Angelica Evans, Riley Bailey, Nicole Wolkov, Karolina Hird, and George Barros
March 6, 2024, 5:20pm ET
Click here
to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here
to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a
computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this
data-heavy tool.
Click here
to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain
map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will
update this time-lapse map archive monthly.|
Note:
The data cut-off for this product was 12:00 pm ET on March 6. ISW will
cover subsequent reports in the March 7 Russian Offensive Campaign
Assessment.
Ukrainian Ground Forces
Commander Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavlyuk stated on March 6 that
Ukraine will try to seize the initiative and conduct unspecified
counteroffensive actions in 2024.[1]
Pavlyuk stated that Ukrainian forces will aim to stabilize the
frontline while degrading Russian forces in order to rotate frontline
Ukrainian units to training grounds in the rear for replenishment and
restoration.[2]
Pavlyuk stated that this will allow Ukraine to create a grouping of
forces that will conduct unspecified counteroffensive actions (possibly
but not necessarily counteroffensive operations) in 2024.[3]
Pavlyuk stated that Russian forces are concentrating offensive efforts
near Avdiivka, in the direction of Chasiv Yar (west of Bakhmut), and in
the Lyman direction and that Russian forces are trying to maintain a
relatively high tempo of offensive operations along the frontline in
order to retain the theater-wide initiative.[4]
Pavlyuk stated that Russian forces are currently suffering significant
losses and assessed that Ukrainian forces will stabilize the frontline
in the near future.[5]
A Ukrainian effort to contest the initiative in 2024 is operationally
sound. Russia will be able to determine the location, time, scale, and
requirements of fighting in Ukraine as long as it retains the
theater-wide initiative, which may allow Russia to force Ukraine to
expend materiel and manpower in reactive defensive operations, denying
Ukraine the ability to amass the materiel necessary for future
counteroffensive operations.[6]
ISW continues to assess that it would be unwise for Ukraine to cede the
advantage of the theater-wide initiative to Russia for longer than is
necessary.[7]
Continued
delays in Western security assistance will likely postpone Ukrainian
efforts to regain the theater-wide initiative, however.
Materiel shortages are forcing Ukrainian forces to husband materiel and
uncertainty about future assistance is likely constraining Ukrainian
operational planning.[8]
Delays in crucial assistance will force Ukraine to make difficult
decisions about how to allocate resources between future operationally
significant counteroffensive operations and ongoing Ukrainian defensive
operations against Russian attackers who currently hold the initiative.[9]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently stated that Ukrainian
forces are planning to conduct counteroffensive operations in 2024 but
stressed that Ukraine’s primary objective remains the defense of
Ukrainian territory.[10]
Zelensky has also stated that Russia is preparing a new offensive
effort that will start in late May or summer 2024, which would likely
further postpone opportunities for Ukraine to prepare and launch
counteroffensive operations.[11]
Well-provisioned Ukrainian forces have proven capable of preventing
even marginal Russian gains during large-scale Russian offensive efforts
and are capable of heavily degrading attacking Russian forces.[12]
Western security assistance is crucial for both Ukraine’ ability to
concentrate material and manpower for future counteroffensive operations
as well as its ability to degrade Russian offensive efforts
sufficiently enough so that Ukraine can seize the theater wide
initiative.
