Russia Set to Gain Ground in Ukrainian Elections

By Andrea Snyder

Russia will likely gain political ground in Ukraine regardless of the outcome of the upcoming 2019 Ukrainian Presidential and Parliamentary Elections scheduled respectively for March 31 and October 27. The majority of the leading presidential candidates are amenable in some degree to the Kremlin. Current Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko is the candidate most aligned with the West but his popular support has slipped due to his inability to deliver on key anti-corruption reforms as well as a sustained disinformation campaign by Russia. If Poroshenko wins the election, it will likely only be by a slim margin and his political bloc still stands to lose seats in the subsequent parliamentary elections. His opponents, by contrast, are populists willing to offer concessions to the Kremlin or politicians openly favorable towards Russia and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Russia thus stands to advance its core strategic objectives in Ukraine - namely, reasserting political control over the Government of Ukraine and preventing its integration with the West. Russia must also extort or otherwise gain access to a supply of freshwater for the occupied Crimean Peninsula. Many of the presidential and parliamentary candidates are likely willing to support these types of concessions in exchange for limited economic or military deals with the Kremlin. Russia has deliberately cultivated these relationships with a wide range of politicians, shifting away from its prior tactics of investing in one major candidate or political party in Ukraine.

Ukraine’s Western-oriented political reformists are active and still have a chance to make progress in the 2019 Ukrainian Parliamentary Election. The U.S. should engage with and support these reformists, who are facing pressures in advance of both elections, in order to counter Russia. Preserving reformers within the Government of Ukraine - particularly the Ukrainian Parliament - will be critical to Ukraine’s ability to withstand subversion by Russia and defend its pursuit of closer ties with the EU and NATO.

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[1] [“Electoral Orientation of Ukraine’s Population: The Last Week of February 2019,”] Social Monitoring Center, March 4, 2019, https://smc.org(.)ua/news/elektoralni-oriyentatsiyi-naselennya-ukrayiny-ostannya-dekada-lyutogo-2019-roku/;

[“Monitoring Electoral Mood of Ukrainians: February 2019,”] Rating Group Ukraine, March 4, 2019, http://ratinggroup(.)ua/research/ukraine/monitoring_elektoralnyh_nastroeniy_ukraincev_fevral_2019.html; [“Electoral Orientations and Protest Structures of Ukrainians in the Active Phase of the Election Campaign,”] Institute for Analysis and Forecasting, March 4, 2019, http://www.iap.org(.)ua/?p=976; [“Electoral Orientation of Ukrainian Citizens (March 2019),”] Sofia Center for Social Studies, March 2019, https://www.sofia-sociology.com(.)ua/elektoralni-oriyentaciyi-lutij-2019; [“Public-Political Mood of the Population of Ukraine: February 2019, No. 2,”] Blue Dawn Monitoring, February 22, 2019, https://www.slideshare(.)net/UkrN/blue-dawn-monitoring-2019-2; [“Four Leaders of the Presidential Race Have Been Identified,”] Advanced Legal Initiatives, February 16, 2019, http://ppi.org(.)ua/news/khto_bude_u_drugomu_turi_zmagatisja_z_zelenskim/2019-02-18-345.

[2] [“Biography of Petro Oleksiyovych Poroshenko,”] Ukrainian Central Election Commission, February 7, 2019, http://www.cvk.gov(.)ua/pls/vp2019/WP005?PT021F01=295&PT001F01=719; Photo Credit: [“Official Portrait of Petro Poroshenko,”] Digital Image, March 15, 2014, Accessed on Presidency of Ukraine, https://www.president.gov(.)ua/photos/official-photos.

[3] “Ukraine's Poroshenko: Billionaire Candy Man, Veteran Politician,” Voice of America, May 25, 2014, https://www.voanews.com/a/ukraines-poroshenko-billionaire-candy-man-veteran-politician/1922373.html.

[4] Agata Wierzbowska-Miazga and Tadeusz Olszanski, “Poroshenko, President of Ukraine,” Centre for Eastern Studies, May 28, 2014, https://www.osw.waw(.)pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2014-05-28/poroshenko-president-ukraine.

[5] [“Biography of Yulia Volodymyrivna Tymoshenko,”] Ukrainian Central Election Commission, January 25, 2019, http://www.cvk.gov(.)ua/pls/vp2019/WP005?PT021F01=225&PT001F01=719; Photo Credit: Thomas Barthelet, “Tymoshenko 2010,” Digital Image, November 17, 2009, Accessed on Flickr, https://www.flickr.com/photos/tommybart2000/4308117555/.

[6] [“Biography of Yulia Volodymyrivna Tymoshenko,”] Civil Movement Chesno, February 25, 2019, https://www.chesno(.)org/politician/26674/.

[7] “Russia and Ukraine Agree Gas Deal,” The Guardian, January 18, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jan/18/russia-ukraine-gas-deal.

[8] Taras Kuzio, “Ukraine’s Populists Push Through Anti-IMF Yet Pro-EU Message,” Kyiv Post, November 8, 2018, https://www.kyivpost.com/article/opinion/op-ed/taras-kuzio-ukraines-populists-push-through-their-contradictory-anti-imf-yet-pro-eu-message.html.

