By Genevieve Casagrande with Jonathan Mautner
Russia continues to use its air
campaign in Syria in order to constrain the U.S. and other regional actors into
a partnership in the Syrian Civil War. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry met
with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Moscow
on July 14 to
discuss a recent proposal from the White House for bilateral military
cooperation in Syria. The proposal calls for the establishment of a “Joint
Implementation Group” based in Amman, Jordan that would facilitate synchronization
of U.S. and Russian air operations against both al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate
Jabhat al Nusra and ISIS, according to a leaked
copy of the proposal. The meeting is ongoing and it remains unclear if
Russia intends to accept the alleged proposal. It would, however, grant Russia authority
to conduct unilateral strikes if Russian personnel faced an “imminent threat” or
if extremist groups were to expand territorial control outside of “designated
areas.” Russia has consistently targeted mainstream elements of the Syrian
opposition and U.S.-allied groups under the guise of “fighting terrorism,” and has
cited threats to civilians and regime-held terrain as justification for
targeting these groups. Russia ultimately seeks to subordinate U.S. policy in
Syria to Russian objectives, which include the preservation of its client
regime in Damascus and a solidified foothold on the Mediterranean. If it
accepts, Russia would likely exploit the loopholes in the proposal to
legitimize a continued campaign against the broader opposition in support of
the Assad regime.
Russia set conditions for the
proposal through a calculated expansion and subsequent tapering of its air
campaign throughout June and July 2016. The tempo of the Russian air campaign in
Aleppo Province decreased significantly from June 29 – July 13, following a major
escalation of the Russian air campaign in
early June 2016. However, Russian warplanes continued targeted strikes in
support of pro-regime ground operations to encircle and besiege Aleppo City. Russian
airstrikes continued to target discreet locations along the opposition’s last
ground line of communication (GLOC) into Aleppo City.
Pro-regime forces with Russian air support established fire control over the Castello
Road north of Aleppo City on July 7 after seizing the nearby Tal Jabenja
hill. The number of locations targeted by Russian airstrikes in Aleppo Province
fell by roughly 50 percent from June 29 – July 13 in comparison to the
preceding two-week period in which Russian airstrikes escalated to levels only
seen prior to the brokering of the Cessation of Hostilities agreement in
February. Russia likely intends to frame the decrease in its air campaign since
June 29 as a confidence-building measure meant to facilitate the potential
military partnership with the United States. Russia has previously used
temporary decreases in air operations in Aleppo to present itself as a
constructive partner in the fight against terrorism in Syria.
Russia’s air campaign nonetheless
continued to prioritize the targeting of mainstream elements of the Syrian
opposition and U.S. allied groups from June 29 – July 13. Suspected Russian
warplanes conducted several
airstrikes in the vicinity of the Hadalat Refugee Camp along the
Syrian-Jordanian border on July 12. The strikes killed at least 12 and wounded over
40 others, including family members of fighters from U.S.-backed TOW anti-tank
missile recipient Jaysh Asoud al Sharqiya. Russian air operations intensified against
ISIS in eastern Homs Province from July 9 - 12, but only following the salafi-jihadist
group’s shoot
down of a Russian Mi-25 helicopter near Palmyra on July 9. Russian
Armed Forces subsequently sortied
six TU-22M3 ‘Backfire’ strategic bombers from an unidentified airbase
in Russia on July 12, targeting alleged ISIS training camps and ammunition
warehouses in the eastern countryside of Palmyra. The potential resurgence
of ISIS in the vicinity of Palmyra may require Russia to divert some air assets
from northwestern Syria in the coming weeks in order to counter the salafi-jihadist
threat and preserve pro-regime gains in the area. Limited Russian air
operations against ISIS offer Russia further opportunity to garner legitimacy
as an effective anti-ISIS actor in Syria and subsequent authority to continue
its air campaign. Deal or no deal, Russia will likely continue to prioritize
its support for pro-regime operational objectives over the fight against
violent extremists in Syria.
The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, statements by Russian and Western officials, and documentation of Russian airstrikes through social media. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties.
High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated by documentation from opposition factions and activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible that demonstrate a number of key indicators of Russian airstrikes.
Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in reports corroborated only by multiple secondary sources, including from local Syrian activist networks deemed credible or Syrian state-run media.
