Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Davit Gasparyan, Nicole Wolkov, Karolina Hird, William Runkel, and Fredrick W. Kagan
Key Takeaways:
- NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte announced that South Korean intelligence officials shared evidence with NATO officials on October 28 that North Korean units are operating in Kursk Oblast.
- Ukrainian forces conducted another series of drone strikes against Russian distilleries on the night of October 27 to 28, reportedly to reduce Russian aviation capabilities.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin briefly acknowledged Russia's labor shortages on October 28, but highlighted Russia's low unemployment rates in an attempt to reframe this challenge in a beneficial light and claim that the Russian economy is able to sustain a long war in Ukraine.
- The Moldovan Constitutional Court stated it that it will review the results of the October 20 European Union (EU) referendum on October 31, and the third runner up in the first round of the presidential election announced that he would not endorse a candidate in the runoff.
- Georgian civil society, opposition, and international election observers continue to reject the results of the 2024 Georgian parliament elections amid a large-scale demonstration in Tbilisi on October 28.
- Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Kupyansk, southeast of Pokrovsk, and southwest of Donetsk City.
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Fighting continued in the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on October 28, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced in Novoivanovka, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[26] Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked east of Korenevo near Kremyanoye; southeast of Korenevo near Nizhny Klin, Novoivanovka, Alexandriya, Lyubimovka, and Darino; east of Sudzha near Russkaya Konopelka; and southeast of Sudzha near Plekhovo.[27] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian sources' claims that Ukrainian forces recaptured Darino are unconfirmed.[28] Elements of the Russian 137th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Zeleny Shlyakh (southeast of Korenevo).[29]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on October 27 and 28 but did not advance.[34] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on October 28 that the Russian grouping in the Kharkiv direction is comprised mainly of forces of the Leningrad Military District's (LMD) 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA) and 11th Army Corps (AC).[35] Mashovets noted that many elements of the 6th CAA and 11th AC are split between Russian efforts in northern Kharkiv Oblast and near Kupyansk.[36] Mashovets reported that the 11th AC's 18th Motorized Rifle Division is predominantly responsible for operations near Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City), and that Russia is currently forming the 68th Motorized Rifle Division as part of the 6th CAA to operate in this direction.[37] Mashovets assessed that Russian forces in northern Kharkiv Oblast have three main tasks — to capture northern Vovchansk and advance into Tykhe (east of Vovchansk); to regain control of Hlyboke (north of Kharkiv City) and advance towards Lyptsi; and to pin Ukrainian forces in northern Kharkiv Oblast to distract them from efforts in Kursk Oblast and in the Kupyansk direction.[38]
Russian forces recently marginally advanced southeast of Kupyansk amid ongoing offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on October 28. Geolocated footage published on October 27 and 28 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced southeast of Kupyansk within Kolisnykivka and southwest of Kruhlyakivka.[39] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Stepova Novoselivka; south of Kupyansk in Zahryzove; northwest of Stelmakhivka (west of Svatove); from Novosadove in the direction of Terny (both west of Kreminna); and within Torske (west of Kreminna).[40] Russian forces continued assaults northwest of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Synivka, Petropavlivka, and Pershotravneve; southeast of Kupyansk near Kolisnykivka, Kruhlyakivka, and Zahryzove; west of Svatove near Lozova and Vyshneve; southwest of Svatove near Hrekivka, Cherneshchyna, Novomykhailivka, Makiivka; west of Kreminna near Zarichne, Terny, and Torske; and southwest of Kreminna near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka.[41] Elements of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade are reportedly operating near Petropavlivka.[42]
Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar on October 28, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar; northeast of Chasiv Yar near Orikhovo-Vasylivka; and south of Chasiv Year near Stupochky and Predtechyne on October 27 and 28.[43] Elements of the Russian “Sever-V” and “Vostok-V” brigades and drone operators of the “Burevestnik” detachment (all part of the Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[44]
Russian forces continued offensive operations near Toretsk on October 28, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed on October 28 that Russian forces advanced in central Toretsk, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[45] Russian forces attacked near Toretsk; south of Toretsk near Niu-York; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on October 27 and 28.[46] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 28 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Sverdlov Street in Toretsk.[47] Elements of the Russian 56th Separate Special Purpose Battalion (51st Guards Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly the 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Crops [DNR AC]) are reportedly operating in the Toretsk direction.[48]
Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Pokrovsk amid continued offensive operations in the area on October 28. Geolocated footage published on October 27 and 28 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Selydove, within central Vyshneve, and near Novodmytrivka (all southeast of Pokrovsk).[49] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on October 28 that Russian forces seized Tsukuryne (southeast of Selydove), and Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov credited elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) with seizing the settlement.[50] Russian milbloggers claimed on October 28 that Russian forces advanced northwest of Vyshneve, capturing the settlement; that Russian forces advanced southwest of Vyshneve; and that Russian forces advanced east of Kreminna Balka (south of Selydove), but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[51] Russian forces continued assaults east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Promin, and Krutyi Yar and southeast of Pokrovsk near Selydove, Novodmytrivka, Kurakhivka, Novoselydivka, Tsukuryne, and Vyshneve on October 27 and 28.[52] The commander of a Ukrainian company operating near Selydove stated on October 27 that Russian forces can “afford” to deploy 600 troops per week to infantry assaults in Selydove and that Russian forces appear to have enough reserve forces to constantly conduct assaults in the area.[53] The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating near Selydove stated that Russian forces have transferred personnel from the northern area of the Pokrovsk direction to the Selydove area to support infantry assaults.[54] The spokesperson also stated that Russian forces are conducting artillery strikes less frequently and prefer to conduct precise strikes with first-person view (FPV) drones attached to and dropped from a reconnaissance drone. Elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]), the 30th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (90th Guards Tank Division, 41st CAA, CMD), and the Russian 71st Separate Spetsnaz Brigade are reportedly operating in Selydove; and elements of the Russian “Black Hussars” detachment of the Russian 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, CMD) and BARS-Sarmat volunteer detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating near Vyshneve.[55]
Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Donetsk City near Vuhledar amid continued offensive operations in the area. Geolocated footage published on October 25 showing Ukrainian forces repelling a Russian reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault southwest of Yelyzavetivka (northeast of Vuhledar) indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in the area.[57] Additional geolocated footage published on October 28 showing Ukrainian forces repelling a Russian reinforced company-sized mechanized assault southwest of Katerynivka (northeast of Vuhledar) indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in the area.[58] Additional geolocated footage published on October 28 indicates that Russian forces advanced northeast of Shakhtarske (northwest of Vuhledar).[59] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced near and within Katerynivka; near Bohoyavlenka (northwest of Vuhledar), Novoukrainka (northwest of Vuhledar), and Zolota Nyva (west of Vuhledar); and within Shakhtarske.[60] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces continued attacks northeast of Vuhledar near Katerynivka and Antonivka; northwest of Vuhledar near Bohoyavlenka, Novoukrainka, Shakhtarske; and west of Vuhledar near Zolota Nyva on October 27 and 28.[61] Elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 1472nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Katerynivka; elements of the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Bohoyavlenka; elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Shakhtarske; and elements of the 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Makarivka (west of Vuhledar and south of Velyka Novosilka).[62]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported fighting in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on October 28.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 28. Elements of the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and the 49th Separate Air Assault Brigade (reportedly subordinated to the 58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the general Zaporizhia direction and northeast of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka, respectively. [63]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Dnipro direction, likely referring to east (left) bank Kherson Oblast and the islands of the Dnipro River Delta, on October 27 and 28. [64]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_230105.htm
[2] https://t.me/DIUkraine/4740 ; https://suspilne dot media/867063-rosiani-perevozat-na-front-soldat-kndr-u-vantazivkah-z-civilnimi-nomerami-gur/; https://gur dot gov.ua/content/naimantsiv-z-kndr-rosiiany-vezut-na-front-vantazhivkamy-z-tsyvilnymy-nomeramy.html
