Failed Coup in Turkey: Implications for the Syrian Civil War

By: Christopher Kozak

This post represents the first in a series examining the implications of the failed coup in Turkey.  President Erdogan has extended the State of Emergency for an additional three months and has begun purging the military as well as other sectors of Turkish society in the aftermath of the coup.  This series will examine both the short- and long-term implications of likely actions by Erdogan beginning as they relate to Syria and Russia. 

The failed coup attempt in Turkey on July 15 will undermine elements of the Syrian opposition in the near term and could also disrupt the campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in Syria. The actors that stand to gain in the short-term include the regime, ISIS, and Syrian Kurds working with the U.S. In the long-term, Turkish President Recep Erdogan will emerge stronger and better positioned to further his various objectives in Syria.

Turkish President Recep Erdogan and his ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) have several objectives in Syria. Erdogan has long provided covert support to opposition groups including al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra and other Salafi-Jihadist groups such as Ahrar al-Sham in order to overthrow Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Turkey participates in the U.S.-led anti-ISIS mission as well, but it uses its strategic position to block the U.S. from deeper partnership with the Syrian Kurds – the main U.S. ally in Northern Syria. In the immediate term, Turkey’s ability to implement these policies beyond its borders will be limited as Erdogan conducts an aggressive purge of state institutions, including the Turkish Armed Forces and Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT). This disruption will impose short-term costs but enable long-term benefits for Erdogan’s agenda in Syria and the region.

Erdogan supports opposition groups fighting against the regime in line with his strategic objective to reshape the region into a constellation of friendly states run by Sunni Muslims and led by Turkey. The attempted coup will disrupt this flow of material, financial, and intelligence support. The opposition will likely take an operational pause in response to this slowdown, leaving them vulnerable to pressure from pro-regime forces. President Bashar al-Assad may exploit this pause to complete the encirclement of Aleppo City before Turkey regains the initiative, eliminating a key bastion of non-jihadist opposition groups that constitute potential long-term partners for the U.S. against ISIS and Al-Qaeda.

The Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) will also likely exploit this disruption to complete the establishment of an autonomous federal region along the Syrian-Turkish Border from Aleppo to Hasaka Province. The YPG constitutes the primary partner for the U.S. in Syria but is considered a strategic threat by Turkey due to its links to the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Turkey has used military threats and diplomatic pressure to contest all progress towards a contiguous zone ruled by the YPG in Northern Syria. In exchange for its cooperation against ISIS, Turkey received guarantees from the U.S. that the YPG would not seize the final stretch of territory between its disconnected cantons in Northern Aleppo Province. The YPG could now elect to break this commitment while Turkey remains incapable of mustering a coherent military response. This decision would set the stage for long-term ethnic conflict and force the U.S. to choose between its two most valuable partners in the fight against ISIS in Northern Syria.

ISIS could also launch new operations to reassert its control over parts of the Syrian-Turkish Border. Turkey has provided extensive military support to opposition groups along the so-called ‘Mare’a Line’ in Northern Aleppo Province as a counterweight to the Syrian Kurdish YPG. The likely disruption of this support in the immediate aftermath of the coup leaves these groups vulnerable to a renewed offensive by ISIS to seize the key cross-border hub of Azaz. ISIS may also use the current disorder within the Turkish Armed Forces along the Syrian-Turkish Border to import additional fighters and resources into Syria to bolster its ranks following several months of battlefield setbacks. ISIS could also use the confusion to smuggle new cells into Turkey in preparation for future attacks in Europe.

The U.S.-led anti-ISIS effort also stands at risk now that Erdogan holds a clear path towards authoritarian rule. Incirlik Airbase in Southern Turkey constitutes the primary base for air operations against ISIS in Northern Syria. Erdogan granted permission for the U.S. to conduct sorties from Incirlik Airbase in July 2015 in exchange for guarantees against further expansion along the border by the Syrian Kurdish YPG. The ongoing wave of purges after the coup risks undermining these advances in the relationship between the U.S. and Turkey. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry warned on July 18 that NATO will carefully observe whether Turkey continues to meet its “requirements with respect to democracy” in an implicit warning to Erdogan as the purges expanded to encompass ever-greater portions of civil society. On the same day, Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim stated that Turkey could “question our friendship” with the U.S. if its leaders failed to respond to a formal extradition request targeting former cleric Fethullah Gulen for his alleged role in the coup. These tensions could lead to a disruption or full cancellation of anti-ISIS operations based out of Incirlik Airbase. Turkey temporarily halted all operations out of Incirlik Airbase until July 17, while electrical power to the base reportedly remains cut. The loss of Incirlik Airbase would not preclude continued operations against ISIS in Northern Syria, but the collapse of relations would complicate ongoing military efforts and slow the current momentum against ISIS in Northern Syria.