[9] [“Election Program of Yulia Volodymyrivna Tymoshenko,”] Ukrainian Central Election Commission, February 25, 2019, http://www.cvk.gov(.)ua/pls/vp2019/WP009?PT021F01=225&PT001F01=719.

[10] Ariana Gic, “Yulia Tymoshenko is a Threat to Pro-EU Reforms in Ukraine,” Emerging Europe, February 1, 2019, https://emerging-europe.com/voices/yulia-tymoshenko-is-a-threat-to-pro-eu-reforms-in-ukraine/.

[11] [“Biography of Volodymyr Olekcandrovich Zelensky,”] Ukrainian Central Election Commission, January 30, 2019. http://www.cvk.gov(.)ua/pls/vp2019/WP005?PT021F01=233&PT001F01=719; Photo Credit: Kvartal95 Official, [“Volodymyr Zelensky 2018,”] Digital Image, July 24, 2016, Accessed on Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:%D0%92%D0%BB%D0%B0%D0%B4%D0%B8%D0%BC%D0%B8%D1%80_%D0%97%D0%B5%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%B9_2018_(1).jpg.

[12] [“Zelensky Announced His Decision to Go to the Presidency (Video),”] UNIAN, January 1, 2019, https://www.unian(.)ua/elections/10396374-zelenskiy-zayaviv-pro-rishennya-yti-u-prezidenti-video.html.

[13] Mykola Vorobiov, “Oligarchs and Their Media Outlets Influence Ukrainian Presidential Elections,” Eurasia Daily Monitor Vol. 16, No. 19 (February 2019), https://jamestown.org/program/oligarchs-and-their-media-outlets-influence-ukrainian-presidential-elections/; “Rule by Oligarchs: Kiev Appoints Billionaires to Govern East,” Russia Today, March 4, 2014, https://www.rt(.)com/news/ukraine-oligarch-rule-governors-512/.

Bermet Talant, “Kolomoisky Rails Against Ukraine and Poroshenko,” Kyiv Post, November 23, 2018, https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/kolomoisky-rails-against-ukraine-and-poroshenko.html.

[14] [“Election Program of Volodymyr Olekcandrovich Zelensky,”] Ukrainian Central Election Commission, February 27, 2019, http://www.cvk.gov(.)ua/pls/vp2019/WP009?PT021F01=233&PT001F01=719.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Konstantin Skorkin, “How a Comedian Will Change Ukraine’s Election,” Carnegie Moscow Center, January 1, 2019, https://carnegie(.)ru/commentary/78218.

[18] [“Biography of Yuriy Anatolievich Boyko,”] Ukrainian Central Election Commission, January 22, 2019, http://www.cvk.gov(.)ua/pls/vp2019/WP005?PT021F01=216&PT001F01=719; Photo Credit: Vadim Chuprina, “Boiko Yurii Wiki,” Digital Image January 29, 2019, Accessed on Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Boiko_Yurii_Wiki_Vadim_Chuprina.jpg.

[19] Vorobiov, “Oligarchs and Their Media Outlets,” https://jamestown.org/program/oligarchs-and-their-media-outlets-influence-ukrainian-presidential-elections/.

[20] Shaun Walker, “Ukrainian Businessman Dmytro Firtash Arrested After Extradition Ruling,” The Guardian, February 21, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/21/austria-grants-us-request-to-extradite-ukrainian-mogul-dmytro-firtash; Vorobiov, “Oligarchs and Their Media Outlets,” https://jamestown.org/program/oligarchs-and-their-media-outlets-influence-ukrainian-presidential-elections/.

[21] Vorobiov, “Oligarchs and Their Media Outlets,” https://jamestown.org/program/oligarchs-and-their-media-outlets-influence-ukrainian-presidential-elections/.

[22] [“Election Program of Yuriy Anatolievich Boyko,”] Ukrainian Central Election Commission, February 27, 2019, http://www.cvk.gov(.)ua/pls/vp2019/WP009?PT021F01=216&PT001F01=719.

[23] Roman Kravets [“Odd-Man-Out: Why Lyovochkin and Medvedchuk Are Preparing for the Election Without Akhmetov,”] Pravda, November 20, 2018, https://www.pravda.com(.)ua/articles/2018/11/20/7198714/; [“Leader of the Ukrainian Party ‘Nashi’ Withdrew His Candidacy from the Elections,”] Radio Svoboda, March 7, 2019, https://www.svoboda(.)org/a/29809132.html.

[24] [“Biography of Oleksandr Yuriyovych Vilkul,”] Ukrainian Central Election Commission, January 25, 2019, http://www.cvk.gov(.)ua/pls/vp2019/WP005?PT021F01=224&PT001F01=719; Photo Credit: Catrifle, [“Oleksandr Yuriyovych Vilkul 2017,”] Digital Image, January 31, 2018, Accessed on Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:%D0%90%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%BA%D1%81%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B4%D1%80_%D0%AE%D1%80%D1%8C%D0%B5%D0%B2%D0%B8%D1%87_%D0%92%D0%B8%D0%BB%D0%BA%D1%83%D0%BB_2017%D0%B3.jpg.

[25] Vorobiov, “Oligarchs and Their Media Outlets,” https://jamestown.org/program/oligarchs-and-their-media-outlets-influence-ukrainian-presidential-elections/

[26] [“Leader of the Ukrainian Party ‘Nashi’ Withdrew His Candidacy from the Elections,”] https://www.svoboda(.)org/a/29809132.html.