[3] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/28/pivnichnyh-korejcziv-bachysh-chy-ye-vijskovi-z-kndr-na-kurshhyni/
[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar102524
[5] https://t.me/gusev_36/2930; "https://t.me/gusev_36/2931; https://t.me/gusev_36/2931; https://t.me/gusev_36/2934
[6] https://t.me/exilenova_plus/2985 ; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/10447; https://t.me/DniproOfficial/5089
[7] https://t.me/astrapress/67281; https://t.me/astrapress/67276
[8] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/8184; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/8188
[9] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/8188
[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-22-2024
[11] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/75423
[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar093024
[13] https://t.me/kremlin_sekret/16395
[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar102724
[15] https://radiomoldova dot md/p/42086/constitutional-court-to-validate-referendum-results-on-oct-31; https://x.com/ipn_moldova/status/1850877508767432726
[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/possible-russian-gains-georgia-and-moldova
[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/possible-russian-gains-georgia-and-moldova
[18] https://moldova dot europalibera.org/a/usatii-nu-va-sprijini-niciun-candidat-in-turul-doi/33176207.html
[19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/possible-russian-gains-georgia-and-moldova
[20] https://www.csce.gov/press-releases/chairman-wilson-calls-on-state-department-to-investigate-allegations-of-fraud-in-georgian-elections/; https://x.com/CharlesMichel/status/1850575679248593036?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1850575679248593036%7Ctwgr%5E2c38facaeb0cffa480d06403c86f08939740edd8%7Ctwcon%5Es1_c10&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fcivil.ge%2Farchives%2F627971; https://civil dot ge/archives/631413; https://www.ndi.org/publications/ndi-presents-preliminary-statement-georgian-elections-and-finds-pre-election-period; https://www.cnn.com/2024/10/27/europe/georgia-election-russia-protests-intl-latam/index.html
[21] https://www.pravda.com dot ua/eng/news/2024/10/28/7481810/; https://oc-media dot org/live-updates-georgian-president-announces-protest-against-election-results/
[22] https://news dot am/eng/news/849613.html
[23] https://x.com/MedvedevRussiaE/status/1850955959192936888; https://t.me/tass_agency/282080; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/142364;
[24] https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-june-06-2024/#post-563929-GEORGIA
[25] https://www.auswaertiges-amt dot de/en/newsroom/news/elections-georgia/2681910
[26] https://t.me/rybar/64849
[27] https://t.me/mod_russia/45036; https://t.me/rybar/64849; https://t.me/dva_majors/56110
[28] https://t.me/rybar/64849
[29] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79587
[30] https://t.me/rybar/64849; https://t.me/rusich_army/18006
[31] https://t.me/brygada47/1037; https://mil.in dot ua/uk/news/47-brygada-zahopyla-pozytsiyi-rosiyan-u-kurskij-oblasti/
[32] https://t.me/avbogomaz/8842;
[33] https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/22252409
[34] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034NHBahwcubzUjnLusWtxFHReFgG66PuBLdJ8duXH6k3MgLWPy8MSrxhdPtTPgvSjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TC8JstdyU21C3erK1ChdLoQqLir7Z89xoKH3Wk3KTmNEo6fH9BLiiPAD9QBKzs2Rl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02WTc4aJCnkrMc6CUsL8dnU8BxWVhSwwwoReYr8o4ui2X8zBKHPeTr7gefvQxk9BJXl
[35] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2302
[36] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2302
[37] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2303
[38] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2304
[39] https://t.me/oaembr77/643; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7285 ; https://t.me/feniksdpsu/309; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7283
[40] https://t.me/dva_majors/56110 ; https://t.me/rybar/64857 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28945 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28951; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28945
[41] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/142389 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/28937 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034NHBahwcubzUjnLusWtxFHReFgG66PuBLdJ8duXH6k3MgLWPy8MSrxhdPtTPgvSjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TC8JstdyU21C3erK1ChdLoQqLir7Z89xoKH3Wk3KTmNEo6fH9BLiiPAD9QBKzs2Rl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02WTc4aJCnkrMc6CUsL8dnU8BxWVhSwwwoReYr8o4ui2X8zBKHPeTr7gefvQxk9BJXl
[42] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/142389
[43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034NHBahwcubzUjnLusWtxFHReFgG66PuBLdJ8duXH6k3MgLWPy8MSrxhdPtTPgvSjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TC8JstdyU21C3erK1ChdLoQqLir7Z89xoKH3Wk3KTmNEo6fH9BLiiPAD9QBKzs2Rl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02WTc4aJCnkrMc6CUsL8dnU8BxWVhSwwwoReYr8o4ui2X8zBKHPeTr7gefvQxk9BJXl
[44] https://t.me/tass_agency/282120; https://t.me/wargonzo/22847; https://t.me/wargonzo/22846; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79573
[45] https://t.me/rybar/64861
