Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan
March 13, 2024, 7:45pm ET
Click here
to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here
to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a
computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this
data-heavy tool.
Click here
to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain
map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will
update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note:
The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on March 13. ISW will
cover subsequent reports in the March 14 Russian Offensive Campaign
Assessment.
Ukrainian shortages of
ammunition and other war materiel resulting from delays in the provision
of US military assistance may be making the current Ukrainian front
line more fragile than the relatively slow Russian advances in various
sectors would indicate. Ukrainian prioritization of the sectors most
threatened by intensive Russian offensive operations could create
vulnerabilities elsewhere that Russian forces may be able to exploit to
make sudden and surprising advances if Ukrainian supplies continue to
dwindle. Russia’s retention of the theater-wide initiative increases the
risks of such developments by letting the Russian military command
choose to increase or decrease operations anywhere along the line almost
at will.
German outlet Der Spiegel
published interviews with unnamed Ukrainian commanders on March 12 who
stated that almost all Ukrainian units and formations have to husband
ammunition and materiel because of the overall ammunition shortage and
that some Ukrainian units with limited ammunition and materiel can only
hold their current positions if Russian forces do not “attack with full
force.”[1]
Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi warned
that there is a threat of Russian units advancing deep into Ukrainian
formations in unspecified areas of the frontline.[2]
Ukrainian
forces are likely attempting to mitigate problems caused by ammunition
shortages by prioritizing the allocation of ammunition to sectors of the
front facing larger-scale Russian offensive operations. The lower
intensity of Russian offensive efforts against currently de-prioritized
sectors likely obscures the risks to Ukrainian forces in those areas
resulting from ammunition shortages. ISW continues to assess that
Russian forces have the theater-wide initiative and will be able to
determine the time, location, and scale of offensive operations so long
as they retain the initiative.[3]
Syrskyi’s and the Ukrainian commanders' statements suggest that an
intensification of Russian offensive operations in an area where
Ukrainian forces have not prioritized allocating already limited
ammunition supplies could lead to a Russian breakthrough and
destabilization along a previously stable sector of the frontline in a
short period of time. The current frontline is likely thus not stable,
and timely Western resourcing of Ukrainian troops is essential to
prevent Russia from identifying and exploiting an opportunity for a
breakthrough on a vulnerable sector of the front.
The
rate of Russian advance west of Avdiivka has recently slowed, although
Russian forces likely retain the capability to intensify offensive
operations in the area at a moment of their choosing. Russian
forces seized Avdiivka on February 17 after roughly four months of
attritional offensive efforts to take the settlement and proceeded to
maintain a relatively high tempo of offensive operations in the area to
exploit tactical opportunities initially offered by the Russian seizure
of the settlement.[4]
Russian forces made relatively quick tactical gains west of Avdiivka in
late February and aimed to push as far west as possible before
Ukrainian forces could establish more cohesive and harder-to-penetrate
defensive lines.[5]
Ukrainian forces appear to have slowed Russian advances along positions
near the Berdychi-Orlivka-Tonenke line in early March, however, despite
speculation that these positions would be insufficient to receive
oncoming Russian offensive operations.[6]
Russian forces likely sought to make the Russian Central Grouping of
Forces (comprised of mainly Central Military District [CMD] and Donetsk
People’s Republic [DNR] elements) the exploitation force to take
advantage of the seizure of Avdiivka.[7]
The Russian military command likely intends for CMD elements to
continue offensive efforts in the Avdiivka area in the near and medium
term.[8]
The
Central Grouping of Forces notably has yet to commit elements of select
formations in the area to offensive operations west of Avdiivka as far
as ISW has been able to observe.[9]
Russian President Vladimir Putin previously credited the 30th Motorized
Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], CMD); 35th, 55th, and 74th
motorized rifle brigades (all of the 41st CAA, CMD); 1st, 9th, and
114th motorized rifle brigades and 1454th Motorized Rifle Regiment and
10th Tank Regiment (all of the 1st DNR Army Corps [AC]); and the 6th,
80th, and 239th tank regiments (all of the 90th Tank Division, 41st CAA,
CMD) with capturing Avdiivka.[10]
Elements of the 2nd CAA’s 15th and 21st motorized rifle brigades, the
DNR 1st AC’s 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade, and the Russian “Veterany”
private military company (PMC) also heavily participated in Russian
offensive operations near Avdiivka beginning in October 2023.[11]
ISW has observed reports of elements of all three of the 2nd CAA’s
brigades; elements of the 41st CAA’s 55th and 35th motorized rifle
brigades, and elements of the DNR’s 1st, 9th, 110th, and 114th motorized
rifle brigades attacking northwest, west, or southwest of Avdiivka
since February 17.[12]
ISW has not observed reports of any elements of the 90th Tank Division
committed to fighting following the Russian seizure of Avdiivka,
however, and Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on
March 2 that elements of the 90th Tank Division were reconstituting and
resting in Horlivka (northeast of Avdiivka).[13]
Mashovets stated on March 2 that the Russian military command committed
elements of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade from reserve to offensive
operations west of Avdiivka, although ISW has not observed wider
subsequent reporting about the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade fighting in
the area.[14]
Elements
of the 90th Tank Division, the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade, the DNR’s
1454th Motorized Rifle Regiment and 10th Tank Regiment, and the
“Veterany” PMC likely represent a sizeable uncommitted operational
reserve that the Russian command can commit to continue and intensify
efforts to push west of Avdiivka. These elements likely suffered heavy
casualties in offensive operations between October 2023 and mid-February
2024, but a month or more of rest will likely allow Russian forces to
replenish these elements and restore their degraded combat capabilities
to the low-quality levels that Russian commanders appear willing to
accept. ISW previously assessed that the Russian offensive effort in the
Avdiivka area would eventually temporarily culminate at least until or
unless Russian forces reinforced their attacking elements.[15] The
Russian forces apparently reconstituting in the Avdiivka area can serve
as operational reserves and let Russian forces prevent the culmination
of their offensive operation and intensify efforts to push further west
of Avdiivka, if or when the Russian command chooses to do so.
