Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 17, 2024

 Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Kateryna Stepanenko, and George Barros

March 17, 2024, 5pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:00 pm ET on March 17. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 18 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

French President Emmanuel Macron underlined the necessity for European countries to continue supporting a Ukrainian victory against Russia in order to ensure Ukrainian and European security. Macron stated in a March 16 interview with Ukrainian TV channels 1+1 and My-Ukraina that there will be “no peace in Europe if Ukraine is forced to capitulate.”[1] Macron called on European countries to speed up military assistance deliveries to Ukraine and stated that a “lasting peace” will restore the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and guarantee the security of Ukraine and all of Europe.[2] Macron also implied that negotiations require both Russia and Ukraine to engage in negotiations, highlighting Russia’s unwillingness to engage in legitimate and good-faith negotiations with Ukraine as an equal party.[3] Macron’s emphasis that only Russia and Ukraine can engage in legitimate negotiations directly challenges an ongoing Russian information operation aimed at framing the West as the only meaningful negotiating party in order to convince the West to accept the Kremlin’s premise that Ukraine has no independent agency and to gain concessions from the West that undermine Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity. Macron also stated in a March 16 interview with French outlet Le Parisien that "perhaps at some point” it would be necessary for French troops to operate on the ground in Ukraine to counter Russian forces but that he “does not want it.”[4] Russian sources hyper-focused on Macron’s response to a question in which he affirmed that he would ask Russia for a ceasefire in Ukraine during the summer 2024 Olympics in Paris.[5] Russian official sources largely rejected Macron’s offer of a ceasefire, citing France’s continued support for Ukraine.[6] Macron stated that France would maintain a message of peace in accordance with the spirit of the Olympic movement but that a message of peace and tolerance does not preclude Ukraine’s need to fully restore its sovereignty and territorial integrity.[7]

The Ukrainian State Security Service (SBU), Special Forces (SOF), and Unmanned Systems Forces reportedly conducted a successful drone strike against a Russian oil refinery in Krasnodar Krai on the night of March 16 to 17. Sources in the SBU told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne that the Ukrainian SBU, SOF, and Unmanned Systems Forces struck the crude oil atmospheric distillation columns of the Slavyansk oil refinery in Slavyansk-on-Kuban, Krasnodar Krai, resulting in a large fire.[8] Krasnodar Krai Operational Headquarters claimed that several drones attempted to strike the Slavyansk oil refinery and that Russian forces neutralized them, though falling drones caused a fire.[9] A Russian milblogger claimed that two of 17 drones that targeted the Slavyansk oil refinery struck the facility.[10] Suspilne reported that SBU drones have recently successfully struck 12 oil refineries in Russia.[11] A Russian milblogger claimed that the Ukrainian strike on the Slavyansk oil refinery is the ninth Ukrainian strike on a Russian oil refinery in the past week.[12] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian strikes on oil refineries are more serious than strikes on fuel depots because international sanctions against Russia complicate Russia’s ability to repair technologically complex oil refinery facilities.[13]

Unspecified actors launched a drone at a military base in Transnistria, the pro-Russian breakaway republic in Moldova, on March 17 amidst an assessed ongoing Kremlin hybrid operation aimed at destabilizing Moldova from within. Transnistrian outlets claimed on March 17 that a single drone struck a helicopter on the territory of an unspecified military unit in Transnistria, posted video footage of the moment of the drone strike, and alleged that the drone flew from the direction of Odesa Oblast.[14] Neither Transnistrian nor Russian authorities have accused Ukrainian forces of conducting the strike as of this writing but may do so in the future. The former Transnistrian Supreme Council Chairman, Alexander Shcherba, claimed that the strike had “Ukrainian fingerprints” and that the “main beneficiary” was Ukraine.[15] The Moldovan Bureau of Reintegration stated that the struck helicopter had not flown for years, and the strike was deliberately meant to spread fear and panic in Transnistria, implying it was part of an adversarial information operation targeting Moldova, though the Bureau of Reintegration did not explicitly accuse Transnistrian or pro-Russian forces of conducting the strike.[16] Moldovan authorities stated that they were in contact with the Ukrainian government.[17] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Andriy Yusov described the situation as a Russian provocation.[18] The Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation accused Russia of conducting the strike to manipulate the information space.[19] ISW cannot independently verify the details of the singular drone strike in Transnistria or identify the responsible actors, but it is unlikely that Ukrainian forces conducted the strike given the limited means used in the strike and the insignificant target. Ukrainian officials have also recently stated that Transnistria does not pose a military threat to Ukraine.[20] Transnistrian authorities recently asked Russia for unspecified “zashchita” (defense/protection) against Moldova, and Russia or Russian-linked actors would likely be the beneficiaries of this provocation in order to further the Kremlin’s ongoing efforts to set information conditions to justify a variety of Russian hybrid operations that aim to destabilize Moldova, about which ISW has extensively warned.[21]