Erdogan will use the coup attempt to remove the obstacles that constrained his ability to take a more active role in the Syrian Civil War over the long-term. The Turkish Armed Forces reportedly opposed his calls for intervention into the conflict. The ongoing purge will ultimately make the military instrument responsive to the personal ambitions of Erdogan, eliminating future roadblocks to more aggressive proposals, including the provision of anti-aircraft missiles to the opposition or the establishment of a ‘safe zone’ along the Syrian-Turkish Border. Any such escalation could place Turkey into direct conflict with major regional powers, particularly Iran and Russia, while applying tremendous strain to the U.S. and Europe via NATO. The coup thus raises the risk of a wider conflict that fuels the spread of regional disorder and erodes the strategic interests of the U.S.

How Turkey Could Become the Next Pakistan

Jennifer Cafarella

The U.S. must recognize the risk a NATO ally may become a safe haven for al Qaeda as Erdogan consolidates power.

The failed coup attempt by elements of the Turkish Armed Forces on July 15 will enable President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to establish himself as an authoritarian ruler in Turkey. His priorities in the next few months will be to solidify the loyalty of the Turkish military establishment and complete the constitutional reform necessary to replace Turkey’s parliamentary democracy with an executive presidency, his longstanding goal. A post-coup Erdogan is much less likely to submit to American pressure without major returns. Erdogan immediately demanded the extradition of political rival Fethullah Gulen from the U.S., accusing Gulen of plotting the coup and condemning the U.S. for harboring him. Erdogan will likely deprioritize the fight against ISIS, undermining the counter-ISIS mission in Syria, as he focuses on consolidating power. He may even revoke past concessions to the U.S., including permission to use Turkey’s Incirlik airbase for counter-ISIS operations.

Erdogan has more dangerous options now that his rule is secure, however. A partnership with al Qaeda could grant him a powerful proxy force to achieve national security objectives without relying on the Turkish Military. American policymakers must recognize the dangerous possibility Erdogan will knowingly transform Turkey into the next Pakistan in pursuit of his own interests.  

Erdogan’s purge will be severe. He declared that the coup attempt was “a gift from God … because this will be a reason to cleanse our army,” in a victory speech on July 17. Turkish security forces immediately arrested over 3,000 soldiers, dozens of colonels, and four high-ranking officers as they reestablished control starting July 16. The subsequent purge has removed approximately one third of all general officers. Erdogan will try the coup leaders and participating rank and file soldiers for treason and approve the reinstitution of the death penalty if passed by Turkish Parliament. He will eliminate political rivals and dissenters and consolidate social control. He is already using the allegation against Gulen to justify a broad crackdown against the judicial establishment and civil society elements allegedly linked to Gulen, including the dismissal and arrest of nearly 3,000 members of the judicial establishment. He has also dismissed at least 8,000 police. His consolidation phase will require significant time, attention and resources for the next few months. He must meanwhile balance national security concerns, including domestic threats from ISIS and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), as well as a tenuous détente with Russia.

Erdogan may turn to non-state militants for security solutions while he lacks a strong military force behind him. Non-state militants can either supplement a Turkish military or serve as an interim partner while Erdogan rebuilds. Erdogan provided support to al Qaeda and associated groups in Syria even before the coup. He has allowed senior al Qaeda leaders to operate relatively freely in Turkey, although a small number of Turkish raids have targeted al Qaeda elements. He is also a primary patron of Ahrar al Sham, a Syrian Salafi-jihadi group with close links to al Qaeda. A closer partnership with these groups could enable him to:

1. Dampen the domestic ISIS threat while purging the military. ISIS continues to use its support networks in Turkey to generate attack nodes targeting Turkish tourist sites. It intends to conduct mass casualty attacks in order to destabilize the Turkish state, similar to its attack on the Ataturk international airport in Istanbul in June. Al Qaeda likely already possesses intelligence regarding the identity and location of ISIS elements in Turkey. A partnership between al Qaeda and Erdogan could facilitate intelligence-driven raids to neutralize ISIS attack cells. Al Qaeda can also coopt ISIS members by offering an attractive option for defection as counter-ISIS operations in northern Syria continue. These measures would not eliminate the ISIS threat to Turkey, but could reduce it to a manageable level while Erdogan focuses on other priorities. 