Russia’s
theater-wide initiative in Ukraine will likely allow the Russian
military command to dynamically reprioritize offensive operations
throughout the frontline. The theater-wide initiative allows
Russia to determine the location, time, intensity, and requirements of
fighting along the frontline, and the flexibility this opportunity
provides will allow the Russian military command to reprioritize efforts
dynamically to take advantage of perceived opportunities occasioned by
Ukrainian materiel shortages or other factors.[16]
The reprioritization of offensive efforts and the commensurate transfer
of materiel and manpower to various areas of the front can result in
decreased offensive activity, operational pauses, or the temporary
culmination of offensive operations in the area from which attacking
forces are drawn. Substantial decreases in the tempo of offensive
operations, operational pauses, or outright culmination are typically
risky as they relieve pressure on defending forces and offer them
opportunities to counterattack to regain the initiative in that sector
of the frontline. The Russian military command may believe that delays
in Western security assistance and growing Ukrainian materiel shortages
will reduce these risks and allow Russian forces to reweight efforts
without significant risk anywhere in the theater. Russian forces will
continue to leverage the advantages of the theater-wide initiative in
Ukraine, and ISW assesses that it would be unwise for Ukraine to cede
this advantage to Russia for longer than is necessary, although
continuing and increasing shortages of materiel will likely leave
Ukraine with few choices.[17]
Ukrainian
actors conducted large-scale drone strikes against energy
infrastructure and military assets within Russia on the night of March
12 to 13. Ukrainian outlets Suspilne and RBC-Ukraine reported
on March 13 that their Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) sources stated
that SBU agents conducted drone strikes against oil refineries in
Ryazan, Nizhny Novgorod, and Leningrad oblasts and military airfields in
Buturlinovka and Voronezh City, Voronezh Oblast.[18]
Ryazan Oblast Head Pavel Malkov confirmed that a drone struck the
Ryazan oil refinery, starting a fire, and footage shows a plume of smoke
rising from the oil refinery area.[19]
At least three Ukrainian drones also targeted the Novoshakhtinsk oil
refinery in Rostov Oblast, reportedly causing the refinery to
temporarily stop operations.[20]
Some Russian sources additionally claimed that one drone struck a
Federal Security Service (FSB) regional building in Belgorod City, but
Russian opposition media noted that Russian state media later deleted
reports of this particular strike.[21]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian air defenses
destroyed 58 drones on the night of March 12 to 13: 11 over Belgorod
Oblast; eight over Bryansk Oblast; 29 over Voronezh Oblast; eight over
Kursk Oblast; one over Leningrad Oblast; and one over Ryazan Oblast.[22]
A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger reported that Ukrainian
drones specifically targeted the Ryazannefteprodukt Rosneft refinery in
Ryazan Oblast, the Kirishi Petroleum Organic Synthesis (KINEF) refinery
in Kirishi, Leningrad Oblast, and the Novoshakhtinsk refinery in Rostov
Oblast, but claimed that Russian air defense and electronic warfare (EW)
systems destroyed and neutralized all the drones.[23] A Russian aviation-focused milblogger claimed that Ukrainian drones mostly targeted military airfields in Voronezh Oblast.[24]
SBU sources told Suspilne that
these strikes are intended to reduce Russia’s economic output and
reduce oil revenue and fuel supplies that Russia uses directly for its
war effort in Ukraine.[25]
Ukrainian actors have continually conducted similar drone strikes
against several major Russian oil refineries in 2024 thus far and
successfully struck oil refineries in Krasnodar Krai and Volgograd
Oblast in January and February.[26] Russian outlet Kommersant
reported in February that Russian refineries reduced their output by 4
percent in January 2024 compared to the same period in 2024, and by 1.4
percent compared to December 2023.[27] Kommersant
stated that this reduction was partially a result of increased drone
attacks on refinery infrastructure. This reported decline in refinery
production is not large, but it shows the potential for Ukraine to
generate asymmetrical effects against critical Russian energy and
military infrastructure by targeting high-value assets with a few
relatively inexpensive drones.
