Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Carolyn Moorman, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, and Nicholas Carl
Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET
The
Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored
activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US
forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the
stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical
Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the
Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly
based on regional events. Click here
to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
CTP-ISW
defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that
Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came
to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state,
semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their
collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the
alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels
of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some
degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional
proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others
are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of
the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives,
which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from
the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these
objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have
become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.
We
do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are
well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military
operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn
violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and
crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these
reports.
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted three waves of strikes into Iran on October 25. The strikes were in response to the large-scale ballistic missile attack that Iran launched against Israel on October 1. The
IDF targeted around 20 locations around Tehran and western Iran,
including vital air defense assets and facilities tied to the Iranian
drone and missile programs.[1] The IDF in particular struck four S-300
air defense batteries, which are Russian-made and the most advanced air
defense system that Iran operates.[2] That the IDF hit these batteries
highlights the relative vulnerabilities of the S-300, especially against
advanced platforms like the F-35 fighter jet. The IDF separately struck
prominent defense industrial sites, such as the Parchin and Khojir
complexes outside Tehran.[3] These complexes are managed by the Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Defense and Armed Forces Logistics
Ministry. The regime uses these facilities to develop and manufacture
advanced weapons systems, including solid-propellant ballistic missiles.
Iran has used the Parchin complex previously for high explosives
testing in support of its nuclear weapons program.[4] International
inspectors found traces of uranium there in 2015, indicating that a
larger quantity of uranium was there at some point, despite Iranian
officials denying that the complex was involved in nuclear
activities.[5] Although there are no known nuclear activities currently
at the Parchin and Khojir complexes, the IDF strikes could impede
Iranian progress toward a nuclear weapon, given the role that these
complexes could play in building a delivery system.

The
IDF strikes could also disrupt the Iranian ability to build missiles
and send some to its partners, such as Russia, Lebanese Hezbollah, and
the Houthis. Three unspecified Israeli sources told Axios that the IDF
targeted sophisticated mixing equipment used to make solid fuel for
advanced ballistic missiles, such as those that Tehran has used to
attack Israel directly.[6] Commercially available satellite imagery
confirmed that the IDF destroyed several buildings at the Parchin and
Khojir complexes. The imagery shows no signs of secondary explosions,
which is consistent with the IDF targeting industrial mixers rather than
weapons storage facilities. The IDF strike on the Khojir complex comes
after the regime began expanding the facilities there in August 2023 in
order to increase the Iranian capacity to build missiles.[7] The Israeli
sources speaking to Axios said that Iran will need to buy new mixers
from China.[8] Doing so could take months or possibly a year or more,
hampering the Iranian ability to replenish its missile stockpiles and
those of its allies in the Axis of Resistance.
The IDF
struck several locations in Iraq and Syria immediately before launching
strikes into Iran.[9] The IDF was likely targeting early warning radars
and sensors that would have given Iran advanced notice of the incoming
Israeli attack. Iran has in recent years worked to build an early
detection network across Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon in order to better
defend against Israeli airstrikes.
Iranian officials and
state media have downplayed the amount of damage that the IDF inflicted.
The regime boasted that it prevented IDF aircraft from entering Iranian
airspace and that the strikes caused only limited damage. The strikes
did kill four Artesh officers, however, presumably at the air defense
sites that the IDF struck.[10] The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry
responded to the IDF strikes saying that Iran has the ”right and duty to
defend itself against foreign acts of aggression.”[11]
A new Iranian-backed militia claiming to operate in Saudi Arabia announced its existence on October 25.[12] The
Islamic Resistance in the Land of the Two Holy Mosques claimed that it
launched a drone attack targeting an unspecified ”vital site” in Israel.
The naming of the group appears inspired by the Islamic Resistance in
Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that has
conducted regular drone and missile attacks on Israel in recent months.
The IDF has not commented on the claimed drone attack at the time of
this writing.
Key Takeaways:
- Iran: The
IDF conducted three waves of strikes in Iran targeting air defenses and
facilities tied to the Iranian drone and missile programs. These
strikes could disrupt the Iranian ability to build missiles and send
some to its partners, such as Russia, Lebanese Hezbollah, and the
Houthis.
- Saudi Arabia: A new Iranian-backed
militia claiming to operate in Saudi Arabia announced its existence. The
Islamic Resistance in the Land of the Two Holy Mosques claimed that it
fired a drone toward Israel.
Lebanon: The IDF
destroyed a large underground Lebanese Hezbollah complex in southeastern
Lebanon. The location, size, sophistication, and structure of the
complex suggested that it was meant for offensive operations against
Israel.