Russian forces conducted a relatively
larger series of drone and missile strikes targeting Ukraine on the
night of March 5 to 6 and on March 6, including strikes on Odesa City
during Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s visit with Greek Prime
Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis. The Ukrainian Air Force reported
that on the night of March 5 to 6 Russian forces launched five S-300
missiles from occupied Donetsk Oblast and 42 Shahed-136/131 drones from
occupied Crimea, Kursk Oblast, and Krasnodar Krai.[13]
The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 38 Shahed
drones over Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy,
Kharkiv, Vinnytsia, and Sumy oblasts.[14]
Russian forces later targeted port infrastructure in Odesa City on
March 6 with an unspecified number of missiles during Zelensky‘s and
Mitsotakis’ visit to the Odesa Port.[15]
Western media reported that a Russian missile struck within several
hundred meters of a convoy transporting Zelensky and Mitsotakis.[16]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces
launched a high-precision missile strike on a hanger in the Odesa Port
where Ukrainian forces were preparing naval drones for operations.[17]
Kremlin
officials continue to invoke nuclear threats as part of ongoing Russian
information operations aimed at weakening Western support for Ukraine
and deterring Western aid to Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson
Dmitri Peskov reiterated on March 6 that Russia will only use nuclear
weapons if “something” threatens Russia’s existence — a longstanding
Russian nuclear weapon usage talking point.[18]
Peskov also accused the West of “routinizing” the topic of nuclear war,
which Peskov called ”extremely dangerous” and “irresponsible,” despite
the fact that it is, in fact, Russian officials, who most frequently
openly threaten employing nuclear weapons. Russian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova responded to Finnish
President Alexander Stubb’s recent statement about NATO membership
providing Finland a nuclear deterrent by claiming that American nuclear
facilities in northern Europe would be “legitimate targets” for Russia
in a hypothetical direct conflict between Russia and NATO.[19]
Zakharova threatened that the security of countries who received
nuclear weapons from the US will “clearly suffer.” Russian Federation
Council Chairperson Valentina Matviyenko stated that Russian needs to
reassess and denounce international agreements that do not serve
Russia’s national interests, specifically unspecified international
agreements signed by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev and other Soviet
and Russian leaders.[20]
Matviyenko’s statement suggests a Russian interest in denouncing a wide
variety of international agreements, potentially including nuclear
proliferation and security agreements. ISW has recently observed several
Kremlin officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, engaged
in nuclear saber rattling but continues to assess that Russian nuclear
use in Ukraine and beyond remains highly unlikely.[21]
International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director Rafael Grossi and Russian
President Vladimir Putin discussed the security of the Zaporizhzhia
Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) and nuclear non-proliferation issues on March
6 in Sochi, Russia.[22] Grossi
stated that he had an “important exchange” with Putin about the
“nuclear safety and security” of the ZNPP, which Russian forces have
controlled for over two years.[23]
The Kremlin and Russian state-run news outlets highlighted Grossi’s
visit to Russia, likely as part of an ongoing effort to portray Russia
as a responsible operator of the ZNPP and to prompt international
recognition for the Russian occupation of the ZNPP and occupied Ukraine.[24]
Russian
President Vladimir Putin met with the governor of pro-Russian Moldovan
autonomous region Gagauzia, Yevgenia Gutsul, on March 6 and emphasized
Russia’s support for Gagauzia. Putin and Gutsul met on the
sidelines of the World Youth Festival in Sochi and discussed “complex
regional and geopolitical issues,” which Gutsul claimed Gagauzia is at
the “epicenter of.”[25]
Gutsul informed Putin about the “lawless actions” of Moldovan
authorities and claimed that Moldova is systematically ”taking away
[Gagauzia’s] powers, limiting the budget, violating legal rights, [and]
provoking instability and destabilization in Gagauzia and throughout
[Moldova].”[26]
Gutsul claimed that Putin “promised to support Gagauzia and the Gagauz
people in defending [their] legitimate rights, powers, and positions in
the international arena.” Gutsul also met with various Russian officials
and agreed to intensify economic and cultural ties with Krasnodar Krai
and Penza and Pskov oblasts on the sidelines of the World Youth Forum.[27]
Gutsul recently met with Russian Federation Council Chairperson
Valentina Matviyenko, who emphasized Russia’s support for Gagauzia
against perceived Moldovan “oppression.”[28]
Gutsul’s trip to Russia follows the February 28 Congress of Deputies in
pro-Russian Moldova breakaway region Transnistria, which requested “zashchita” (defense/protection) from Russia in response to alleged increasing pressure from Moldova.[29]
Putin did not respond to the February 28 Transnistrian request, but the
Transnistrian requests still afford the Kremlin a wide range of
possible courses of action (COAs) at a later time.[30]
It is unclear why Putin would choose to meet with Gutsul and engage
with Gagauzian authorities after declining to respond to Transnistria’s
request for defense/protection. The Kremlin’s recent high-level
interactions with Gagauzian authorities after a previous rhetorical
focus on Transnistria supports ISW assessment that the Kremlin desires
to use both of Moldova’s pro-Russian regions to justify hybrid
operations aimed a destabilizing and further polarizing Moldova ahead of
Moldova’s EU accession negotiations and the Moldovan presidential
election later in 2024.[31]
Moldova suspended the Cold War-era Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty on March 6.[32] Twenty-two
NATO members and Warsaw Pact states signed the CFE Treaty in 1990, and
it was ratified in 1992 after the fall of the Soviet Union.[33]
The CFE was meant to set equal limits on the number of tanks, armored
combat vehicles, heavy artillery, combat aircraft, and attack
helicopters between NATO and Warsaw Pact states in order to
counterbalance the Soviet Union’s advantage in conventional weapons
systems in the final years of the Cold War.[34]
Moldovan officials stated that Moldova is suspending the CFE Treaty
because there has been a “fundamental change in circumstances” in the
international security environment since the original signing of the
treaty.[35]
Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov
responded to the Moldovan decision and claimed that it is against
Russian interests, despite the fact that Russia itself withdrew from the
treaty in 2023.[36]
Russian officials’ negative response to Moldova’s decision further
suggests that the Kremlin desires to maintain influence over Moldova
using a variety of avenues.
