Alexandra Braverman, Annika Ganzeveld, Katherine Wells, Siddhant Kishore, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, and Nicholas Carl
Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET
The
Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored
activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US
forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the
stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical
Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the
Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly
based on regional events. Click here
to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
CTP-ISW
defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that
Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came
to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state,
semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their
collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the
alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels
of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some
degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional
proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others
are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of
the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives,
which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from
the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these
objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have
become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.|
We
do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are
well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military
operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn
violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and
crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these
reports.
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has advanced into southern Lebanon along at least two axes. Geolocated imagery shows Israeli forces separately approaching Odaisseh and Maround al Ras.[1] The IDF 36th and 98th divisions participated in these advances and both have elements that fought in the Gaza Strip.[2]
The Lebanese Armed Forces claimed that Israeli forces went around 1,300
feet into Lebanon around Odaisseh and Khirbet Yaroun and that the
Israeli forces retrograded after a ”short period.”[3]
This activity comes after the IDF began the initial phase of its ground
operation into southern Lebanon on October 1. This effort—paired with
the IDF air campaign—is meant to degrade Lebanese Hezbollah capabilities
and destroy much of the military infrastructure that Hezbollah has
built in southern Lebanon in violation of UN Security Council Resolution
1701.[4]
These military effects are meant, in turn, to achieve the stated
Israeli war aim of safely returning displaced civilians to their homes
in northern Israel.[5]
Thousands of Israeli civilians have fled their homes, as Hezbollah has
conducted almost daily attacks into northern Israel since October 2023.[6]
Hezbollah
engaged the IDF as it advanced into southern Lebanon. Hezbollah claimed
that it engaged Israeli forces in Odaisseh and Maround al Ras in
southern Lebanon.[7] Hezbollah also claimed that it detonated improvised explosive devices (IED) targeting Israeli forces near Kfar Kila and Yaroun.[8] The IDF reported that it killed Hezbollah fighters and destroyed military infrastructure in unspecified locations.[9] The IDF also reported that Hezbollah killed eight Israeli soldiers in four separate engagements.[10]
The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson called on civilians to evacuate immediately from 24 towns in southern Lebanon.[11]
The spokesperson asked residents to travel north of Awali River, which
is 30 miles north of Litani River. The spokesperson separately asked
residents to avoid traveling by vehicle from north of Litani River to
anywhere south of it.[12]

The IDF continued its air campaign targeting Hezbollah capabilities, infrastructure, and leadership. The
IDF struck Hezbollah militants as well as observation posts and weapons
depots, among other military infrastructure sites, across Lebanon.[13] The IDF reported that it has struck Hezbollah munitions production sites around Beirut in recent days.[14]
The IDF also reported that it has destroyed over 150 Hezbollah
infrastructure sites in airstrikes over an unspecified period of time[15]

This
map illustrates individual Israeli air and artillery strikes based on
local Lebanese reporting. This map depicts strikes reported from 2:00pm
ET on October 1 to 2:00pm ET on October 2. This map is not exhaustive.
CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the locations of Israeli strikes.
Hezbollah has continued its attack campaign targeting civilian and military locations in Israel. Hezbollah conducted a two-wave rocket attack targeting an IDF position in Avivim for the second consecutive day on October 2.[16] The IDF reported that two rockets landed in an open area near Avivim.[17] Hezbollah also claimed that it fired rockets at Haifa in response to Israeli advances intosouthern Lebanon.[18] Hezbollah has fired rockets at Haifa almost daily since September 21.[19]
Hezbollah separately attacked IDF personnel around the Israel-Lebanon
border on October 2. Hezbollah fired rockets targeting Israeli troops
near Adamit, Avdon, Misgav Am, Shtula, and Yaara.[20]

The
IDF released new information on Hezbollah planning to launch a ground
attack into Israel in the days after Hamas’ attack into Israel in
October 2023. Israel military correspondent reported that over
3,000 Iranian-backed fighters deployed to the Israel-Lebanon border
after Hamas’ October 7 attack in preparation for their own possible
ground attack into Israel.[21]
This force included 2,400 militants from Hezbollah‘s Radwan special
operations forces and 500 Palestinian Islamic Jihad militants. The
correspondent added that these forces were equipped with ”thousands of
guns, anti-tank missiles, mines, [and] RPGs.”[22] The forces also had equipment, including aerial photographs, binoculars, night-vision goggles, and protective vests.[23]
The correspondent lastly said that the force planned to use explosives
to destroy the border walls between Israel and Lebanon and also use
tunnels in order to enter Israel.