The governor of the
pro-Russian Moldovan autonomous region of Gagauzia, Yevgenia Gutsul,
claimed on March 13 that her recent meetings with Russian officials in
Russia led to deepening economic ties between Gagauzia and Russia, which
the Kremlin likely hopes to exploit as part of its wider efforts to
destabilize Moldova and prevent Moldova from joining the European Union
(EU). Gutsul gave a briefing on her meetings in Russia during her visit from March 1 to 8.[28] Gutsul claimed that her meetings focused on three “key” topics that are of the “most concern” to the Gagauz people — a
“special gas tariff” for Gagauzia, opening accounts for Gagauzian
businesses and individuals remotely in the Russian “MIR” payment system,
and the details about excise taxes and duties so Russia can open its
markets to Gagauzian companies. Gutsul claimed that Gagauzian businesses
exporting goods to Russia “will most likely receive very serious
advantages compared to other regions of Moldova.” Moldova’s other
pro-Russian region, the breakaway republic of Transnistria, has long
enjoyed free supplies of Russian gas from Russian state-owned energy
company Gazprom to an electricity plant in Transnistria.[29]
Moldova is still heavily reliant on Transnistrian-produced electricity,
despite Moldovan efforts to limit its dependence on Russian energy
since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[30]
Russian gas supplies to Gagauzia would likely hamper the Moldovan
government’s efforts to move away from its decades-long dependence on
Russian energy as it turns instead to European suppliers and would
create another avenue through which Moldova is vulnerable to Russian
“energy blackmail” schemes, which the Kremlin has already employed
against Moldova in the past.[31]
Russia could also use reduced gas prices for Gagauzia to stoke domestic
discontent against the backdrop of higher gas prices in Moldova as
compared to previous years when Moldova imported Russian gas.[32]
Sergei Ibrishim, the Head of the Main Directorate of the
Agro-Industrial Complex of Gagauzia, sent an appeal to Kremlin officials
in January 2024 claiming that Gagauzian businesses have been unable to
sell their products to Russia since Moldova's July 2023 decision to
leave the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Interparliamentary
Assembly and asked Russian officials to abolish excise taxes and customs
duties for Gagauzian exports to Russia.[33] The opening of Russian markets to Gagauzian products and the likely tax benefits that would accompany
this opening are likely meant to dissuade Moldova from leaving the CIS,
which Moldova plans to do by the end of 2024, and create
inconsistencies in Moldova’s economic relations that would complicate or
derail its progress towards accession into the EU.[34]
The
Kremlin is likely trying to use cooperation between Gutsul and other
pro-Russian actors and parties in Moldova as part of wider Kremlin
hybrid warfare operations in Moldova ahead of upcoming presidential and
parliamentary elections. Gutsul claimed that she will soon meet
with Igor Dodon, Vladimir Voronin, Ilan Shor, and the leadership of the
Moldovan Revival Party to discuss “possible cooperation.”[35] Dodon is the former pro-Russian president of Moldova who preceded the current president, Maia Sandu.[36]
Voronin is also a former Moldovan president and current member of
parliament. Dodon, as the leader of the Moldovan Socialist Party, and
Voronin, as the leader of the Moldovan Communist Party and a current
member of Parliament, formed an electoral alliance in parliament in
2021.[37]
Ilan Shor is a US-sanctioned, pro-Kremlin Moldovan politician who
recently met with Kremlin officials in Russia and is currently living in
Israel after Moldovan authorities sentenced him in absentia for fraud and money laundering in April 2023.[38]
The Revival Party is affiliated with Shor’s now-banned Moldovan
political party, the Shor Party, and multiple parliamentary deputies
from Dodon’s Socialist party have recently joined the Revival Party.[39]
Gutsul,
who ran as a candidate for the Shor Party in Gagauzia’s 2023
gubernatorial election, does not have an extensive political background.
Gutsul is a lawyer by training, reportedly worked as a telephone
operator from 2012–2014 and then as a telecommunications operator,
commercial representative, and archivist.[40]
Gutsul reportedly started working as a secretary for the Shor Party
from 2018-2022. Russian Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) leader Leonid
Slutsky and Russian cultural figures supported her gubernatorial
campaign.[41]
Gutsul’s plans to meet with multiple Kremlin-linked politicians and
parties, despite the fact that these actors are not directly involved in
Gagauzian politics and do not have previous ties to Gutsul, suggests
that these meetings are Kremlin-orchestrated and aimed at furthering
wider Kremlin, not Gagauzian, objectives. ISW continues to assess that
the Kremlin is trying to use both Gagauzia and Transnistria as part of
its hybrid operations aimed at sabotaging Moldova’s EU accession process
and keeping Moldova within Russia’s sphere of influence.[42]
The Kremlin may hope to create and exploit a coalition between Dodon’s
Socialist Party, Voronin’s Communist Party, and various Shor-linked
parties, such as the Revival party, to counter Sandu’s pro-Western Party
of Action and Solidarity (PAS) party ahead of the upcoming Moldovan
presidential elections in late 2024 and parliamentary elections in 2025.
Russian
sources claimed that Russian forces repelled another limited
cross-border incursion by the all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Russian
Volunteer Corps (RDK), Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR), and Siberian
Battalion in Belgorod and Kursk oblasts on the night of March 12 and the
morning of March 13. Russian sources claimed that Russian
forces repelled all-Russian pro-Ukrainian forces that attempted to
conduct a limited incursion near Kozinka and Mokraya Orlovka, Belgorod
Oblast and unspecified areas in Kursk Oblast.[43]
The LSR posted footage on March 13 and claimed that it seized part of
Tetkino, Kursk Oblast, although the footage was geolocated to Ryzhivka,
Sumy Oblast.[44]
The RDK, LSR, and Siberian Battalion issued a joint statement on March
13 stating that they are targeting Russian military positions in
Belgorod and Kursk oblasts and calling on civilians to leave.[45] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Andriy Yusov acknowledged the joint statement.[46]
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian
shortages of ammunition and other war materiel resulting from delays in
the provision of US military assistance may be making the current
Ukrainian front line more fragile than the relatively slow Russian
advances in various sectors would indicate.