2. Address his Kurdish problem. Erdogan regards the Syrian Kurdish YPG as a primary national security threat because of its links to the PKK, which is waging an active insurgency against the Turkish state. Syrian Salafi-jihadi groups have fought against the YPG in Syria and could be willing to do so again in return for higher levels of Turkish support. 

3. Set conditions in Syria for the rise of a Sunni Islamist government. Erdogan seeks to promote the formation of Sunni Islamist governments in the Middle East in order to legitimize his own rule and reestablish a quasi-imperial sphere of influence. Al Qaeda and its allies already govern large areas in northwestern Syria, setting conditions for an Islamic Emirate in opposition-held terrain in the long term. 

4. Prevent outright regime and Russian victory in Syria. Erdogan will continue to support the war against the Assad regime despite rumors of back channeling over shared opposition to the Syrian Kurdish YPG. Pro-regime forces encircled and besieged Turkish- and US-backed opposition forces in Aleppo City July 17, fulfilling Assad’s promise that “Aleppo will be the graveyard where the dreams and hopes of the butcher Erdogan will be buried.” Erdogan also must preclude an outright Russian victory in Syria in order to maintain leverage in the Turkish-Russian relationship.

5. Retain leverage over the U.S. Erdogan opposes American focus on ISIS in Syria and will continue to use his involvement in the anti-ISIS effort as leverage in negotiations with the U.S. He will also continue to leverage his gatekeeper role in the flow of migrants to Europe. These forms of leverage are significant, but they have not enabled Erdogan to affect American policy in the way he desires. After consolidating his rule, he can and likely will increase the scale to which he utilizes these sources of pressure. He may also seek alternate sources of leverage. A partnership with al Qaeda could enable him to disrupt counter-ISIS operations in Syria by attacking the YPG, positioning him as a powerbroker in the anti-ISIS fight independent of the anti-ISIS coalition. It would also inextricably link American success against al Qaeda in Syria to American relations with Turkey, forcing the U.S. to subordinate its strategy against al Qaeda to the requirements to manage its diplomatic relations in Turkey.

Erdogan can establish closer partnership with al Qaeda through a number of simple steps. He can provide covert support to increase the effectiveness of counter-Assad operations, including increased funding and equipment in addition to intelligence and campaign design. He can ensure freedom of movement for al Qaeda and its allies in Turkey and enable the relocation of formal headquarters into Turkish territory. He has already proposed granting citizenship to Syrian refugees in Turkey, likely in order to counter rising Kurdish birth rates in Turkey by adding millions of Arab citizens to the population. Naturalizing Syrian refugees could also enable him to obscure his support to Salafi jihadis in Syria by channeling that support through new Turkish-Syrian citizens. Finally, he can also allow or facilitate new flows of foreign fighters to al Qaeda in Syria.

These steps would take Erdogan much deeper into a partnership with al Qaeda than his current support to al Qaeda’s war against the Assad regime. A reliance on al Qaeda to accomplish Turkish security objectives, and the resulting freedom of maneuver it would provide to al Qaeda, would transform Turkey into a state sanctuary for terrorism. The scale of the problem could be similar to Pakistani harboring of militants fighting American and allied forces in Afghanistan, including the Afghan Taliban. A permanent Turkish safe haven would protect some of al Qaeda’s critical capabilities and critical requirements in Syria from direct targeting, increasing the requirements to destroy the group in Syria. It would also provide an ideal launching point for a future wave of attacks.

An empowered al Qaeda with a durable safe haven in Turkey will pose an even greater threat to Europe and the American homeland than ISIS in the long term. Al Qaeda prioritizes cultivating local support among Sunni populations in Syria and the Middle East, but intends to conduct spectacular attacks in the West and is developing the capability to do so. The future war against al Qaeda will be more difficult to win even without direct Turkish backing because of how al Qaeda is embedding itself into the local population. A partnership with al Qaeda is not the most likely option for Erdogan to take because of its severe implications for NATO and American national security. It is a much more dangerous future scenario for the U.S. than even the loss of Incirlik as a base for anti-ISIS operations, however.

