Angelica Evans
Executive
Summary: Russian forces launched offensive operations intended to seize
Pokrovsk in Donetsk Oblast during Spring 2024 at the moment of greatest
constraints on Ukraine's manpower and materiel following the suspension
of US assistance in Fall 2023. Russian forces have not taken Pokrovsk
after eight months of grinding but consistent advances in western
Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian defensive operations, based on the integration
of successful Ukrainian drone innovators and operators with ground
forces combined with constraints on Russia's strategic and
operational-level manpower and materiel reserves have forced the Russian
military command to abandon its original campaign design of a frontal
assault on Pokrovsk. The Russian military command is currently
attempting to envelop Pokrovsk from the southwest via Selydove and to
even out the frontline west of Kurakhove and north of Vuhledar. Russian
forces recently seized Selydove and are currently leveraging the seizure
of Vuhledar to advance towards Kurakhove, but Russian advances have
come at very high costs in troops and armored vehicles and months of
time. Ukrainian drone operations continue to play a critical role in
constraining Russian mechanized maneuver and preventing Russian forces
from fully exploiting Ukraine's ongoing manpower constraints. Ukraine’s
ability to stave off the seizure of Pokrovsk thus far and force the
Russian military to divert its efforts to advances in arguably the least
operationally significant sector of the frontline is a positive
indicator of Ukraine’s ability to continue fighting this war despite the
challenges Ukraine faces and the setbacks it has suffered.
Russian
forces are currently attempting to conduct two simultaneous and
supporting offensive operations to seize Pokrovsk through a turning
maneuver via Selydove and to level the frontline from Pokrovsk to Yasna
Polyana in order to collapse the Ukrainian salient west of Donetsk City
and set conditions for future, possibly more operationally significant
gains in Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces have consistently been
advancing in the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions since March 2024, but
have yet to make operationally significant advances in either direction.
ISW distinguishes between tactical gains, which are relevant at the
tactical level of war in the near vicinity of fighting, and operational
gains, which are significant at the operational level of war and affect
large sectors of the entire frontline. Ukrainian defenders have,
thus far, successfully diverted Russian forces from a direct assault on
Pokrovsk and convinced the Russian military command to expend manpower,
equipment and time on less operationally significant gains in western
Donetsk Oblast. Recent Russian advances near Selydove, the recent
seizure of Vuhledar, and subsequent Russian advances north of Vuhledar
are not yet operationally significant gains and have cost the Russians
tremendous manpower and materiel losses. Russian forces will eventually
make operationally significant gains if Ukrainian forces do not stop the
ongoing Russian offensive operations, although Ukraine’s ability to
inflict notable manpower and materiel losses on the Russian military
continues to depend on the provision of sufficient and regular Western
military assistance. Significant Russian advances in the Pokrovsk and
Kurakhove directions would be but one step in Russia’s ongoing offensive
campaign to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast and would not portend
the immediate collapse of the frontline in Donetsk or throughout
Ukraine.
Ukrainian drone operations continue to be
the backbone of Ukraine's war effort, particularly in western Donetsk
Oblast where successful Ukrainian drone operations contributed to
forcing the Russian military command to reorient its primary operational
effort for 2024. Ongoing Ukrainian manpower constraints and
morale issues are currently creating vulnerabilities in Ukraine's
defensive lines, and Ukrainian drone operations are likely playing an
outsized role in defending against and inflicting losses on advancing
Russian forces.[1]
Ukrainian drone operators have also played a critical role in
constraining Russian mechanized maneuver and repelling platoon- to
battalion-sized mechanized assaults throughout the frontline and in
Kursk Oblast in 2024.[2]
Ukrainian aerial and naval drone operators have played a critical role
in undermining Russia’s ability to facilitate and conduct its invasion
of Ukraine on land and sea, and Russia has consistently underestimated
the impact and influence of Ukraine’s asymmetric drone capabilities and
innovations throughout the war, to Russia’s detriment.[3]
Russian
President Vladimir Putin’s articulated theory of victory assumes that
Russian forces will be able to make and sustain gradual creeping
advances indefinitely but does not appear to account for the possibility
that Ukrainian forces could inflict losses sufficient to stall or stop
future Russian offensive operations.[4]
Recent Western estimates of Russian manpower losses suggest that
Russian forces are currently losing more troops per month than Russia’s
ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts can sustain, and evidence is
mounting that Russia cannot sustain the current rate of armored vehicle
and tank losses in the medium term.[5]
Ukrainian drone operators, particularly in the Pokrovsk direction, have
successfully degraded Russian forces’ mechanized capabilities and have
slowed Russian forces’ ability to make gains by forcing Russian infantry
to advance primarily at foot pace.[6]
The integration of Ukrainian drone operations with sufficiently
resourced artillery and committed Ukrainian infantry units is and will
remain essential in defending against Russian advances throughout the
frontline.