- The
rate of Russian advance west of Avdiivka has recently slowed, although
Russian forces likely retain the capability to intensify offensive
operations in the area at a moment of their choosing.
- Ukrainian
actors conducted large-scale drone strikes against energy
infrastructure and military assets within Russia on the night of March
12 to 13.
- The governor of the pro-Russian
Moldovan autonomous region of Gagauzia, Yevgenia Gutsul, claimed on
March 13 that her recent meetings with Russian officials in Russia led
to deepening economic ties between Gagauzia and Russia, which the
Kremlin likely hopes to exploit as part of its wider efforts to
destabilize Moldova and prevent Moldova from joining the EU.
- Russian
sources claimed that Russian forces repelled another limited
cross-border incursion by the all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Russian
Volunteer Corps (RDK), Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR), and Siberian
Battalion in Belgorod and Kursk oblasts on the night of March 12 and the
morning of March 13.
- Russian forces recently
made confirmed advances near Avdiivka amid continued positional
engagements along the entire frontline on March 13.
- Russian
authorities continue efforts to censor protests of wives and mothers of
mobilized soldiers ahead of the Russian presidential election.
We
do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities
are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the
military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue
to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on
the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on
combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations
of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast
(Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push
westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Positional
fighting continued along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on March
13. Positional fighting continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka;
northwest of Svatove near Tabaivka and Stelmakhivka; west of Kreminna
near Terny and Yampolivka; and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka (12km
south of Kreminna).[47]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Positional
engagements continued in the Bakhmut direction on March 13 but there
were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Some Russian
milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have captured unspecified
tactical positions near the railway station in Klishchiivka (southwest
of Bakhmut), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these
Russian gains.[48] Milbloggers also claimed that there is heavy fighting ongoing in Ivanivske (west of Bakhmut).[49]
Ukrainian and Russian sources reported positional engagements northwest
of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka; west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske and east of
Chasiv Yar; and southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka and Andriivka.[50] Elements of the Russian 98th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division are continuing to operate northwest of Bakhmut.[51]
Russian
forces recently advanced northwest and southwest of Avdiivka.
Geolocated footage published on March 12 indicates that Russian forces
advanced on the eastern outskirts of Berdychi (northwest of Avdiivka).[52]
Additional geolocated footage published on March 12 shows that Russian
forces recently advanced along Pershotravneva Street in Pervomaiske
(southwest of Avdiivka).[53] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are continuing to make gradual tactical advances towards central Pervomaiske.[54]
Russian milbloggers additionally claimed on March 12 that Russian
forces expanded their control in Tonenke (west of Avdiivka) and captured
new positions in forest areas between Orlivka (west of Avdiivka) and
Tonenke.[55]
One milblogger noted on March 13 that the most intense fighting is
ongoing between Berdychi and Tonenke (northwest of Avdiivka), but
another Russian source noted that fighting overall has slowed down in
this area.[56]
Ukrainian and Russian sources reported fighting northwest of Avdiivka
near Berdychi and Novobakhmutivka; west of Avdiivka near Orlivka and
Tonenke; and southwest of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske.[57]
Elements of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s
Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) are reportedly fighting in Pervomaiske.[58]
Positional
engagements continued west and southwest of Donetsk City on March 13,
but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. One
Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are continuing to make
gains south of Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City) but that the
terrain north of Novomykhailivka is making it more difficult for Russian
forces to advance.[59]
Ukrainian and Russian sources reported continued positional fighting
west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of
Donetsk City near Novomykhailivka and Pobieda.[60]
Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms Army
[CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near
Krasnohorivka.[61]
Limited
positional engagements continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast
border area on March 13, but there were no confirmed changes to the
frontline in this area. Ukrainian and Russian sources reported fighting
southeast of Velyka Novosilka near Novodonetske and Shevchenko and south
of Velyka Novosilka near Staromayorske.[62]
Elements of the Russian 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized
Rifle Division, 5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 336th
Naval Infantry Brigade (11th Army Corps, Baltic Fleet) are operating in
the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.[63]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Positional
engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 13, but
there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Ukrainian
and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued near
Robotyne and Verbove (east of Robotyne).[64]
