Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Riley Bailey, and Kateryna Stepanenko
March 2, 2024, 6:05pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on March 2. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 3 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Russian forces appear to be willing to risk continued aviation losses in pursuit of tactical gains in eastern Ukraine, likely along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on March 2 that Ukrainian forces destroyed one Su-34 aircraft that was conducting glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian positions in eastern Ukraine on the morning of March 1.[1] Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk later stated that Ukrainian forces attempted to down two additional Russian Su-34 aircraft and one Su-35 and downed one of the Su-34 aircraft.[2] Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian forces have shot down 15 Russian aircraft since February 17.[3] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that Russian forces have not deployed A-50 long-range radar detection aircraft over the Sea of Azov for the past six days following the destruction of an A-50 aircraft on February 23 and implied that the absence of A-50 aircraft forces Russian Su-34 and Su-35 aircraft to fly closer to their targets to conduct strikes.[4] Previous Russian aircraft losses have prompted Russian forces to temporarily decrease aviation activity throughout Ukraine, but the increased rate of Russian aviation losses in Ukraine in the past weeks has yet to prompt Russian forces to significantly decrease tactical aviation activity.[5] ISW assessed that Russian forces temporarily established limited and localized air superiority during the final days of the Russian seizure of Avdiivka.[6] Russian forces are likely attempting to reestablish this limited and localized air superiority in order to support tactical Russian advances in the Avdiivka direction and have decided that continued offensive operations with air support outweigh the risk of losing more aircraft. ISW continues to assess that the reported loss of 15 aircraft and possibly some highly trained pilots in about two weeks is not negligible for the Russian military given that Russia likely has about 300 various Sukhoi fighter aircraft.[7]
Transfers of North Korean weapons to Russia by sea apparently paused as of mid-February 2024. North Korea-focused outlet NK Pro reported on February 29, citing satellite imagery, that Russian ships involved in the maritime transport of North Korean ammunition and weaponry to Russia have not docked at North Korea’s Rajin Port since February 12.[8] NK Pro reported that Russian ships have made at least 32 trips between the Rajin Port and Russia’s Dunay and Vostochny ports, Primorsky Krai since August 2023. NK Pro reported that the Russian Lady R cargo ship transported an unspecified number of shipping containers, likely containing North Korean ammunition and weapons, between North Korea and Russia from January 30 to February 8 and that the Maia-1 cargo ship arrived at Russia’s Vostochny Port from North Korea on February 12. NK Pro reported that satellite imagery has not captured another large cargo ship traveling between the two piers or new deliveries to the Rajin Port since February 12 and suggested that the pause could be due to production issues in North Korea or other logistical issues. NK Pro noted that North Korea could also be transporting weapons to Russia via air or rail. ISW previously reported that Russia uses the Baikal-Amur Railway and the East Siberian Railway to facilitate cargo transfers from and to China and North Korea, both countries that Russia is increasingly relying on for economic and military support respectively to sustain its war effort in Ukraine.[9] South Korean Defense Minister Shin Won-sik stated on February 26 that North Korea has sent an estimated 6,700 shipping containers of ammunition to Russia in recent months.[10] Shin stated that these containers could carry over three million 152mm artillery shells or roughly 500,000 122mm shells.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov publicly rejected Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s recent offer to host a negotiation platform for Russia and Ukraine.[11] Lavrov attended the Antalya Diplomatic Forum in Turkey on March 1 and responded to a question about Erdogan’s offer by stating that there are no current dialogue initiatives that consider Russian interests.[12] Lavrov, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and other Kremlin officials routinely feign openness to negotiations while promoting information operations that place the onus for negotiations on the West.[13] Lavrov’s demand for a dialogue initiative that accounts for Russian interests is part of a longstanding effort to prompt preemptive Western concessions regarding Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.[14]