All-Russian pro-Ukrainian volunteer forces reportedly seized a Russian administrative building in the Belgorod Oblast border area amid continued cross-border raids into Belgorod Oblast. The all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR) and Siberian Battalion claimed on March 17 that their forces entered the Gorkovsky border settlement in Belgorod Oblast and seized the settlement’s administration building.[22] Russian milbloggers either denied this claim or claimed that the settlement was already deserted several years ago.[23] Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), amplified footage claiming to show Russian air defenses downing a Ukrainian helicopter near Lukashivka, Sumy Oblast that was reportedly en route to Belgorod Oblast.[24] Russian milbloggers initially claimed that Russian forces downed a Western-produced helicopter, but the Russian MoD later claimed that the helicopter was a Soviet-era Mi-8.[25] The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) denied the Russian claims that Russian forces downed a Ukrainian helicopter and characterized the claims as part of a Kremlin information operation.[26] Russian milbloggers claimed that limited ground activity continued near Kozinka and Spodariushino, Belgorod Oblast.[27]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) signaled that it intends to protect the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) against Ukrainian strikes and may have replaced the BSF commander as part of this effort. The Russian MoD reported on March 17 that Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visited the BSF command post in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea where he received reports about Ukrainian operations and the BSF’s performance.[28] Shoigu emphasized that the BSF must conduct daily training exercises to repel aerial and unmanned maritime vehicle strikes so that all Russian crews are ready to defend against such strikes.[29] Shoigu ordered that the BSF install additional weapons, including large-caliber systems and machine guns, on unspecified BSF assets to augment Russian defenses.[30] Shoigu also received a report from Russian Vice Admiral Sergei Pinchuk, whom some Russian sources recently claimed replaced Admiral Viktor Sokolov as BSF commander.[31] ISW remains unable to confirm this claim, however. A Ukrainian strike campaign has forced the BSF to redeploy the majority of its naval assets away from its main base in Sevastopol to smaller and less capable bases in Novorossiysk and elsewhere, and the Ukrainian Armed Forces Center for Strategic Communications (StratCom) reported that Ukrainian strikes have disabled roughly 33 percent of the BSF’s warships as of early February 2024, including 24 ships and one submarine.[32] Shoigu’s posturing to protect the BSF sets conditions for Shoigu to either take credit should the BSF become more effective at protecting itself against Ukrainian strikes or blame other commanders should the BSF fail in this effort.

Key Takeaways:

• French President Emmanuel Macron underlined the necessity for European countries to continue supporting a Ukrainian victory against Russia in order to ensure Ukrainian and European security.
• The Ukrainian State Security Service (SBU), Special Forces (SOF), and Unmanned Systems Forces reportedly conducted a successful drone strike against a Russian oil refinery in Krasnodar Krai on the night of March 16 to 17.
• Unspecified actors launched a drone at a military base in Transnistria, the pro-Russian breakaway republic in Moldova, on March 17 amidst an assessed ongoing Kremlin hybrid operation aimed at destabilizing Moldova from within.
• All-Russian pro-Ukrainian volunteer forces reportedly seized a Russian administrative building in the Belgorod Oblast border area amid continued cross-border raids into Belgorod Oblast.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) signaled that it intends to protect the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) against Ukrainian strikes and may have replaced the BSF commander as part of this effort.
• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Avdiivka and Donetsk City.
• Russian authorities continue to militarize children in occupied Ukraine as part of efforts to Russify Ukrainian children and create a resource for Russia’s future force generation needs.

 

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.   