American policymakers must make it a priority to prevent this most dangerous future from occurring. A victorious Erdogan poses a difficult challenge for conventional diplomatic instruments. A partnership with al Qaeda would not strictly violate Erdogan’s NATO obligations because the alliance’s mandate does not extend to terrorism. NATO does not have a formal mechanism for ejecting member states, making it difficult to coerce Erdogan by threatening to revoke NATO protections anyway. It is unclear that Erodgan would respond to such a threat even if credible. The Foreign Policy Chief of the European Union (EU) stated that the restoration of the death penalty would forfeit Turkey’s chance for EU membership in a similar attempt to constrain Erdogan’s behavior on July 18. He is unlikely to submit. The U.S. must abandon presuppositions about how a democratically elected leader will behave in order to explore policy options that engage with Erdogan's calculus. Achieving American objectives in the region – and preventing a more dangerous future from emerging - will require creative thinking about how to incentivize Erdogan to choose policies that favor or do not undermine American interests while serving his own. 

Failed Coup Attempt in Turkey

By: Christopher Kozak, Melissa Pavlik, Jennifer Cafarella, and the ISW research team

The situation

A cadre within the Turkish Armed Forces mounted a failed coup attempt against Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) on 15 - 16 JUL.

• Shortly before midnight on July 15, units in the Turkish Land Forces and Turkish Gendarmerie seized key positions in Istanbul and Ankara, including Ataturk International Airport,the Turkish General Staff headquarters, and major bridges across the Bosphorus Strait.
• Elements of the Turkish Air Force conducted airstrikes against key government buildings including the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) headquarters, the Presidential Palace, and the Grand National Assembly.
• A statement broadcasted by the coup plotters on national television announced the formation of a “committee of national peace” to run the country and prevent the erosion of democratic and secular values.
• At about 12:30 AM local time on July 16, President Erdogan issued a live statement via FaceTime, calling for “people to gather in squares, airports.” Mosques and political party offices also repeated the call to action.
• By about 8:00 AM local time on the morning of July 16, at least 2,839 military personnel had been detained, including four generals and twenty-nine colonels, according to Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim.
• Prime Minister Yildirim noted on July 16 that clashes killed at least 265 individuals and wounded at least 1,440 others as anti-Coup demonstrators and military personal reasserted control. 

The coup-plotter did not receive broad-based support within military ranks, political elite, or from foreign countries. They likely intended to spark popular support for removing Erdogan, but failed.

• Most coup plotters were low-to-mid-ranking officers led by Col. Muharrem Kose, the former head of the legal advisory department in the Turkish Armed Forces, and Gen. Akin Ozturk, former commander of the Turkish Air Force.
• The coup lacked unanimous support among high-ranking officers. Plotters were forced to detain Turkish Chief of the General Staff Gen. Hulusi Akar and other senior officials early in the coup when they refused to cooperate. Other high ranking officers, including Turkish First Army Commander Gen. Umit Dundar and General Zekai Aksakalli, the commander of the military special forces, condemned the coup publically as events unfolded.
• The three main opposition parties – the Republican People’s Party (CHP), the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), and the People’s Democratic Party (HDP) – all publically renounced the coup.
• U.S. President Barack Obama and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry called upon all parties to respect the “democratically-elected” government roughly two hours after the coup broke out. Other countries quickly followed suit.

Context and Implications

Erdogan has been setting conditions against a military coup since the late 1990’s,slowly purging the military. The failed coup demonstrated the success of these efforts.

• The inability of the junior officers in charge of the coup to broaden their support base indicates that Erdogan has the personal loyalty of most of the senior officer corps.
• Erdogan will take this opportunity to further establish his cult of personality in the military by purging the military at lower levels. Erdogan stated: “This uprising is a gift from God to us because this will be a reason to cleanse our army.”

The size and the scale of popular mobilization against the coup indicates that Erdogan’s domestic base is broad and powerful.

• Erdogan effectively used mosques and religious leaders, in addition to traditional party offices, to draw the masses to the street promptly.
• Thousands of civilians poured into the streets in Istanbul, Ankara, and other cities to protest the coup after Erdogan called for mass unrest. Protestors overwhelmed the Turkish military forces and seized the Ataturk International Airport, forcing the occupying soldiers to surrender. Similar events occurred on smaller levels across Istanbul and Ankara.
• Erdogan has now demonstrated the extent of his domestic support and holds a mandate to purge the military, judiciary, and other bodies under the guise of post-coup reforms without significant public backlash.

