Nicole Wolkov, Kateryna Stepanenko, Angelica Evans, Davit Gasparyan, and Frederick W. Kagan
October 26, 2024, 5:45 pm ET
Click here
to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here
to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a
computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this
data-heavy tool.
Click here
to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain
map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will
update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note:
The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on October 26. ISW will
cover subsequent reports in the October 27 Russian Offensive Campaign
Assessment.
The October 26, 2024 Georgian parliamentary election will be covered in a separate special edition.
Bloomberg reported
on October 25, citing South Korean intelligence documents, that a
second group of North Korean soldiers will soon deploy to Russia. Bloomberg reported
that it viewed South Korean intelligence documents from an unspecified
date that assessed that the first group of 1,500 North Korean "elite
special forces" had arrived in Vladivostok, Primorsky Krai between
October 8 and 13 and that this first group was part of a planned
deployment of roughly 10,000 North Korean soldiers in total.[1] Bloomberg
also reported that the documents assessed that North Korea has sent
roughly 8 million rounds of 122mm and 152mm shells to Russia since
August 2023, roughly 100 KN-23 Hwasong-11 ballistic missiles, and an
unspecified number of Bulsae-4 anti-tank weapons. Bloomberg,
citing two people familiar with the matter, stated that South Korean
officials will share South Korea's assessments about North
Korean-Russian cooperation with NATO officials at an October 28 NATO
meeting. The New York Times (NYT), citing one unnamed Ukrainian
official and two unnamed US officials, reported on October 25 that
"several thousand" North Korean soldiers arrived at Kursk Oblast to
participate in an upcoming Russian counteroffensive operation to push
Ukrainian forces from their salient in Kursk Oblast.[2]
The officials stated that North Korean forces have not engaged in
combat operations yet and that the North Korean forces' task in Kursk
oblast is unclear. The officials noted that a significant contingent of
North Korean forces would help the Russian military to avoid pulling
additional forces from eastern Ukraine to participate in
counteroffensive operations in Kursk Oblast. A senior Ukrainian official
told the NYT that a maximum number of 5,000 elite North Korean troops had likely arrived in Russia by October 21.[3]
The participation of North Korean troops in combat operations in Kursk
Oblast or frontline areas in Ukraine would make North Korea an active
combatant and belligerent in Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall announced preparations to open additional defense industrial plants in Ukraine. Rheinmetall
CEO Armin Papperger announced on October 26 that Rheinmetall already
opened one plant in Ukraine that serves as a maintenance and production
facility for infantry fighting vehicles and main battle tanks and is on
track to build a powder factory and a munitions manufacturing plant in
Ukraine.[4]
Papperger added that Rheinmetall expects to begin the production of the
Lynx infantry fighting vehicles at the recently operational plant in
Ukraine by the end of 2024. Rheinmetall also reportedly plans to open a
joint production facility for air defense systems in Ukraine.
Rheinmetall announced in March 2024 that it plans to open at least four
weapons manufacturing plants in Ukraine.[5]
Key Takeaways:
We
do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities
are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the
military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue
to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on
the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on
combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations
of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Russian
President Vladimir Putin continued to double down on his likely
exaggerated claims about Russian progress in Kursk Oblast amid continued
Ukrainian offensive operations and in the context of the likely
imminent deployment of North Korean troops to combat in this area. Putin
told Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin on October 25 that two weeks ago
(likely the week of October 6 through 13) elements of the Russian 155th
Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD])
broke through Ukrainian defenses around 10 kilometers from the
Russian-Ukrainian international border and advanced to unspecified
positions near the border.[6]
Putin claimed that elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade
(Black Sea Fleet [BSF], Southern Military District [SMD]), 51st and
137th airborne (VDV) regiments (both part of the 106th VDV Division),
56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division), and 83rd Separate VDV Brigade
participated in these operations. Putin once again claimed that Russian
forces have encircled 2,000 Ukrainian forces in an area of about six
kilometers by 15 kilometers. Putin also claimed that Russian forces
guarantee the safety of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POW), although a
spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kursk direction
reported that Russian commanders issued an order to not take Ukrainian
POWs, and presumably instead to kill any Ukrainian servicemembers who
surrender or are captured by Russian forces.[7]
Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi notably
refuted Putin‘s earlier claims of Russian forces encircling Ukrainian
forces in Kursk Oblast on October 25.[8]
Putin’s interview with Zarubin was broadcasted on Russian state
television and is likely part of the Kremlin’s ongoing effort to explain
away Russia’s inability to decisively repel the Ukrainian incursion
into Kursk Oblast after nearly three months and ahead of the reported
imminent arrival of North Korean troops to Kursk Oblast. Putin may also
be setting informational conditions to give Russian forces credit for
any progress North Korean troops make in regaining control of Russian
territory in Kursk.