The Ukrainian Main
Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reportedly conducted a drone
strike on a mining and processing plant in Kursk Oblast on March 6. Ukrainian outlet Ukrainska Pravda
reported on March 6 that unspecified GUR sources stated that GUR
conducted a drone strike on the Mikhailovsky Mining and Processing Plant
in Zheleznogorsk, Kursk Oblast.[37]
Kursk Oblast Governor Roman Starovoit claimed that a Ukrainian drone
struck a fuel depot in Zheleznogorsk causing a fire and that another
Ukrainian drone struck the Mikhailovsky Mining and Processing Plant.[38] Ukrainska Pravda
reported that the Mikhailovsky Mining and Processing plants is one of
the largest iron ore mining enterprises in Russia. The US has sanctioned
the Mikhailovsky Mining and Processing Plant’s holding company,
Metalloinvest.[39]
Armenia
appears to be taking limited measures to reduce its bilateral security
cooperation with Russia outside of its reduced participation in the
Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Armenian
Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan stated on March 6 that
Armenia officially informed Russia that “only Armenian border guards”
should perform duties at Zvarnots International Airport in Yerevan.[40] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Armenian service Radio Azatutyun
reported that Russian border guards have been serving at the Zvarnots
Airport since the signing of a 1992 Armenian-Russian agreement which
regulates Russian forces in Armenia but does not specifically mention a
Russian presence at Zvarnots Airport.[41]
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian
Ground Forces Commander Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavlyuk stated on
March 6 that Ukraine will try to seize the initiative and conduct
unspecified counteroffensive actions in 2024.
- Russian
forces conducted a relatively larger series of drone and missile
strikes targeting Ukraine on the night of March 5 to 6 and on March 6,
including strikes on Odesa City during Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky’s visit with Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis.
- Kremlin
officials continue to invoke nuclear threats as part of ongoing Russian
information operations aimed at weakening Western support for Ukraine
and deterring Western aid to Ukraine.
- International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director Rafael Grossi and Russian
President Vladimir Putin discussed the security of the Zaporizhzhia
Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) and nuclear non-proliferation issues on March
6 in Sochi, Russia.
- Russian President Vladimir
Putin met with the governor of pro-Russian Moldovan autonomous region
Gagauzia, Yevgenia Gutsul, on March 6 and emphasized Russia’s support
for Gagauzia.
- Moldova suspended the Cold War-era Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty on March 6.
- The
Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reportedly
conducted a drone strike on a mining and processing plant in Kursk
Oblast on March 6.
- Armenia appears to be taking
limited measures to reduce its bilateral security cooperation with
Russia outside of its reduced participation in the Russian-led
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).
- Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Kupyansk and Donetsk City and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
- The Russian legal system continues efforts to use the Russian criminal justice system to augment Russia’s recruitment base.
We
do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities
are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the
military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue
to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on
the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on
combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations
of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast
(Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push
westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian
forces recently advanced northeast of Kupyansk amid continued
positional fighting along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on March 6.
