Data Cutoff: March 7 at 12:00pm ET
The
China–Taiwan Weekly Update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s
paths to controlling Taiwan and relevant cross–Taiwan Strait
developments.
Key Takeaways
- Taiwan’s
Coast Guard Administration (CGA) claimed that three Chinese Coast Guard
ships entered Taiwan’s contiguous zone off the east coast of the main
island on February 27.
- The Kuomintang (KMT) initiated a
legislative inquiry into the Kinmen capsizing incident to determine the
liability of Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration. This supports the
efforts of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to vilify and undermine
domestic Taiwanese support for the Democratic Progressive Party.
- PRC
Premier Li Qiang’s work report to the National People’s Congress
continued a trend of CCP officials using more belligerent language about
“reunification” with Taiwan but did not signal a major policy change.
- Recent
PRC diplomatic outreach in Europe may aim to advance the PRC’s
September 2023 Proposal on the Reform and Development of Global
Governance, which faults the West for the war in Ukraine.
- Chinese
Coast Guard (CCG) ships fired water cannons and collided with
Philippine ships while attempting to block a Philippine resupply mission
to Second Thomas Shoal.
Cross-Strait Relations
Taiwan
Taiwan’s
Coast Guard Administration claimed that three Chinese Coast Guard ships
entered Taiwan’s contiguous zone off the east coast of the main island
on February 27.[1]
The contiguous zone around Taiwan and its closer islands constitutes
the buffer between 12 and 24 nautical miles from the coast.[2]
Taiwanese media reported that the presence of Chinese Coast Guard (CCG)
vessels in the waters along Taiwan’s east coast is rare, and the three
vessels in question usually operate around the contested Senkaku
Islands, which Japan controls.[3]
The CCG vessels left without incident after the Coast Guard
Administration (CGA) deployed to the location and demanded that they
depart the area.[4]
This incident coincides with a consistently higher presence of PRC
ships in the waters around Kinmen since the capsizing incident. The
Kinmen capsizing incident refers to the February 14 event in which a PRC
fishing boat in Taiwan’s waters capsized while fleeing from a legal
Taiwanese Coast Guard pursuit. The capsizing resulted in the deaths of
two of the four fishermen onboard. CGA Director General Chou Mei-wu
reported increased PRC vessel presence near Kinmen since the incident,
with up to 11 vessels per day, including law enforcement and official
ships.[5]
The
presence of more CCG vessels around Taiwan’s water serves to
incrementally challenge and erode the Republic of China's (ROC)
sovereignty in its adjacent waters. Normalizing operations around
Taiwan’s waters can set conditions for the PRC to apply further pressure
on Taiwan in the future. The CCP does not accept Taiwan’s sovereignty
over the waters. PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) spokesperson Zhu
Fenglian denied the existence of Taiwan’s so-called prohibited and
restricted waters on February 28.[6]
The increase in the number of the CCG vessels illustrates the PRC’s
opportunism as it capitalizes on heightened cross-strait tensions and
political sensitivity stemming from the Kinmen capsizing incident.
The
PRC’s intensified maritime activities complement its regular violations
of Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). Retired ROC Air
Force Lieutenant General Chang Yen-ting pointed out on February 29 that
the Ministry of National Defense (MND) detected a People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) aircraft as close as 23 nautical miles from Taiwan’s northern
coast.[7]
Chang highlighted the proximity to Taiwan’s airspace and the challenges
to the military’s operational depth and early warning time. The ROC Air
Force announced on March 6 that it would resume nighttime flight
training.[8]
Chang stated in an interview that the measure is a necessary response
to the higher frequency of PLA aircraft harassing Taiwan in recent
years.[9]
The
Kuomintang initiated a legislative inquiry into the Kinmen capsizing
incident to determine the liability of Taiwan’s Coast Guard
Administration. This supports the efforts of the Chinese Communist Party
to vilify and undermine domestic Taiwanese support for the Democratic
Progressive Party. KMT-aligned independent legislator May Chin
convened the Legislative Yuan’s Internal Affairs Committee on March 4,
summoning Coast Guard and government officials to testify regarding the
law enforcement process and subsequent handling of the incident. Chin
favors closer relations with the PRC and has a history of meeting with
CPP officials, prompting accusations from DPP members that she is under
the CCP’s influence.[10]
Ocean Affairs Council Minister and DPP member Kuan Bi-ling and CGA
Director General Chou Mei-wu faced fierce questioning from Chin and KMT
lawmakers about the cause of the incident and the liability of the CGA.