Ukrainian
forces recently launched a likely reinforced platoon-sized mechanized
assault on Russian positions in Glushkovsky Raion west of the main
Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast. Geolocated footage published on
October 26 show that Ukrainian forces conducted a likely reinforced
platoon-sized mechanized assault east of Novy Put (southwest of
Glushkovo), and the footage indicates that Russian forces likely
regained positions east of Novy Put at an earlier date and that
Ukrainian forces likely maintain positions southeast of Novy Put along
the Russian-Ukrainian international border.[9] Elements of the Russian 106th VDV Division are reportedly operating near Novy Put.[10]
Ukrainian
and Russian forces continued to fight in Ukraine’s main salient in
Kursk Oblast on October 26, but the frontline did not change. Russian
sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that
fighting continued southeast of Korenevo near Novoivanovka, Lyubimovka,
and Zeleny Shlyakh; north of Sudzha near Kamyshovka; northwest of Sudzha
near Pogrebki and Malaya Loknya; and south of Sudzha near Plekhovo on
October 25 and 26.[11] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continued to operate in Darino (southeast of Korenevo).[12] Elements of the 137th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) continued to operate near Lyubimovka and Zeleny Shlyakh.[13]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian
objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border
with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of
Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive
operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 26 but did not make
any confirmed advances. Russian forces continued attacking near
Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) and Starytsya (southwest of
Vovchansk) on October 25 and 26.[14]
Ukraine's Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Yevhenii Romanov
stated that Ukrainian forces are preventing Russian forces from
advancing toward Kharkiv City through Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City) but
that Russian forces have significantly destroyed most buildings in
Lyptsi, leaving no habitable buildings in the settlement.[15]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast
(Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push
westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian
forces continued offensive operations along the
Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on October 26 but did not make any
confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces
advanced south of Kupyansk near Kolisnykivka and Kruhlyakivka; southeast
of Kupyansk near Vyshneve; and northwest of Kreminna near Terny,
although ISW has not observed visual evidence of these claims.[16]
Russian forces continued attacking northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka;
north of Kupyansk near Holubivka and Kindrashivka; south of Kupyansk
near Kruhlyakivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and
Vyshneve; west of Svatove near Pershotravneve; northwest of Kreminna
near Terny, Hrekivka, Nevske, and Makiivka; west of Kreminna near
Torske; south of Kreminna near Hryhorivka; and southwest of Kreminna
near Serebryanka and the Serebryanske forest area on October 25 and 26.[17]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian
forces continued offensive operations in northeast of Siversk near
Bilohorivka and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Daryivka and Vyimka on
October 25 and 26, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline
in this area.[18]
Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on October 26
that elements of the Russian 6th, 7th, and 123th motorized rifle
brigades (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's
Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) and
reserves of the 1102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd CAA) are
unsuccessfully attacking near Bilohorivka, Ivano-Daryivka, and Vyimka
and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske.[19]
Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 85th and 88th motorized
rifle brigades (3rd CAA) are attacking south of Siversk along the
railway line in the direction of Pereizne and towards Fedorivka.
Mashovets stated that Russian forces have two regiments (possibly one
airborne [VDV] regiment and one motorized rifle regiment) from the
Russian “mobilization reserve” and two reserve battalions of the 3rd CAA
in their operational reserve in the Siversk direction.[20] Mashovets stated that Russian forces have no tanks and roughly three dozen armored vehicles in reserve in this direction.
