikes on March 28 after Taliban militants briefly captured it on March 15, demonstrating the effectiveness of ANSF operations combined with U.S. airstrikes. Taliban militants control seven districts in Helmand Province, however, and are contesting areas surrounding the provincial capital Lashkar Gah. ISW has updated this version of its Afghanistan map to reflect Taliban militants’ longstanding control of Baghran District Center in Helmand, which is now among ISW’s researched districts. The map now also reflects Taliban militants’ effective control of Kajaki District Center, as the ANSF is reportedly unable to maneuver beyond a fixed position at the nearby Kajaki dam.

4. Rival Taliban militant factions participated in large-scale clashes in Shindand District, Herat Province. Shindand District is a launching pad for militant operations in western Afghanistan. The district is currently a stronghold for leading dissident Taliban commander Mullah Rasul Akhund’s faction.

5. Rival Northern Warlords First Vice President General Abdul Rashid Dostum and Balkh Provincial Governor Mohammad Atta Noor conducted competing operations against Taliban militants in Faryab, Jowzjan and Balkh Provinces in late February and early March. Competition between the rival warlords intensified when Dostum and Atta’s supporters staged protests and counter-protests in Mazar-e Sharif and Maimanah Cities on March 22 and 23. Competition between these northern warlords reflects competition between President Ghani, linked with Ghani, and CEO Abdullah Abdullah, whom Atta backs, and challenges the legitimacy of the National Unity Government by strengthening militias conducting operations outside of government control.

6. Taliban militants recaptured Dand-e Ghori area, Pul-e Khumri District, Baghlan Province, returning to the area on March 24 after the ANSF conducted multiple clearing operations. Dand-e Ghori lies on the main road connecting northern Baghlan and Balkh provincial capitals Pul-e Khumri and Mazar-e Sharif and was originally captured by Taliban militants in last year’s spring offensive. Control of this area enables militants to attack Pul-e Khumri City and disrupt travel to Mazar-e Sharif. Taliban militants may have seized the area as a means of demonstrating Pashtun strength in response to protests and militia operations by Uzbek Dostum and Tajik Atta. The capture of Dand-e Ghori immediately followed protests in Mazar-e Sharif and Maimanah on March 22 and 23. Militants also attacked Dowlatabad City in late March in Faryab after Dostum’s operations in the province.

Warning: Political Crisis in Iraq's Parliament as PM Abadi's Reforms Presented

By Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

The session of the Council of Representatives (CoR) to select a new cabinet for the government dissolved into chaos when political blocs could not reach an agreement over the cabinet’s final composition. The CoR members burst into an uproar when CoR Speaker Juburi announced the decision that followed a closed-door meeting of Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi, CoR Speaker Juburi, and the heads of several political blocs during a recess of the CoR session. Reportedly over 100 members of the CoR began a sit-in in the CoR to protest the decision by CoR Speaker Salim al-Juburi to postpone the vote on the cabinet reshuffle until Thursday, April 14. The protesters’ demands include the removal of PM Abadi, President Fuad Masoum, and CoR Speaker Juburi, as well as the end to political quotas determining the composition of the cabinet. Several members also demanded that the CoR vote on PM Abadi’s original list of technocratic candidates presented on March 31, and not the April 12 list of candidates that constituted a compromise between technocrats and political appointees. An unconfirmed source stated that there are at least 114 signatures for their removal. The participants appear to be cross-sectarian; members of the Sunni Etihad bloc, the Shi’a State of Law Alliance, and the Sadrist Trend are participating, Members that have a strong dislike for one another are also participating; senior Sadrist Trend member Hakim al-Zamili, for example, is participating alongside Hassan Salam, a CoR member linked to the Iranian proxy militia Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq.

[Above: CoR members stage a sit-in in the CoR to protest the postponement of the vote to select the new cabinet until April 14.]

