By
Jonathan Mautner and Christopher Kozak
Russia enabled
pro-regime forces to complete
the physical encirclement of Aleppo City on July 28, isolating the primary
nexus of the non-jihadist opposition in Northern Syria. These gains threaten
the long-term survival of mainstream opposition groups that could serve as
potential partners against ISIS and Syrian Al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra.
Russian warplanes continued to concentrate airstrikes against opposition
targets on the northern and western outskirts of Aleppo City from July 14 - 27,
allowing pro-regime forces to seize
positions along the Castello Highway that serves as the only major ground
line of communication (GLOC) into opposition-held districts in the eastern half
of the city. Russian Minister of Defense Sergey Shoygu announced on July 28 that
Russian President Vladimir Putin would authorize a “large-scale
humanitarian operation” around Aleppo City in order to “help civilians…taken
hostage by terrorists” while pro-regime forces opened a number of evacuation
routes for the estimated 250,000 civilians that remain in Eastern Aleppo City. On
the same day, Assad issued an offer
of general amnesty for any opposition fighters that surrender to the regime
within the next three months. The proposals regarding humanitarian support and
national reconciliation, however, coincided with continued airstrikes against critical
infrastructure and densely-populated urban terrain within Aleppo City, suggesting
that Russia likely aims to depopulate Aleppo City in preparation for concerted
pro-regime ground operations to force the surrender of opposition groups within
the city.
Russia also
intensified its air operations in Eastern Homs Province in a likely attempt to preserve
its legitimacy as a viable international partner in the Syrian Civil War. Russia
concentrated its strikes on the eastern outskirts of Palmyra – a key crossroads
town that provides the regime with a launching point for future operations into
Eastern Syria. Russia invested
significant resources into the operation to seize Palmyra in March 2016 and
spun
the victory as a triumph against terrorism that justified its narrative for
intervention into the Syrian Civil War. Recent advances by ISIS near Palmyra
have threatened to undermine this narrative. The Russian Ministry of Defense
announced that it sortied six long-range
strategic bombers from Russia to strike alleged ISIS targets near Palmyra
on July 21, marking the second such sortie in the past month. The regime later deployed over 1,000
Iranian-backed Iraqi and Afghan Shi’a militia fighters to Palmyra on July 25 in
order to reinforce the defenses of the city. Russia will likely continue to
prioritize its campaign against ISIS in Eastern Homs Province in order to
preempt its potential resurgence in the region and protect its claims to be a
credible partner against violent extremism.
Russia continues
to wage its air campaign in a manner aimed at shaping the terms of a potential end-state
to the Syrian Civil War in accordance with its strategic objectives. Putin has
leveraged his role in the conflict in order to attract the U.S. into a one-sided
partnership that will ultimately benefit Assad. On July 26, U.S. Secretary
of State John Kerry stated that talks regarding potential cooperation with
Russia in Syria against ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra had been “making
progress” and noted that final details could be announced as early as
August 2016. The continued consideration of a bilateral deal despite the looming
siege of Aleppo City will likely encourage Russia to continue its operations
unchecked against large swaths of the mainstream opposition under the guise of
counter-terrorism. Continued attacks against mainstream opposition groups will fuel
further radicalization and consolidation under the leadership of jihadist
groups. At the same time, Russia continued to promote itself as a constructive
diplomatic actor by participating in a trilateral
meeting with the U.S. and UN Special Envoy to Syria Staffan de Mistura on July
26 that urged a resumption of political negotiations. Russia will use its
military influence to set conditions on the ground that force the U.S. into
tacit acceptance of the long-term preservation of the regime.
The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, statements by Russian and Western officials, and documentation of Russian airstrikes through social media. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties.
High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated by documentation from opposition factions and activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible that demonstrate a number of key indicators of Russian airstrikes.
Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in reports corroborated only by multiple secondary sources, including from local Syrian activist networks deemed credible or Syrian state-run media.