Russian
forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar on October 25 and
26, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[21]
Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division and
200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th AC, Leningrad Military District
[LMD]) recently marginally advanced across the Siverskyi-Donets Donbas
Canal south of Hryhorivka (north of Chasiv Yar) and that elements of the
Russian Volunteer Corps and the 2nd "Veterany" Assault Brigade (Russian
Volunteer Corps and reportedly subordinated to Redut private military
company [PMC]) recently advanced near Kalynivka (north of Chasiv Yar)
and seized part of the Zhovtnevyi Microraion (eastern Chasiv Yar).[22]
Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle
Division (3rd AC) recently unsuccessfully attacked southeast of Chasiv
Yar near Ivanivske and Kurdyumivka.[23]
Mashovets stated that Russian forces have up to three regiments,
including one VDV regiment of the 98th VDV Division and two motorized
rifle regiments currently in Rostov Oblast, and up to three battalions
of the 3rd AC in their operational reserve in the Kramatorsk direction.[24]
Mashovets estimated that Russian forces currently have six to eight
tanks and 85-88 armored vehicles in reserve in this direction.

Russian
forces continued offensive operations near Toretsk itself and southwest
of Toretsk in the direction of Shcherbynivka on October 25 and 26, but
there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[25]
Russian
forces recently marginally advanced east and southeast of Pokrovsk amid
continued offensive operations in the area on October 26. Geolocated
footage published on October 25 and 26 indicates that Russian forces
recently advanced into the eastern outskirts of Novotoretske (east of
Pokrovsk), west of Novohrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk), into the
Korotchenko mine waste heap northeast of Selydove (southeast of
Pokrovsk), and into northern Oleksandropil (southeast of Pokrovsk).[26]
Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 71st Separate
Spetsnaz Brigade raised a flag over the waste heap northeast of Selydove
and that Russian forces advanced one kilometer within Seldyove.[27]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the
Russian 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk
People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) seized Oleksandropil, and Russian
milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle
Brigade (51st CAA) seized Hirnyk (southeast of Selydove) and advanced to
Mine No. 42 southwest of Hirnyk.[28]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to the train
station in southern Vyshneve (southwest of Selydove), west of Tsukuryne
(southeast of Selydove), and further northeast of Novodmytrivka (south
of Selydove).[29] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces operating east of Pokrovsk advanced north of Hrodivka and west of Krasnyi Yar.[30]
Russian forces continued assaults east of Pokrovsk near Vozdvyzhenka,
Myrolyubivka, Promin, and Krutyi Yar and southeast of Pokrovsk near
Lyskivka, Mykolaivka, Selydove, Novoselydivka, Novodmytrivka,
Izmailivka, and Stepanivka on October 25 and 26.[31]
Elements of the Russian 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central
Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Novotoretske
(east of Pokrovsk), and elements of the Russian "Borz" and "Storm"
assault battalions are reportedly operating southeast of Pokrovsk near
Zoryane.[32]
Russian
forces continued offensive operations east of Kurakhove near Hostre,
and Dalne on October 25 and 26, but there were no confirmed changes to
the frontline.[33]
Artillerymen of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th
Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) and the 291st Artillery Brigade
(58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Kurakhove.[34]
Russian
forces recently advanced southeast of Donetsk City near Vuhledar amid
continued offensive operations in the area on October 26. Geolocated
footage published on October 26 indicates that Russian forces advanced
west of Pobieda (southwest of Donetsk City).[35]
Geolocated footage published on October 26 showing a Russian reinforced
platoon-seized assault and another Russian reduced company-seized
assault indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Zolota
Nyva and north and northwest of Prechystivka (both west of Vuhledar).[36]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in southern
and western Bohoyavlenka (north of Vuhledar), reached the outskirts of
Novoukrainka (northwest of Vuhledar), and gained a foothold in the
southeastern outskirts of Shakhtarske (northwest of Vuhledar), although
ISW has not observed visual evidence of these claims.[37]
Russian forces continued attacking southwest of Donetsk City and
northeast of Vuhledar near Antonivka, Yelyzavetivka, and Katerynivka
and north of Vuhledar near Bohoyavlenka on October 25 and 26.[38]
Elements of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Special Forces of the
Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces [GRU])
are reportedly operating near Bohoyavlenka; and elements of the Russian
40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District
[EMD] operating in the Zolota Nyva-Prechystivka area.[39]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported on Russian activity in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on October 26.