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov used the Antalya Diplomatic Forum to promote Kremlin narratives about Moldova, likely to set conditions for potential Kremlin hybrid operations that aim to destabilize Moldova and prevent Moldova’s accession to the European Union (EU). Lavrov answered a question at the Antalya Diplomatic Forum in Turkey on March 1 about the recent Congress of Deputies held in pro-Russian Moldovan breakaway region of Transnistria, which requested that Russia provide Transnistria “defense/protection.”[15] Lavrov claimed that the Moldovan government is ”moving in Kyiv’s footsteps,” reiterating his previous comparisons of Moldovan policies towards Transnistria to Ukraine before 2014.[16] Lavrov continued to claim that Moldova is discriminating against Russian speakers, applying ”economic pressure” to Transnistria, and blocking the 5+2 negotiating process for the Transnistria conflict — claims that Kremlin officials and mouthpieces have consistently repeated.[17] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin will use the recent Transnistrian congress as a springboard to intensify hybrid operations aimed at destabilizing and further polarizing Moldova ahead of Moldova-EU accession negotiations and the Moldovan presidential election later in 2024.[18]
Senior Russian officials acknowledged Armenia’s reduced participation in the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), marking a notable shift in Russian official rhetoric that previously sought to ignore Armenian efforts to distance itself from the CSTO. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that “it is time for Armenia to decide on its status in the CSTO,” likely in response to Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s February 22 statement that Armenia “essentially” froze its participation in the CSTO because the CSTO “failed to fulfill its obligations in the field of security” to Armenia, particularly in 2021 and 2022.[19] Pashinyan stated on February 28 that Armenia has not had a permanent representative to the CSTO in the past year and that Armenian officials and forces have not participated in CSTO events and exercises in “a long time.”[20] ISW observed that Armenia effectively abstained from the CSTO by failing to send representatives to several consecutive CSTO events in mid-to-late-2023.[21] Pashinyan has increasingly publicly questioned Armenia’s security relations with Russia since mid-2023.[22] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs previously responded to Pashinyan’s statements about the CSTO by rejecting his claims and emphasizing Armenia’s continued membership in the CSTO.[23] Lavrov’s acknowledgment of Armenia’s continued objection to its participation in the CSTO indicates that the Kremlin may be preparing a more concerted response to its deteriorating relations with Armenia.
The Kremlin appears to have largely permitted displays of anti-war sentiment in Moscow as Russians observed Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny’s funeral on March 1. Russian opposition sources reported that up to 16,500 people attended Navalny’s funeral at the Borisovsky Cemetery in Moscow, and footage shows that crowds of people queueing for the funeral chanted anti-war slogans and calls for demobilization.[24] Russian civil rights group OVD-info reported that Russian authorities detained 15 people in Moscow and 89 other people in 18 other Russian cities in connection with Navalny’s funeral by the night of March 1 to 2.[25] Russians continued to lay flowers at Navalny’s grave in Moscow and at memorials elsewhere on March 2, although relatively large displays of anti-war sentiment did not continue on March 2.[26] The Moscow Times reported on March 1 that the Kremlin tasked Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) officials with conducting an operation to ”protect the constitutional order from threats” during Navalny’s funeral.[27] The Kremlin likely did not order large crackdowns against displays of anti-war sentiment in order to avoid prompting wider outrage while also projecting confidence in public support for Russian President Vladimir Putin and his war effort in Ukraine ahead of presidential elections on March 17.
Key Takeaways:
- Russian forces appear to be willing to risk continued aviation losses in pursuit of tactical gains in eastern Ukraine, likely along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
- Transfers of North Korean weapons to Russia by sea apparently paused as of mid-February 2024.
- Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov publicly rejected Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s recent offer to host a negotiation platform for Russia and Ukraine.
- Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov used the Antalya Diplomatic Forum to promote Kremlin narratives about Moldova, likely to set conditions for potential Kremlin hybrid operations that aim to destabilize Moldova and prevent Moldova’s accession to the European Union (EU).
- Senior Russian officials acknowledged Armenia’s reduced participation in the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), marking a notable shift in Russian official rhetoric that previously sought to ignore Armenian efforts to distance itself from the CSTO.
- The Kremlin appears to have largely permitted displays of anti-war sentiment in Moscow as Russians observed Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny’s funeral on March 1.
- Russian forces made confirmed advances near Kreminna, Avdiivka, and Krynky on March 2.