[27] [“Biography of Oleh Valerievich Lyashko,”] Ukrainian Central Election Commission, January 25, 2019, http://www.cvk.gov(.)ua/pls/vp2019/WP005?PT021F01=220&PT001F01=719; Photo Credit: Vadim Chuprina, [“Lyashko, Oleg Valerievich,”] Digital Image, November 9, 2015, Accessed on Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:%D0%9B%D1%8F%D1%88%D0%BA%D0%BE,_%D0%9E%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%B3_%D0%92%D0%B0%D0%BB%D0%B5%D1%80%D1%8C%D0%B5%D0%B2%D0%B8%D1%87_0076_%D0%A7%D1%83%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B0_%D0%92%D0%B0%D0%B4%D0%B8%D0%BC_%D0%90_(cropped).jpg.

[28] [“Biography of Oleh Valerievich Lyashko,”] Ukrainian Central Election Commission, January 25, 2019, http://www.cvk.gov(.)ua/pls/vp2019/WP005?PT021F01=220&PT001F01=719.

[29] Oleksiy Bratuschak, [“Lyashko Becomes a Mascot of Akhmetov,”] Pravda, May 9, 2018, https://blogs.pravda.com(.)ua/authors/bratushchak/5af3507e21111/.

[30] Andrew Wilson, “Ukrainian Elections: Poroshenko and Proliferating Populists,” European Council on Foreign Relations, May 23, 2018, https://www.ecfr(.)eu/article/commentary_ukrainian_elections_poroshenko_and_proliferating_populists.

[31] “Europe Is Divided by a Line of Blood,” EU Today, October 13, 2017, https://eutoday(.)net/news/politics/2017/europe-is-divided-by-a-line-of-blood.

[32] “‘There Will Be No EU in 5 Years, Only Ukraine’ – Radical Party MP,” Russia Today, March 4, 2016, https://www.rt(.)com/news/334573-lyashko-eu-schengen-dissolution/; Volodymyr Yermolenko, “Ukraine’s New Populists: Who They Are and Why They’re Dangerous,” Atlantic Council, May 17, 2018, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraine-s-new-populists-who-they-are-and-why-they-re-dangerous.

[33] [“Biography of Anatoliy Stepanovich Hrytsenko,”] Ukrainian Central Election Commission, January 15, 2019, http://www.cvk.gov(.)ua/pls/vp2019/WP005?PT021F01=208&PT001F01=719; Photo Credit: Antje Wildgrube, “42nd Munich Security Conference 2006: Anatoliy Hrytsenko, Minister of Defense, Ukraine,” Digital Image, February 4, 2006, Accessed on Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Msc_2006-Saturday,_16.00_-_18.00-Grytsenko.jpg.

Turkey and Russia Prepared to Launch Joint Military Patrols in Syria’s Idlib

By Elizabeth Teoman with the ISW Syria Team

Key Takeaway: Growing Turkish-Russian military cooperation in Syria is a dangerous sign of a wider shift to a closer strategic relationship between Turkey and Russia. Russia gave Turkey permission to fly air sorties into Northern Syria as part of an agreement for joint military patrols along the frontlines in Greater Idlib Province. The Turkish Armed Forces began joint frontline patrols with pro-regime forces on March 8 with accompanying overflights by the Turkish Air Force. The Turkish-Russian agreement in Idlib Province demonstrates that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is failing in his attempts to spoil the de-escalation zone in Northern Syria brokered by Russia, Iran, and Turkey in 2017. Turkey will likely soon begin independent joint patrols with the Russian Armed Forces. Turkey and Russia began joint patrols of a separate area near Tel Rifaat north of Aleppo City on February 14. Turkey’s deepening relationship with Russia in Syria decreases the likelihood that the U.S. will reach a negotiated agreement with Turkey over the status of Eastern Syria. Russia intends to use its engagement with Turkey in Western Syria to set conditions to cooperate with Turkey against the U.S.-Led Coalition and its partnered Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Eastern Syria. ISW is closely following the evolving situation in Idlib Province and will provide further updates as necessary.

The graphic below depicts the approximate route of the recent Turkish patrol based on open sources.

Disposition of Adversary & Friendly Forces in Eastern Syria: March 2019

By ISW Research Team

Key Takeaway: U.S. President Donald Trump’s recent decision to keep a residual force of at least 400 troops in Syria prevents the immediate takeover of valuable natural resources and infrastructure in Eastern Syria by Iran, Assad, and Russia. These actors nonetheless still have options that could lead to the defeat or expulsion of U.S. forces. The residual U.S. forces will operate at Al-Tanf on the Syrian-Jordanian Border as well as in Northern and Eastern Syria across the Euphrates River. The garrison at Al-Tanf is relatively defensible with secure supply lines to Jordan as well as a limited tactical requirement to defend the base and a surrounding fifty-five kilometer exclusion zone, which includes the Rukban IDP Camp. The U.S. is significantly more vulnerable east of the Euphrates River. Iran, Assad, and Russia are building up forces west of the Euphrates River and using outreach to local tribes to gain footholds on its eastern bank. Even a limited drawdown by the U.S. will create security gaps east of the Euphrates River that could be exploited by Iran, Assad, and Russia.