The Iranian
missile attack into Israel on October 1 appears to have been more
effective at penetrating Israeli air defenses than the Iranian
drone-missile attack in April 2024. This may indicate that Iran is
learning how to optimize its strike packages against Western and Israeli
air defenses. Though Israel intercepted most of the missiles
that Iran launched on October 1, some of the missiles managed to impact.
These missiles caused minor damage to dozens of homes north of Tel
Aviv, a major road near the Mossad headquarters in Tel Aviv, a school in
central Israel, and the IDF Nevatim airbase in the Negev Desert.[24]
In contrast, the United States, Israel, and their regional partners
intercepted almost all of the drones and missiles that Iran launched in
April 2024.[25]
Several
factors could have led to the increased damage in the most recent
Iranian attack. One factor could be that Iran meaningfully increased its
volume of fire, launching 180-200 ballistic missiles compared to the
120 that it launched in April 2024.[26] Iran also refrained from launching slower moving cruise missiles and drones in the April 2024 attack.[27]
Former Israeli Missile Defense Organization head Uzi Rubin said that
the April 2024 attack was “easier to defend [against]” because the
cruise missile and drones gave the IDF “plenty of warning.”[28] The ballistic missiles took about 15 minutes to fly from Iran to Israel.[29]
Iran separately appeared to concentrate much of its fire around densely
populated central Israel in the most recent attack, whereas Iran
exclusively attacked remote areas in April 2024. Israeli air defenses
are designed to avoid intercepting projectiles that will land in open
areas. But the concentration of fire on central Israel, where there is a
high risk of collateral damage, may have been designed to overwhelm
Israeli air defenses by saturating the airspace with a large number of
projectiles over relatively small and densely populated areas.
Outlets
affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) reported
that Iran used a combination of missiles to achieve different effects in
the attack.[30]
The outlet stated that the liquid-fueled Emad missiles were meant to
engage Israeli interceptors, while the more advanced Fattah and Kheybar
Shekan missiles were meant to strike precision targets.
Iranian
military leaders threatened that they would launch larger attacks on
Israel if Israel retaliated for the October 1 missile attack.[31] Armed
Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri warned that
Iran would repeat its October 1 attack with “greater intensity” and
target “all [Israeli] infrastructure” if Israel attacks Iranian
territory.[32]
Artesh Commander Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi similarly warned
that Iran would attack unspecified Israeli infrastructure if Israel
retaliates against Iran for the October 1 attack.[33] Mousavi added that future Iranian attacks would be “stronger and multiple times [larger].”[34]
These Iranian threats come amid reports that Israel will conduct a “significant retaliation” against Iran in the coming days.[35]
Anonymous Israeli officials told Axios that Israel may target Iranian
air defense sites or energy infrastructure or conduct a targeted killing
similar to the killing of Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail
Haniyeh in Tehran in July 2024.[36]
The officials said that the Israeli retaliation will be “much more
significant” than the Israeli response to the April 2024 Iranian drone
and missile attack.[37] Israel at the time conducted an airstrike targeting an Artesh airbase in Esfahan, Iran, in retaliation.[38] The Israeli officials added that Israel could attack Iranian nuclear facilities if Iran launched another attack.[39]
Adviser
to IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami, Ebrahim Jabari, claimed
on October 2 that Iran conducted a cyber attack targeting Israeli air
defense systems at the same as its ballistic missile attack on October
1.[40]
Reuters
reported on how deeply Israel has infiltrated the Iranian security
establishment and Hezbollah, citing anonymous Iranian sources.[41]
The report stated that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei offered to
relocate Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah to Iran in
response to concerns of Israeli infiltration and the possibility that
Israel would try to kill Nasrallah. Nasrallah declined the offer,
according to the report, and Khamenei sent IRGC Brigadier General Abbas
Nilforoushan to Beirut to persuade Nasrallah. Nilforoushan died in the
Israeli airstrike that killed Nasrallah in Beirut. The airstrike follows
several other Israeli operations killing high-profile officials in the
Axis of Resistance, such as Mohammad Reza Zahedi, Fuad Shukr, and Ismail
Haniyeh. Reuters reported that the killings—coupled with Israel
detonating thousands of Hezbollah pagers and personal radios—has stoked
mistrust and paranoia among Iranian and Hezbollah leaders, including
Khamenei. Iran, according to Reuters, launched investigating possible
Israeli agents in the Iranian security apparatus, focusing on
individuals traveling or with family abroad. Reuters also reported that
Iran has arrested several individuals on suspicion that they helped
Israel kill Nasrallah.