Campaign
The
seizure of Pokrovsk and leveling of the frontline in western Donetsk
Oblast are two subordinate efforts of the Kremlin's wider campaign to
seize the remainder of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts. Putin
identified the complete seizure of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts as a
priority goal of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and
Russian officials have reiterated this goal over the past three years.[7]
Western and Ukrainian sources assessed in 2023 and 2024 that Russia
intended to seize the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk by the end of
2024.[8]
Russian offensive operations in the Siversk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk,
Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka directions are currently all
aimed at seizing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces
intensified localized assaults in the Velyka Novosilka and Siversk
directions in October and November 2024 respectively, but it remains
unclear if the Russian military command is willing to allocate the
manpower necessary to launch a more concerted offensive operation or
make operationally significant advances in these lower priority
directions.[9]
Russian advances near Chasiv Yar have largely stalled in 2024, and
Russian forces have yet to advance into the center of the settlement,
although the settlement remains at high risk. ISW has previously
assessed that the Russian offensive effort to seize Chasiv Yar offers
Russian forces the most immediate prospects for operationally
significant advances in Donetsk Oblast as the seizure of Chasiv Yar
would likely allow Russian forces to launch subsequent offensive
operations against Ukraine’s fortress belt – a group of major cities
that form a significant defensive belt in Donetsk Oblast.[10]
The Russian military command has, however, opted to prioritize
offensive operations in the Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove directions,
which provide Russian forces with less direct paths to operationally
significant Ukrainian objects. Russian forces have yet to make
operationally significant advances in exchange for notable manpower and
materiel losses in 2024.
Russian forces seized a little
over 2,000 square kilometers in Ukraine between October 1, 2023 and
October 5, 2024, mostly in fields and small settlements and towns. They
must seize an additional 9,322 square kilometers including several large
urban areas in order to take the remainder of Donetsk Oblast as of
November 14, and the seizure of Pokrovsk will likely only result in
several tens of additional square kilometers. Assessed Russian positions
south of Pokrovsk near Vyshneve and Sontsivka are currently Russian
forces’ closest positions to the Donetsk Oblast administrative boundary
in the Toretsk, Pokrovsk, or Kurakhove directions and are roughly 22-23
kilometers from the boundary as of November 14. Russian advances in the
Toretsk direction have been slow in 2024, as Russian forces have largely
spent the last five months struggling through highly urbanized areas,
and Russian forces’ rate of advance is unlikely to increase
significantly in this sector until Russian forces advance through
Toretsk and its more urbanized suburbs. Russian gains in the Kurakhove
pocket will result in additional territorial advances, but these gains
do not shift Russian positions significantly closer to the Donetsk
Oblast administrative boundaries than Russian forces' current closest
assessed point of advance. Russian forces could attempt to connect the
Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk-Kurakhove efforts in the future by
trying to advance north from Pokrovsk towards Toretsk and to force
Ukrainian forces to withdraw from positions in Toretsk, although it
would likely take the Russian military months to make gains of this
scale at its current rate of advance.[11]
It remains unclear if Russian forces would be sufficiently combat
capable to conduct such an operation without an operational pause to
reconstitute after evening out the frontline in western Donetsk Oblast
and seizing Pokrovsk.