Map Methodology: This graphic depicts the disposition of both adversary and partnered forces deployed at key infrastructure locations and urban centers in Eastern Syria and Western Iraq. Position locations are based on information available in open sources reviewed by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). The list of locations and forces depicted on this graphic is not exhaustive but rather meant to show the presence of forces at assessed locations of vital strategic value or likely escalation. It also does not provide an assessment of the size of the deployed forces or their integration into wider command-and-control structures. The graphic does not depict the specific deployment locations of U.S.-Led Anti-ISIS Coalition forces beyond the garrison at Al-Tanf.  ISW will continue to update this dataset and publish updates as necessary. U.S. and allied government readers may contact ISW to request more details on the specific units and forces represented generally on this graphic.

Syria Situation Report: February 18 - March 5, 2019

By ISW's Syria Team and Syria Direct

The following graphic marks the latest installment of the Syria Situation Report (SITREP) Map made possible through a partnership between the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and Syria Direct. The map depicts significant developments in the war in Syria during the period February 18 - March 5, 2019.

Click image to enlarge

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ISIS Re-Establishes Historical Sanctuary in Iraq

By: Brandon Wallace

Key Takeaway: ISIS’s post-Caliphate insurgency in Iraq is accelerating faster than efforts to prevent it by the U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition. ISIS is re-establishing capable insurgent networks in multiple historical strongholds and linking them together, setting the conditions for future offensive operations against the Government of Iraq. The U.S. and its partners should not view the current relative security in Baghdad as confirmation of the defeat of ISIS. The U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition’s strategy to enable Iraq to “independently manage” an insurgency through intelligence support and other building partner capacity efforts will likely fail to prevent ISIS from regaining momentum based on its current trajectory in Iraq. 

1) ISIS has established and strengthened a durable support zone in the vicinity of Hawija in Kirkuk Province since September 2017

• The System: Hawija is a historical stronghold for ISIS and its predecessor al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) with a sympathetic population of Sunni Arabs. The Hamrin Mountains near Hawija enable north-south transit from Ninewa Province to Diyala Province. The mountains also provide durable sanctuary from airstrikes and ground clearing operations.

• Resurgent ISIS Activity: ISIS ceded territorial control of Hawija to the U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition in October 2017 in order to preserve its forces and resources to mount a future insurgency in Northern Iraq. ISIS preserved much of these capabilities in the Hamrin Mountains but also embedded cells within the civilian population around Hawija. The military escalation between the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) against Iraqi Kurdistan along the Disputed Internal Boundaries (DIBs) in October 2017 created security gaps that provided additional opportunities for ISIS to resurge near Hawija. ISIS began to conduct and claim insurgent attacks against the ISF and PMF by December 2017, when a member of the Iraqi Council of Representatives warned that at least “1000” ISIS fighters were operating near Hawija.[1] By May 2018, ISIS had expanded its local operations to include extortion and the destruction of crops in order to generate revenue and degrade popular confidence in the ability of security forces.[2] ISIS also continued to develop its support infrastructure in the Hamrin Mountains. ISIS had reportedly established permanent infrastructure including training camps, courts, and militant housing in Hamrin by September 2018.[3] The ISF failed to clear ISIS from Hawija despite major clearing operations in April 2018. [4]

2) ISIS is forming a durable support zone in the Northern Diyala River Valley.

• The System: Diyala Province is a frequent target of sectarian violence given its population mix of Shi’a Arabs, Sunni Arabs, and Kurds. The Iraqi Government and Iraqi Kurdistan dispute zones in majority-Kurdish Northern Diyala Province, generating instability that can be exploited by ISIS. The Diyala River Valley (DRV) holds a dense network of orchards which provide cover for insurgent activity. The Hamrin Mountains end in Northern Diyala Province, connecting it to Kirkuk and Ninewa Provinces. The PMF and ISF claimed to clear ISIS from Diyala Province in January 2015 without support from the U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition.

• Resurgent ISIS Activity: ISIS has waged a slow but steady campaign of attacks to increase its freedom of movement in Diyala Province January 2015. In July 2018, ISIS accelerated its efforts to re-establish a support zone in a region stretching from Khanaqin to Muqdadiyah and Lake Hamrin in Northern Diyala Province. ISIS reinforced this campaign by transiting fighters from Kirkuk Province to Diyala Province via the Hamrin Mountains, according to local security officials.[5] ISIS operates safe houses near Lake Hamrin that direct militants further on into DRV. Local Kurds fled as many as thirty small villages near Khanaqin between July - November 2018 under pressure from ISIS.[6] A member of the Diyala Provincial Council issued a failed call for a state of emergency and tribal mobilization near Khanaqin in November 2018.[7] Local officials confirmed that ISIS de facto controls several villages near Muqdadiyah in January 2019.[8] Local security forces conduct frequent clearing operations in the area with little effect.

3) ISIS is developing an attack and transit vector south of Baqubah City, Diyala Province.

• The System: Baqubah links networks in Northern Diyala Province to the Northern Baghdad Belts. Buhriz Subdistrict south of Baqubah features dense palm groves that provide ideal conditions for a sustained insurgency. AQI historically projected attack cells southward from Buhriz through Khan Bani Saad into Northern Baghdad. ISIS attempted but failed to seize Buhriz in March 2014 during its territorial campaign in Diyala Province. 