Iraq Situation Report: April 5 - 11, 2016

By Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

Key Take-Away: Political blocs continue to jockey for influence over the final composition of the Council of Ministers (CoM) amid increased threats to Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi’s position. Reuters reported on April 6 that U.S. and Iranian officials intervened to “stave off” an initiative by Vice President Nouri al-Maliki to oust PM Abadi, with the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – Quds Force, Qassim Suleimani, reportedly intervening in order to prevent any change in the Iraqi government. Meanwhile, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, speaking in Baghdad on April 8, reiterated that the U.S. administration had unequivocal support for PM Abadi. U.S., and notably Iranian, support for the notion of keeping PM Abadi in his position indicate that PM Abadi will likely remain Prime Minister, as political blocs will be hesitant to oppose U.S. and Iranian directives. However, it also looks increasingly likely that political blocs will determine the final composition of the cabinet and will not select technocrats for the ministerial positions or other senior government posts, as PM Abadi originally intended. The Council of Representatives (CoR) is slated to discuss the new cabinet on April 12, but the date could be further delayed or the session blocked by a lack of quorum if no agreement can be reached before the CoR session. It remains to be seen how the Kurdistan Alliance, the most vocal opponents of the cabinet reshuffle, and Muqtada al-Sadr, who has positioned himself as a leader of the reform process and the strongest supporter of the cabinet reshuffle, will react to the new cabinet changes. However, both have previously stated they will pursue a no-confidence vote or withdraw from government if their vision of the cabinet reshuffle are not met, courses of action that have the potential to seriously undermine the stability of the government. It thus looks increasingly likely that any substantial changes in government will be delayed, if they occur at all. Meanwhile, the U.S. is considering building additional firebases in northern Iraq to support operations to recapture Ninewa that have stalled due to stiff resistance from ISIS and manpower issues. The proposal would provide necessary assistance for the ground offensive while demonstrating U.S. support for the Iraqi Security Forces and the Iraqi government, though these additions may not be significant enough factors to make up for the limited number of ISF members currently engaged in operations.

Aleppo Warning Update: April 7, 2016

By: Christopher Kozak

Key Takeaway: Aleppo Province stands to become the focal point of a new round of violence in the Syrian Civil War even as the Geneva III Talks to end the conflict are scheduled to resume on April 13. Continued violations of an ongoing ‘cessation of hostilities’ by both pro-regime and opposition factions have fueled the largest outbreak of violence in northern Syria since the agreement went into effect on February 27, threatening to drive a wider breakdown of the tenuous ceasefire. Additional violence can also be expected in northern Aleppo Province over the coming weeks as Turkey and the U.S. vie over the course and composition of coalition-led efforts to sever the ground lines of communication between Ar-Raqqa City and the Syrian-Turkish Border. Turkey has worked to empower opposition groups in Aleppo Province in order to foil the territorial gains made by the Syrian Kurdish YPG, which the U.S. relies upon in the counter-ISIS fight. The regime and its allies also retain positions at the Kuweires Airbase from which to contest ISIS-held portions of Aleppo Province. This local competition for control over Aleppo Province – and the larger geopolitical struggle between the U.S., Russia, Iran, and Turkey that it reflects – will reach a critical boiling point in the coming months.

1. Hostilities Resume in Southern Aleppo Province: Syrian Al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra and a coalition of other opposition groups – including several U.S.-backed Free Syrian Army (FSA)-affiliated factions – seized the strategic town of Al-Eis in southern Aleppo Province on April 1 following clashes that involved at least three SVBIED detonations. The Syrian Arab Army released a statement condemning the offensive as a major violation of the ‘cessation of hostilities’ and vowing to recapture the town, while opposition groups presented the attack as a justified counterattack in response to persistent ceasefire violations by pro-regime forces throughout the country. Pro-regime forces have mobilized for a counteroffensive amidst reports that Russia resumed its air campaign in Aleppo Province. Iran also announced the deployment of ‘advisors’ from its conventional armed forces in a significant inflection of its own intervention in Syria. The mounting military escalation in southern Aleppo Province heightened further on April 5 after prominent Salafi-Jihadist group Ahrar al-Sham downed a regime warplane over Al-Eis. The incident comes amidst persistent rumors that Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and other foreign actors may intend to provide the opposition with a small number of man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) as a counter the air campaign being conducted by Russia in Syria.

2. Kurds and Opposition Skirmish in Aleppo City: The Syrian Democratic Forces – a coalition composed of the Syrian Kurdish YPG and allied opposition factions – clashed with Syrian Al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra and other opposition groups in the Sheikh Maqsoud District of Aleppo City on April 5. Activist groups accused the Syrian Democratic Forces of cooperating with the regime in order to sever the key Castello Highway that supplies opposition-held Aleppo City. Long-standing tensions with the Syrian Kurds have flared into open violence in the past few months after the Syrian Democratic Forces assisted the regime in severing the primary ground line of communication between Aleppo City and Turkey in February 2016.