Gaza Strip
Axis of Resistance objectives:
The IDF 162nd Division reportedly continued operations around Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip on October 26.
A Palestinian journalist reported gunfire from Israeli vehicles
northwest of Jabalia and within Jabalia camp.[13] Palestinian militias
conducted multiple attacks targeting Israeli forces around Jabalia on
October 26, including Hamas detonating a rigged house north of Jabalia
refugee camp.[14] Hamas claimed to kill and wound Israeli forces in this
attack.[15]
Palestinian militias claimed to have
conducted two attacks targeting IDF command-and-control sites around the
Netzarim Corridor since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 25.[16] The IDF 252nd Division operates around the Netzarim Corridor.[17]
The IDF expanded al Mawasi humanitarian zone eastward on October 26.[18]
The IDF has repeatedly released evacuation orders for Palestinian
civilians in Jabalia and the surrounding areas, telling residents to
travel south to al Mawasi humanitarian zone.[19] The IDF continues to
operate in the northern Gaza Strip since it launched a new clearing
operation into Jabalia refugee camp on October 6 in order to disrupt
Hamas reconstitution efforts.[20]
The IDF 252nd
Division destroyed Palestinian militia infrastructure and killed
Palestinian fighters in the central Gaza Strip on October 26.[21] The
5th Brigade (252nd Division) directed an airstrike to destroy a militia
observation post.[22] The strike caused secondary explosions,
indicating the presence of munitions at the site. The 454th Fire Brigade
(252nd Division) separately directed a strike that destroyed an
observation post and a weapons depot.[23] A Palestinian journalist
reported gunfire from Israeli vehicles around Nuseirat and Bureij
refugee camps.[24] The National Resistance Brigades mortared Israeli
personnel and vehicles southeast of al Bureij camp.[25]
The IDF 933rd Brigade (143rd Division) continued operations in Rafah on October 26.[26] Israeli
forces destroyed Palestinian militia infrastructure and killed
Palestinian fighters. Israeli forces also located a rocket-propelled
grenade launcher.[27] A Palestinian journalist reported gunfire from IDF
vehicles west of Rafah on October 25 and 26.[28]


West Bank
Axis of Resistance objectives:
Israeli forces killed local Hamas commander in Tulkarm, Islam Jamil Odeh, on October 25.[29]
Israeli forces surrounded Odeh in a building and used a “pressure
cooker“ tactic to force him out.[30] Odeh opened fire on Israeli forces
before he was killed.[31] The IDF identified weapons in his vehicle,
including materials for assembling explosives.[32] Odeh assumed command
of Hamas in Tulkarm after the IDF struck and killed his predecessor,
Zaher Yasser Aoufi, on October 4.[33] Odeh was responsible for planning
attacks, including attacks planned for the anniversary of October 7.[34]
A Hamas official and other Tulkarm militias mourned Odeh’s death.[35]
Palestinian
fighters have attacked Israeli forces in at least three locations in
Tulkarm since CTP-ISW's data cutoff on October 25.[36] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired small arms targeting Israeli soldiers in Tulkarm.[37]

Northern Israel and Lebanon
Axis of Resistance objectives:
Israeli
forces destroyed a “strategic” underground Hezbollah complex in Rab el
Thalathine, southeastern Lebanon, on October 26.[38] The IDF
98th Division and Yahalom Engineering Unit used 400 tons of explosives
to destroy the “largest” Hezbollah complex ever found in southern
Lebanon.[39] The detonation triggered earthquake alerts across northern
Israel.[40] Israeli forces spent two weeks securing the area and mapping
the complex.[41] The tunnel had weapons and supplies for hundreds of
Hezbollah militants.[42] IDF officers at the complex said that they
encountered some resistance from Hezbollah militants guarding the
complex in the first two days of operations.[43] Hezbollah and local
sources have reported consistent engagements with Israeli forces in Rab
el Thalathine but few were close quarters combat.[44]
Hezbollah
likely built the compound in Rab el Thalathine for offensive operations
against Israel. Hezbollah had built the over
one-and-a-half-kilometer-long complex over the past 15 years.[45] The
complex had rooms large enough for a company of Radwan special
operations forces (SOF) to gather and receive orders.[46] The size,
sophistication, and supply stocks in the compound—coupled with its very
close proximity to the Israel-Lebanon border—suggest that Hezbollah
could have used this tunnel in its planned ”Conquer the Galilee” ground
attack into Israel.[47] Hezbollah planned for “Conquer the Galilee” to
be a similar offensive to Hamas’ October 7, 2023, attack and to target
northern Israeli towns.[48] The compound is about five kilometers from
the over 20,000 Israelis living in Kiryat Shmona and would have allowed
Hezbollah militants to rapidly mobilize and launch an attack against the
town and surrounding areas.
The IDF 98th Division continued clearing operations in southeastern Lebanon. The
98th Division directed strikes on Hezbollah military buildings,
militants, and anti-tank missile firing sites.[49] Division forces also
located several rocket launchers aimed and primed for launch at northern
Israel.[50] Hezbollah has claimed at least two attacks targeting
Israeli forces in the 98th Division’s area of operations in southern
Lebanon since CTP-ISW's data cutoff on October 25.[51]
The IDF 91st Division continued clearing operations in southeastern Lebanon. The
91st Division engaged Hezbollah militants and seized weapons, including
four loaded rocket launchers mounted on trucks capable of firing 160
rockets into Israel.[52] The IDF 288th Infantry Division (Res.) directed
strikes on a Hezbollah squad operating from a munitions warehouse.[53]