Kuan and Chou pushed back against the notion that the CGA vessel’s
collision with the mainland fishing boat caused it to capsize. Kuan and
other DPP cabinet members stood by the Coast Guard’s actions as lawful
and denied insinuations of guilt. DPP legislators disagreed with the
KMT’s framing of the incident in a report, claiming it lent itself to
the TAO’s position.[11]
Kuan refuted allegations that she ordered the Coast Guard to open fire
or that she was a hindrance to the reconciliation process. Kuan
characterized the rumors as a cognitive warfare strategy by the CCP and
emphasized the role of misinformation in shaping public perception of
sensitive cross-strait issues.[12]
The
KMT and CCP are urging the DPP to disclose the truth about the
incident. The PRC blames the DPP and CGA for the deaths and failure of
the reconciliation process.[13]
The PRC has responded by repeatedly deploying CCG patrols into waters
around Kinmen and Matsu, two Taiwan-controlled island groups that are
close to the coast of the PRC.
China
The
National People’s Congress announced a 5% GDP growth target and a 7.2%
defense budget increase for 2024. PRC defense spending has outpaced the
GDP growth target for over a decade.[14] Both figures are identical to growth targets announced at the 2023 National People’s Congress session.[15]
Premier Li Qiang’s work report to the annual session of the NPC focused
primarily on the PRC’s economic goals, including maintaining target
growth rates, developing “new productive forces” to drive the economy,
and furthering “reform and opening up” policies. Li said the economy was
improving with a growth rate of 5.2% in 2023 but acknowledged that
achieving the economic growth goals would not be easy.[16]
The spokesperson for the Chinese People’s Political Consultative
Conference (CPPCC), the PRC’s top advisory body which is having its
annual session concurrently with the NPC, also signaled that the CPPCC
was chiefly concerned about the economy.[17]
The
PRC has the world’s second-largest defense budget after the United
States and the budget is set to increase to 1.67 trillion yuan ($232
billion) in 2024. Although PRC defense spending has doubled since 2015,
annual increases in defense spending have declined to single-digit
percentages as economic growth has slowed. Official spending increases
in defense have hovered around 7% each year since 2016.[18]
The US Department of Defense estimated in 2021 that the PRC’s true
spending on defense could be 1.1 to 2 times its official budget.[19]
The PRC can likely sustain its military spending despite slowing
economic growth, however. The state exerts considerable control over the
country’s economy and the distribution of resources to various sectors.
The PRC’s official defense spending is also much smaller than US
defense spending as a percentage of GDP, equaling 1.6% of GDP in 2022
compared to 3.5% for the United States.[20]
PRC
Premier Li Qiang’s work report to the National People’s Congress
continued a trend of CCP officials using more belligerent language about
“reunification” with Taiwan but did not signal a major policy change. Li
stressed that the CCP must “resolutely oppose ‘Taiwan independence’
separatism and external interference.” Li’s predecessor Li Keqiang said
in the 2023 work report that the CCP should “advance the process of the
peaceful reunification of the motherland,” but Li Qiang dropped the word
“peaceful” and called on the CCP to “unswervingly advance the great
cause of the reunification of the motherland.” Li Qiang did say the CCP
should promote the “peaceful development” of cross-strait relations,
however.[21] State-owned media Global Times
cited PRC scholars who said that the omission of the term “peaceful
reunification” does not signal that the CCP has dropped this goal but
rather signals that it considers fighting Taiwanese “secessionism” will
be a more urgent task in 2024.[22]
The change in the language of the report is consistent with the change
of tone in CPPCC Chairman Wang Huning’s speech at the Taiwan Work
Conference on February 23, which emphasized the need to “fight” (rather
than merely “oppose”) Taiwanese independence and foreign interference.[23]
The
premier’s government work report to the NPC also omitted the term
“peaceful reunification” in 2016 and 2020, the years that ROC President
Tsai Ing-wen won the presidential elections. That the report again
dropped the term after the DPP won the 2024 presidential elections
indicates that the change in rhetoric signals disapproval of the DPP
presidency.[24]
CCP
Central Military Commission (CMC) Vice Chairmen Zhang Youxia and He
Weidong highlighted the need to improve the military’s preparation for
“major missions” at the annual National People’s Congress. Zhang
and He participated in deliberations by the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) and People’s Armed Police (PAP) delegations as they reviewed the
government work report at the NPC. Zhang highlighted the need to
implement the CMC Chairman responsibility system, step up troop
training, strengthen coordination of preparations for “major missions”,
accelerate construction and implementation of network-enabled
information systems, integrate military and civilian resources, and
improve the military's “ability to win.” He Weidong stressed the need to
strengthen training in CCP theory in the military and deepen political
“rectification” and anti-corruption efforts.[25]
Zhang and He’s recommendations provide insight into the PLA’s
priorities in improving its readiness for “major missions” such as
operations against Taiwan. These priorities include strengthening
centralized CCP control over the military, strengthening personnel
training and political loyalty, deepening military-civil fusion, and
constructing information systems to facilitate joint operations in
“informationized” warfare.