• Resurgent ISIS Activity: ISIS is expanding its operations in its durable support zone near Buhriz. ISIS began conducting hit-and-run attacks near Buhriz in mid-2018.[9] ISIS later escalated its attack tempo against security forces, local tribal figures, and commercial sites in Buhriz in January 2019. Buhriz Subdistrict was “almost under the control of ISIS” by February 2019, according to an anonymous security source.[10] A member of the Iraqi Council of Representatives called on the Government of Iraq to deploy additional troops to prevent a “serious security deterioration” in Diyala Province on February 28, 2019.[11] ISIS will likely leverage its presence in Buhriz to attack both south into Baghdad and north into Baqubah, from which it could ultimately project force farther along the DRV and connect with its support zones in Northern Diyala Province. 

4) ISIS is building out a support zone in the Northern Baghdad Belts that connects its operations in Diyala and Anbar Provinces. 

• The System: AQI historically used the zone from Karmah to Taji and Tarmiyah in the Northern Baghdad Belts as a support zone to launch attacks into Baghdad as well as transit fighters and supplies between Anbar, Salah ad-Din, and Diyala Provinces.

• Resurgent ISIS Activity: ISIS retained a latent presence in the Northern Baghdad Belts, which were never adequately cleared by the ISF and PMF. ISIS has thus far limited its attacks in this area to small-scale raids and SVESTs but it is attempting to develop a more robust network. The ISF detained a school principal for providing a safe house for a suicide bomber in Tarmiyah in April 2018. The Iraqi Ministry of Interior later claimed to disrupt an ISIS VBIED cell north of Baghdad in September 2018.[12] ISIS has also established several cells near Karmah in Anbar Province since October 2018.[13] The U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition maintains a footprint at Camp Taji that enables it to facilitate raids by the ISF that have disrupted but not dismantled ISIS in the Northern Baghdad Belts.

5) ISIS is expanding a support zone in the southwestern quadrant of the Baghdad Belts.

• The System: The so-called “Triangle of Death” in the Southern Baghdad Belts stretches from south of Fallujah through Amariyat al-Fallujah and Jurf al-Sakhar into Northern Babil Province. This system links ISIS in Anbar Province to Baghdad and Babil Province. ISIS used its a presence in this area to support its operations in Fallujah in 2014. ISIS later seized control of Jurf al-Sakhar and declared an official province for its operations in Northern Babil Province in 2014. ISIS used several VBIED factories near Amariyat al-Fallujah in its defense of Fallujah against the U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition. 

• Resurgent ISIS Activity: ISIS has re-established a support zone near Amariyat al-Fallujah to attack into Fallujah as of August 2018. ISIS attempted a motorcycle-borne suicide bombing of a popular restaurant in Fallujah in August 2018.[14] In October 2018, ISIS detonated its first VBIED in Fallujah since the city’s recapture by the U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition in June 2016. ISIS likely produced the VBIED using historical production sites in Amariyat al-Fallujah or Southern Fallujah. The ISF discovered sophisticated tunnel networks entering Fallujah from the direction of Amariyat al-Fallujah in January 2019.[15] ISIS likely used the tunnels to infiltrate cells into the city. Security forces later arrested more than 180 individuals connected to ISIS in Fallujah in February 2019.[16] ISIS has also begun using its support zone in Amariyat al-Fallujah to project force south towards Jurf al-Sakhar and Northern Babil Province in December 2018. The ISF has detained several ISIS militants at checkpoints along the highways connecting Babil Province to Baghdad since December 2018.[17] Security forces later thwarted an ISIS SVBIED in Jurf al-Sakhar in January 2019.[18]

6) ISIS maintains freedom of movement in the Jazeera Desert that it uses to transport fighters and materials between Syria, Anbar Province, and Salah al-Din Province.

• The System: The Jazeera Desert along the Iraqi-Syrian Border north of the Euphrates River is an ungoverned space featuring robust cross-border operations by both criminal networks and ISIS. ISIS and AQI both leveraged their freedom of action in this area to mitigate the effects of clearing operations against their ground lines of communication along the Euphrates River Valley (ERV). AQI became increasingly reliant upon this area for logistics after its loss of popular support along the ERV during the Anbar Awakening in mid-2007.

• Resurgent ISIS Activity: ISIS maintains a logistics network in the vicinity of Al-Qaim that uses tunnels and safe houses to transit fighters, drugs, money, and other materials along the Middle Euphrates River Valley (MERV).[19] This network is likely exfiltrating fighters and material from the final physical zone controlled by ISIS in Baghuz in Syria. Anonymous U.S. and Iraqi officials stated in February 2019 that more than 1,000 ISIS fighters had crossed the Iraq-Syrian Border through the Jazeera Desert since September 2018. The ISF and PMF have disrupted tens of cells smuggling militants and resources in small villages farther east along the ERV since September 2018. Some of these fighters may be establishing local support networks, but many others are moving on to conduct attacks farther north in Salah al-Din Province. ISIS is reportedly attacking Baiji from the Jazeera Desert, demonstrating its use of desert logistics networks to project force into Central Iraq.[20] ISIS has also attacked security forces patrolling the Jazeera Desert north of Al-Qaim in a likely effort to protect its supply routes across the Iraqi-Syrian Border.