The Islamic Resistance in
Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed three drone
attacks targeting three unspecified locations in northern Israel on
October 2.[42]
Iranian-backed
Iraqi militias threatened on October 1 to attack US forces in the
Middle East if the United States attacks or helps Israel attack Iran in
retaliation for the October 1 Iranian missile attack. Kataib
Hezbollah threatened to attack US forces and interests in Iraq and
across the region if the United States participates in “any hostile
action” against Iran or if Israel uses Iraqi airspace to attack Iran.[43] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba similarly threatened to attack US forces if the United States or Israel attack Iran.[44] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba separately criticized Jordan for helping Israel intercept Iranian ballistic missiles.[45]
Houthi
spokesperson Yahya Sarea claimed that the Houthis launched three Quds-5
cruise missiles at unspecified locations in Israel on October 2.[46] Sarea
claimed that the missiles hit their targets and added that the Houthis
are ready to join any combined military operations against Israel.
CTP-ISW cannot verify whether these attacks occurred.
Hamas claimed responsibility for the terror attack in Jaffa, south of Tel Aviv, on October 1.[47] Hamas
claimed that two fighters managed to infiltrate into Israeli territory
from the West Bank to conduct the attack. The two Hamas fighters
reportedly stabbed and killed an Israeli security officer and seized his
firearm.[48]
The two attackers then shot and killed eight civilians in Jaffa and
wounded 16 others before Israeli forces killed both attackers.[49] The IDF identified the two Hamas fighters as residents of Hebron in the West Bank and identified their homes for demolition.[50] The IDF also detained and interrogated several “suspects,” who were likely assisted the two Hamas fighters in the attack. [51]
Jaish
al Adl—a Baloch Salafi-jihadi group—has increased its rate of attacks
targeting security forces in southeastern Iran in recent days. This
uptick coincides with the two-year anniversary of “Bloody Friday,” when
Iranian security forces brutally suppressed protests in Zahedan, Sistan
and Balochistan Province.[52] Jaish al Adl has claimed the following attacks.
September 28
September 29
October 1
This activity is part of a general increase in anti-regime militancy in southeastern Iran since December 2023.[61]
Jaish al Adl has conducted numerous attacks targeting Iranian security
forces in this time, at times demonstrating unprecedented coordination
and organization.[62]
Iranian Interior Minister Eskandar Momeni ordered Deputy Interior
Minister for Security and Police Affairs Brigadier General Ali Akbar
Pour Jamshidian and the Sistan and Baluchistan governor to conduct an
investigation into the recent attacks.[63]
Iranian leaders could interpret some of this activity through the lens
of their fight against the United States and Israel, as they have long
accused both countries of stoking anti-regime militancy in Iran.
Key Takeaways:

Gaza Strip
Axis of Resistance objectives:
- Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
- Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip
The IDF Air Force conducted airstrikes targeting Hamas command-and-control sites across the Gaza strip on October 1 and 2. Three of the sites were in central Gaza Strip.[64]
The IDF reported that two of the three were based in the Brig High
School and Nuseirat Girls school and that Hamas fighters used the sites
to plan and conduct attacks targeting Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip
and into Israeli territory.[65]
The IDF added that it took steps to minimize casualties in these two
airstrikes. The third site in the central Gaza Strip was in a tent in
Nuseirat.[66] The IDF stated that this site posed an immediate threat to Israeli forces in the area.[67] The IDF separately conducted airstrikes targeting two Hamas command-and-control sites in the northern Gaza Strip.[68]
The IDF reported that the two sites were based in the former Muscat and
Rimal schools and that Hamas used these sites to attack Israeli forces.[69]
The IDF fired small arms targeting “dozens of suspects” in central Gaza Strip on October 1.[70] The IDF stated that these individuals posed a threat to Israeli forces in the area.