Russian
forces launched offensive operations intended to seize Pokrovsk during
Spring 2024 following the seizure of Avdiivka and at a moment when
Ukraine's manpower and materiel constraints reached their peak.
Russian forces intensified offensive operations in Pokrovsk Raion in
October 2023 when they began the four-month-long battle for Avdiivka and
maintained a consistent tempo of operations in the area until seizing
Avdiivka on February 17, 2024 – at which point Russian forces
temporarily paused offensive operations.[12] The Russian military command tasked the Russian Central Grouping of Forces and 51st Combined Arms Army (formerly the 1st
Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) with exploiting the
seizure of Avdiivka to make further gains west of the settlement.[13]
The Russian Central Grouping of Forces resumed a high tempo of assaults
several days later and began the offensive operation aimed at seizing
Pokrovsk through a frontal assault in late February and early March
2024.[14]
Russian forces in this area benefited from Ukrainian manpower and
materiel constraints, partially driven by delays in Western-provided
military assistance, between March and June 2024 and made consistent
gains west of Avdiivka in the direction of Pokrovsk.[15]
Ukrainian officials and frontline servicemembers consistently warned
about an increasing disparity between Russian and Ukrainian artillery
use during this time and suggested that Ukrainian forces were
increasingly husbanding ammunition and relying on drone operators to
defend against Russian infantry and mechanized assaults.[16]
Russia’s
likely intended primary offensive effort for Summer 2024 was a direct
assault on Pokrovsk following the railway line west of Avdiivka and the
seizure of both Myrnohrad and Pokrovsk. The
Avdiivka-Ocheretyne-Zhelanne-Novohrovika-Pokrovsk railway line proved to
be an advantageous path for Russian advances during Spring and Summer
2024, as settlements along the railway line were critical lynchpins in
Ukraine’s defensive lines in this direction. Russian forces advanced
northwest from Avdiivka along the railway line and west from Avdiivka
towards Ukraine’s main defensive line along the Berdychi-Orlivka-Vodyane
line in March and April 2024, and elements of the Russian Central
Grouping of Forces reportedly exploited a bungled Ukrainian rotation to
make a narrow penetration near Ocheretyne in late April 2024.[17] The Russian exploitation force, mainly comprised of Central Military District [CMD] brigades and elements of the 51st
CAA, continued to advance west of Ocheretyne in May and June 2024 and
forced Ukrainian forces to retreat from the Berdychi-Orlivka-Tonenke to
more defensible positions along the Prohres-Skuchne-Karlivka line on the
east (left) bank of the Vovcha River.[18]
Russian materiel advantages peaked during May and June 2024, and
Ukrainian officials identified “overwhelming [Russian] air superiority”
and a 20-to-one Russian artillery advantage as main contributing factors
to the Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction.[19]
Ukrainian officials noted in May and June 2024 that Russian forces were
mainly advancing via infantry assaults using ATVs or motorcycles and
conducting very few mechanized assaults in the Pokrovsk direction.[20]
A Russian milblogger claimed in early June 2024 that specialized
Ukrainian drone units were heavily targeting and destroying unprotected
Russian armored equipment in the Pokrovsk direction, inhibiting Russian
offensive operations in the area – and more effective Ukrainian drone
operations in this direction likely played a role in the Russian
military command’s decision to limit mechanized activity in this
direction moving forward.[21
Further
Russian advances east of Pokrovsk near Prohres and later Zhelanne
during July and August 2024 notably drove Ukrainian back from the east
(left) bank of the Vovcha River towards the
Hrodivka-Novohrodivka-Selydove line (east to southeast of Pokrovsk) as
Russian forces prioritized advances along the railway line and advanced
more slowly through the fields and small settlements west and southwest
of Avdiivka.[22]
Russian forces conducted two successful turning maneuvers around
Hrodivka and Novohrodivka by advancing along the railway line in late
August 2024 and largely forced Ukrainian forces to retreat from the
settlements without having to conduct costly, frontal assaults.[23]
Russian milbloggers claimed on August 29 that likely Russian sabotage
and reconnaissance groups advanced into the southeastern outskirts of
Myrnohrad (immediately east of Pokrovsk) and began small arms combat
with Ukrainian forces in the town, but ISW has yet to observe
confirmation of Russian forces operating in Myrnohrad.[24]
These reports, if accurate, suggest that Russian forces may have
temporarily advanced into Myrnohrad and that Ukrainian forces later
pushed Russian forces from the town and have consistently defended
against Russian advances into the town since late August 2024. Russian
advances along the Novohrodivka-Hrodivka-Myrnohrad-Pokrovsk line stalled
as of September 2024 as the Russian military command increasingly
devoted manpower and resources to offensive operations along the
Selydove-Hirnyk line and in the Kurakhove and Vuhledar directions.