Geolocated footage published on March 5 indicates that Russian infantry
recently advanced on the northern outskirts of Synkivka.[42]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced several
hundred meters in depth near Terny (west of Kreminna) and seized several
unspecified Ukrainian strongpoints, although ISW has not observed
confirmation of this claim.[43]
Positional fighting continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka;
northwest of Svatove near Tabaivka; west of Kreminna near Yampolivka and
Terny; and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna)
and Verkhnokamianske.[44]
Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov
stated that Russian forces have concentrated roughly 100,000 personnel
in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions and that roughly 40,000 of those
Russian personnel are combat personnel.[45]
Synehubov added that Russian forces are currently conducting mechanized
assaults in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions with MT-LB armored
fighting vehicles instead of with tanks.[46]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian
forces reportedly advanced near Bakhmut amid continued positional
fighting in the area on March 6. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn
Mashovets stated that Russian forces advanced in the direction of
Bohdanivka-Kalynivka (northwest of Bakhmut) and Ivanivske-Stupochky
(west of Bakhmut).[47]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized an unspecified
forest area north of Bohdanivka (west of Bakhmut) and marginally
advanced near Ivanivske (west of Bakhmut), although ISW has not observed
visual evidence of Russian advances in either of these areas.[48]
Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional fighting continues
near Spirne (northeast of Bakhmut); near Ivanivske; and southwest of
Bakhmut near Klishchiivka, Andriivka, and Bila Hora.[49]
Elements of the Russian 331st and newly-formed 299th airborne (VDV)
regiments (both of the 98th VDV Division) are operating north and south
of Bohdanivka and elements of the 11th VDV Brigade are operating near
Ivanivske.[50]
Positional
engagements continued near Avdiivka on March 6, but there were no
confirmed changes to the frontline in the area. Russian and Ukrainian
sources stated that positional engagements continued northwest of
Avdiivka near Berdychi, Orlivka, and Semenivka; west of Avdiivka near
Tonenke; and southwest of Avdiivka near Vodyane, Pervomaiske, and
Nevelske.[51]
One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces control around half
of Tonenke and Pervomaiske and most of Orlivka, while another milblogger
claimed that Russian forces control two thirds of Tonenke and half of
Orlivka.[52] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces control the eastern half of Berdychi.[53]
Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian electronic warfare (EW)
systems are interfering with Russian drone operations near Lastochkyne
(northwest of Bakhmut) and claimed that Russian forces need to create
drone and EW coordination centers.[54]
The milblogger also claimed that Russian assaults have “slowed down”
west of Avdiivka as retreating Ukrainian forces consolidate on new
defensive lines. The milblogger claimed that the increasing degradation
of Russian forces in the area is exposing issues with planning and
coordination between Russian military command and frontline units.[55]
The Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Press Service reported that
Ukrainian forces have established a second line of defensive
fortifications in the Avdiivka direction, equipped with asphalt support
points for higher and more secure trench walls, anti-tank trenches,
concrete bunkers, dragon’s teeth, and other fortifications.[56]
Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces have also equipped
fortifications with unspecified protection against Russian shelling and
drone strikes.[57]
Russian
forces recently marginally advanced west of Donetsk City amid continued
positional fighting west and southwest of Donetsk City on March 6.
Geolocated footage published on March 6 indicates that Russian forces
recently marginally advanced in Heorhiivka (west of Donetsk City).[58]
A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced
along Heolohichna, Lermontova, and Zhalyznichna streets in the southern
outskirts of Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City) and achieved
unspecified success north of Pobieda (southwest of Donetsk City).[59] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City).[60]
ISW has not observed visual evidence of these claims. Russian and
Ukrainian sources stated that positional fighting continued near
Krasnohorivka, Heorhiivka, Pobieda, Novomykhailivka.[61]
Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms
Army, Southern Military District) are reportedly operating near
Heorhiivka.[62]
The
Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian
assaults near Prechystivka (southeast of Velyka Novosilka) in the
Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on March 6.[63]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian
forces recently made confirmed advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast
amid continued positional engagements on March 6. Geolocated footage
published on March 5 and 6 indicates that Russian forces recently
advanced east of Robotyne and northwest of Verbove (east of Robotyne).[64] Positional engagements continued near Robotyne and Verbove.[65]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces operating in the
Zaporizhia direction do not have a sufficient number of drones and that
Russian forces operating near Robotyne lack adequate counter-battery and
electronic warfare (EW) capabilities.[66]
Elements of the Russian 71st Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade and 39th
Separate Covering Brigade (both of the 35th Combined Arms Army [CAA],
Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the
Zaporizhia direction.[67]
Limited positional engagements continued near Krynky in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on March 6.[68]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces intensified shelling
and loitering munition strikes on Ukrainian positions in the Kherson
direction.[69]
Ukrainian
Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk reported on
March 6 that Ukrainian forces have destroyed or damaged roughly one
third of Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) vessels since the start of
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[70]
Pletenchuk stated that Ukrainian forces have struck 27 vessels, and
that 15 of these struck Russian vessels are under repair. Pletenchuk
stated that the BSF maintains a “fairly serious” presence in the Black
Sea including 10 missile carriers, three submarines, two missile boats,
and several patrol and guard ships. Pletenchuk reported that the BSF has
five large amphibious landing ships in service, four of which are
undergoing repair.