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian forces reportedly attacked north of Robotyne in the direction of Novodanylivka on October 26.[40]
New recruits of the 1430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (58th Combined Arms
Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly training
in the Zaporizhia direction; and drone operators of the 150th Separate
Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA)
are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[41]
Russian
forces continued attacking in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on
October 25 and 26 but did not make any confirmed advances.[42]
A milblogger affiliated with the Russian Air Force claimed that an
unspecified Russian military helicopter crashed in the Kerch Strait near
occupied Crimea.[43]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian
forces launched another missile and drone strike targeting Ukrainian
rear areas overnight on October 25 and 26, resulting in the destruction
of civilian infrastructure. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that
Russian forces launched three Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from
occupied Crimea, two Kh-59 cruise missiles from Bryansk Oblast, two
missiles of an unknown type from Belgorod Oblast, and 91 Shahed-type and
other unidentified strike drones from Kursk and Oryol oblasts.[44]
The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces reportedly shot
down 44 drones as of 1200 local time over Kirovohrad, Sumy, Chernihiv,
Kyiv, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, and Kursk oblasts;
that 44 Russian drones became ”locally lost;” that one drone flew into
Belarusian airspace; and that one drone remained in the Ukrainian
airspace as of 1200 local time. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that
Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure in Sumy Oblast and Dnipro
City, resulting in civilian casualties. Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and
Ukrainian state officials reported that Russian strikes against Dnipro
City destroyed a two-floor residential building and killed four
civilians and damaged the Mechnikov Hospital (one of the largest
Ukrainian medical facilities) and other civilian infrastructure.[45]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces targeted the Mechnikov
Hospital with Iskander-M missiles but missed, possibly due to the
Ukrainian use of electronic warfare (EW) systems.[46]
Ukrainian regional officials also reported that Russian Shahed drones
struck residential buildings and a hotel in Starokostiantyniv,
Khmelnytskyi Oblast, and a high-rise apartment building in Solomyanskyi
Raion, Kyiv City.[47]
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
The
Russian military command is reportedly continuing to commit military
specialists to assault operations and incurring unnecessary losses,
likely in an effort to centralize control over Russian forces and
maintain the tempo of Russian offensive operations throughout the
theater. A former Russian Storm Z instructor and milblogger claimed on
October 26 that he received a message from the frontlines that the
Russian military command is transferring a group of experienced Russian
drone operators to infantry units in an unspecified direction.[48]
The milblogger accused the Russian military command of failing to
effectively use drone specialists and hindering the Russian military
from achieving parity with or even superiority over Ukrainian drone
operations. ISW previously assessed that the Russian military command
has been indiscriminately committing specialists to grinding assault
operations, partly in support of Russia’s ongoing force centralization
efforts and in an attempt to maintain the offensive tempo in eastern
Ukraine.[49]
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
Nothing significant to report.
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
(Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed
areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural,
economic, military, and governance systems)
ISW is not publishing reporting on activities in Russian-occupied areas today.
Significant activity in Belarus
(Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and
further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner
Group activity in Belarus)
Nothing significant to report.