Russia
Recent
PRC diplomatic outreach in Europe may aim to advance the PRC’s
September 2023 Proposal on the Reform and Development of Global
Governance, which faults the West for the war in Ukraine. The
proposal calls the root of the “Ukraine crisis” lying “in the problem of
security governance in Europe.” The “parties concerned… [must]
accommodate each other’s legitimate concerns… [and] abandon the Cold War
mentality.”[26]
These are thinly veiled references to accommodating Russian historical
grievances at the price of NATO unity and Ukrainian territorial
sovereignty. The alleged “stabilizing force” of any PRC-negotiated
ceasefire along these lines would normalize the principle of revisionist
international aggression. This principle would provide the CCP with a
precedent for the party to falsely justify aggressive coercion aimed at
Taiwan, with the eventual political objective of annexing Taiwan into
the PRC.
PRC Special Representative for Eurasian Affairs
Li Hui traveled to Europe on March 2 for a round of visits to Russia,
the EU, Poland, Ukraine, Germany, and France. PRC MFA Spokeswoman Mao
Ning claimed that Li Hui would “pave the way for peace talks.”[27]
Li’s comments align with Kremlin talking points, however. The South
China Morning Post reported on March 6 that PRC Special Representative
for Eurasian Affairs Li Hui reiterated the Kremlin talking point that
the discussion of Ukrainian territorial sovereignty could only occur
when violence ceases. He also implied that the EU needs to stop sending
weapons to Ukraine for this to happen.[28] Li’s
claims align with PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s message at the Munich
Security Conference in mid-February that the PRC is a “responsible major
country” that would serve as a “stabilizing force” amid global turmoil.
[29]
Wang also repeated his claim on March 7 that the PRC “supports the
timely convening of an international peace conference” during a press
conference at the annual Two Sessions meeting.[30] CCP leadership delivers policy guidance for the upcoming year to the party cadre at this annual meeting.
The
PRC and Russia are collaborating on the development of surveillance and
energy-related space capabilities that threaten US access to space and
space-based capabilities. The China National Space
Administration (CNSA) stated in late February that the PRC plans to
construct a surveillance system around the in-progress International
Lunar Research Station. The surveillance system will use the Skynet mass
surveillance system as a model.[31] Skynet is the PRC’s nationwide camera surveillance system that includes over 600 million cameras.[32]
The ILRS is a multinational space station initiative that Russia and
the PRC founded in 2021 that is scheduled for competition by the 2030s.
CNSA did not specify how it would prioritize surveillance efforts in
space. The head of Russia’s space agency, Roscosmos, Yuri Borisov also
stated on March 5 that the PRC and Russia are considering cooperation to
build a nuclear power plant on the moon in the early 2030s.[33] This is a competing initiative to an ongoing NASA project to design a nuclear fission reactor on the moon.[34]
Commander
of United States Space Command General Stephen N. Whiting stated that
these types of space-based systems compete with US interests during his
February 29 testimony to the United States Senate Committee on Armed
Services. He warned that the PRC “and the Russian Federation continued
to field systems and engage in behavior that threaten U.S., Allied, and
Partner access to space and space-based capabilities.”[35]
Southeast Asia
Chinese
Coast Guard (CCG) ships fired water cannons and collided with
Philippine ships while attempting to block a Philippine resupply mission
to Second Thomas Shoal. A CCG vessel attempted to block and
collided with a Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) vessel escorting a supply
mission to Second Thomas Shoal on March 5, causing minor damage to the
Philippine ship.[36]
PCG spokesperson for the West Philippine Sea Commodore Jay Tarriela
said that the CCG and Chinese Maritime Militia ships attempted
“dangerous” blocking maneuvers against PCG vessels in an “unprovoked
[act] of coercion.”[37]
Two CCG ships also fired water cannons at a Philippine supply ship,
injuring four Philippine personnel, and later collided with it. The
supply ship returned to the Philippines under PCG escort. Another
Philippine ship completed its mission of delivering supplies to
personnel on the BRP Sierra Madre, a deliberately grounded derelict warship that serves as the Philippine base on Second Thomas Shoal.[38] The MFA claimed the Philippine supply mission was transporting construction materials.[39]
The
CCG claimed that it took “control measures in accordance with the law”
to stop the Philippines’ “illegal intrusion” and that a Philippine ship
“deliberately rammed” a CCG ship.[40] A PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson accused the Philippines of violating its commitments to China to tow the Sierra Madre
and violating the PRC’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights by
“infringing, provoking and causing trouble” in the waters of Second
Thomas Shoal, which the PRC calls “Ren’ai Reef” and the Philippines
calls “Ayungin Shoal.”