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus
  
  

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian military officials recently reported that Ukrainian forces repelled three Russian reconnaissance and sabotage groups on the Ukrainian-Russian international border near Stara Huta and Brusky, Sumy Oblast.[33] It is unclear whether the Ukrainian military officials were referring to previously reported Russian reconnaissance and sabotage groups in the same area on March 16 or additional Russian operations on March 17 that occurred since the initial reports.[34]

Positional fighting continued on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on March 17, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Positional fighting continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; west of Kreminna; and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka.[35] Elements of the Chechen Akhmat “Aida” detachment continue to operate near Bilohorivka, and elements of the 346th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Lysychansk.[36]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces reportedly unsuccessfully attacked in the Siversk direction (northeast of Bakhmut) on March 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault near Rozdolivka (southwest of Siversk).[37] Elements of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People's. Republic [LNR] Army Corps [AC]) reportedly continue to operate near Spirne (southeast of Siversk).[38]

Positional engagements continued around Bakhmut on March 17 but did not result in changes to the frontline. Positional battles continued northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka; west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske and east of Chasiv Yar; southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka, Shumy, and Pivdenne.[39] Elements of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd AC) reportedly continue to operate in the Bakhmut direction; and elements of the Russian 78th “Sever-Akhmat” Special Purpose Motorized Regiment are reportedly operating near Klishchiivka.[40]

 

Russian forces recently marginally advanced northwest and west of Avdiivka amid continued positional fighting in the area on March 17. Geolocated footage published on March 16 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Tonenke (west of Avdiivka), and a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced along Tsentralna Street in the settlement.[41] Geolocated footage published on March 16 also indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to the central part of Orlivka (northwest of Avdiivka).[42] Positional battles continued northeast of Avdiivka near Oleksandropil; northwest of Avdiivka near Novobakhmutivka, Berdychi, and Orlivka; west of Avdiivka near Tonenke; and southwest of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske and Nevelske.[43]

 

Russian and Ukrainian forces recently advanced on the Donetsk City frontline amid continued positional fighting on March 17. Geolocated footage published on March 14 shows elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Pacific Fleet) striking Ukrainian positions south of Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City), indicating that Ukrainian forces have advanced in the area.[44] Geolocated footage published on March 17 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced northeast of Marinka (immediately west of Donetsk City).[45] Positional fighting continued west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Novomykhailivka and Pobieda.[46] Elements of the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Novomykhailivka.[47]

 

Positional engagements continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on March 15. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing near Malynivka (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[48] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks southeast of Velyka Novosilka near Vodyane and Volodymyrivka and south of Velyka Novosilka near Urozhaine.[49] Elements of the Russian 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Staromayorske (south of Velyka Novosilka).[50]

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces reportedly seized Myrne (northeast of Robotyne) amid continued positional fighting in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 17. Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that elements of the Russian 35th Combined Arms Army (Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized Myrne after pushing Ukrainian forces from the settlement.[51] Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Robotyne and Verbove (east of Robotyne).[52] Positional engagements continued near Robotyne and northwest of Verbove.[53] Elements of the Russian BARS-3 ”Rodina” Battalion (Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[54]

 

Positional engagements continued in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast, particularly near Krynky and the Antonivsky roadway bridge area, on March 17.[55] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian Spetsnaz forces conducted a raid in an unspecified area of west (right) bank Kherson Oblast at an unspecified time earlier this week.[56]

 