Note:
ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only
publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian,
Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as
commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as
the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided
in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-10-25/north-korea-to-send-more-troops-to-russia-soon-intelligence-documents-reveal
[2] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/25/world/europe/north-korean-troops-arrive-kursk-russia.html
[3] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/25/world/europe/north-korean-troops-arrive-kursk-russia.html
[4] https://newsukraine.rbc dot ua/news/four-rheinmetall-plants-set-to-launch-in-1729944205.html; https://euromaidanpress dot com/2024/10/26/german-arms-giant-rheinmetall-to-open-second-ukraine-plant-with-four-in-total/
[5] https://newsukraine dot rbc.ua/news/rheinmetall-plans-to-construct-four-weapon-1710433612.html
[6] https://t.me/tass_agency/281740 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/281741 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/281742 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/281743 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/281744 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/281745 ; https://smotrim dot ru/video/2885131 ; https://iz dot ru/1780498/2024-10-25/putin-soobshchil-ob-okruzhenii-vs-rf-2-tys-ukrainskikh-boevikov-v-kurskoi-oblasti
[7] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/26/na-kurskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-otrymaly-nakaz-ne-braty-v-polon-ukrayinskyh-vijskovyh/
[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-25-2024
[9] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7262; https://t.me/khornegroup/2875; https://t.me/rybar/64781; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/142214; https://t.me/wargonzo/22812
[10] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79445; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18029
[11] https://t.me/mod_russia/44955; https://t.me/rybar/64781; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79411; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79419; https://t.me/dva_majors/55958; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/142199; https://t.me/milinfolive/133579
[12] https://t.me/motopatriot/28801; https://t.me/rybar/64781
[13] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79411; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79419
[14] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028Vn1oSR8trA1cxgH4qgw3zhsRex6s9zeXhfFo13RAG1pdgcMnf3UXL9EdaRBEJ1Pl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029qCxD8XM7EL5zaAoivLtN4rsTsqkc8utdraZa6MAQQkC5NFiDY7jfcGDRvgQckaZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rmyrjNsiLzttL7TGUr23JbWRdGxwrTjcq2szCTjVz2tGrnRZkUZaFhZ89mZXNp6hl
[15] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/26/harkiv-u-nebezpeczi-u-zsu-prokomentuvaly-vazhlyvist-zvilnennya-lypcziv/
[16] https://t.me/z_arhiv/28880 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28867 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28841
[17] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028Vn1oSR8trA1cxgH4qgw3zhsRex6s9zeXhfFo13RAG1pdgcMnf3UXL9EdaRBEJ1Pl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029qCxD8XM7EL5zaAoivLtN4rsTsqkc8utdraZa6MAQQkC5NFiDY7jfcGDRvgQckaZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rmyrjNsiLzttL7TGUr23JbWRdGxwrTjcq2szCTjVz2tGrnRZkUZaFhZ89mZXNp6hl
[18] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028Vn1oSR8trA1cxgH4qgw3zhsRex6s9zeXhfFo13RAG1pdgcMnf3UXL9EdaRBEJ1Pl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029qCxD8XM7EL5zaAoivLtN4rsTsqkc8utdraZa6MAQQkC5NFiDY7jfcGDRvgQckaZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rmyrjNsiLzttL7TGUr23JbWRdGxwrTjcq2szCTjVz2tGrnRZkUZaFhZ89mZXNp6hl
[19] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2298
[20] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2297
[21] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029qCxD8XM7EL5zaAoivLtN4rsTsqkc8utdraZa6MAQQkC5NFiDY7jfcGDRvgQckaZl
; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rmyrjNsiLzttL7TGUr23JbWRdGxwrTjcq2szCTjVz2tGrnRZkUZaFhZ89mZXNp6hl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/22812
[22] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2298
[23] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2299
[24] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2297
[25] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028Vn1oSR8trA1cxgH4qgw3zhsRex6s9zeXhfFo13RAG1pdgcMnf3UXL9EdaRBEJ1Pl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029qCxD8XM7EL5zaAoivLtN4rsTsqkc8utdraZa6MAQQkC5NFiDY7jfcGDRvgQckaZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rmyrjNsiLzttL7TGUr23JbWRdGxwrTjcq2szCTjVz2tGrnRZkUZaFhZ89mZXNp6hl
[26] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7258; https://t.me/urga_74/2258 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7265; https://t.me/ggwpteam2504/148 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7253; https://t.me/voenacher/73567 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7255; https://t.me/nm_dnr/12884
[27] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18019 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79446 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18024 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28853 ; https://t.me/rybar/64810