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
See topline text.
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
The
Russian legal system continues efforts to use the Russian criminal
justice system to augment Russia’s recruitment base. Russian outlet Kommersant reported
on March 6 that the Russian State Duma will consider a new bill that
proposes a mechanism that will exempt individuals from criminal
punishment if they sign a military contract during “a military
operation.”[71]
The legal mechanism reportedly applies to suspects under investigation
for lower-level crimes and current convicts and will allow cases against
the individuals to be suspended if they complete the term of their
military contract. An investigation by Russian opposition outlet Verstka
similarly details the role that some Russian courts play in sending
convicts to the frontline and found that some Russian courts have been
offering convicts deferments on their sentences and an expungement of
their criminal records if they sign contracts with the Russian military
and go to the front.[72] Verstka noted
that courts can grant such sentencing deferments through Article 398 of
the Russian Criminal Code, a previously scarcely-used provision that
allows deferment of sentences in ”exceptional cases” that Russian courts
have been using much more frequently since the start of the full-scale
invasion in 2022.[73]
Courts are reportedly granting sentencing deferments to those convicted
of lower-level crimes such as drunk driving or failure to pay child
support, but Verstka noted that not all courts apply this
practice evenly, as some judges believe that mobilization should not be a
way out of serving time for committing a crime. Verstka stated
that courts that do grant sentencing deferments either grant them for
six months or until the end of a service contract. Russian human rights
organization “Rus Sidyashchaya” (Russia Behind Bars) reported that the
Russian Penal Executive Inspectorate actively advertises this as an
option for convicts.[74]
A
group of Indian nationals alleged that Russian authorities coerced them
to join the Russian military and sent them to fight in Ukraine with two
weeks of training.[75]
Social media footage posted on March 6 shows a group of seven
individuals in military uniform claiming that they visited Russia from
India for New Years on tourist visas and then went to visit Belarus,
where Belarusian officials detained them for not having visas and then
transferred them to Russian authorities. The Indian nationals stated
that Russian authorities told them that if they did not sign service
contracts, they would face 10 years imprisonment. A prominent
Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian authorities likely
did not forcibly mobilize the men, and rather that they joined the
Russian military voluntarily and changed their minds upon experiencing
combat.[76]
The Indian Ministry of External Affairs recently stated that India is
aware of several Indian nationals serving in the Russian army and trying
to secure the “early discharge” of 20 Indian nationals who were
reportedly working as support staff for Russian forces.[77]
Russian
Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visited the Almaz-Antey defense
industrial base (DIB) enterprise on March 6. The Russian Ministry of
Defense (MoD) posted footage showing Shoigu inspecting Almaz-Antey,
where Almaz-Antey Director General Gennady Mendersky spoke about the
enterprise’s efforts to create and test various anti-drone platforms. [78] Shoigu also visited the Avangard Moscow Machine-Building Plant and inspected anti-aircraft missile production.
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
Kremlin newswire TASS reported on March 6 that Russia is developing a new and advanced version of the “Bulat” drone detector.[79] TASS reported
that St. Petersburg-based drone suppression company 3mx has developed a
fourth version of the “Bulat” drone detector that has an expanded
frequency range and can link 30 individual sensors.[80] 3mx reported that they will begin delivering the “Bulat” detectors to the combat zone in Ukraine in May 2024.
Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts
(Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become
more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international
partners)
Note: ISW will be publishing
its coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts on a weekly basis
in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. ISW will continue to track
developments in Ukrainian defense industrial efforts daily and will
refer to these efforts in assessments within the daily Russian Offensive
Campaign Assessment and other ISW products when necessary.
ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
(Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed
areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural,
economic, military, and governance systems)
Note:
ISW will be publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas
twice a week in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. ISW will
continue to track activities in Russian-occupied areas daily and will
refer to these activities in assessments within the daily Russian
Offensive Campaign Assessment and other ISW products when necessary.
ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
See topline text.
Significant activity in Belarus
(Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and
further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner
Group activity in Belarus)
Belarus continues to
develop bilateral security ties with Middle Eastern partner states.
Belarusian Minister of Internal Affairs Ivan Kubrakov and
representatives of the Belarusian Ministry of Internal Affairs and
Belarusian police force visited the World Police Summit in the United
Arab Emirates (UAE) on March 6.[81]
Kubrakov and the Belarusian delegation learned about the practices of
UAE law enforcement in the field of domestic security and presented
Belarus’ own experience in this sphere. Belarusian Deputy Head of the
Department of International Cooperation Colonel Dmitry Ryabikhin also
met with Qatari Department for Work with Military Attachés Head Colonel
Nasser Ali al-Thani at the Doha International Maritime Defense
Exhibition and Conference (DIMDEX-24) on March 6 to discuss issues of
bilateral Qatari-Belarusian military cooperation.[82]
Note:
ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only
publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian,
Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as
commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as
the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided
in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://suspilne
dot
media/700028-komanduvac-suhoputnih-vijsk-zavdanna-ukraini-stvoriti-udarne-ugrupuvanna-j-u-2024-roci-provesti-kontrudarni-dii/
; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R5vvrb1YsqU
[2] https://suspilne
dot
media/700028-komanduvac-suhoputnih-vijsk-zavdanna-ukraini-stvoriti-udarne-ugrupuvanna-j-u-2024-roci-provesti-kontrudarni-dii/
[3]
https://suspilne dot
media/700028-komanduvac-suhoputnih-vijsk-zavdanna-ukraini-stvoriti-udarne-ugrupuvanna-j-u-2024-roci-provesti-kontrudarni-dii/
; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R5vvrb1YsqU
[4]
https://suspilne dot
media/700028-komanduvac-suhoputnih-vijsk-zavdanna-ukraini-stvoriti-udarne-ugrupuvanna-j-u-2024-roci-provesti-kontrudarni-dii/
[5]
https://suspilne dot
media/700028-komanduvac-suhoputnih-vijsk-zavdanna-ukraini-stvoriti-udarne-ugrupuvanna-j-u-2024-roci-provesti-kontrudarni-dii/
[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011924
[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011924
[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar121823 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-23-2024
[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022324
[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022324
[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-26-2024
[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021324 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-winter-spring-2024-offensive-operation-kharkiv-luhansk-axis ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030723 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021523
[13]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xkUvJL2kABKjQriXczA53w7uSv5AyNYUNZpKZQLeT741FhmM4GJYA4KHDn6um35Ql
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0vB97fHzYNcnvnH2sot6bBu8gEf7G6YQMfzU6SA5iHd5QhmV1ea8nhCzsS1nFYZMl
; https://t.me/kpszsu/11485
[14]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xkUvJL2kABKjQriXczA53w7uSv5AyNYUNZpKZQLeT741FhmM4GJYA4KHDn6um35Ql
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0vB97fHzYNcnvnH2sot6bBu8gEf7G6YQMfzU6SA5iHd5QhmV1ea8nhCzsS1nFYZMl
; https://t.me/kpszsu/11485
[15] https://suspilne dot media/700044-rosia-atakuvala-portovu-infrastrukturu-odesi-zaginulo-patero-ludej-pletencuk/ ; https://suspilne dot media/699440-cerez-rankovu-ataku-rf-po-odesi-e-zagibli-ta-poraneni-zelenskij/ ; https://suspilne dot media/699986-mozlivostej-u-svitu-dostatno-zelenskij-vkotre-zaaviv-so-ukraini-potribni-zbroa-ta-ppo-dla-zahistu-zitta-ludej/
[16] https://abcnews.go.com/International/missile-explodes-ukrainian-president-volodymyr-zelenskyys-meeting-greek/story?id=107844297 ; https://edition.cnn.com/2024/03/06/europe/russia-missile-odesa-greece-russia-zelensky-intl/index.html ;