Moving forward

Erdogan’s victory on July 15 will allow him to finish consolidating power by eliminating rivals such as members of the Gulen movement.

• President Erdogan blamed the coup attempt on a “parallel state” linked to former political ally Fethullah Gulen, a former cleric who lives in self-imposed exile in Pennsylvania, and his support base known as ‘the Gulen movement.’ Gulen has denied the charges. Gulen fled to the U.S. in 1999, and in 2014 the Turkish government issued a warrant for his arrest. This occurred after a fallout with Erdogan over Gulen's allegations of corruption against officials close to Erdogan.
• Ergodan is using the allegation of Gulen’s involvement in the coup attempt to justify a sweeping crackdown against the judiciary in addition to the Turkish Armed Forces. The Turkish government dismissed up to 2,745 judges on July 16 due to suspected links to the Gulen Movement. Arrest warrants have also been issued for at least 188 members of the judiciary. This purge follows efforts by the AKP to consolidate control over the court system.
•  Erdogan has demanded Gulen’s extradition from the U.S.

Conditions are now set for Erdogan to achieve his goal of transitioning Turkey to an authoritarian regime.

• He will likely use this moment to press for his long-term objective of a constitutional transition from a parliamentary system to an executive presidency under his rule.
• This effort may include a call for new elections that solidify the parliamentary majority currently held by the AKP, allowing it to cross the three-fifths threshold required for unilateral constitutional amendments.
• Erdogan has slowly consolidated control in Turkey through cracking down on media organizations, setting limits on freedom of speech, and broadening anti-terrorism laws. These efforts will likely only increase in the wake of the coup attempt.
• Over the long-term, Turkey will likely trend towards increasing religious radicalization under the authoritarian regime of President Erdogan – raising tough questions for the U.S. and NATO.

Turkey Expands Campaign against ISIS and the PKK

by: Christopher Kozak

The conclusion of an agreement between Turkey and the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition to open Turkish airbases for coalition aircraft conducting sorties against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) marks a major shift in Turkish policy which will provide immediate boost to U.S. efforts to degrade and ultimately defeat ISIS. At the same time, Turkey began launching airstrikes and internal crackdowns targeting members of both ISIS and the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the wake of several days of violence which included an ISIS-linked SVEST attack inside Turkey and several PKK-linked assassinations of Turkish police officers. Turkey’s decision to escalate against both militant groups suggests that Turkey intends to leverage the coalition’s calls for further action against ISIS in order to assert its own strategic interest in limiting the expansion of armed Kurdish groups along the Turkish border. The government of Turkish President Recep Erdogan may also seek to utilize these security threats to increase its own political standing amidst ongoing negotiations to form a coalition government and a potential call for early elections. Over the near-term Turkey will face an expanded domestic threat from both ISIS and PKK militancy in the form of persistent violence against the Turkish state. Nonetheless, a sustained Turkish effort against ISIS’s networks in Turkey and northern Syria combined with the efforts of local anti-ISIS Syrian opposition forces has the potential to significantly disrupt the foreign fighter flows which provide ISIS with a key source of reinforcements, suicide bombers, and legitimacy as a global caliphate.

The Deal

Turkey significantly increased its participation in the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition in a marked shift from its previous hesitancy to directly engage the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement on July 24 confirming that Turkey and the U.S. had agreed to “further deepen their ongoing cooperation in the fight against ISIS” following a telephone conversation between U.S. President Barack Obama and Turkish President Recep Erdogan on July 22. Although the exact details of the deal remain unknown, President Erdogan confirmed that the Turkish government granted the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition access to the strategic Incirlik and Diyarbakir Airbases in southern Turkey “within a certain framework” in a move long sought by the U.S. to stage operations near Syria. The opening of these bases would sharply reduce the distance that coalition aircraft must transit to strike ISIS targets in Syria, allowing for an increased rate of daily combat sorties. The Turkish government also reportedly authorized the U.S.-led coalition to utilize airbases in the southern cities of Batman and Malatya for emergency situations.