- Russian Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov inspected a Russian shipbuilding facility and the construction site of a new military hospital in the Republic of Dagestan during a working trip to Russia’s Southern Military District on March 2.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
- Russian Information Operations and Narratives
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces recently advanced near Kreminna amid continued positional engagements along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on March 2. Geolocated footage published on March 1 and 2 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Terny (west of Kreminna) and south of Bilohorivka (south of Kreminna).[28] Positional engagements continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka, Lake Lyman, and Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Tabaivka; west of Kreminna near Yampolivka and Terny; and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka.[29]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Note: ISW is restructuring its coverage of the Donetsk Oblast axis to include activity in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area. During the 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive, ISW assessed that Ukrainian activity in the border area was a supporting and related effort to Ukrainian activity in the south. As Russian forces have seized the battlefield initiative following the end of the counteroffensive, Russian troops appear to be trying to drive southwest of Donetsk City while simultaneously driving northeast from the Velyka Novosilka area on the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border. This Russian effort appears to include settlements along the O0532 Marinka-Pobieda-Vuhledar route. ISW will further restructure the Donetsk Oblast axis if Russian operational objectives in this area appear to change in the future.
Russian forces reportedly advanced near Bakhmut on March 2, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in Ivanivske (west of Bakhmut), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[30] Positional engagements continued northeast of Bakhmut near Rozdolivka, northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka, southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka and Andriivka, and south of Bakhmut near Pivdenne.[31]
Russian forces recently advanced near Avdiivka. Geolocated footage published on March 1 and 2 indicates that Russian forces advanced in central and eastern Orlivka (west of Avdiivka).[32] Geolocated footage published on March 2 indicates that Russian forces also advanced in Tonenke (west of Avdiivka).[33] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of Tonenke, but other Russian milbloggers denied claims that Russian forces controlled the settlement.[34] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced near Stepove (northwest of Avdiivka), Novobakhmutivka (northwest of Avdiivka), and Nevelske (southwest of Avdiivka), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[35] Positional engagements continued northwest of Avdiivka near Novobakhmutivka, Berdychi, Semenivka, and Stepove; west of Avdiivka near Tonenke; and southwest of Avdiivka near Vodyane, Nevelske, and Pervomaiske.[36] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian forces completely rotated elements of a brigade that had been fighting in the eastern direction for two years and transferred them to the rear for restoration.[37] Elements of the Russian 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating near Nevelske; elements of the 1st ”Slavic” Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) are reportedly operating near Tonenke; and elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) are reportedly operating near Tonenke and Orlivka.[38]
The Russian military command is reportedly committing additional elements to offensive operations west of Avdiivka, further suggesting that Russian forces intend to continue their efforts to advance as far as possible before Ukrainian forces establish harder-to-penetrate defenses.[39] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that the Russian military command committed elements of the 74th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) from reserve into battle in the Lastochkyne-Tonenke direction.[40] Mashovets stated that the Russian command will also likely commit elements of the 348th Motorized Rifle Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, CMD) to the Berdychi or Novobakhmutivka direction in the near future. Mashovets stated that elements of the 348th Motorized Rifle Regiment recently concentrated near Horlivka (northeast of Avdiivka) after resting and reconstituting. ISW last observed reports of elements of the 90th Tank Division attacking near Avdiivka during the Russian seizure of the settlement in mid-February but has not observed reports of them attacking west or northwest of the settlement since then.[41]
Positional engagements continued west and southwest of Donetsk City on March 2, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Positional engagements continued west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Pobieda and Novomykhailivka.[42] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Novomykhailivka, Heorhiivka, and Krasnohorivka, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian minefields west of Donetsk City are complicating Russian offensive operations.[44] Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) and the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Krasnohorivka.[45]
Positional engagements continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on March 2, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Urozhaine (south of Velyka Novosilka).[46] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced near Marfopil (southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and Hulyaipole, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[47] Elements of the Russian 69th Covering Brigade (35th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Hulyaipole, and elements of the 30th Artillery Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[48]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Positional fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast near Robotyne and Verbove (east of Robotyne) on March 2.[49] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that there is a lull in activity near Robotyne, and the Ukrainian General Staff reported only one unsuccessful Russian attack in the area.[50] Elements of the 247th Guards Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Verbove.[51]