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces launched several drone and missile strikes on Ukraine on March 16 and March 17. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces struck Kharkiv and Donetsk oblasts with five S-300 missiles and struck Chernihiv Oblast with two Kh-59 cruise missiles on the night of March 16 to 17.[57] Ukrainian officials reported on March 17 that Russian forces struck an infrastructure facility in Mykolaiv City with two ballistic missiles, likely Iskander-Ms.[58] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 16 Shahed-136/131 drones from occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea, overnight on March 16 to 17 and that Ukrainian forces shot down 14 Shaheds over Odesa Oblast.[59] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that some Shahed drones damaged agricultural enterprises in Odesa Oblast overnight.[60]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian authorities continue to militarize children in occupied Ukraine as part of efforts to Russify Ukrainian children and create a resource for Russia’s future force generation needs. Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Military Administration Head Artem Lysohor stated on March 17 that Russian authorities have approved the creation of the Luhansk Cadet Corps under the Russian Investigative Committee (Russia’s rough equivalent to the American Federal Bureau of Investigation), possibly before 2025.[61] Lysohor stated that Luhansk Cadet Corps will teach Ukrainian children about pro-Russian concepts including their “debt” to the Russian “Motherland.” The Ukrainian Resistance Center stated on March 17 that Russian authorities have spent a decade developing a plan to introduce a Russian federal military training system for civilians in occupied Crimea and plan to introduce the same military training system in occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts.[62] The Ukrainian Resistance Center stated the Kremlin ordered the establishment of centers for military-patriotic education and military training for civilians in each of Russia’s municipal entities and in occupied Ukraine and that occupation authorities are focusing on the expansion of the Young Cadets National Movement (Yunarmiya) as part of these efforts. The Ukrainian Resistance Center stated that occupation authorities plan to build an “Avangard” military-patriotic education center in occupied Sevastopol in 2025-2027 that will train about 5,000 Ukrainian children annually. The “Avangard” centers reportedly cooperate with the Russian Volunteer Society for Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy of Russia (DOSAAF), and the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) will reportedly use the new “Avangard” center in Sevastopol to recruit personnel from occupied Crimea. Yevpatoria occupation administration head Elena Demidova announced in October 2023 that Russian occupation officials opened an “Avangard” center in the “Gagarin” children’s health camp in occupied Yevpatoria, Crimea, which reportedly accepted its first group of 100 ninth-through-eleventh grade students in early October 2023, to teach Ukrainian children basic Russian military training and organize “patriotic leisure activities.”[63] Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported in August 2023 that the Russian Investigative Committee and its head, Alexander Bastrykin, were using toys, clothes, and school supplies to coerce Ukrainian children in orphanages in Russia to join the Russian cadet corps and that Bastrykin ordered some Russian cadets corps to prepare to receive Ukrainian children from occupied Ukraine as early as February 25, 2022.[64]

Russian authorities continue to use financial incentives to encourage Russian civilians to voluntarily sign contracts for military service with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Russian outlet Kommersant reported on March 11 that Tatarstan regional authorities temporarily increased the signing bonus for signing a contract to join the Russian military from 305,000 rubles (about $3,300) to 400,000 rubles (about $4,300) until March 25.[65] A Russian insider source claimed on March 17 that taxi drivers are reporting an increased number of advertisements on taxi driver forums offering monetary bonuses for joining the Russian military.[66]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine) 

Nothing significant to report.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

Note: ISW will be publishing its coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts on a weekly basis in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. ISW will continue to track developments in Ukrainian defense industrial efforts daily and will refer to these efforts in assessments within the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment and other ISW products when necessary.

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Note: ISW will be publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas twice a week in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. ISW will continue to track activities in Russian-occupied areas daily and will refer to these activities in assessments within the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment and other ISW products when necessary. 

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

The March 2024 Russian presidential election concluded on March 17, and Russian President Vladimir Putin is the likely victor as expected. Russian state newswire TASS reported that exit polls suggest that 87 percent of voters voted for Putin, which is congruent with ISW’s previous assessments that the Kremlin aims to portray public support for Putin at about 80 percent.[67] Russian authorities continue efforts to portray the Russian presidential election as a popular and legitimate election, including by claiming that voter turnout exceeded 90 percent in some federal subjects and that the overall voter turnout was 70 percent as of 15:45 Moscow time on March 17, exceeding the alleged turnout of 67.54 percent of the last 2018 Russian presidential election.[68] Senior Russian officials continued to accuse the West of interfering in the election and claimed that attempts to divide Russia only united Russians around the election and Putin, even as demonstrations against the choreographed election continued in Russia.[69] Russians across the country and the global Russian diaspora organized large-scale “Noon against Putin” protests, lining up en masse at noon on March 17 to vote against Putin so that a surge of ballots against Putin simultaneously would complicate the Kremlin’s efforts to falsify votes in Putin’s favor.[70] Many Russian opposition outlets posted imagery showing anti-war slogans written on election ballots.[71] Russian authorities continued to crack down on certain demonstrators who damaged ballot boxes or polling centers, reportedly detaining at least 75 Russians on March 17 alone.[72] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian military veterans and athletes attempted to argue with and disperse demonstrators against the choreographed election.[73]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 

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[1] https://suspilne dot media/707418-makron-ne-bude-miru-v-evropi-akso-ukraina-bude-zmusena-kapituluvati/

[2] https://suspilne dot media/707418-makron-ne-bude-miru-v-evropi-akso-ukraina-bude-zmusena-kapituluvati/ ; https://www.kyivpost dot com/uk/post/29641