Elements of the Russian 22nd Spetsnaz Brigade and 1430th Motorized
Rifle Regiment (Russian Territorial Troops [TRV]) are reportedly
operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[65]
Elements of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized
Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military
District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Robotyne.[66]
The
Russian government responded to the International Atomic Energy
Agency’s (IAEA) March 7 resolution calling for the urgent withdrawal of
all unauthorized Russian military and other personnel from the
Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) and the return of the ZNPP to
full Ukrainian control.[67]
The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed on March 13 that
any resolutions or statements from officials and international
organizations that call for the return of the ZNPP to Ukraine or the
establishment of international control over the ZNPP are “attempt[s] to
encroach on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia.”[68]
The Russian MFA also claimed that Russian forces are taking all
possible measures to protect the plant and that Ukrainian forces
threaten the plant‘s safety. ISW previously assessed that the IAEA’s
resolution undermined ongoing Russian efforts to use the IAEA and other
international organizations to legitimize its occupation of the ZNPP.[69]
Russian
sources claimed that Russian forces conducted a limited raid in west
(right) bank Kherson Oblast on the night of March 12–13, but there were
no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian sources,
including Kherson Oblast occupation governor Vladimir Saldo, claimed on
March 13 that Russian naval infantry, airborne (VDV) troops, and
volunteer servicemen conducted a limited raid on Ukrainian positions on
the west bank of the Dnipro River near the base of the Antonivsky
Bridge.[70] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 45th Spetsnaz Brigade participated in the raid.[71]
ISW has not observed any visual confirmation of Russian activity on the
west bank and there are no confirmed changes to the frontline in west
bank Kherson Oblast. Saldo claimed that all Russian personnel involved
in the raid returned to their east (left) bank positions, indicating
that Russian forces did not seek to establish an enduring presence in
west bank Kherson Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that
positional engagements continued near Krynky.[72]
Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet)
and elements of the 126th Coastal Defense Brigade (22nd Army Corps,
reportedly part of the forming 18th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating
in the Kherson direction.[73]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian
forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against
Ukrainian rear areas on March 13. The Ukrainian General Staff reported
that Ukrainian forces destroyed one Russian Kh-31 missile over an
unspecified location.[74]
Ukrainian officials stated that Russian forces struck Kryvyi Rih,
Dnipropetrovsk Oblast with an unspecified missile; Novyi Korotych,
Kharkiv Oblast with an unspecified number of S-300 missiles; and a
residential building in Sumy Oblast with Shahed-136/131 drones.[75]
Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces
launched unspecified missiles from tactical aircraft towards Odesa
Oblast in the morning and afternoon and that Ukrainian forces shot down
the first missile over the Black Sea and that the second missile
malfunctioned and fell on an open area.[76]
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Russian
authorities continue efforts to censor protests of wives and mothers of
mobilized soldiers ahead of the Russian presidential election. Russian
opposition outlet Mobilization News reported on March 13 that
Russian police visited “Way Home” movement leader Maria Andreeva’s home
to issue a warning that she could be participating in “extremist
activities.”[77]
The “Way Home” movement’s participants recently claimed that they would
not vote for Russian President Vladimir Putin in the Russian
presidential election and accused him of not caring about them or their
mobilized relatives.[78]
The “Way Home” movement nevertheless called for people to vote on March
17, suggesting that the movement is encouraging Russians to vote for a
candidate other than Putin.[79] ISW has observed continued Kremlin attempts to censor and discredit the ”Way Home” movement since December 2023.[80]
A
Russian insider source claimed on March 13 that the Kremlin intends to
transfer powers away from the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD)
and remove MVD Head Vladimir Kolokoltsev at an unspecified date in
2024.[81]
The source claimed that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) will
be involved in rotating personnel out of the MVD, but that the new MVD
head may be one of Kolokoltsev’s current deputies. ISW cannot
independently verify any of the insider source’s claims.
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
Nothing significant to report.
Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts
(Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become
more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international
partners)
Note: ISW will be publishing
its coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts on a weekly basis
in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. ISW will continue to track
developments in Ukrainian defense industrial efforts daily and will
refer to these efforts in assessments within the daily Russian Offensive
Campaign Assessment and other ISW products when necessary.
ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
(Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed
areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural,
economic, military, and governance systems)
Note:
ISW will be publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas
twice a week in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. ISW will
continue to track activities in Russian-occupied areas daily and will
refer to these activities in assessments within the daily Russian
Offensive Campaign Assessment and other ISW products when necessary.
ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Russian
President Vladimir Putin and Kremlin officials continue to feign
interest in negotiations to prompt Western concessions on Ukrainian
sovereignty and territorial integrity. Putin stated in an interview
published on March 13 that Russia has never refused negotiations and
reiterated accusations that Western officials previously coerced Ukraine
to reject an agreement favorable to Russia.[82]
Putin asserted that it would be “ridiculous” for Russia to negotiate
when Ukraine is ”running out of ammunition” and that Russia will proceed
with negotiations if the negotiations take into account Russian
security guarantees and forbid Ukrainian rearmament.[83]
Putin’s focus on Ukrainian ”rearmament” is a refence to his call for
the “demilitarization” of Ukraine, which he hopes will allow him to
enforce his will upon Ukraine without any substantial military
resistance.[84]
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova
stated on March 13 that Russia will not participate in the Ukrainian
Peace Formula Summit in Switzerland in 2024, even if Russia was invited,
and denounced the summit and Switzerland as biased.[85] Zakharova similarly stated that Russia is open to negotiations that take into account "legitimate” Russian interests.[86]
ISW continues to assess that Russia is not interested in good faith
negotiations with Ukraine and has no interest in ending the war on
anything but Russia’s articulated maximalist terms of destroying
Ukraine’s sovereignty and eradicating the notion of a unique Ukrainian
national identity.[87]
Putin
also reiterated boilerplate nuclear rhetoric that aims to deter Western
support to Ukraine over fears of Russia potentially using nuclear
weapons. Putin stated that Russia is always in a state of nuclear
readiness and that Russia will only use nuclear weapons to protect the
existence of the Russian state.[88]
Putin’s continued appeals to Russian nuclear capabilities do not
reflect any changes in Russian nuclear doctrine, and Putin likely refers
to these capabilities to try to raise Western fears of nuclear
escalation. ISW continues to assess that Russian use of a tactical
nuclear weapon in Ukraine remains highly unlikely.[89]
The
Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) warned that the
Kremlin intends to intensify an information operation called “Perun”
ahead of the Russian presidential election on March 17 that aims to
discredit Ukraine among Russians and the West.[90]
The GUR stated on March 13 that Russian special services, including
Rosgvardia and the Russian Main Directorate of the General Staff (GRU),
have received instructions to discredit Ukrainian and pro-Ukrainian
politicians in the West while continuing efforts to portray Ukrainians
as “Nazis“ among Russian and Western audiences.[91]
The GUR reported that the Kremlin information operation will peak
around the Russian presidential election and culminate by the end of
June 2024.[92]
The Kremlin is reportedly conducting a parallel information campaign
called “Maidan-3” that aims to sow panic and discontent in the Ukrainian
population and drive a wedge between civilians and military and
political leadership in Ukraine.[93] Russian actors will reportedly intensify the “Maidan-3” information operation in May 2024.[94]
A
Kremlin-affiliated prominent milblogger continues to accuse the West of
bribing and blackmailing Armenian officials to pursue anti-Russian
positions.[95]
ISW assesses that the Kremlin is likely preparing a harsher and more
concerted response as Armenia continues to take measures to distance
itself from Russia and signal interest in strengthening relations with
the West.[96]
Significant activity in Belarus
(Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and
further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner
Group activity in Belarus)
Union State Secretary
Dmitry Mezentsev, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk, Russian
Ambassador to Belarus Boris Gryzlov, and Smolensk Oblast Governor
Vasily Anokhin participated in a meeting of the Union State’s Council of
Ministers High-Level Group on March 13.[97]
Overchuk stated that Russian companies from 72 Russian federal subjects
entered 5,236 trade contracts with Belarusian companies from March 2022
to February 2024. ISW continues to assess that Belarusian companies
assist Russian businesses in sanctions evasions schemes.[98]
Note:
ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only
publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian,
Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as
commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as
the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided
in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.spiegel dot de/ausland/ukraine-steht-die-front-vor-dem-zusammenbruch-a-7ea598f2-e911-4dde-8724-aa1c9ad1c24b
[2] https://t.me/osirskiy/615
[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-26-2024
[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022724
[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022724
[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030824 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030424 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-3-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030224
[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022724
[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022724
[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022724
[10] https://tass dot ru/politika/20016943
[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWarO22124 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-16-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-4-2024 ;
[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-22-2024 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/35896;%C2%A0https://t.me/RVvoenkor/62569; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/113892;%C2%A0https://t.me/FilatovCorr ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-28-2024
; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/62783 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/4531;
https://t.me/RVvoenkor/62682;
https://x.com/EjShahid/status/17613952652...
https://twitter.com/antiputler_news/status/1761367797827785038; https://twitter.com/blinzka/status/1761428874447982624 ; https://t.me/sashakots/45098 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/113662 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-20-2024 ; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/8138%C2%A0 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/62721%C2%A0;%C2%A0https://t.me/z_arhiv/26132 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/62597 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-29-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-11-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-10-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-9-2024 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1686 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1685 ; https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid0jqrA5VrwTUuSLm3G9jbbtwZrJZ1rWeXFqRUaHWhhZgSLsKijb9pA3y2sdzHLzadQl ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-2-2024 ;