7) ISIS elements are entrenched in a geographic safe haven west of Mosul City.

• The System: The Badush Mountains southwest of Mosul provide a geographic safe haven for insurgency similar to the Hamrin Mountains southwest of Kirkuk. This system connects to a region of industrial areas and small villages on the southwest outskirts of Mosul called the Jurn Corridor. AQI historically used this area as sanctuary. Both ISIS and AQI also used the area as a staging ground for attacks into Mosul.

• Resurgent ISIS Activity: The U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition never successfully cleared ISIS from the Badush Mountains, which likely received an influx of fighters and material as ISIS fled Mosul in 2017. ISIS fighters retreating from ground operations by the U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition in Syria may also be relocating to this area via the Jazeera Desert. Reports of ISIS performing support functions and reconstituting fighting forces in the Badush Mountains increased in November 2018.[21] ISIS is conducting attacks against local security forces and tribal figures in villages south of the Badush Mountains. It may ultimately expand its attacks to Mosul and contest access to the Mosul-Baiji Highway. Raids by the elite Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS) have not degraded the safe haven held by ISIS in the Badush Mountains.[22]

8) ISIS is reconstituting a networked presence in Mosul 

• The System: Mosul was largely destroyed during clearing operations by the U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition. Some of the civilian population has since returned but many others have opted to remain in internally-displaced persons camps outside Mosul. Mosul requires significant investment including unexploded ordinance removal to rehabilitate areas of the city destroyed or heavily mined by ISIS. Reconstruction efforts have been marred by corruption and mismanagement. The CTS identified Gogjali District in Eastern Mosul as the main center of ISIS VBIED factories during the Battle of Mosul.

• Resurgent ISIS Activity: ISIS established a network of sleeper cells throughout Mosul after its recapture by the U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition in July 2017. ISIS detonated its first VBIED in Mosul since 2017 in November 2018 followed by a second VBEID in February 2019. ISIS’s networks inside Mosul likely facilitated these attacks. ISIS also likely retains some VBIED capabilities in Eastern Mosul including Gogjali District.

9) ISIS is successfully recruiting among Iraqi Kurds with the potential to create a new insurgent threat based in Iraqi Kurdistan. 

• The System: Iraqi Kurds have historically contributed to Salafi-Jihadist Groups in Iraq. Kurdish Salafi-Jihadists operated under the banner of Ansar al-Islam during the Iraq War. Large elements of Ansar al-Islam in Iraq later merged with ISIS in 2014. Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga prevented ISIS from advancing into Iraqi Kurdistan in 2014 - 2015.

• Resurgent ISIS Activity: ISIS is recruiting and generating attack networks within Iraqi Kurdistan. Three Kurds seized two hostages after storming the Arbil Province Governor’s Building in Arbil on July 21, 2018.[23] The militants were high school students from Arbil who were radicalized by an Iraqi Kurdish cleric with known ties to ISIS, whom security forces subsequently arrested on July 24, 2018.[24] Security forces also arrested eight members of an ISIS financing network in Arbil in October 2018. The militants were connected to the Al-Rawi Network sanctioned by the U.S. in 2016. Security forces have also detained multiple cells plotting spectacular attacks in Sulaymaniyah Province following a prison break in December 2018. Prison breaks were a leading indicator of ISIS’s resurgence in Iraq after the withdrawal of the U.S. in 2011. 

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[1] [“ISIS Remnants Resume Attacking Hawija Two Months After Its Liberation,”] Al-Mada Newspaper, December 11, 2017, https://web.archive(.)org/web/20171214024627/https://almadapaper.net/ar/news/539851/%D9%81%D9%84%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%AC%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%86; “Daily Bulletin for December 14, 2017,” Al-Nabaa, December 14, 2017, accessed via Telegraph, http://telegra(.)ph/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF-12-14-3.

[2] [“Source Reveals the Displacement of Families from the South of Kirkuk,”] Sot al-Iraq, June 20, 2018, https://www.sotaliraq(.)com/2018/06/20/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%B4%D9%81-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%B2%D9%88%D8%AD-%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A8-%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%88%D9%83/; [“ISIS Burns Crops of Wheat from Owners Who Refused to Pay Zakat,”] Al-Bawabah, 24 May, 2018, https://www.albawabhnews(.)com/3118414.

[3] [“ISIS Creates Courts, Detention Cells and Training Camps in Makhoul,”] Al-Mada Newspaper, September 18, 2018, https://almadapaper(.)net/Details/213313/%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D9%8A%D9%8F%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%A6-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%83%D9%85-%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%88%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A8-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D9%83%D8%AD%D9%88%D9%84.

[4] “Iraqi Forces Target ISIS, ‘White Flags’ on Kirkuk-Khurmatu-Kifri Road,” Rudaw, April 07, 2018, http://www.rudaw(.)net/english/middleeast/iraq/040720181.

[5] [“Arrest of ISIS Transport Official and Three of His Assistants in a Surprise Operation in Northeastern Diyala,”] Al-Ghad Press, July 25, 2018, https://www.alghadpress(.)com/news/%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82/167889/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A8%D8%B6-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A4%D9%88%D9%84-%D9%86%D9%82%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D9%883-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85; [“Diyala Police: Arrest of ISIS Transport Official and Three of His Assistants in a Surprise Operation in the Northeast of the Province,”] Badr Organization, July 25, 2018, http://badr(.)iq/ar/41168; “IS Commander Captured Before Entering Kirkuk,” Basnews, July 24, 2018, http://www.basnews(.)com/index.php/en/news/iraq/454335.