[46] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034NHBahwcubzUjnLusWtxFHReFgG66PuBLdJ8duXH6k3MgLWPy8MSrxhdPtTPgvSjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TC8JstdyU21C3erK1ChdLoQqLir7Z89xoKH3Wk3KTmNEo6fH9BLiiPAD9QBKzs2Rl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02WTc4aJCnkrMc6CUsL8dnU8BxWVhSwwwoReYr8o4ui2X8zBKHPeTr7gefvQxk9BJXl
[47] https://t.me/rybar/64861
[48] https://t.me/nm_dnr/12895
[49] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7282; https://t.me/opbr_zsu/385; https://t.me/rusich_army/17995 ; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1850961765301129433; https://t.me/shershni68/322
[50] https://t.me/mod_russia/45030; https://t.me/tass_agency/282176; https://t.me/mod_russia/45032
[51] https://t.me/motopatriot/28903 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/17995; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79581; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28939; https://t.me/dva_majors/56110; https://t.me/wargonzo/22836; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/11684
[52] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034NHBahwcubzUjnLusWtxFHReFgG66PuBLdJ8duXH6k3MgLWPy8MSrxhdPtTPgvSjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TC8JstdyU21C3erK1ChdLoQqLir7Z89xoKH3Wk3KTmNEo6fH9BLiiPAD9QBKzs2Rl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02WTc4aJCnkrMc6CUsL8dnU8BxWVhSwwwoReYr8o4ui2X8zBKHPeTr7gefvQxk9BJXl ; https://t.me/motopatriot/28903 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18140
[53] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/27/idut-po-trupah-na-shodi-rosiyany-poklaly-za-tyzhden-600-vlasnyh-soldativ-za-selo-z-odniyeyi-vulyczi/ ; https://youtu.be/aDXWlQ2K0dM
[54] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/27/drony-matky-pid-selydovym-vorog-prorvavsya-do-mista-zavdyaky-znachnij-perevazi-v-zhyvij-syli/
[55] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79570; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79550; https://t.me/motopatriot/28905; https://t.me/rybar/64842
[56] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034NHBahwcubzUjnLusWtxFHReFgG66PuBLdJ8duXH6k3MgLWPy8MSrxhdPtTPgvSjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TC8JstdyU21C3erK1ChdLoQqLir7Z89xoKH3Wk3KTmNEo6fH9BLiiPAD9QBKzs2Rl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02WTc4aJCnkrMc6CUsL8dnU8BxWVhSwwwoReYr8o4ui2X8zBKHPeTr7gefvQxk9BJXl ; https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/191665 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/56095
[57] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7284; https://t.me/osirskiy/906
[58] https://t.me/odshbr79/410; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7295
[59] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7296; https://t.me/morpex_V/3310; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1850663572872802799
[60] https://t.me/rybar/64843; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28925 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/28933 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28951 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/56110 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/28887
[61] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02WTc4aJCnkrMc6CUsL8dnU8BxWVhSwwwoReYr8o4ui2X8zBKHPeTr7gefvQxk9BJXl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034NHBahwcubzUjnLusWtxFHReFgG66PuBLdJ8duXH6k3MgLWPy8MSrxhdPtTPgvSjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TC8JstdyU21C3erK1ChdLoQqLir7Z89xoKH3Wk3KTmNEo6fH9BLiiPAD9QBKzs2Rl ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28925 ; https://t.me/rybar/64843 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/56110
[62] https://t.me/rybar/64843 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/142430 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/11523
[63] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/142390 ; https://t.me/vrogov/17798
[64] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02WTc4aJCnkrMc6CUsL8dnU8BxWVhSwwwoReYr8o4ui2X8zBKHPeTr7gefvQxk9BJXl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TC8JstdyU21C3erK1ChdLoQqLir7Z89xoKH3Wk3KTmNEo6fH9BLiiPAD9QBKzs2Rl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034NHBahwcubzUjnLusWtxFHReFgG66PuBLdJ8duXH6k3MgLWPy8MSrxhdPtTPgvSjl
[65] https://t.me/kpszsu/22029
[66] https://t.me/dsns_telegram/34189
[67] https://t.me/tass_agency/282170; https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/988970; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/10/28/rosgvardiya-poobeschala-osvobozhdat-ot-otvetstvennosti-za-melkie-narusheniya-vladeltsev-oruzhiya-esli-oni-sdadut-ego-na-nuzhdy-svo; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/10/28/rosgvardiya-poobeschala-osvobozhdat-ot-otvetstvennosti-za-melkie-narusheniya-vladeltsev-oruzhiya-esli-oni-sdadut-ego-na-nuzhdy-svo
[68] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2024
; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-28-2024
[69] https://meduza dot io/news/2024/10/28/rosgvardiya-poobeschala-osvobozhdat-ot-otvetstvennosti-za-melkie-narusheniya-vladeltsev-oruzhiya-esli-oni-sdadut-ego-na-nuzhdy-svo
[70] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/20719
[71] https://isw.pub/UkrWar100524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar102724
[72] https://mlyn dot by/28102024/kak-uvelichit-vklad-dalnevostochnyh-regionov-vo-vneshnyuyu-torgovlyu-belarusi-i-rossii-mnenie-lukashenko/; https://t.me/pul_1/14110
[73] https://belta dot by/society/view/s-kakimi-stranami-vooruzhennye-sily-belarusi-proveli-uchenija-rasskazal-komandujuschij-sso-671320-2024/