[13] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1670
[14] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1670
[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022724
[16] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030624
[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011924
[18] https://suspilne dot media/704524-sbu-dronami-atakuvala-odrazu-tri-naftopererobnih-zavodi-u-rosii-dzerela/ ; https://t.me/RBC_ua_news/87104
[19] https://t.me/pavelmalkov_official/266; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1767813722523722213?s=20 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1767854240653877384?s=20
[20] https://suspilne
dot
media/704262-paket-dopomogi-vid-ssa-rosijski-vijskovi-vdarili-po-krivomu-rogu-749-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1710331787&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps;
https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1767856685987606588?s=20; https://t.me/golubev_vu/1202; https://t.me/tass_agency/236237; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/63608 ; https://t.me/golubev_vu/1203; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/54698
[21] https://t.me/bbcrussian/62063 ; https://t.me/astrapress/50780; https://t.me/dva_majors/36536 ; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/39950 ; https://t.me/bazabazon/25819
[22] https://t.me/mod_russia/36564; https://t.me/mod_russia/36566; https://t.me/mod_russia/36569 https://t.me/mod_russia/36572; https://t.me/mod_russia/36576; https://t.me/mod_russia/36578; https://t.me/mod_russia/36580
[23] https://t.me/rybar/58131
[24] https://t.me/fighter_bomber/15984
[25] https://suspilne dot media/704524-sbu-dronami-atakuvala-odrazu-tri-naftopererobnih-zavodi-u-rosii-dzerela/
[26] https://isw.pub/UkrWar012524; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020324; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020924
[27] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6493688
[28] https://t.me/evgheniagutul/2473
[29] https://ecfr.eu/article/the-final-frontier-ending-moldovas-dependency-on-russian-gas/
[30] https://www.csis.org/analysis/winter-coming-moldova
[31]https://www.intellinews.com/moldova-halved-natural-gas-consumption-since-2021-302640/ ; https://www.csis.org/analysis/winter-coming-moldova ; https://ecfr.eu/article/the-final-frontier-ending-moldovas-dependency-on-russian-gas/
[32] https://www.intellinews.com/moldova-halved-natural-gas-consumption-since-2021-302640/ ; https://www.csis.org/analysis/winter-coming-moldova ; https://ecfr.eu/article/the-final-frontier-ending-moldovas-dependency-on-russian-gas/
[33] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-28-2024
[34] https://jamestown.org/program/moscow-working-to-block-moldova-from-leaving-cis/ ; https://www.kyivpost dot com/post/25790
[35] https://t.me/evgheniagutul/2473
[36] https://balkaninsight
dot
com/2022/11/08/moldova-ex-president-dodon-was-on-moscows-payroll-report/
;
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/31/world/europe/moldova-presidential-election-igo-dodon.html
[37] https://tv8 dot md/2021/05/13/ultima-ora-cec-a-inregistrat-blocul-electoral-al-pcrm-si-psrm
[38] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/warning-transnistria-may-organize-referendum-annexation-russia-support-russian-hybrid ; https://www.rferl.org/a/moldova-shor-returns-israel-fugitive/32681693.html
[39] https://moldova dot europalibera.org/a/cum-se-scurg-socialistii-intr-un-satelit-al-partidului-sor-/32424432.html ; https://newsmaker
dot
md/ro/socialistii-se-reinventeaza-dupa-discutiile-cu-ilan-sor-deputatii-vasile-bolea-si-alexandr-suhodolskii-au-aderat-la-partidul-renasterea/
; https://www.publika
dot
md/psrm-slabeste-deputatii-vasile-bolea-alexandr-suhodolschi-irina-lozovan-si-alexandr-nesterovschi-au-aderat-la-partidul-renastere-_3136983.html
[40] https://www.mold-street dot com/?go=news&n=16109 ; https://bas-tv
dot
md/bitva-za-gagauz-lend-ot-trenera-po-borbe-do-diplomata/?fbclid=IwAR0TKu2jBk5rRswm2QtpfLq9iJ5OlEamejdPo9JPuerzDDLq_gWjRzsbvHg
; https://www.moldovacurata dot md/profil-candidat-evghenia-gutul-1-2577
[41] https://newsmaker
dot
md/rus/novosti/video-slutskiy-vsled-za-rossiyskimi-pevtsami-podderzhivayuschimi-voynu-prisoedinilsya-k-agitatsionnoy-kampanii-partii-shor-v-gagauzii/
; https://ria dot ru/20230414/gagauziya-1865279455.html
[42] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030824 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022824
[43]
https://t.me/epoddubny/19326 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/36574 ;
https://t.me/tass_agency/236252 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/116270 ;
https://t.me/rybar/58129
[44] https://twitter.com/kromark/status/1767897579734302763?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/legion_svoboda/status/1767827926311964996?s=20 ; https://t.me/agentstvonews/5429
[45] https://t.me/legionoffreedom/1129 ; https://t.me/russvolcorps/891 ; https://t.me/SiberianBattalion/238
[46] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/03/13/u-gur-rozpovily-pro-serjoznist-zvernennya-rdk-do-zhyteliv-kurshhyny-i-bilgorodshhyny/
[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023mkW4RCqwxUnKsLkcVCyGWeRChpchmNaB9jvJ9G91n1SHERfdAQavNW5QSyFFpRil ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0369FBYMWwLN9F6EmYN5K6Abq4yAErxBAQQoKzFZiBwq6FHNZVjDtticoNH9b1C3Y6l ; https://t.me/wargonzo/18702 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tCXSQqEUgmhtFduQ1obhyPECFWtRrAVspxyNdWoFupbP9VM4Y2GzwVTJhcHWU2afl ; https://t.me/mod_russia/36574 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/36581
[48] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8236; https://t.me/wargonzo/18702; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/8856
[49] https://t.me/dva_majors/36524; https://t.me/wargonzo/18702; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8236
[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tCXSQqEUgmhtFduQ1obhyPECFWtRrAVspxyNdWoFupbP9VM4Y2GzwVTJhcHWU2afl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023mkW4RCqwxUnKsLkcVCyGWeRChpchmNaB9jvJ9G91n1SHERfdAQavNW5QSyFFpRil ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0369FBYMWwLN9F6EmYN5K6Abq4yAErxBAQQoKzFZiBwq6FHNZVjDtticoNH9b1C3Y6l; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8236; https://t.me/wargonzo/18702