[3] https://suspilne dot media/707418-makron-ne-bude-miru-v-evropi-akso-ukraina-bude-zmusena-kapituluvati/

[4] https://www.leparisien dot fr/politique/emmanuel-macron-sur-lukraine-peut-etre-qua-un-moment-donne-il-faudra-avoir-des-operations-sur-le-terrain-16-03-2024-ZJUB5CCX2FCMFCJE7552HIUPWY.php ; https://archive dot is/piUsm

[5] https://suspilne dot media/707430-francia-zaproponue-pripinenna-vognu-v-ukraini-na-cas-olimpijskih-igor-makron/

[6] https://t.me/tass_agency/237092; https://t.me/tass_agency/237199 ; https://t.me/sashakots/45593 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/10018 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/54841; https://t.me/tass_agency/237251

[7] https://suspilne dot media/707430-francia-zaproponue-pripinenna-vognu-v-ukraini-na-cas-olimpijskih-igor-makron/

[8] https://suspilne dot media/707580-sbu-atakuvala-dronami-slovanskij-npz-u-krasnodarskomu-krai-rosii-dzerela/

[9] https://t.me/tass_agency/237108 ; https://t.me/opershtab23/7996

[10] https://t.me/rybar/58236

[11] ttps://suspilne dot media/707580-sbu-atakuvala-dronami-slovanskij-npz-u-krasnodarskomu-krai-rosii-dzerela/

[12] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/54848

[13] https://t.me/milinfolive/118400

[14] https://t.me/tv_pmr/53981;; https://t.me/novostipmrcom/53948 ;  https://t.me/novostipmrcom/53953 ; https://t.me/tv_pmr/53986 ; https://t.me/tv_pmr/53985 ; https://t.me/novostipmrcom/53952

[15] https://rtvi dot com/news/v-pridnestrove-dron-podorval-staryj-mi-8-moldova-ne-priznala-eto-napadeniem/

[16] https://gov dot md/ro/content/comentariul-biroului-politici-de-reintegrare

[17] https://gov dot md/ro/content/comentariul-biroului-politici-de-reintegrare

[18] https://t.me/RBC_ua_news/87758; https://www.rbc dot ua/rus/news/sumah-tizhden-vidpravlyayut-ditsadki-distantsiyku-1710692565.html

[19] https://t.me/CenterCounteringDisinformation/9636

[20] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022324

[21] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022824 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031324 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022824 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030824; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030724; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030124 ;

[22] https://t.me/legionoffreedom/1161 ; https://t.me/SiberianBattalion/257

[23] https://t.me/warfakes/21086 ; https://t.me/warfakebelgorod/2876 ; https://t.me/rosgvardia67/34281 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/63925   ; https://t.me/rusich_army/13682 ;

[24] https://t.me/mod_russia/36717 ; https://t.me/vrogov/14779 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/9803  https://t.me/epoddubny/19393; https://t.me/wargonzo/18792 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/37131 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/37133 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/63884 ; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/9015 ; https://t.me/rsotmdivision/14559 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/118441 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/15019  ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/54849 ; https://t.me/rybar/58238 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/37135; https://t.me/dva_majors/37136 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/63887 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/15021  

 

[25] https://t.me/epoddubny/19393; https://t.me/wargonzo/18792 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/37131 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/37133 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/63884 ; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/9015 ; https://t.me/rsotmdivision/14559 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/118441 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/15019  ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/54849 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/19396

[26] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/ekipazhi-helikopteriv-black-hawk-hur-mo-ukrainy-prodovzhuiut-boiovu-robotu.html

[27] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/15015 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/15016 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/13682 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/13673 ; https://t.me/rsotmdivision/14547 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/118453 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/63851 ; https://t.me/rybar/58247 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/37155 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/18785 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/37071 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/37065 ; https://t.me/control_sigma/28356 ; https://t.me/rybar/58234 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/37089

[28] https://t.me/mod_russia/36707

[29] https://t.me/mod_russia/36707

[30] https://t.me/mod_russia/36707

[31] https://www.gazeta dot ru/army/news/2024/03/17/22566703.shtml; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-10-2024

[32] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-14-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/special-edition-campaign-assessment-ukraine%E2%80%99s-strike-campaign-against-crimea; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-strikes-have-changed-russian-naval-operations-black-sea