Hamas fired mortars and rockets targeting Israeli forces around the Netzarim Corridor on October 1.[71]


West Bank
Axis of Resistance objectives:
Hamas claimed responsibility for the terror attack in Jaffa, south of Tel Aviv, on October 1.[72] Hamas
claimed that two fighters managed to infiltrate into Israeli territory
from the West Bank to conduct the attack. The two Hamas fighters
reportedly stabbed and killed an Israeli security officer and seized his
firearm.[73]
The two attackers then shot and killed eight civilians in Jaffa and
wounded 16 others before Israeli forces killed both attackers.[74] The IDF identified the two Hamas fighters as residents of Hebron in the West Bank and identified their homes for demolition.[75] The IDF also detained and interrogated several “suspects,” who were likely assisted the two Hamas fighters in the attack. [76]
The IDF conducted overnight raids across the West Bank and detained 16 wanted individuals.[77] The IDF confiscated firearms and materials used to manufacture improvised explosive devices during the raids.[78]
Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights
Axis of Resistance objectives:
Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least 22 attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 1.[79] See the topline section for more information.
Iran and the Axis of Resistance
US Central Command (CENTCOM) destroyed six Houthi drones in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen on September 30.[80] CENTCOM determined that the drones presented an imminent threat to US and coalition forces and merchant vessels in the area.
Iranian
President Masoud Pezeshkian traveled to Doha, Qatar, on October 2 for
an official visit, during which he will meet with Qatari Emir Sheikh
Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani and participate in the Asian Cooperation
Dialogue Forum.[81]
Iranian
First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref headed a trade delegation to a
Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) summit in Yerevan, Armenia,on 1. Aref underlined [82]Iranian
prioritization of Eurasian economic cooperation and trade opportunities
in his EAEU address. Aref referenced the International North-South
Transit Corridor (INSTC), which Iran, Russia, and I[83]ia
established in 2000. Iranian Trade Devlopment Organization Director
Mohammad Ali Dehghan Dehnavi established a working group to improve
Iranian-Armenian commerce in a meeting with the Armenian Deputy Econoy
Miniser Nare[84]
Hovakimyan on Oct Iranian Industry, es, and Trade Minister Mohammad
Atabek proposed expanding Iranian-Armenian mining cooperation to Armenia
Territorial Administration and Infrastructure Mi[85]str
Gel Sanosyan. Atabe also invited Sanosyan to the Mining and Mineral
Industries Exhibition in Iran in November 2024. Russian[86]Belarussian, Kazakhstani, Kyrgyzstani, and Uzbekistani delegations attended the EAEU summit too.[87]
Iranian
Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi appointed Esmail Baghaei as the
new spokesperson of the Foreign Affairs Ministry on October 2.[88]
Baghaei served as the assistant to the foreign affairs minister and the
Iranian ambassador and permanent representative to the UN Office in
Geneva from 2018 to 2021. Baghaei also headed the ministry’s Legal
Affairs Department from 2011 to 2015 and represented Iran in the UN
Legal Committee from 2006 to 2010.[89]

[1] https://x.com/TwistyCB/status/1841489628169109846 ; https://x.com/Asia_Intel/status/1841484197451481430
[2] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1841364546205737242 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-1-2024
[3]
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[4] https://unsco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/s_res_17012006.pdf
[5] https://x.com/IsraeliPM/status/1835890307763757535
[6] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-9-2023 ;
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https://t.me/mmirleb/7515 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7510 ; dot
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[9] https://x.com/IDF/status/1841436605669835238
[10] https://www.jpost dot com/middle-east/article-822975 ; https://www.jpost dot com/israel-hamas-war/article-822992
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[12] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1841335617164062853
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[19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-22-2024 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7504
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[22] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1841096315259818482
[23] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1841096315259818482
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[25] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/04/14/iran-attack-israel-us-military/
[26] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/04/17/iran-israel-attack-drones-missiles/ ;
https://t.me/moriahdoron/14921
[27] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-assesses-damage-from-irans-missile-barrage-27c26e5e ;
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/04/17/iran-israel-attack-drones-missiles/
[28] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-assesses-damage-from-irans-missile-barrage-27c26e5e
[29] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-assesses-damage-from-irans-missile-barrage-27c26e5e
[30] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/07/11/3169886
[31] https://www.barrons.com/news/iran-chief-of-staff-threatens-to-hit-all-israel-infrastructure-if-attacked-be6ee47b ;
https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/07/11/3169941 ;
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[32] https://www.barrons.com/news/iran-chief-of-staff-threatens-to-hit-all-israel-infrastructure-if-attacked-be6ee47b ;
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[33] https://www.presstv dot ir/Detail/2024/10/02/734386/Iran-Army-commander-warning-Israel-destruction
[34] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/695601 ;
https://www.presstv dot ir/Detail/2024/10/02/734386/Iran-Army-commander-warning-Israel-destruction
[35] https://www.axios.com/2024/10/02/iran-israel-missile-attacks-response
[36] https://www.axios.com/2024/10/02/iran-israel-missile-attacks-response
[37] https://www.axios.com/2024/10/02/iran-israel-missile-attacks-response