Russian
forces also renewed offensive operations aimed at seizing Toretsk and
intensified offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City in
June 2024. The Russian military command redeployed some elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces and 51st CAA, including the CMD’s 27th Motorized Rifle Division, from the Pokrovsk direction to renewed assaults in the Toretsk direction in mid-June 2024.[25]
The decision roughly doubled the length of the Central Grouping of
forces area of responsibility (AOR) and drew some units away from the
CMD’s exploitation force in the Pokrovsk direction.[26]
The Russian military command likely intended to eliminate the Ukrainian
salient in the Toretsk direction to deny Ukrainian forces the ability
to shell rear Russian areas of the Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk directions,
but Russian forces have yet to make gains significant enough to deny
Ukrainian artillery operations in the area as of November 2024.[27]
Russian assaults in the Toretsk direction have been characterized by
infantry-heavy assaults in highly urbanized areas that have slowed
Russian advances – as Russian forces have historically struggled with
urban combat in Ukraine.[28]
Ukrainian
Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi noted in mid-June
2024 that Russian forces were also concentrating efforts and assault
units in the Kurakhove direction, and ISW observed a minor
intensification in Russian activity in the Kurakhove direction at this
time.[29]
Russian forces began consistently conducting platoon- and company-sized
mechanized assaults in western Donetsk Oblast in June 2024 and further
intensified mechanized activity when Russian force began to conduct
occasional battalion-sized mechanized assaults in the area in late July
2024.[30]
Russian forces did not begin to make significant advances in the
Kurakhove direction until July and August 2024 and have continued to
make advances in this area in recent months.
The
Russian military command amended its Summer 2024 campaign design likely
after assessing that Russian forces were unlikely to seize Pokrovsk in a
frontal assault and decided instead to attempt to envelop Pokrovsk from
the south via Selydove and to intensify offensive operations west of
Donetsk City and near Vuhledar in order to eliminate the Ukrainian
salient in western Donetsk Oblast along the Hirnyk-Kurakhove-Vuhledar
line. ISW observed reports that elements of the CMD’s 90th
Tank Division – a formation heavily involved in the CMD’s exploitation
force - conducted a reinforced battalion-sized mechanized assault
southwest of Donetsk City in late July 2024.[31]
The further expansion of the Central Grouping of Forces AoR into both
the Toretsk and Kurakove directions in June and July 2024 indicated that
the Russian military command had likely re-tasked the CMD from acting
as an exploitation force to being responsible for the bulk of Russia’s
main offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast.[32]
The Russian military command likely reassessed its campaign design and
determined that Russian forces were unlikely to make rapid tactical
gains in this direction or successfully seize Pokrovsk in an
attritional, frontal assault. At this point, the Russian military
command decided to attempt a turning maneuver via Selydove in order to
avoid fighting through more built-up Ukrainian defenses immediately east
of Pokrovsk and reprioritized leveling the frontline in western Donetsk
Oblast. The Russian military command likely identified the seizure of
Selydove, Vuhledar, and Kurakhove and leveling of the frontline in
western Donetsk Oblast as desired prerequisites for launching an
intensified offensive effort against Pokrovsk itself. Shortening and
leveling the frontline in western Donetsk Oblast will free up Russian
troops currently attacking all along the Ukrainian pocket north and
south of Kurakhove to redeploy to the Pokrovsk effort and will secure
Russian forces’ southern flank for a renewed assault on Pokrovsk.