Second Thomas Shoal is a submerged
reef in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea which the Philippines
and the PRC both claim. The Philippines controls the shoal with troops
based on the grounded warship BRP Sierra Madre. It maintains
its presence at the shoal with regular shipments of living supplies for
its personnel and construction materials for repairing the World War
II-era warship, which is in poor condition. The Philippines began
“superficial repairs” on the ship in October 2023 to make it more
livable for the roughly dozen Philippine military personnel stationed
there.[41]
The
PRC opposes these shipments and claims the Philippine military presence
is illegal. The PRC claims sovereignty over nearly the entirety of the
South China Sea including the Spratly Islands through its “Nine Dash
Line” maritime boundary. It rejects a 2016 Permanent Court of
Arbitration ruling that found the Nine Dash Line claims are unlawful.
The PRC has constructed, seized, and attempted to seize many islands in
the South China Sea so it can build a military presence throughout the
critical waterway. The PRC has built military infrastructure on islands
that it has seized control of or artificially constructed to expand its
power projection capability, strengthen domain awareness, and increase
its ability to block critical Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) through
the South China Sea. Developing the capability to monitor or restrict
ships through the South China Sea would support a future PRC effort to
implement a blockade of Taiwan or block US and allied reinforcements
from reaching the Taiwan Strait in wartime.
The
PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs objected to the Philippines’ passage of
the “Maritime Zones Act” that codifies Philippine territorial claims in
the South China Sea. The act is based on the 2016 Arbitration ruling,
which found the PRC’s competing territorial claims in the region to be
invalid. The Philippine Senate passed the Maritime Zones Act on
February 26. The act establishes the Philippines’ archipelagic
boundaries, internal waters, and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in
accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the
2016 Arbitral Ruling.[42]
The 2016 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration found that the
PRC’s “Nine Dash Line” territorial claims to nearly the entire South
China Sea, including many Philippine-claimed features, had no legal
basis.[43]
A PRC MFA spokesperson said on March 5 that the PRC “firmly opposes”
the law. She reiterated the PRC stance that the PRC has sovereignty over
many islands the Philippines claims, including the Spratly Islands and
Scarborough Shoal. She also asserted that the treaties originally
delineating Philippine territory did not include these islands, that the
Philippines illegally occupied PRC territory in the South China Sea,
and that the 2016 arbitration ruling is illegal under UNCLOS.[44]
The
PRC’s use of legal arguments in tandem with maritime operations to
assert territorial claims over most of the South China Sea serves to lay
the groundwork for PRC military control over the South China Sea. PRC
control over the sea could enable it to establish domain awareness or
block passage through the waterway to support a blockade or military
operations against Taiwan. The legal arguments about UNCLOS and the
territorial boundaries of rival claimants are part of a CCP effort to
legitimize PLA and CCG actions in the South China Sea. “Legal warfare”
is one of the PLA’s “three warfares” strategies of non-kinetic warfare,
which also include psychological and public opinion warfare.