[28] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79434 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18017 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28856 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/12884 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/21454 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/44953 https://t.me/vysokygovorit/17772 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/22819 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28873 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79458 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18032 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/133647 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79434 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/28785; https://t.me/motopatriot/28786 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/142146; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/142157
[29] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79432 ; https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/191364 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/55947 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/55958 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28853 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/17962 ; https://t.me/sashakots/49778 ; https://t.me/rybar/64811 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/28802 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/28813 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/28807
[30] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/17774
[31] https://t.me/wargonzo/22812 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028Vn1oSR8trA1cxgH4qgw3zhsRex6s9zeXhfFo13RAG1pdgcMnf3UXL9EdaRBEJ1Pl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029qCxD8XM7EL5zaAoivLtN4rsTsqkc8utdraZa6MAQQkC5NFiDY7jfcGDRvgQckaZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rmyrjNsiLzttL7TGUr23JbWRdGxwrTjcq2szCTjVz2tGrnRZkUZaFhZ89mZXNp6hl
[32] https://t.me/wargonzo/22817 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/28802
[33] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028Vn1oSR8trA1cxgH4qgw3zhsRex6s9zeXhfFo13RAG1pdgcMnf3UXL9EdaRBEJ1Pl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029qCxD8XM7EL5zaAoivLtN4rsTsqkc8utdraZa6MAQQkC5NFiDY7jfcGDRvgQckaZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rmyrjNsiLzttL7TGUr23JbWRdGxwrTjcq2szCTjVz2tGrnRZkUZaFhZ89mZXNp6hl
[34] https://t.me/nm_dnr/12885 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79406
[35] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7250; https://t.me/mechanized33/467; https://x.com/klinger66/status/1850168034448622071
[36]
https://x.com/giK1893/status/1849927458864181470;
https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7251; https://t.me/morpex_V/3287;
https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7260; https://t.me/SPN_SIGMA/930;
https://t.me/z_arhiv/28849; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7266;
https://t.me/opbr_zsu/384
[37] https://t.me/z_arhiv/28849 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79473 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/22812 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18037 ; https://t.me/ne_rybar/2479 ; https://t.me/rybar/64814
[38] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028Vn1oSR8trA1cxgH4qgw3zhsRex6s9zeXhfFo13RAG1pdgcMnf3UXL9EdaRBEJ1Pl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029qCxD8XM7EL5zaAoivLtN4rsTsqkc8utdraZa6MAQQkC5NFiDY7jfcGDRvgQckaZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rmyrjNsiLzttL7TGUr23JbWRdGxwrTjcq2szCTjVz2tGrnRZkUZaFhZ89mZXNp6hl
[39] https://t.me/voin_dv/11492 ; https://t.me/rybar/64814
[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028Vn1oSR8trA1cxgH4qgw3zhsRex6s9zeXhfFo13RAG1pdgcMnf3UXL9EdaRBEJ1Pl
[41] https://t.me/dva_majors/55997; https://t.me/milinfolive/133604
[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028Vn1oSR8trA1cxgH4qgw3zhsRex6s9zeXhfFo13RAG1pdgcMnf3UXL9EdaRBEJ1Pl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029qCxD8XM7EL5zaAoivLtN4rsTsqkc8utdraZa6MAQQkC5NFiDY7jfcGDRvgQckaZl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rmyrjNsiLzttL7TGUr23JbWRdGxwrTjcq2szCTjVz2tGrnRZkUZaFhZ89mZXNp6hl
[43] https://t.me/vchkogpu/52079 ; https://t.me/astrapress/67203; https://t.me/fighter_bomber/18566
[44] https://t.me/kpszsu/21943
[45] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/26/vid-raketnogo-udaru-po-dnipru-zagynula-druzhyna-ta-donka-policzejskogo/; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/16993 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/16991 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/16983 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/16982; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/16972; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/16971; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/16969; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/16971; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/16968 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/16965; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/16966; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/26/raketnyj-udar-po-dnipru-sered-majzhe-20-poranenyh-4-dytyny/; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/34082;
https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2024/10/26/prezydent-vidreaguvav-na-rosijski-obstrily-nadijnyj-myr-mozhlyvyj-lyshe-cherez-sylu/;
https://x.com/USAmbKyiv/status/1850143899852878143
[46] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18018
[47] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/25/u-bagatopoverhivku-solom%ca%bcyanskogo-rajonu-vluchyv-shahed-pochalasya-pozhezha/; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/3639;
https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2024/10/26/naslidky-udaru-po-kyyevu-drony-zrujnuvaly-budynok-u-solomyanskomu-rajoni-ye-zagybli/;
https://t.me/dsns_telegram/34079; https://armyinform
dot
com.ua/2024/10/26/vorog-prodovzhuye-teroryzuvaty-myrne-naselennya-hmelnychchyny/;
https://www.facebook.com/share/p/ZQ6ipjK6BT5kfcfo/
[48] https://t.me/philologist_zov/1625
[49] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-26-2024