By Genevieve Casagrande
Russia reportedly withdrew
approximately fifteen
of its airframes from the Bassel al Assad International Airport in Latakia
Province from March 15 - 16, following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s announcement
of a drawdown on March 14. Five Russian Su-34 bombers, four Su-25s, five
Su-24s, and at least one Su-30 had left the airbase to return to Russia as of
March 16, according to a
Reuters investigation of Russian state media. Russian officials asserted
that Russia would nonetheless continue its counterterrorism
efforts, a term Russia has previously used to obfuscate its air campaign in
support of President Bashar al Assad against mainstream elements of the Syrian
opposition. Russia has yet to withdraw many of its other aircraft from the base,
including numerous short- and medium-range bombers. Putin has messaged his determination to
defend both the airfield at Bassel al Assad and Russia’s naval basing in
Tartous as well as his intent to retain the S-400 air defense system in
Latakia. Russia has therefore gained significant
capabilities along the Eastern Mediterranean that it intends to secure.
Russia will therefore continue to be able to rapidly deploy long- and
medium-range air assets into the theater through its airbase in Latakia. As Russia’s
air campaign had operated at decreased levels since the cessation of
hostilities agreement on February 27 and had lowered its rate of airstrikes
even further from March 14 – 15, Russia may be removing excess airframes from
the base.
Russian airstrikes in Syria have
notably decreased since Putin’s announcement and partial drawdown. ISW was only
able to confirm strikes in the vicinity of the ISIS-held town of Palmyra in
central Homs Province with both high and low confidence from March 14 - 15.
Pro-regime forces launched a renewed campaign to seize Palmyra in early March,
backed heavily
by Russian and regime fixed and rotary wing strikes. Russia will likely continue
its air operations
in support of the regime ground offensive against Palmyra, despite the
drawdown. The combination of Russian airpower and likely Iranian reinforcement
has brought Assad’s forces within
four kilometers of Palmyra as of March 16. The current “cessation of
hostilities,” which does not apply to ISIS targets and which has reduced
overall levels of violence has likely allowed the regime to refocus efforts on
clearing ISIS’s presence in central Homs. Russia will also use its air
operations against ISIS as a means to further project itself as a provider of
international security and to legitimize its continued presence inside Syria. Russia’s
airstrikes against ISIS, however, come at a cost. Alleged videos
and photos from
Palmyra show the damage caused by the intensity of Russia’s air campaign in the
area, while local sources continue to report
civilian
casualties, highlighting the continued
indiscriminate nature of Russian airstrikes. The Russian air campaign and
recovery of Palmyra may on the surface seem to support U.S. objectives against
ISIS, but over the long term may exacerbate grievances and insurgency.
The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties.
High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.
Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.