Oceania
Compacts of Free Association
The House of Representatives voted to renew the Compacts of Free Association (COFA) on March 6.[45] The bill is now before the Senate for consideration. The
COFAs govern the United States’ relationship with Palau, Micronesia,
and the Marshall Islands while granting the United States military
access throughout their territories. The United States renewed COFAs
with Palau and Micronesia in May and the Marshall Islands in October.[46] [47] Congress previously funded the COFAs for a twenty-year period in 2003.[48]
That funding has now expired. The renewal of the COFAs in 2024 would
replenish this funding at a total cost for all three of the twenty-year
agreements of roughly $7 billion spread over the period 2024 to 2043,
according to the Congressional Research Service.[49]
[1] https://www.cga dot gov.tw/GipOpen/wSite/ct?xItem=159806&ctNode=10198&mp=999
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[3] https://www.chinatimes dot com/realtimenews/20240305002460-260407?chdtv
[4] https://www.cga dot gov.tw/GipOpen/wSite/ct?xItem=159806&ctNode=10198&mp=999
[5] https://www.chinatimes dot com/realtimenews/20240304002208-260409
[6] http://www.gwytb dot gov.cn/m/speech/202402/t20240228_12602525.htm
[7] https://www.chinatimes dot com/realtimenews/20240301000005-260407
[8] https://www.mnd dot gov.tw/Publish.aspx?p=82668&title=%e5%9c%8b%e9%98%b2%e6%b6%88%e6%81%af&SelectStyle=%e6%96%b0%e8%81%9e%e7%a8%bf
[9] https://www.cna dot com.tw/news/aipl/202403060141.aspx
[10] https://www.setn dot com/News.aspx?NewsID=1265258
https://www.setn dot com/News.aspx?NewsID=1265464
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[11] https://news.ltn dot com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4594723
[12] https://udn dot com/news/story/9213/7808428
[13] http://www.gwytb dot gov.cn/m/speech/202402/t20240228_12602525.htm
[14] https://chinapower.csis.org/military-spending/
https://www.allianzgi.com/en/insights/outlook-and-commentary/china-equity-outlook-2024
[15] https://www.cnn.com/2023/03/04/economy/china-two-sessions-gdp-growth-target-military-spending-intl-hnk/index.html
[16] https://www.gov dot cn/yaowen/liebiao/202403/content_6936260.htm
[17] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/politics/article/3254011/two-sessions-2024-economy-set-lead-agenda-chinas-top-political-advisory-body
[18] https://chinapower.csis.org/military-spending/
[19] https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF
[20] https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?most_recent_year_desc=true
[21] https://www.gov dot cn/yaowen/liebiao/202403/content_6936260.htm
[22] https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202403/1308237.shtml
[23] http://www.news dot cn/politics/leaders/20240223/5bff376d7b5e4b03bec2fbfc4417967c/c.html
http://cpc.people dot com.cn/n1/2023/0510/c64094-32683120.html
[24] https://english.www.gov dot cn/premier/news/2016/03/17/content_281475309417987.htm
https://english.www.gov dot cn/premier/news/202005/30/content_WS5ed197f3c6d0b3f0e94990da.html
[25] http://www.news dot cn/politics/20240305/e24c2abd5a4648319f771221e164273f/c.html
[26] https://www.fmprc dot gov.cn/eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/202309/t20230913_11142010.html
[27] https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202402/t20240229_11252087.shtml
https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/wsrc_674883/202402/t20240228_11251245.shtml
[28] https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3254311/eu-locks-horns-chinas-envoy-ukraine-schisms-war-remain
[29] https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/web/wjbz_673089/xghd_673097/202402/t20240217_11246040.shtml
[30] https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/gjldrhd_674881/202403/t20240307_11255225.shtml
[31] https://www.scmp
dot
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[32] https://www.scmp
dot
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[33] https://www.reuters.com/technology/space/russia-china-are-considering-putting-nuclear-power-unit-moon-ria-2024-03-05/
[34] https://www.space.com/nasa-moon-nuclear-reactor-project-first-phase-complete
[35] https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/whiting_statement.pdf, p.5
[36] https://www.gmanetwork dot com/news/topstories/nation/899475/pcg-china-actions-led-to-collision-during-latest-ayungin-resupply-mission/story/
[37] https://twitter.com/jaytaryela/status/1764902394381643825
[38] https://www.gmanetwork
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[39] https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202403/t20240305_11254023.shtml
[40] https://www.ccg dot gov.cn//2024/hjyw_0305/2429.html
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[41] https://manilastandard dot net/news/314381977/repairs-on-brp-sierra-madre-start.html
[42] https://www.pna dot gov.ph/articles/1219564
https://legacy.senate dot gov.ph/press_release/2024/0226_tolentino1.asp
[43] https://uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Issue%20Brief_South%20China%20Sea%20Arbitration%20Ruling%20What%20Happened%20and%20What%27s%20Next071216.pdf
[44] https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202403/t20240305_11254023.shtml
[45] https://docs.house.gov/billsthisweek/20240304/HMS31169.PDF
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[46]
https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinken-witnesses-the-signing-of-the-u-s-palau-2023-agreement-following-the-compact-of-free-association-section-432-review/
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-signs-agreement-continue-micronesia-assistance-under-strategic-pact-2023-05-23/
[47] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-negotiator-expects-sign-new-deal-with-strategic-marshall-islands-monday-2023-10-16/
[48] https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12194#:~:text=In%202003%2C%20the%20United%20States,years%20(FY2004%2DFY2023).
[49] https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12194#:~:text=In%202003%2C%20the%20United%20States,years%20(FY2004%2DFY2023).