[17] https://t.me/mod_russia/36356 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/235223
[18] https://t.me/tass_agency/235151
[19] https://t.me/tass_agency/235140 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/finlands-new-president-says-finland-must-have-real-nuclear-deterrent-2024-03-01/
[20] https://t.me/tass_agency/235101 ;https://t.me/tass_agency/235107
[21] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030524
[22] https://twitter.com/rafaelmgrossi/status/1765395224350593041 ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/73612
[23] https://twitter.com/rafaelmgrossi/status/1765395224350593041
[24] https://t.me/tass_agency/235213 ; https://t.me/rian_ru/234195 ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/73612
[25] https://t.me/evgheniagutul/2439 ; http://www.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/73617
[26] https://t.me/evgheniagutul/2439
[27] https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/20176673 ; https://t.me/evgheniagutul/2408 ; https://t.me/evgheniagutul/2394 ; https://t.me/evgheniagutul/2436
[28] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030124
[29] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022824
[30] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022924
[31] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022824 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021424 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar013124
[32] https://protv dot md/livepro/live-sedinta-guvernului-republicii-moldova-din-6-martie-2024---2683182.html; https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/06/03/2024/65e82d7c9a79471002da3b8f; https://t.me/tass_agency/235129
[33] https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/ac/rls/fs/11243.htm
[34] https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheet/cfe
[35] https://ria dot ru/20240306/moldaviya-1931415989.html
[36]
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/11/07/statement-from-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-on-united-states-suspension-of-the-cfe-treaty-alongside-nato-allies/
[37] https://www.pravda.com dot ua/news/2024/03/6/7445200/
[38] https://t.me/gubernator_46/5029 ; https://t.me/gubernator_46/5031 ; https://t.me/gubernator_46/5046
[39] https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/Details.aspx?id=42096 ; https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/Details.aspx?id=42097 ; https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/Details.aspx?id=42136 ; https://www.metalloinvest dot com/business/mining-segment/mgok/
[40] https://armenpress dot am/arm/news/1131888.html ; https://www.azatutyun dot am/a/32850516.html
[41] https://www.azatutyun dot am/a/32837192.html
[42]
https://x.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1765297674251567517?s=20;
https://t.me/mb2omb30/42;
https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/1765138890715807855?s=20
[43] https://t.me/dva_majors/35893
[44] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FGUTjMTwFU2EdS7F2qRibTW98N6M4LyUfbTupg6mf9k3HbAjPraVSyEeFMxqzjwBl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xkUvJL2kABKjQriXczA53w7uSv5AyNYUNZpKZQLeT741FhmM4GJYA4KHDn6um35Ql ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0tbM7yJ7dbKo9ZkSnkM6h6p48XgwchxssfSjzog4apA6KP75vXL7HpNmCZybonLtEl ; https://t.me/mod_russia/36343 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/36345 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/18584
[45] https://t.me/synegubov/8632
[46] https://t.me/synegubov/8632
[47] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1681
[48] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8009 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/115544
[49] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0tbM7yJ7dbKo9ZkSnkM6h6p48XgwchxssfSjzog4apA6KP75vXL7HpNmCZybonLtEl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FGUTjMTwFU2EdS7F2qRibTW98N6M4LyUfbTupg6mf9k3HbAjPraVSyEeFMxqzjwBl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xkUvJL2kABKjQriXczA53w7uSv5AyNYUNZpKZQLeT741FhmM4GJYA4KHDn6um35Ql ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8009 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/18584 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1681
[50] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1681