Unverified Turkish sources indicated that the deal also included provisions for an “ISIS-free” zone extending forty to fifty kilometers into ISIS-held regions of Aleppo Province in northern Syria in order to attack ISIS in greater depth within Syrian territory. Turkish and U.S.-led coalition aircraft would perform “attacking or exploration” missions over the zone “as needed” in order to prevent advances by ISIS or Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN). The exact parameters of this claimed zone have not yet been clearly defined in the public record. Although some Turkish sources referred to the region as a no-fly zone and claimed that Syrian regime aircraft entering the zone would also be targeted, U.S. officials including U.S. Special Envoy to the Anti-ISIS Coalition Gen. John Allen (ret.) denied that the implementation of a no-fly zone had been “part of the discussion.”

The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs also announced that Turkish warplanes will directly participate in the international anti-ISIS coalition air campaign for the first time. Turkey launched the opening salvo of this expanded role in the morning of July 24 as three Turkish F-16 fighter jets departed from Diyarbakir Airbase in south-central Turkey and conducted three airstrikes against ISIS targets in the Syrian border town of Hawar Kilis north of Aleppo City. Turkish media sources reported that the strikes comprised part of a newly-declared Turkish military operation named “Martyr Yalcin” after a Turkish non-commissioned officer killed during a gunfight with ISIS militants along the Syrian border on July 23. A second round of Turkish airstrikes on the night of July 24-25 also targeted positions of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) militant group in northern Iraq for the first time since 2011, effectively ending a two-year ceasefire agreement between the PKK and the Turkish government. Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu stated that the airstrikes were not an isolated incident but rather part of an ongoing “process” to address threats along the Turkish border. Nonetheless, one Turkish government official speaking to Reuters later noted that “we can't say this is the beginning of a military campaign, but certainly the policy will be more involved, active and more engaged.” These statements imply that Turkey intends to sustain its activities against ISIS and the PKK over a long-term campaign.

Why Now?

The outlines of this agreement between the U.S. and Turkey appear to have been laid during a visit to Turkey by Gen. John Allen (ret.) and U.S. Undersecretary of Defense Christine Wormuth on July 7-8. Unconfirmed reports at the time suggested that the talks had resulted in preliminary approval for the coalition’s use of Incirlik Airbase after Turkey received assurances that the U.S. would consider Turkish proposals for a buffer zone in northern Syria and block any attempt by Syrian Kurdish forces to move into areas along the Turkish border west of the Euphrates River. These accounts suggested that Turkey had offered a major concession by dropping its long-standing insistence that the international coalition expand its air campaign against ISIS to include airstrikes against the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. This rebalancing suggests that recent developments may have led the Turkish government to prioritize the internal security threats posed by ISIS and the PKK over Turkey’s regional concerns regarding Iranian expansionism and the enduring presence of the Syrian regime.

The successful conclusion of these negotiations following months of talks likely came as a product of the intensifying security concerns facing the Turkish government. Turkey had previously avoided overt confrontation with ISIS and other militant groups transiting through its territory in order to apply indirect pressure to both the Syrian regime and the Syrian Kurdish YPG, which the Turkish government views as an offshoot of the PKK. This stance also enabled Turkey to limit the potential for violent terrorist attacks within its borders by providing an incentive for ISIS and other extremist groups to avoid jeopardizing their supply routes through Turkey by disrupting the status quo. Although the existence of these transit pathways represented an implicit threat to Turkey, the seizure of the border town of Tel Abyad in northern Syria from ISIS on June 15 by Kurdish YPG forces appears to have been the primary trigger which forced Turkey to reevaluate its security policies. The prospect of further gains along the Syrian-Turkish border by PKK-linked Kurdish forces directly supported by the U.S.-led coalition likely generated the impetus for Turkey to further engage with the anti-ISIS coalition in order to ensure that the coalition campaign would evolve in line with Turkey’s own strategic interests.

The Turkish government soon moved to link its concerns regarding the Kurds to the security threat posed by ISIS in a likely attempt to attract buy-in from the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition for the imposition of limits on further Kurdish expansion. President Erdogan called security meetings with senior Turkish government and military officials on June 17-18 which established “red lines” for further Kurdish expansion in Syria. The Turkish National Security Council held additional meetings to address the threat posed by ISIS, and on June 29 an advisor to Prime Minister Davutoglu stated that the meetings would likely result in a change to the Turkish military’s rules of engagement that would authorize attacks against ISIS fighters inside Syria near the Turkish border. Over subsequent weeks Turkey reinforced its border with largenumbers of soldiers, armored vehicles, and artillery units, placing a particular concentration in Kilis and Gaziantep Provinces opposite ISIS-held areas of Aleppo Province in Syria. By July 22, Turkish media reported that half of Turkey’s border security personnel and armored cars as well as 90% of Turkey’s drones had been deployed to the Syrian border. Meanwhile, Turkey also began a crackdown against suspected ISIS members or sympathizers inside Turkey. President Erdogan noted on July 10 that nearly 1,300 foreigners had been arrested and deported on suspicion of involvement with ISIS.