Russian forces recently made marginal gains near Krynky amid continued positional fighting in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast.[52] Geolocated footage published on March 2 indicates that Russian forces recently made marginal gains within Krynky.[53]
Russian forces in occupied Crimea are reportedly trying to disrupt and mislead Ukrainian reconnaissance out of apparent fear of continued Ukrainian strikes. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on March 2 that elements of the Russian 31st Air Defense Division in occupied Crimea have started to widely employ false positions and are using false radio communications to mislead Ukrainian reconnaissance.[54]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces conducted another series of missile and drone strikes targeting Ukraine on the night of March 1 to 2. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched three Kh-59/35 missiles from occupied Kherson and Donetsk oblasts and 17 Shahed-136/131 drones from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, and occupied Balaklava, Crimea.[55] Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian air defenses shot down 14 Shahed drones over Odesa, Mykolaiv, Zaporizhia, Kharkiv, Sumy, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts and two missiles in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[56] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential buildings in Odesa City with drones and Shevchenkove Hromada, Mykolaiv Oblast with a missile.[57]
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Russian Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov inspected a Russian shipbuilding facility and the construction site of a new military hospital in the Republic of Dagestan during a working trip to Russia’s Southern Military District on March 2. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Russian authorities are constructing new mooring infrastructure for Russia’s Caspian Flotilla and a large military hospital complex in Makhachkala, Dagestan.[58]
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
Nothing significant to report.
Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)
Note: ISW will be publishing its coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts on a weekly basis in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. ISW will continue to track developments in Ukrainian defense industrial efforts daily and will refer to these efforts in assessments within the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment and other ISW products when necessary.
ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.
Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)
Note: ISW will be publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas twice a week in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. ISW will continue to track activities in Russian-occupied areas daily and will refer to these activities in assessments within the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment and other ISW products when necessary.
ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Russian President Vladimir Putin continued efforts to portray Russia as an inclusive harmonious, multicultural state during a speech to the World Youth Festival on March 2.[59] ISW has extensively reported on growing anti-migrant sentiments and interreligious tensions in Russia and Russia’s efforts to persecute non-Russian Orthodox Christian religious communities in occupied Ukraine and Russia.[60]
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)
The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Belarus disagreed with Russia on the price of components for Grad multiple rocket launch systems (MLRS), resulting in Belarus providing lower quality Grad MLRS components to Russia.[61] The GUR reported that Belarusian defense company Volatavto agreed to supply 250 Grad MLRS components to Russian defense company Special Design Bureau at a 500 to 600 percent markup. The GUR stated that Belarus agreed to lower the price of the Grad MLRS components by producing them through subcontractors who do not have the necessary licenses to produce the parts. The GUR noted that Volatavto and Special Design Bureau are under international sanctions.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/kpszsu/11331 ; https://t.me/MykolaOleshchuk/215
[2] https://t.me/MykolaOleshchuk/216 ; https://t.me/MykolaOleshchuk/217
[3] https://t.me/kpszsu/11331 ; https://t.me/MykolaOleshchuk/217 ; https...
[4] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/03/02/yurij-ignat-okupanty-ne-znayut-yak-vykorystovuvaty-a-50-nemaye-vzhe-shostyj-den/
[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122623 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120323
[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021724
[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...
[8] https://www.nknews dot org/pro/russian-ship-rejoins-north-korea-weapons-trade-only-for-operation-to-go-on-hold/
[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar113023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120123
[10] https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Ukraine-war/North-Korea-sent-more-than-...
[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022824
[12] https://t.me/tass_agency/234467
[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020924
[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar123023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122823 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122323 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121923 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121723 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar112823 ;
[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022824 ; https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1936226/
[16] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1936226/ ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...
[17] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1936226/ ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021424 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgr... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...
[18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022824
[19] https://www.azatutyun dot am/a/32845113.html ; https://t.me/tass_agency/234479 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022324
[20] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022924
[21] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022924
[22] https://isw.pub/UkrWar090523 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar090823 https://i...
