By Christopher Kozak
Pro-regime forces seized
Palmyra as well as the adjacent Palmyra Airbase in Eastern Homs Province on March
27 after ISIS withdrew from the city, completing
an operation that began on March 7 with the aim of recapturing the
strategic crossroads. The Syrian Arab Army and its auxiliary National Defense
Forces conducted multiple offensives against ISIS in the western countryside of
Palmyra in the eight months after its rapid fall to ISIS in May 2015, achieving limited
tactical gains at a high cost in manpower and equipment. The latest offensive
proceeded as a three-pronged frontal assault similar to previous
regime-directed operations against Palmyra, displaying little-to-none of the sophisticated operational design that characterized the recent
campaign in Aleppo Province. Instead, the regime relied upon large numbers of reinforcements
from Russia, Iran, and other foreign backers as well as a lull in combat
generated by a nationwide ‘cessation of hostilities’ that began on February 27 in
order to generate sufficient combat power to overwhelm ISIS in Palmyra.
Russia played a major role in enabling
the successful seizure of Palmyra following months of indecisive engagements.
The Russian Armed Forces shifted
the focus of its air campaign against Palmyra and its environs in
March 2016 despite a drawdown announced by Russian President Vladimir Putin on March 14. The Russian
Ministry of Defense claimed to conduct at
least 41 sorties against 146 targets near Palmyra between March 22 and March
24 alone, while local activists reported that the constant aerial bombardment
has destroyed
up to fifty percent of the city. Russia paired its air
campaign with a significant deployment of ground forces. ISIS claimed to kill
up to five
Russian Spetznaz personnel west of Palmyra on March 18 and posted
images appearing to show one of the men standing in front
of the symbol of the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU). Russia later confirmed that at least one special forces officer died near Palmyra while
“directing airstrikes onto terrorist targets” near Palmyra. Media reports also revealed the deployment of
Russian
TOS-1 and BM-30 ‘Smerch’ heavy multiple rocket launcher systems
as well as Mi-24
‘Hind’ helicopter gunships in support of operations to seize
Palmyra.
The regime also received significant
reinforcements on the ground in Eastern Homs Province in recent weeks,
allegedly raising the total number of participants in the operation to over five
thousand personnel. Activists noted that the offensive
included hundreds of fighters from Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraqi Shi’a Militias,
and the Afghan Shi’a Liwa al-Fatimiyoun. The death of a
member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps near Palmyra on March 16
suggests that Iran also deployed its own ground forces in order to oversee its
coalition of proxy forces in the operation. Meanwhile, the regime deployed a convoy of
up to one thousand Syrian Marines and pro-regime militiamen from the Syrian
Coast to Eastern Homs Province on March 18. These redeployments were enabled in
part by the ongoing
‘cessation of hostilities’ which allowed the regime and its allies
to withdraw troops from its frontlines with opposition groups in Latakia, Aleppo,
and Quneitra Provinces without major risk.
The fall of Palmyra represents a major
victory on the international stage for both Syrian President Bashar al-Assad
and Russian President Vladimir Putin. The new gains allow the
Russian-Iranian-Syrian coalition to claim a significant win in the fight
against ISIS, bolstering its narrative as the ideal partner in the anti-ISIS
campaign. This message may stand to gain additional traction within Europe in
the aftermath of a major terrorist
attack by ISIS in Brussels, Belgium on March that killed
thirty-one civilians and wounded several hundred others. The advance also bolsters the current position of strength held by Syrian President Bashar
al-Assad amidst the ongoing Geneva III Talks to end the Syrian Civil War. The
seizure of Palmyra curtails the ability of ISIS to project force into Western
Syria from its safe haven along the Euphrates River Valley and provides a
much-needed buffer for several critical regime-held oil and natural gas fields
that provide electricity to Western Syria. The regime and its allies will
likely leverage Palmyra and its military facilities as an optimal forward
position for follow-on operations against ISIS in Ar-Raqqa and Deir ez-Zour Cities,
complicating the position of the U.S.-led coalition in the region.