These security concerns dramatically escalated on July 20 after a suspected ISIS member conducted a spectacular SVEST attack against a group of pro-Kurdish student activists in the southern Turkish town of Suruc on July 20, killing at least thirty-one individuals and wounding over one hundred others. Kurdish activists linked the bombing to a similar double IED attack against a Kurdish political rally in Diyarbakir on June 6 which killed four individuals and wounded at least 400 others, raising the prospect of an incipient ISIS campaign to target Kurds inside of Turkey. This message was reinforced with the release of the second issue of ISIS’s Turkish-language Constantinople magazine on July 21 which contained a warning that Kurds fighting ISIS in Iraq and Syria “may fight in Turkey in a similar way in the not too distant future.” In response, Kurdish militants engaged in their own campaign of targeted violence against alleged ISIS “collaborators”, triggering a major amplification of violence within Turkey. The PKK claimed responsibility for the execution of two Turkish police officers with a claimed association to ISIS in the border town of Ceylanpinar on July 22. Suspected PKK members also killed another Turkish police officer in an ambush in Diyarbakir, while members of the PKK youth wing executed an alleged ISIS member in Istanbul. Turkish security forces also discovered IEDs in front of two offices of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) of President Erdogan in the Turkish capital of Ankara and the southwestern Turkish province of Hatay. Kurds and Turkish opposition parties held large streetprotests in Istanbul, Ankara, and several other Turkish cities which in some cases devolved into violence. 

The threat posed by this spiral of violence likely played a role in expediting the final agreement between the U.S. and Turkey. On June 24, simultaneous with the implementation of the agreement, Turkish security forces launched a wave of arrests targeting suspected ISIS, Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and leftist Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front (DHKP-C) members throughout thirteen Turkish provinces which detained at least 297 individuals. Local media reported that the raids involved thousands of police officers and Special Forces soldiers supported by helicopters. CNN Turk reported that anti-terror police raided over 140 locations in the major city of Istanbul alone, detaining ninety individuals including thirty foreigners. The office of Prime Minister Davutoglu later released a statement pledging to fight all transnational “terrorist” groups “without distinction.” A senior Turkish official characterized the airstrikes in Syria and the domestic raids as dual “preventative measures” conducted in line with a policy decision to “move to active defense from passive defense” that had been formalized during an emergency “Special Security Meeting” on July 23. This confluence of events may have provided the final stimulus for Turkey to adopt a more aggressive stance against ISIS in exchange for the acquiescence of the U.S.-led coalition towards Turkish military action against the PKK.

The timing of the start of combat operations against both ISIS and the PKK may also have been driven by domestic Turkish political concerns. President Erdogan and his ruling AKP Party have come under heavy criticism from domestic opponents for their foreign policy towards Syria, which included a permissive attitude towards ISIS, JN, and other extremist groups fighting the Assad regime in Syria. These mounting criticisms came to a head during the Turkish general elections on June 7 in which the AKP lost their overall majority in the Turkish Parliament amidst historic gains for the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP). This development raised the potential for a shift in Turkish policy towards the Syrian Civil War as Turkish opposition parties pressed the AKP to reduce its hostility towards Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, limit its support to Syrian opposition factions, and establish positive relations with Syrian Kurds. Nonetheless, ongoing negotiations between the AKP and rival Turkish political parties to form a coalition government do not appear to be gaining traction and a call for early elections in Turkey appears likely. Expanded Turkish participation in the anti-ISIS coalition may thus serve a political goal for President Erdogan and the AKP by undercutting criticism of government policy towards ISIS and rallying the Turkish populace in the face of domestic security threats. The increase in violence attributed to the PKK and other Kurdish militant groups will also likely erode the position of the HDP to the benefit of the AKP. If early elections are called, these effects could improve the AKP’s vote share sufficiently to allow the AKP to regain its outright parliamentary majority and advance its Syria policy unhindered.

