Jennifer Cafarella
The
U.S. must recognize the risk a NATO ally may become a safe haven for al Qaeda as
Erdogan consolidates power.
The failed
coup attempt by elements of the Turkish Armed Forces on July 15 will enable
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to establish himself as an authoritarian ruler
in Turkey. His priorities in the next few months will be to solidify the
loyalty of the Turkish military establishment and complete the constitutional
reform necessary to replace Turkey’s parliamentary democracy with an executive
presidency, his longstanding goal. A post-coup Erdogan is much less likely to
submit to American pressure without major returns. Erdogan immediately demanded the
extradition of political
rival
Fethullah Gulen from the U.S., accusing Gulen of plotting the coup and
condemning the U.S. for harboring him. Erdogan will likely deprioritize the
fight against ISIS, undermining the counter-ISIS mission in Syria, as he
focuses on consolidating power. He may even revoke past concessions to the U.S.,
including permission to use Turkey’s Incirlik airbase for counter-ISIS
operations.
Erdogan has more dangerous options now that his rule is secure,
however. A partnership with al Qaeda could grant him a powerful proxy force to
achieve national security objectives without relying on the Turkish Military.
American policymakers must recognize the dangerous possibility Erdogan will knowingly
transform Turkey into the next Pakistan in pursuit of his own interests.
Erdogan’s purge will be severe. He declared that the coup attempt
was “a gift from God … because
this will be a reason
to cleanse our army,” in a
victory speech on July 17. Turkish security forces immediately arrested over
3,000
soldiers, dozens of colonels, and four high-ranking
officers as they reestablished control starting July 16. The subsequent
purge has removed approximately one
third of all general officers. Erdogan will try the coup leaders and
participating rank and file soldiers for treason and approve
the reinstitution
of the death penalty if passed by Turkish Parliament. He will eliminate
political rivals and dissenters and consolidate social control. He is already using
the allegation against Gulen to justify a broad crackdown against the
judicial establishment and civil society elements allegedly linked to Gulen,
including the dismissal and arrest of nearly 3,000
members of the judicial establishment. He has also dismissed at least 8,000
police. His consolidation phase will require significant time, attention
and resources for the next few months. He must meanwhile balance national
security concerns, including domestic threats from ISIS and the Kurdistan
Workers Party (PKK), as well as a tenuous détente with Russia.
Erdogan may turn to non-state militants for security solutions while
he lacks a strong military force behind him. Non-state militants can either
supplement a Turkish military or serve as an interim partner while Erdogan
rebuilds. Erdogan provided support to al Qaeda and associated groups in Syria
even before the coup. He has allowed senior al Qaeda leaders to operate
relatively freely
in Turkey, although a small number of Turkish raids have targeted al Qaeda
elements. He is also a primary patron
of Ahrar al Sham, a Syrian Salafi-jihadi group with close links to al
Qaeda. A closer partnership with these groups could enable him to:
1. Dampen the domestic ISIS threat while purging the military. ISIS continues to use its support networks in Turkey to generate attack nodes targeting Turkish tourist sites. It intends to conduct mass casualty attacks in order to destabilize the Turkish state, similar to its attack on the Ataturk international airport in Istanbul in June. Al Qaeda likely already possesses intelligence regarding the identity and location of ISIS elements in Turkey. A partnership between al Qaeda and Erdogan could facilitate intelligence-driven raids to neutralize ISIS attack cells. Al Qaeda can also coopt ISIS members by offering an attractive option for defection as counter-ISIS operations in northern Syria continue. These measures would not eliminate the ISIS threat to Turkey, but could reduce it to a manageable level while Erdogan focuses on other priorities.
2. Address his Kurdish problem. Erdogan regards the Syrian Kurdish YPG as a primary national security threat because of its links to the PKK, which is waging an active insurgency against the Turkish state. Syrian Salafi-jihadi groups have fought against the YPG in Syria and could be willing to do so again in return for higher levels of Turkish support.
3. Set conditions in Syria for the rise of a Sunni Islamist government. Erdogan seeks to promote the formation of Sunni Islamist governments in the Middle East in order to legitimize his own rule and reestablish a quasi-imperial sphere of influence. Al Qaeda and its allies already govern large areas in northwestern Syria, setting conditions for an Islamic Emirate in opposition-held terrain in the long term.