The IDF 146th Division continued clearing operations in southwestern Lebanon on October 25. The
146th Division killed several Hezbollah militants in ground and air
engagements.[54] Hezbollah claimed that it fired rockets targeting
Israeli forces in Ras Naqoura.[55]

The IDF continued its air campaign to targeting Hezbollah capabilities, infrastructure, and leaders on October 26. The
IDF Air Force struck over 70 Hezbollah targets across Lebanon,
including anti-tank positions, ammunition depots, and military
headquarters.[56] The IDF Air Force struck multiple weapons
manufacturing sites and the headquarters of Hezbollah’s intelligence
division in southern Beirut.[57] The IDF issued warnings to residents of
Burj al Barajneh and Haret Hreik to evacuate at least 500 meters from
Hezbollah infrastructure prior to attacking the area.[58] The IDF also
struck a Hezbollah air defense cell that had launched a missile
targeting an Israeli drone near Kfar Fila, north of the Litani
River.[59]
Hezbollah has conducted at least 25 attacks into Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 25.[60] Hezbollah
conducted four drone and rocket attacks into central and northern
Israel under its ”Khaybar“ campaign, which is meant to respond to Israel
killing Hassan Nasrallah.[61] Khaybar operations often target deeper
and more militarily significant sites in Israel, such as Tel Nof Airbase
near Tel Aviv.[62]Hezbollah attacked Israeli forces along the
Israel-Lebanon border in eight separate incidents.[63] Hezbollah
claimed a record of 48 attacks targeting Israeli forces in Lebanon and
sites in Israel on October 25.[64]
Hezbollah told the residents of 25 northern Israeli towns and cities to evacuate “immediately.”[65]
Hezbollah stated that the towns had become legitimate targets for
attacks due to the presence of Israeli soldiers there staging operations
into Lebanon.[66] Israel has repeatedly issued similar evacuation
notices for Lebanese residents ahead of airstrikes.[67] Hezbollah has
expanded its target list over the past month to include these towns and
regularly fires drones and rockets at these civilians areas.[68] These
towns are outside Israel’s closed military zones and do not border
Lebanon.

Iran and the Axis of Resistance
The
Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi
militias—has claimed one attack targeting Israel since CTP-ISW's last
data cutoff on October 25. The group claimed to launch a
one-way attack drone targeting an unspecified military site in Acre.[69]
The group added that it would attack Israel at an ”escalating
pace.”[70]