[33] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid026NgUGgSt9uQ7NysgUP2pLBB4KcodqizHx9Km7vW6ZNttwUCLf67gxRY2vLqFkoPVl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Mrw9qd9Bzc4joJdtUEXuCJgVvdzVqGuiSt3DEYthgpPbciYzxYs1JhtRUwJF7Kdhl; https://suspilne dot media/707566-na-sumsini-trom-rosijskim-drg-zavadili-probratisa-vglib-ukraini-dpsu/; https://t.me/DPSUkr/18924 ; https://www.facebook.com/DPSUkraine/posts/pfbid02sp2hJ2KJoLw7LqP6btifTuv48jF8ojpMB9mmEtEa2umVnw2SPqwL8mrxkFxWwigTl

[34] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-16-2024

[35] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036Rjk5u3JsfAxjgxY2ELbdLGYjhEjG97t43aXvLUa9vzxsSqznszNvjkAwPTxgMFZl; https://t.me/mod_russia/36711; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid026NgUGgSt9uQ7NysgUP2pLBB4KcodqizHx9Km7vW6ZNttwUCLf67gxRY2vLqFkoPVl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Mrw9qd9Bzc4joJdtUEXuCJgVvdzVqGuiSt3DEYthgpPbciYzxYs1JhtRUwJF7Kdhl; https://t.me/rybar/58234 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/37089

[36] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/4594 (Bilohorivka); https://t.me/rybar/58230 (Lysychansk)

[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036Rjk5u3JsfAxjgxY2ELbdLGYjhEjG97t43aXvLUa9vzxsSqznszNvjkAwPTxgMFZl

[38] https://t.me/sons_fatherland/13287

[39] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036Rjk5u3JsfAxjgxY2ELbdLGYjhEjG97t43aXvLUa9vzxsSqznszNvjkAwPTxgMFZl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid026NgUGgSt9uQ7NysgUP2pLBB4KcodqizHx9Km7vW6ZNttwUCLf67gxRY2vLqFkoPVl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Mrw9qd9Bzc4joJdtUEXuCJgVvdzVqGuiSt3DEYthgpPbciYzxYs1JhtRUwJF7Kdhl; https://t.me/rybar/58228; https://t.me/rybar/58234 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/37089; https://t.me/wargonzo/18785; https://t.me/mod_russia/36711

[40] https://t.me/fronttyagach82/512 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/37100 (Bakhmut direction); https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/4595 (Klishchiivka)

[41] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1769109313786704378?s=20; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1769109320581407131?s=20; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1769109317112811995?s=20; https://t.me/brigade_53/376; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/4775; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8367

[42] https://t.me/lumieregroup/119; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/12432

[43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036Rjk5u3JsfAxjgxY2ELbdLGYjhEjG97t43aXvLUa9vzxsSqznszNvjkAwPTxgMFZl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid026NgUGgSt9uQ7NysgUP2pLBB4KcodqizHx9Km7vW6ZNttwUCLf67gxRY2vLqFkoPVl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Mrw9qd9Bzc4joJdtUEXuCJgVvdzVqGuiSt3DEYthgpPbciYzxYs1JhtRUwJF7Kdhl; https://t.me/mod_russia/36711;

[44] https://t.me/Fab_1500/55; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/4779

[45] https://x.com/Ukraine_Twi/status/1769408049700126789?s=20; https://x.com/klinger66/status/1769422960245236091?s=20; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1769405963990192489?s=20; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1769416693237928317?s=20

[46] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036Rjk5u3JsfAxjgxY2ELbdLGYjhEjG97t43aXvLUa9vzxsSqznszNvjkAwPTxgMFZl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid026NgUGgSt9uQ7NysgUP2pLBB4KcodqizHx9Km7vW6ZNttwUCLf67gxRY2vLqFkoPVl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Mrw9qd9Bzc4joJdtUEXuCJgVvdzVqGuiSt3DEYthgpPbciYzxYs1JhtRUwJF7Kdhl; https://t.me/rybar/58228; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/9004

[47] https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/9004

[48] https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/8999

[49] https://t.me/mod_russia/36711 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/36709

[50] https://t.me/voin_dv/7534 (Staromayorske)

[51] https://t.me/mod_russia/36711 ; https://t.me/rybar/58237 ; https://t.me/vrogov/14776 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/7533

[52] https://t.me/rybar/58234 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/37089 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/18785