[38] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-19-2024
[39] https://www.axios.com/2024/10/02/iran-israel-missile-attacks-response
[40] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/07/11/3170126 ;
https://ifpnews dot com/irgc-israeli-fighter-jets-cyber-operation/
[41] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-khamenei-warned-nasrallah-israeli-plot-kill-him-sources-say-2024-10-02/
[42] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1302
[43] https://t.me/centerkaf/4618
[44] https://t.me/Al_Nojaba/1206
[45] https://t.me/Al_Nojaba/1206
[46] https://x.com/ameenhayan/status/1841365911250362615
[47]
https://alqassam dot
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[50] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1841394034423586897
[51] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1841394034423586897
[52] https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/12/22/iran-bloody-friday-crackdown-years-deadliest ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-30-2024
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[55] https://t.me/mediaadl/447
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[57] https://t.me/mediaadl/452
[58] https://t.me/mediaadl/460 ; https://www.iranintl dot com/202410018197
[59] https://t.me/mediaadl/454
[60]
https://t.me/mediaadl/458 ; https://farsnews dot
ir/Rahgozar_b/1727777233920084767/Two-Police-Officers-Martyred-in-Khash%2C-Sistan-and-Baluchestan
[61] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-9-2024#_edn08ee1735036e7b87073111ba56692bd495 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-2-2024#_edn08ee1735036e7b87073111ba56692bd495 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-august-14-2024#_edn08ee1735036e7b87073111ba56692bd495
[62] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-13-2024 ;https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-30-2024
; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-12-2024
; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-8-2024
[63] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/07/10/3169496
[64] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1841322368506986748; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1841457902231408731 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1841215408163950700
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[66] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1841215408163950700
[67] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1841215408163950700
[68] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1841259394627224047
[69] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1841259397818822953
[70] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1841187508891345395
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ps/arabic/%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/8125/%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%88-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AE-%D8%B1%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D9%88%D9%82%D8%B0%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%84
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https://alqassam dot
ps/arabic/%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/8126/%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A4%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B7%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%8A-%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B0%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%83-%D9%88%D8%A3%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%87%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%84
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ps/arabic/%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/8126/%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A4%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B7%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%8A-%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B0%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%83-%D9%88%D8%A3%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%87%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%84
[74] https://www.haaretz
dot
com/israel-news/2024-10-02/ty-article/at-least-five-wounded-in-suspected-shooting-attack-in-jaffa/00000192-48e5-d6a1-a3de-eafd7ecd0000
[75] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1841394034423586897
[76] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1841394034423586897
[77] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1841394047518224501
[78] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1841394051083341978
[79] https://t.me/mmirleb/7479 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7481 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7485 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7491 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7494 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7496 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7498 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7500 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7502 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7504
; https://t.me/mmirleb/7506 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7508 ;
https://t.me/mmirleb/7509 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7511 ;
https://t.me/mmirleb/7512 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7513 ;
https://t.me/mmirleb/7516 ;
https://t.me/mmirleb/7518 ;
https://t.me/mmirleb/7519 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7521
;https://t.me/mmirleb/7522 ; https://t.me/mmirlb/7523
[80] https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3922606/sept-30-us-central-command-update/
[81] https://president dot ir/fa/154389
[82] https://en.irna dot ir/news/85614582/Iran-seeks-stronger-economic-ties-in-Eurasian-Economic-Union
[83]
https://en.irna dot
ir/news/85614582/Iran-seeks-stronger-economic-ties-in-Eurasian-Economic-Union;
https://aric.adb dot
org/initiative/international-north-south-transport-corridor
[84] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85615786
[85] https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/222253/Iran-Armenia-stress-expanding-mineral-industrial-coop
[87] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/07/10/3169132
[88] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/695823
[89] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6245025