[1]
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-strikes-back-at-iran-further-expanding-the-war-in-the-middle-east-759cc6ec?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos2
;
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/10/26/israel-attacks-iran-retaliation-analysis/
[2]
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/26/world/middleeast/irans-state-media-plays-down-israeli-attacks.html
;
https://www.axios.com/2024/10/26/israel-strike-iran-missile-production
[3]
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/26/world/middleeast/irans-state-media-plays-down-israeli-attacks.html;
https://x.com/Vahid/status/1849995331951325275
[4] https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/new-information-about-the-parchin-site/8
[5] https://www.wsj.com/articles/uranium-provides-new-clue-on-irans-past-nuclear-arms-work-1466380760
[6] https://www.axios.com/2024/10/26/israel-strike-iran-missile-production
[7] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/satellite-photos-show-iran-expanding-missile-production-sources-say-2024-07-08/
[8] https://www.axios.com/2024/10/26/israel-strike-iran-missile-production
[9] https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-826132
[10] https://www.tabnak dot ir/fa/news/1268009 ; https://farsnews dot ir/TM_911/1729932120306337649
[11]
https://www.timesofisrael dot
com/iran-says-it-has-duty-to-defend-itself-after-israeli-strikes-2-soldiers-killed/
; https://mfa dot ir/portal/newsview/755585
[12] https://x.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/1850195344576913453
[13] https://t.me/hamza20300/305183 ; https://t.me/saedalzaneen8/129837
[14] https://t.me/C_Military1/63893 ; https://t.me/darebmojahden/5314
[15] https://t.me/C_Military1/63893
[16] https://t.me/sarayaps/18743 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7750
[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-20-2024
[18] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1850132629703585913
[19]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-7-2024
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-8-2024
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-9-2024
[20]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-25-2024
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-6-2024
[21] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850058048519237959
[22] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850058052063408377
[23] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850058052063408377
[24]
https://t.me/hamza20300/305102 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/305192 ;
https://t.me/hamza20300/305149 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/305156 ;
https://t.me/hamza20300/305170
[25] https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4454
[26] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850058060754014492
[27] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850058060754014492
[28] https://t.me/hamza20300/305209 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/305202
[29] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850140677952143637
[30] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15889
[31] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15889 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850140681777348708
[32] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850140681777348708
[33]
https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850140684516225490 ;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-4-2024
[34] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850140684516225490 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850140693584318519
[35] https://hamasinfo dot info/2024/10/26/4412 ; https://t.me/alredalsrey/751
[36] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7749 ; https://t.me/sarayatulkarm/753 ; https://t.me/alredalsrey/750
[37] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7749 ; https://t.me/sarayatulkarm/752
[38] https://x.com/KJ_X23/status/1850116859841900663 ; www dot idf.il/242499
[39]
www dot idf.il/242499 ; www dot
timesofisrael.com/under-a-lebanese-border-village-idf-finds-huge-hezbollah-base-primed-for-invasion
; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1850209740514628088
[40] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850030656710947229 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1850098487297266149
[41] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/91824 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/91882 ; www dot idf.il/242499
[42] www dot idf.il/242499
[43]
https://www dot idf.il/242499 ; www dot
timesofisrael.com/under-a-lebanese-border-village-idf-finds-huge-hezbollah-base-primed-for-invasion/
[44]
https://t.me/channelnabatieh/88501; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/91599 ;
https://t.me/channelnabatieh/91722 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/91824
; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/91882 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7942 ;
https://t.me/mmirleb/7949 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/92171 ;
https://t.me/dahieh4all/42313 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/92537 ;
https://t.me/mmirleb/8123 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8158 ;
https://t.me/mmirleb/8162 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8200 ;
https://t.me/mmirleb/8201 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8204 ;
https://t.me/mmirleb/8206 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8215 ;
https://t.me/mmirleb/8261 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/95306
[45] https://www dot idf.il/242499
[46] www dot timesofisrael.com/under-a-lebanese-border-village-idf-finds-huge-hezbollah-base-primed-for-invasion/
[47] https://www dot idf.il/242499
[48] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sB9wtaWHRxw&ab_channel=IsraelDefenseForces
[49] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850058048519237959
[50] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850172448848695591
[51] https://t.me/mmirleb/8374 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8347
[52] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850172445237395891
[53] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850058009453486409 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850058019352068457
[54] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850058019352068457
[55] https://t.me/mmirleb/8364
[56] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850057957997765117
[57] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850100313262277060
[58] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1849882867716763996
[59] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850100309353267457 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1850101671709356267
[60]
https://t.me/mmirleb/8349 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8350 ;
https://t.me/mmirleb/8351 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8352 ;
https://t.me/mmirleb/8353 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8354 ;
https://t.me/mmirleb/8355 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8358 ;
https://t.me/moriahdoron/15871 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8361 ;
https://t.me/mmirleb/8362 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8363 ;
https://t.me/mmirleb/8365 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8366 ;
https://t.me/mmirleb/8367 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8368 ;
https://t.me/mmirleb/8369 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8370 ;
https://t.me/mmirleb/8371 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8372 ;
https://t.me/mmirleb/8373 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8375 ;
https://t.me/mmirleb/8376 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8378 ;
https://t.me/mmirleb/8379
[61] https://t.me/mmirleb/8375 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8378 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8361 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8349
[62] https://t.me/mmirleb/8361
[63]
https://t.me/mmirleb/8350 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8351 ;
https://t.me/mmirleb/8352 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8354 ;
https://t.me/mmirleb/8355 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8358 ;
https://t.me/mmirleb/8365 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8369
[64] https://t.me/mmirleb/8356 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8357
[65] https://t.me/mmirleb/8381
[66] https://t.me/mmirleb/8381
[67] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate100724 ; https://isw.pub/IranUpdate100624
[68] https://t.me/mmirleb/8348 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8171 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8134 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8375
[69] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1406
[70] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1406