3. Turkish-Backed Opposition Advances on Syrian-Turkish Border: The Hawar Kilis Operations Room – a coalition of opposition groups backed by the U.S. and Turkey – seized the ISIS-held town of Al-Rai in northern Aleppo Province on April 7. Al-Rai serves as a key route for illegal cross-border smuggling of foreign fighters and supplies to ISIS in Syria. The advance comes as part of an ongoing offensive along the Syrian – Turkish Border that seized at least sixteen villages from ISIS since March 31. Turkey has intensified its provision of weapons, cross-border artillery fire, and other forms of support to opposition forces in northern Aleppo Province in recent months in a likely attempt to preclude further gains in the border region by the Syrian Kurdish YPG.

4. The U.S. and Turkey Spar Over Counter-ISIS Operations: The Syrian Democratic Forces – a coalition composed of the Syrian Kurdish YPG and allied opposition factions – announced preparations for an upcoming military operation to seize the ISIS-held city of Manbij in eastern Aleppo Province. Manbij is a major hub for foreign fighters and supplies transiting the Syrian-Turkish Border, thus representing a key objective for the U.S.-led coalition in its efforts to isolate Ar-Raqqa City. The operation nonetheless faces significant hurdles. Local Arab and Turkmen tribes have reportedly resisted overtures to participate in the operation due to the alleged mistreatment of civilians in regions previously-cleared by the Syrian Kurdish YPG. Meanwhile, Turkish President Recep Erdogan reportedly linked his support for the operation to demands for participating Sunni Arab factions to disavow their ties with the Syrian Democratic Forces as well as calls for the U.S. to provide additional air support to Turkish-backed opposition groups in northern Aleppo Province. The U.S. and Turkey held a technical meeting on April 4 in order to discuss the operation but the issue remains contentious given the links between the Syrian Kurdish YPG and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a designated terrorist group currently waging an active insurgency in southern Turkey.

Iraq Situation Report: March 29 - April 4, 2016

By Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

Key Take-Away: ISIS conducted a wave of explosive attacks across Iraq aimed at disrupting the forward operations of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Coalition-trained elements of the ISF, supported by local forces, converged on Hit District in western Anbar and the village of al-Nasr, west of Makhmur, conducting operations aimed at recapturing areas on key ground lines of communication. ISIS launched a responsive wave of suicide attacks in both Hit and Makhmur, as well as in the vicinity of Baghdad, primarily aimed at hard targets in order to arrest the ISF’s forward progress and to force a contraction of security forces towards Baghdad and central Iraq. The attacks included suicide attacks on April 4 in Basra and Dhi Qar Provinces, areas that have not seen spectacular attacks since October 2015 and June 2014, respectively. The attacks, combined with the spectacular attacks in Babil Province on March 6 and 25, indicate that ISIS is reconstituting capabilities in southern Iraq. Continued spectacular attacks and instability in the southern provinces would have the potential to seriously restrict the ability of the ISF and Popular Mobilization to conduct operations in northern and western Iraq, as forces would need to redeploy to southern Iraq, an area where few ISF formations are present, to re-establish security.

Iraq Situation Report: March 22 - 28, 2016

By Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

Key Take-Away: Pressure continues to mount on Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi to reshuffle the cabinet. Sadrist Trend leader Muqtada al-Sadr gave PM Abadi until March 26 to submit the list of nominations for the new cabinet to the Council of Representatives (CoR). However, discussions underway in the pan-Shi’a political body, the National Alliance, over what positions blocs will retain in the new government stalled the reshuffle process, and PM Abadi missed the deadline as a result. In response, Sadr initiated his own sit-in inside of a tent in the Green Zone on March 27 to pressure PM Abadi to conduct reforms, refusing to meet with politicians and government officials. Political blocs meanwhile have pressured PM Abadi to conduct reforms to their own preferences, seeking to preserve their positions and increase their representation within the cabinet. Groups like the Sunni Etihad and the Kurdistan Alliance refused to submit nominations for the new cabinet positions, citing concerns over the unclear selection process. Meanwhile, the National Alliance decided on March 27 to form a new sub-committee aimed at “advising” PM Abadi during the cabinet reshuffle process. However, the presence of Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri and Popular Mobilization Commission Chairman Faleh al-Fayadh on the committee indicate that Iranian proxies are attempting to direct the final outcome of the cabinet reshuffle, an outcome that would undermine the U.S.’s ability to continue its advise-and-assist mission in Iraq and effectively combat ISIS. PM Abadi is being pulled in multiple directions by Sadr, pro-Iranian elements, and non-Shi’a political blocs in a way that makes it impossible to satisfy all parties involved. It is a distinct possibility that multiple political blocs will reject PM Abadi’s cabinet submission on Thursday, or that he may not be able to submit it at all, given the disparate demands of the political blocs. PM Abadi may thus face the real possibility of a questioning session and a subsequent vote of no-confidence if the reform process continues to stall.