[51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0tbM7yJ7dbKo9ZkSnkM6h6p48XgwchxssfSjzog4apA6KP75vXL7HpNmCZybonLtEl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FGUTjMTwFU2EdS7F2qRibTW98N6M4LyUfbTupg6mf9k3HbAjPraVSyEeFMxqzjwBl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xkUvJL2kABKjQriXczA53w7uSv5AyNYUNZpKZQLeT741FhmM4GJYA4KHDn6um35Ql ; https://t.me/mod_russia/36343 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/36347 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7996 ; https://t.me/rybar/57918 ; https://t.me/sashakots/45378 ; https://t.me/sashakots/45375 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/18584 ; https://t.me/rybar/57918
[52] https://t.me/philologist_zov/870 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/115532
[53] https://t.me/rybar/57918 ; https://t.me/sashakots/45378 ; https://t.me/sashakots/45375
[54] https://t.me/philologist_zov/868
[55] https://t.me/philologist_zov/870
[56] https://www.facebook.com/PresscentrTavria/posts/pfbid02PC95PcnSbXZxqsT9kdbDY9gRK1y8sTo6KdxGzV7k98VL2aN9FhsXjKUPUhgtp9Ztl
[57] https://www.facebook.com/PresscentrTavria/posts/pfbid02PC95PcnSbXZxqsT9kdbDY9gRK1y8sTo6KdxGzV7k98VL2aN9FhsXjKUPUhgtp9Ztl
[58] https://t.me/GloOouDy/2575; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/4671
[59] https://t.me/rybar/57915; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8011
[60] https://t.me/wargonzo/18584
[61] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0tbM7yJ7dbKo9ZkSnkM6h6p48XgwchxssfSjzog4apA6KP75vXL7HpNmCZybonLtEl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FGUTjMTwFU2EdS7F2qRibTW98N6M4LyUfbTupg6mf9k3HbAjPraVSyEeFMxqzjwBl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xkUvJL2kABKjQriXczA53w7uSv5AyNYUNZpKZQLeT741FhmM4GJYA4KHDn6um35Ql ; https://t.me/mod_russia/36343 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/36346 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8010 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/35893 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/18584
[62] https://t.me/nm_dnr/11911 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/115501 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/63247
[63] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FGUTjMTwFU2EdS7F2qRibTW98N6M4LyUfbTupg6mf9k3HbAjPraVSyEeFMxqzjwBl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xkUvJL2kABKjQriXczA53w7uSv5AyNYUNZpKZQLeT741FhmM4GJYA4KHDn6um35Ql
[64]
https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1765099468234408000?s=20;
https://x.com/blinzka/status/1765127423035879913?s=20;
https://t.me/lost_warinua/55874; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/11900;
https://t.me/creamy_caprice/4667 (Robotyne)
https://x.com/EjShahid/status/1765366376888193408?s=20; https://t.me/jaguar1bop/20 (Verbove)
[65] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FGUTjMTwFU2EdS7F2qRibTW98N6M4LyUfbTupg6mf9k3HbAjPraVSyEeFMxqzjwBl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xkUvJL2kABKjQriXczA53w7uSv5AyNYUNZpKZQLeT741FhmM4GJYA4KHDn6um35Ql ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0tbM7yJ7dbKo9ZkSnkM6h6p48XgwchxssfSjzog4apA6KP75vXL7HpNmCZybonLtEl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/18584 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/35893 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8013
[66] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8013
[67] https://t.me/voin_dv/7372 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/7374
[68] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FGUTjMTwFU2EdS7F2qRibTW98N6M4LyUfbTupg6mf9k3HbAjPraVSyEeFMxqzjwBl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xkUvJL2kABKjQriXczA53w7uSv5AyNYUNZpKZQLeT741FhmM4GJYA4KHDn6um35Ql ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8008 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/35893
[69] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8008 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/35893
[70] https://suspilne dot media/699306-u-vms-zsu-nazvali-kilkist-znisenih-korabliv-cf-rf-i-skilki-se-zalisilosa/
[71] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6559498
[72] https://verstka dot media/issledovanie_kak_zhelayuschie_poehat_na_voinu_prosyat_sudi_otsrochit_prigovor
[73] https://verstka dot media/issledovanie_kak_zhelayuschie_poehat_na_voinu_prosyat_sudi_otsrochit_prigovor
[74] https://t.me/svobodnieslova/4256
[75] https://t.me/Operativ_luga_channel/76377; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1765331070315069842
[76] https://t.me/rybar/57922;
[77] https://indianexpress dot com/article/india/indians-russian-army-discharge-mea-9180919/
[78] https://t.me/mod_russia/36342
[79] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/20165081
[80] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/20165081; https://3mx dot ru/
[81] https://www.belta
dot
by/society/view/kubrakov-na-vsemirnom-politsejskom-sammite-v-dubae-znakomitsja-s-rabotoj-emiratskih-pravoohranitelej-619821-2024/
[82] https://t.me/modmilby/36692