Implications

The expansion of Turkey’s role in the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition will almost certainly generate an immediate reaction in the form of retaliatory attacks from ISIS or ISIS sympathizers operating inside of Turkey. Thousands of foreign fighters have utilized Turkey and its porous border with Syria as a pathway to join with ISIS forces in Syria and Iraq, including an estimated 1,000 Turkish citizens. The members of these covert ISIS networks represent a key threat to Turkey’s internal security, and ISIS will likely seek to activate these cells in order to punish the Turkish government. ISIS fighters and supporters began circulating violent rhetoric against the Turkey within hours of the Turkish airstrikes on July 24. At the same time, Turkey also faces expanded internal turmoil in its southeastern Kurdish-majority provinces due to the resumption of hostilities with the PKK and other Kurdish militant groups. These two simultaneous threat streams will likely interact to prompt further attacks inside of Turkey in coming weeks targeting the Turkish government, Turkish military forces, or vital Turkish interests such as the tourism industry.

Turkish intervention in Aleppo Province could also prompt a response from Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and JN-aligned Salafi-jihadist groups operating along the Turkish border. Unverified Turkish sources identified both ISIS and JN as targets for Turkish and U.S.-led coalition airstrikes. JN later claimed on July 24 that aircraft from the “Arab-Crusader alliance” had conducted airstrikes against JN positions in the town of Baraghitah in northern Aleppo Province. Baraghitah is located directly adjacent to the announced location of Turkish airstrikes in the town of Hawar Kilis, suggesting that Turkish aircraft may have also conducted strikes against JN. Although JN remains unlikely to directly escalate against Turkey due to its own reliance on supply lines running through the Turkish border, sustained targeting of JN could ultimately drive the group to conduct attacks against Turkey or Turkish-sponsored rebel groups operating in Aleppo and Idlib Provinces.

Meanwhile, Turkish military action against ISIS forces in northern Syria could produce significant ramifications for the current balance of power between ISIS, Syrian rebels, and the Syrian regime in Aleppo Province. A sustained campaign of Turkish airstrikes and artillery shelling designed to force ISIS away from the Turkish border would likely open exploitable opportunities for rebel forces to advance against ISIS in the northern countryside of Aleppo City, reversing ISIS’s recent gains in the region and reducing the threat posed to the key rebel supply line moving from Turkey through the Syrian border town of Azaz. Over the long-term, ISIS’s position could be sufficiently weakened to enable advances by both rebel and regime forces east of Aleppo City, which could ultimately threaten ISIS’s control over the key urban centers of al-Bab, Manbij, and Jarabulus. Turkey will also likely seek to leverage these rebel advances as a means to block further Syrian Kurdish advances in Aleppo Province along the Turkish border. On a wider scale, the campaign of mass arrests and invigorated border security efforts undertaken by the Turkish government could result in a significant disruption of the foreign fighter flows which provide ISIS with a key source of reinforcements, suicide bombers, and legitimacy as a global caliphate. The intersection of these effects with potential losses of terrain in Aleppo Province would likely inflict significant damage to ISIS’s operations within both Iraq and Syria. ISIS may thus attempt to reduce its overall risk profile by setting conditions over the near-term to secure additional border access, particularly in the opposition-held province of Idlib in northwestern Syria which has seen a series of recent ISIS-attributed assassinations and bombings.

The increase in Turkish support to the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition through expanded border security, airstrikes, and airbase access will deliver an immediate boost to U.S. efforts to degrade and defeat ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Nonetheless, Turkey’s decision to escalate against both ISIS and the PKK will also produce a number of challenges for the U.S. and its coalition allies in the near-term. The high likelihood of retaliatory attacks in Turkey directed by both Salafi-jihadist and Kurdish militants suggests that the U.S. will witness persistent violence in a major NATO ally. U.S.-led coalition personnel stationed at newly-opened airbases in Turkey may come under particular risk of attack due to the heavy presence of ISIS networks in the country. The U.S.-led coalition could also face pushback or reduced cooperation from the Syrian Kurdish forces that have formed the core U.S. ground partner in Syria as a result of renewed hostilities between the Turkish government and the PKK. Over the long-term, however, the expansion of the Turkish role against ISIS will likely mark a major positive development for the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition and its efforts to dismantle the Islamic State.