[23] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022324
[24] https://t.me/bbcrussian/61519 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/61504 ; http... https://t.me/severrealii/23457 ; https://www.facebook.com/WhiteCounter/posts/798643988956303 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/76007 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/61597
[25] https://t.me/bbcrussian/61558
[26] https://meduza dot io/feature/2024/03/02/na-sleduyuschiy-den-posle-pohoron-navalnogo-lyudi-prodolzhayut-nesti-tsvety-na-borisovskoe-kladbische-fotografii-i-video ; https://t.me/sotaproject/75998
[27] https://www.moscowtimes dot ru/2024/03/01/putin-potreboval-ot-fsb-ne-dopustit-myatezha-iz-za-smerti-navalnogo-a123267 ; https://t.me/istories_media/5324
[28] https://x.com/thisisnotdirk/status/1763705901918175652?s=20; https://t.me/UA_4_tankova/887; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/4611 (Terny)
https://x.com/TOGAjano21/status/1763795639769366672?s=20; https://x.com/klinger66/status/1763815622176075977?s=20; https://twitter.com/klinger66/status/1763814211338076617; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/4614; https://t.me/rybar/57801 (Bilohorivka)
[29] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Re7TL8e7iGqMBZx6N2c... ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02WkQ1yWhR775ibCVxY4... ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0boQhWVYuMNVzXWGbE6m... ; https://t.me/mod_russia/36206 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/18514 ; https://t.me/rybar/57801
[30] https://t.me/rybar/57777 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/18514 ; https://t.m...
[31] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Re7TL8e7iGqMBZx6N2c... https://t.me/mod_russia/36210 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/36214
[32] https://t.me/Airborne1126/11863; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/4615; htt... https://t.me/creamy_caprice/4616
[33] https://t.me/z_arhiv/26171 ; https://t.me/voenkorkhayrullin/2277 ; h...
[34] https://t.me/wargonzo/18525 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/115037 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/54463
[35] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7859
[36] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Re7TL8e7iGqMBZx6N2c... https://t.me/mod_russia/36210 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/36214; https://t.me/mod_russia/36208 ; https:... https://t.me/dva_majors/35597
[37] https://t.me/osirskiy/608
[38] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/63023 (110th Brigade) ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/63047 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/18525 (1st Brigade) ; https://t.me/SolovievLive/243637; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/4616 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/18525 (114th Brigade)
[39] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022724
[40] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1670
[41] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...
[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Re7TL8e7iGqMBZx6N2c... https://t.me/dva_majors/35597
[43] https://t.me/rybar/57773 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/18514 ; https://t.m... https://t.me/boris_rozhin/115103
[45] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/63004 (5th Brigade) ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/115072 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/11871 (238th Brigade)
[46] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02WkQ1yWhR775ibCVxY4...
[47] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/20131185
[48] https://t.me/voin_dv/7322 (69th Brigade) ; https://t.me/voin_dv/7326 (30th Brigade)
[49] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Re7TL8e7iGqMBZx6N2c... https://t.me/tass_agency/234417 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/36235 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/18514
[50] https://t.me/rybar/57793 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Re7TL8e7iGqMBZx6N2c...
[51] https://t.me/tass_agency/234417 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/36235 (Verbove)
[52] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Re7TL8e7iGqMBZx6N2c...
[53] https://x.com/thisisnotdirk/status/1763928658329129425?s=20; https://t.me/argus38/156 ; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/8506
[54] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1670
[55] https://t.me/kpszsu/11331 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0M2mLnmQjDx6nyJTMHo4... ;
[56] https://t.me/kpszsu/11331 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0M2mLnmQjDx6nyJTMHo4... ; https://suspilne dot media/696766-zbiti-raketi-j-dron-obstril-nikopolsini-bezpekova-situacia-na-dnipropetrovsini-2-berezna/
[57] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/03/02/v-odesi-udarnyj-drony-zrujnuvav-9-poverhivku-dvoye-zagyblyh-pid-zavalamy-shukayut-lyudej/ ; https://t.me/UA_National_Police/19507 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/4293 ; https://suspilne dot media/696770-gatili-z-artilerii-ta-zavdali-raketnogo-udaru-ak-minula-doba-na-mikolaivsini/
[58] https://t.me/mod_russia/36218
[59] https://t.me/tass_agency/234493 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/35816 ; ht...
[60] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...