[51] https://t.me/mod_russia/36590
[52] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/12209; https://t.me/aerial_reconnaissance25/26; https://x.com/small10space/status/1767492997728309604?s=20; https://x.com/Spider18Actual/status/1767560755459875181?s=20
[53] https://t.me/ssternenko/26220; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/4748; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/12223
[54] https://t.me/rybar/58138; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/54692; https://t.me/z_arhiv/26262; https://t.me/wargonzo/18702
[55] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/116214; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/54692
[56] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/54693; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8239
[57] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tCXSQqEUgmhtFduQ1obhyPECFWtRrAVspxyNdWoFupbP9VM4Y2GzwVTJhcHWU2afl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023mkW4RCqwxUnKsLkcVCyGWeRChpchmNaB9jvJ9G91n1SHERfdAQavNW5QSyFFpRil ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0369FBYMWwLN9F6EmYN5K6Abq4yAErxBAQQoKzFZiBwq6FHNZVjDtticoNH9b1C3Y6l; https://t.me/mod_russia/36574 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/36583; https://t.me/mod_russia/36563
[58] https://t.me/wargonzo/18720; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/8882
[59] https://t.me/dva_majors/36524; https://t.me/dva_majors/36510
[60] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tCXSQqEUgmhtFduQ1obhyPECFWtRrAVspxyNdWoFupbP9VM4Y2GzwVTJhcHWU2afl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023mkW4RCqwxUnKsLkcVCyGWeRChpchmNaB9jvJ9G91n1SHERfdAQavNW5QSyFFpRil ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0369FBYMWwLN9F6EmYN5K6Abq4yAErxBAQQoKzFZiBwq6FHNZVjDtticoNH9b1C3Y6l; https://t.me/dva_majors/36510; https://t.me/dva_majors/36524; https://t.me/wargonzo/18702; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/54693
[61] https://t.me/milinfolive/118161
[62] https://t.me/mod_russia/36574 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/36584; https://t.me/mod_russia/36568 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tCXSQqEUgmhtFduQ1obhyPECFWtRrAVspxyNdWoFupbP9VM4Y2GzwVTJhcHWU2afl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023mkW4RCqwxUnKsLkcVCyGWeRChpchmNaB9jvJ9G91n1SHERfdAQavNW5QSyFFpRil ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0369FBYMWwLN9F6EmYN5K6Abq4yAErxBAQQoKzFZiBwq6FHNZVjDtticoNH9b1C3Y6l
[63] https://t.me/dva_majors/36546 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/7491 (Pryyutne); https://t.me/voin_dv/7494 (Malynivka)
[64] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tCXSQqEUgmhtFduQ1obhyPECFWtRrAVspxyNdWoFupbP9VM4Y2GzwVTJhcHWU2afl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023mkW4RCqwxUnKsLkcVCyGWeRChpchmNaB9jvJ9G91n1SHERfdAQavNW5QSyFFpRil ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0369FBYMWwLN9F6EmYN5K6Abq4yAErxBAQQoKzFZiBwq6FHNZVjDtticoNH9b1C3Y6l ; https://t.me/wargonzo/18702 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/36524
;
[65] https://t.me/milinfolive/118159 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/36597
[66] https://t.me/epoddubny/19327 ; https://t.me/voenacher/62414 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/36586
[67] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030824 ; https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1938246/
[68] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1938246/
[69] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030824
[70] https://t.me/tass_agency/236234 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/236236; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8234 ; https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/2490 ; https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/19516 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/36524 ; https://t.me/osetin20/8131 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/36545
[71] https://t.me/osetin20/8131 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/36545
[72] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tCXSQqEUgmhtFduQ1obhyPECFWtRrAVspxyNdWoFupbP9VM4Y2GzwVTJhcHWU2afl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023mkW4RCqwxUnKsLkcVCyGWeRChpchmNaB9jvJ9G91n1SHERfdAQavNW5QSyFFpRil ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0369FBYMWwLN9F6EmYN5K6Abq4yAErxBAQQoKzFZiBwq6FHNZVjDtticoNH9b1C3Y6l
[73] https://t.me/russianocontext/2383 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1767595014727602310?s=20 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/116289
[74] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tCXSQqEUgmhtFduQ1obhyPECFWtRrAVspxyNdWoFupbP9VM4Y2GzwVTJhcHWU2afl
[75] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/11295 ; https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/24884 ; https://t.me/Klymenko_MVS/777?single ; https://t.me/synegubov/8705
[76] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/7120 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/7131
[77] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/17941 ; https://t.me/mobilizpravda/297 ; https://t.me/mobilizpravda/293
[78] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/17935 ; https://t.me/PYTY_DOMOY/963
[79] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/17935 ; https://t.me/PYTY_DOMOY/963
[80] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-7-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-9-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-3-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-10-2024
[81] https://t.me/vchkogpu/46548
[82] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/73648
[83] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/73648
[84] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030124
[85] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1938357/
[86] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1938357/
[87] https://isw.pub/UkrWar010224;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-4-2023-0;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar122922
[88] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/73648
[89] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-6 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-update-february-5-2023
[90] https://t.me/DIUkraine/3588
[91] https://t.me/DIUkraine/3588
[92] https://t.me/DIUkraine/3588
[93] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022724
[94] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022724
[95] https://t.me/rybar/58130 ; https://t.me/rybar/58127
[96] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031124
[97] https://t.me/MID_Russia/36103
[98] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-28-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-17-2023