[6] “ISIS Threats Force Kurds to Evacuate Village Near Khanaqin,” Rudaw, July 25, 2018, http://www.rudaw(.)net/english/kurdistan/25072018; “Khanaqin Villagers Flee Their Homes, Fearing Resurgent ISIS,” Rudaw, December 13, 2018, http://www.rudaw(.)net/english/kurdistan/131220183.

[7] [“Claims of the Return of Peshmerga and Asayish to Khanaqin,”] PUK Media, January 11, 2018, http://pukmedia(.)com/AR_Direje.aspx?Jimare=119618.

[8] [“Abu Sayda Subdistrict Chief: Most Villages in the South of the Subdistrict Under Control of ISIS,”]  Al-Sumaria, January 23, 2019, https://www.alsumaria(.)tv/news/258765/%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%B5%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7-%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%B8%D9%85-%D9%82%D8%B1%D9%89-%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%AA-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%B1/ar.

[9] [“7 Civilians Shot Dead in Diyala,”] Rudaw, July 06, 2018, http://www.rudaw(.)net/arabic/middleeast/iraq/060720189.

[10] [“Source: Area Where Mortars Landed in Diyala is Almost Under Control of Terrorist Groups,”] Al-Ghad Press, February 27, 2019, https://www(.)alghadpress.com/news/%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82/192595/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%8A-%D8%B3%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%87%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D9%82.

[11] [“Deputy Calls on Prime Minister to Send Additional Troops to Diyala,”] Al-Sumaria, February 28, 2019, https://www(.)alsumaria.tv/news/262173/%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%A8-%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D8%B6%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A7/ar.

[12] [“Source: Interior Intelligence Thwarted Plan to Revive ‘Wilayat Baghdad’ of ISIS,”] Al-Ghad Press, September 6, 2018, https://www.alghadpress(.)com/news/%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82/173347/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D8%AD%D8%A8%D8%B7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%B7%D8%A7-%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A5%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%88.

[13] [“Dismantling a Terrorist Cell in Anbar,”] PUK Media, October 20, 2018, http://pukmedia(.)com/AR_Direje.aspx?Jimare=119052; [“Detained One of the ISIS Snipers in Karmah,”] PUK Media, February 17, 2019, http://pukmedia(.)com/AR_Direje.aspx?Jimare=124001.

[14] [“Defense Declares Thwarting a Terrorist Operation Near Haji Hussein in Fallujah,”] Al-Sumaria, August 13, 2018,

https://www(.)alsumaria.tv/news/244453/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B7-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A5%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D8%AD%D8%AC%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84/ar.

[15] [“Terrorist Operation in Fallujah Thwarted,”] Al-Sumaria, January 23, 2019, https://www.alsumaria(.)tv/news/258687/%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B7-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D9%84%D9%88%D8%AC%D8%A9/ar.

[16] [“Spokesman of the Interior Ministry Holds a Press Conference in Anbar Province,”] Iraqi Ministry of Interior, February 11, 2019, https://moi.gov(.)iq/index.php?name=News&file=article&sid=7911.

[17]  [“Terrorist Arrested at a Checkpoint at Entrance of North Babil,”] Al-Ghad Press, February 19, 2019, https://www.alghadpress(.)com/news/%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82/191768/%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A5%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D9%86%D8%AF-%D9%86%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%AF%D8%AE%D9%84-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A.

[18] [“Security Forces Set Controlled Detonation of Car Bomb North of Babil,”] Al-Sumaria, January 30, 2019, https://www.alsumaria(.)tv/news/259470/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%AC%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%81%D8%AE%D8%AE%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A/ar.

[19] [“Foiled Three Infiltration Attempts by ISIS and Found 11 Tunnels Linking Iraq to Syria,”] Al-Sumaria, February 13, 2019, https://www.alsumaria(.)tv/news/260713/%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B7-%D8%AB%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AB-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%84-%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AB%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-11-%D9%86%D9%81%D9%82%D8%A7/ar.

[20] [“Several Members of the Security Forces Injured in Suicide Bombings West of Baiji,”] Al-Sumaria, July 19, 2018, https://alsumaria(.)tv/news/242208/%D8%A5%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A/ar.

[21] [“Illegal Oil Factory Was Set Up Northwest of Mosul,”] Sot al-Iraq, November 08, 2018, https://www.sotaliraq(.)com/2018/11/08/%d8%b6%d8%a8%d8%b7-%d9%85%d8%b9%d9%85%d9%84-%d8%ba%d9%8a%d8%b1-%d9%82%d8%a7%d9%86%d9%88%d9%86%d9%8a-%d9%84%d8%aa%d8%b5%d9%81%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%86%d9%81%d8%b7-%d8%b4%d9%85%d8%a7%d9%84-%d8%ba/.

[22] [“Security Operation Was Launched in the Mahabiyah Mountains Southeast of Tal Afar,”] Al-Ghad Press, November 15, 2018, https://www(.)alghadpress.com/news/%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82/181874/%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A8-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%AA%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%81%D8%B1.