4. Prevent outright regime and Russian victory in Syria. Erdogan will continue to support the war against the Assad regime despite rumors of back channeling over shared opposition to the Syrian Kurdish YPG. Pro-regime forces encircled and besieged Turkish- and US-backed opposition forces in Aleppo City July 17, fulfilling Assad’s promise that “Aleppo will be the graveyard where the dreams and hopes of the butcher Erdogan will be buried.” Erdogan also must preclude an outright Russian victory in Syria in order to maintain leverage in the Turkish-Russian relationship.
5. Retain leverage over the U.S. Erdogan opposes American focus on ISIS in Syria and will continue to use his involvement in the anti-ISIS effort as leverage in negotiations with the U.S. He will also continue to leverage his gatekeeper role in the flow of migrants to Europe. These forms of leverage are significant, but they have not enabled Erdogan to affect American policy in the way he desires. After consolidating his rule, he can and likely will increase the scale to which he utilizes these sources of pressure. He may also seek alternate sources of leverage. A partnership with al Qaeda could enable him to disrupt counter-ISIS operations in Syria by attacking the YPG, positioning him as a powerbroker in the anti-ISIS fight independent of the anti-ISIS coalition. It would also inextricably link American success against al Qaeda in Syria to American relations with Turkey, forcing the U.S. to subordinate its strategy against al Qaeda to the requirements to manage its diplomatic relations in Turkey.
Erdogan can establish closer partnership with al Qaeda through a
number of simple steps. He can provide covert support to increase the
effectiveness of counter-Assad operations, including increased funding and
equipment in addition to intelligence and campaign design. He can ensure
freedom of movement for al Qaeda and its allies in Turkey and enable the
relocation of formal headquarters into Turkish territory. He has already proposed
granting citizenship to Syrian refugees in Turkey, likely in order to counter
rising Kurdish
birth rates in Turkey by adding millions of Arab
citizens to the population. Naturalizing Syrian refugees could also enable him
to obscure his support to Salafi jihadis in Syria by channeling that support
through new Turkish-Syrian citizens. Finally, he can also allow or facilitate new
flows of foreign fighters to al Qaeda in Syria.
These steps would take Erdogan much deeper into a partnership with
al Qaeda than his current support to al Qaeda’s war against the Assad regime. A
reliance on al Qaeda to accomplish Turkish security objectives, and the resulting
freedom of maneuver it would provide to al Qaeda, would transform Turkey into a
state sanctuary for terrorism. The scale of the problem could be similar to
Pakistani harboring of militants fighting American and allied forces in
Afghanistan, including the Afghan Taliban. A permanent Turkish safe haven would
protect some of al Qaeda’s critical
capabilities and critical requirements in Syria
from direct targeting, increasing the requirements to destroy the group in
Syria. It would also provide an ideal launching point for a future wave of
attacks.
An empowered al Qaeda with a durable safe haven in Turkey will pose
an even greater threat
to Europe and the American homeland than ISIS in the long term. Al Qaeda
prioritizes cultivating local support among Sunni populations in Syria and the
Middle East, but intends
to conduct spectacular attacks in the West and is developing the capability to
do so. The future war against al Qaeda will be more
difficult to win even without direct Turkish backing because of how al Qaeda is
embedding itself into the local population. A partnership with al Qaeda is
not the most likely option for Erdogan to take because of its severe
implications for NATO and American national security. It is a much more
dangerous future scenario for the U.S. than even the loss of Incirlik as a base
for anti-ISIS operations, however.
American policymakers must make it a priority to prevent this most dangerous
future from occurring. A victorious Erdogan poses a difficult
challenge for conventional diplomatic instruments. A partnership with al Qaeda
would not strictly violate Erdogan’s NATO obligations because the alliance’s
mandate does not extend to terrorism. NATO does not have a formal mechanism for
ejecting member states, making it difficult to coerce Erdogan by threatening to
revoke NATO protections anyway. It is unclear that Erodgan would respond to
such a threat even if credible. The Foreign Policy Chief of the European Union
(EU) stated that the restoration of the death penalty would forfeit
Turkey’s chance for EU membership in a similar attempt to constrain
Erdogan’s behavior on July 18. He is unlikely to submit. The U.S. must abandon
presuppositions about how a democratically elected leader will behave in order
to explore policy options that engage with Erdogan's calculus. Achieving
American objectives in the region – and preventing a more dangerous future from
emerging - will require creative thinking about how to incentivize Erdogan to
choose policies that favor or do not undermine American interests while serving
his own.