[53] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036Rjk5u3JsfAxjgxY2ELbdLGYjhEjG97t43aXvLUa9vzxsSqznszNvjkAwPTxgMFZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid026NgUGgSt9uQ7NysgUP2pLBB4KcodqizHx9Km7vW6ZNttwUCLf67gxRY2vLqFkoPVl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Mrw9qd9Bzc4joJdtUEXuCJgVvdzVqGuiSt3DEYthgpPbciYzxYs1JhtRUwJF7Kdhl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/18785 ; https://t.me/batalyon15/3976

[54] https://t.me/dva_majors/37059

[55] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid026NgUGgSt9uQ7NysgUP2pLBB4KcodqizHx9Km7vW6ZNttwUCLf67gxRY2vLqFkoPVl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Mrw9qd9Bzc4joJdtUEXuCJgVvdzVqGuiSt3DEYthgpPbciYzxYs1JhtRUwJF7Kdhl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036Rjk5u3JsfAxjgxY2ELbdLGYjhEjG97t43aXvLUa9vzxsSqznszNvjkAwPTxgMFZl ; https://t.me/rybar/58234 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/37089

[56] https://t.me/rybar/58234 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/37089

[57] https://t.me/kpszsu/11940

[58] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/03/17/rosiya-atakuvala-mykolayiv-balistykoyu-5-poranenyh-poshkodzheno-pryvatni-budynky/ ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/03/17/udaru-po-mykolayevu-zavdano-balistychnoyu-raketoyu-iskander-m-iz-terytoriyi-krymu/

[59] https://t.me/kpszsu/11940

[60] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/7253 

[61] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/17655

[62] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/kreml-rozbudovuye-merezhu-zakladiv-militaryzatsiyi-molodi/

[63] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2023

[64] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Aug%207%20Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%20PDF_0.pdf

[65] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6561656

[66] https://t.me/vchkogpu/46653

[67] https://t.me/tass_agency/237351; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-8-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Oct%209%20Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%20PDF.pdf

[68] https://t.me/idelrealii/34347; https://t.me/bbcrussian/62261

[69] https://t.me/tass_agency/237285; https://t.me/tass_agency/237298; https://t.me/tass_agency/237299; https://t.me/tass_agency/237300; https://t.me/tass_agency/237300; https://t.me/tass_agency/237321  ; https://t.me/tass_agency/237322; https://t.me/tass_agency/237323; https://t.me/MID_Russia/36539; https://t.me/MID_Russia/36611 

[70] https://meduza dot io/feature/2024/03/17/v-berline-proshla-odna-iz-samyh-massovyh-aktsiy-protiv-putina-v-posledniy-den-golosovaniya-na-vyborah-fotografii ; https://t.me/idelrealii/34383 ; https://t.me/severrealii/23774; https://www.severreal.org/a/gossmi-rasskazali-ob-ogromnyh-ocheredyah-na-vyborah-za-granitsey-ne-ukazav-v-chem-ih-prichina/32865145.html; https://t.me/MariaVladimirovnaZakharova/7432 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/77346; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/03/17/ovd-info-bolee-50-rossiyan-zaderzhany-v-posledniy-den-golosovaniya-na-vyborah-prezidenta; https://ovd dot info/2024/03/17/vybory-prezidenta-rossii-spisok-zaderzhannykh-17032024-g ; https://t.me/idelrealii/34370  ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/62264; https://t.me/svobodnieslova/4390; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/03/17/v-armenii-i-kazahstane-ocheredi-k-uchastkam-dlya-golosovaniya-na-vyborah-prezidenta-rf-rastyanulis-na-sotni-metrov;

[71] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/17980 ; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/17982 ; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/17983 ; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/17984  ; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/17987;  https://t.me/mobilizationnews/17988 ; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/17989 ; https://t.me/astrapress/51211 ; https://t.me/astrapress/51278 ; https://t.me/astrapress/51299; https://t.me/sotaproject/77214; 

[72] https://meduza dot io/news/2024/03/17/ovd-info-bolee-50-rossiyan-zaderzhany-v-posledniy-den-golosovaniya-na-vyborah-prezidenta; https://ovd dot info/2024/03/17/vybory-prezidenta-rossii-spisok-zaderzhannykh-17032024-g ; https://t.me/idelrealii/34370  ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/62264; https://t.me/svobodnieslova/4390

[73] https://t.me/sashakots/45595