[23] “Update: 3 Gunmen Who Attacked Erbil Governor’s Building Named,” Rudaw, July 23, 2018, http://www(.)rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/23072018.

[24] “Radical Cleric Accused of ISIS Links Arrested by Erbil Security Forces,” Rudaw, July 24, 2018, http://www.rudaw(.)net/english/kurdistan/240720182.

Russia's Influence Grows After Moldovan Elections

Russia in Review is a weekly intelligence summary (INTSUM) produced by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). This ISW INTSUM series sheds light on key trends and developments related to the Russian government’s objectives and its efforts to secure them. Receive future Russia in Review INTSUM products via-email by signing up for the ISW Mailing List.

Special Topic Update: Moldovan Elections

Author: Darina Regio with Andrea Snyder

Key Takeaway: The Kremlin is successfully increasing its political influence in Moldova. The pro-Kremlin Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PRSM) won the largest share in the February 24 Moldovan Parliamentary Elections. However, Moldova will likely be forced to call new elections within the next forty-five days due to continued deadlock in government-formation negotiations. Russia will likely bolster its disinformation campaign over the next six weeks in order to set conditions ahead of a new vote. Pro-Kremlin Moldovan President Igor Dodon will also likely continue to shape the information space and stress the need for a strategic alliance with Russia rather than the EU in order to ensure a decisive victory for his PSRM. The U.S. should engage diplomatically and work with favorable political parties in order to counter Russia’s agenda in Moldova. 

Moldova sits at a political impasse following a deadlocked result to the February 24 Moldovan Parliamentary Elections. Four political parties won seats in the election but none achieved the simple majority required to form a new Government of Moldova.[1] The pro-Kremlin Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM) of Moldovan President Igor Dodon won 35 seats (31.2%) - the largest share in the Moldovan Parliament. The pro-Western Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM) led by oligarch Vlad Plahotniuc came in second with 30 seats (23.6%) while the pro-EU ACUM Alliance took third with 26 seats (26.8%). The Sor Party - a social conservative party that advocates for Soviet-style agricultural reform - won 7 seats (8.3%). The election marked the first such ballot since the adoption of a Mixed Electoral System Law in 2017. The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe had previously concluded that the new system would advantage established political parties such as the PSRM and PDM, both of which increased their seat totals in the Moldovan Parliament. However, the PDM lost both of its coalition partners in the former pro-Western Government of Moldova - the Liberal Party (PL) and the Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova (PLDM).

Moldova will likely be forced to hold new elections, leaving it vulnerable to further influence from Russia. The Moldovan Parliament faces a forty-five day deadline to form a new government, after which President Dodon has the right to dissolve the legislature and call for new elections. The ongoing government-formation talks will likely fail. The PSRM is opposed by both the PDM and ACUM, and will fall short of a majority even if it aligns with the fringe Sor Party. Meanwhile, ACUM issued pledges prior to the election vowing to remain in opposition and reject any coalition offers from the PSRM or PDM. ACUM has also directed accusations of corruption and attempted assassination against the PDM. President Dodon noted that the "risk is high that it could come to a snap election in the coming few months" on February 24. Russia mounted a robust disinformation campaign to set conditions ahead of the February 24 Moldovan Parliamentary Elections. A repeat election would open further opportunities for Russia to spread overt disinformation, apply covert political pressure, and shape public sentiment in favor of Dodon and the PSRM.

The Kremlin intends to use a favorable Government of Moldova to exert influence over the EU and NATO. Russia aims to win strategic military and diplomatic positioning through its interference in Moldova. Moldova holds a strategic location between Ukraine and Romania - a valuable member of NATO and the EU. Russia has maintained an illegal occupation force in the autonomous region Transnistria in Eastern Moldova on the Moldovan-Ukrainian Border since 1990. A pro-Kremlin Government of Moldova could allow Russia to bolster its footprint in Transnistria and threaten the vital port city of Odesa in Western Ukraine. Russia could at minimum use an expanded presence to create multiple simultaneous dilemmas for the Ukrainian Armed Forces during any escalation in the Donbas in Eastern Ukraine. Russia could also potentially use a pro-Kremlin Government of Moldova as a vector to subvert Romania. Russia already holds strong ties with neighboring Hungary and Hungarian President Viktor Orban. The U.S. and EU should engage diplomatically and work with favorable pro-Western political parties in order to counter Russia’s agenda in Moldova.

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[1] [“2019 Moldovan Parliamentary Election Results,”] Moldova CEC, February 25, 2019, https://pv.cec(.)md/cec-template-proportionale-rezultate-preliminarii.html.

Syria Situation Report: February 7 - 20, 2019

By ISW's Syria Team and Syria Direct

The following graphic marks the latest installment of the Syria Situation Report (SITREP) Map made possible through a partnership between the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and Syria Direct. The map depicts significant developments in the war in Syria during the period February 7 - 20, 2019.

Click image to enlarge.

Syria Situation Report: January 23 - February 6, 2019

By ISW's Syria Team and Syria Direct

The following graphic marks the latest installment of the Syria Situation Report (SITREP) Map made possible through a partnership between the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and Syria Direct. The map depicts significant developments in the war in Syria during the period January 23 - February 6, 2019.

Click image to enlarge.