Russian-Syrian-Iranian Coalition Seizes ISIS-Held Palmyra

By Christopher Kozak

Pro-regime forces seized Palmyra as well as the adjacent Palmyra Airbase in Eastern Homs Province on March 27 after ISIS withdrew from the city, completing an operation that began on March 7 with the aim of recapturing the strategic crossroads. The Syrian Arab Army and its auxiliary National Defense Forces conducted multiple offensives against ISIS in the western countryside of Palmyra in the eight months after its rapid fall to ISIS in May 2015, achieving limited tactical gains at a high cost in manpower and equipment. The latest offensive proceeded as a three-pronged frontal assault similar to previous regime-directed operations against Palmyra, displaying little-to-none of the sophisticated operational design that characterized the recent campaign in Aleppo Province. Instead, the regime relied upon large numbers of reinforcements from Russia, Iran, and other foreign backers as well as a lull in combat generated by a nationwide ‘cessation of hostilities’ that began on February 27 in order to generate sufficient combat power to overwhelm ISIS in Palmyra.

Russia played a major role in enabling the successful seizure of Palmyra following months of indecisive engagements. The Russian Armed Forces shifted the focus of its air campaign against Palmyra and its environs in March 2016 despite a drawdown announced by Russian President Vladimir Putin on March 14. The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed to conduct at least 41 sorties against 146 targets near Palmyra between March 22 and March 24 alone, while local activists reported that the constant aerial bombardment has destroyed up to fifty percent of the city. Russia paired its air campaign with a significant deployment of ground forces. ISIS claimed to kill up to five Russian Spetznaz personnel west of Palmyra on March 18 and posted images appearing to show one of the men standing in front of the symbol of the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU). Russia later confirmed that at least one special forces officer died near Palmyra while “directing airstrikes onto terrorist targets” near Palmyra.  Media reports also revealed the deployment of Russian TOS-1 and BM-30 ‘Smerch’ heavy multiple rocket launcher systems as well as Mi-24 ‘Hind’ helicopter gunships in support of operations to seize Palmyra.

The regime also received significant reinforcements on the ground in Eastern Homs Province in recent weeks, allegedly raising the total number of participants in the operation to over five thousand personnel. Activists noted that the offensive included hundreds of fighters from Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraqi Shi’a Militias, and the Afghan Shi’a Liwa al-Fatimiyoun. The death of a member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps near Palmyra on March 16 suggests that Iran also deployed its own ground forces in order to oversee its coalition of proxy forces in the operation. Meanwhile, the regime deployed a convoy of up to one thousand Syrian Marines and pro-regime militiamen from the Syrian Coast to Eastern Homs Province on March 18. These redeployments were enabled in part by the ongoing ‘cessation of hostilities’ which allowed the regime and its allies to withdraw troops from its frontlines with opposition groups in Latakia, Aleppo, and Quneitra Provinces without major risk.

The fall of Palmyra represents a major victory on the international stage for both Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and Russian President Vladimir Putin. The new gains allow the Russian-Iranian-Syrian coalition to claim a significant win in the fight against ISIS, bolstering its narrative as the ideal partner in the anti-ISIS campaign. This message may stand to gain additional traction within Europe in the aftermath of a major terrorist attack by ISIS in Brussels, Belgium on March that killed thirty-one civilians and wounded several hundred others. The advance also bolsters the current position of strength held by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad amidst the ongoing Geneva III Talks to end the Syrian Civil War. The seizure of Palmyra curtails the ability of ISIS to project force into Western Syria from its safe haven along the Euphrates River Valley and provides a much-needed buffer for several critical regime-held oil and natural gas fields that provide electricity to Western Syria. The regime and its allies will likely leverage Palmyra and its military facilities as an optimal forward position for follow-on operations against ISIS in Ar-Raqqa and Deir ez-Zour Cities, complicating the position of the U.S.-led coalition in the region.