The
Russian military command’s new campaign design sought to take advantage
of the most effective tactics in each respective frontline sector. A Ukrainian drone operator told the Associated Press
(AP) in August 2024 that Russian forces had been relatively successful
in the Pokrovsk direction because they were conducting ground attacks in
groups of two to four soldiers under the cover of trees, making them
harder for Ukrainian drone operators to detect.[33]
An official in a Ukrainian brigade operating near Selydove reported in
mid-September 2024 that Russian forces began moving in small infantry
groups and using windbreaks and buildings for cover instead of
conducting head-on frontal assaults with larger groups.[34]
A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor noted on November 16
that small, infantry-led assaults are not the most efficient tactic for
expedient advances in the rural settlements and fields near Selydove,
where Russian forces have very little coverage from Ukrainian drone
operations.[35]
The milblogger suggested that Ukrainian drone operations are
constraining Russian forces' ability to bring reinforcements and
supplies to forward positions. Russian forces’ ability to utilize
windbreaks and forested areas as cover against Ukrainian drone operators
and advance into vulnerable Ukrainian positions has been a critical
aspect of their ability to advance in the Pokrovsk direction in recent
months, particularly since Russian forces have not widely utilized
armored vehicles in this area.[36]
Russian forces may increase their use of armored vehicles in the
Pokrovsk direction if muddy ground conditions begin to significantly
constrain infantry movement, however.
Russian mechanized
activity in the Kurakhove and Vuhledar directions has been notably more
successful than in the Pokrovsk direction or other sectors of the
frontline, and more effective mechanized activity has facilitated
marginally more rapid Russian advances in western Donetsk Oblast. ISW
observed a notable intensification in Russian mechanized activity in the
Kurakhove and Vuhledar directions in October 2024, when Russian forces
began conducting regular platoon- to battalion-sized mechanized assaults
in these directions.[37]
Russian mechanized assaults in this direction have been significantly
more successful than in other frontline sectors. Russian mechanized
assaults frequently fail to result in advances and typically only result
in armored vehicles losses in most sectors of the frontline, but
Russian mechanized activity in the Kurakhove and Vuhledar directions has
repeatedly resulted in several kilometers of advances. Russian forces
notably advanced several kilometers to the outskirts of Hostre
(northeast of Kurakhove) in September 2024, and Russian mechanized
activity has been the foundation of Russian advances north and northwest
of Vuhledar in October and November 2024.[38]
Russian mechanized activity in these directions is not indicative of a
substantial improvement in Russian forces’ ability to conduct the kind
of rapid mechanized maneuver that would be necessary to restore
mechanized maneuver to the battlefield at scale, however. The most
successful Russian assaults in this area still result in high armored
vehicle losses in exchange for a few kilometers of gains, but the
increased efficacy of Russian mechanized activity in the Kurakhove and
Vuhledar directions is still notable. Recent mechanized assaults in
September and November 2024 also resulted in tactically significant
Russian advances in the Kupyansk direction, and the Russian miliary may
be looking to replicate the conditions that have increased the efficacy
of mechanized activity in the Kurakhove and Vuhledar directions in other
areas of the frontline.[39]
Russian
forces also continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction
during late Summer and Fall 2024, but the pace of Russian advances has
remained slow as Russian forces have largely relied on infantry to make
advances in this direction.[40]
Ukrainian forces have consistently and successfully counterattacked in
the Toretsk direction more than in any other sector of western Donetsk
Oblast, and successful Ukrainian counterattacks have helped limit the
scope and rate of Russian advances in the area.[41]
ISW assessed that Russian forces have seized 23.1 percent of Toretsk
itself as of November 13 and Russian forces have advanced fewer than 10
kilometers in this direction from the June 2024 frontline as of November
14. Russian forces in Toretsk do not currently pose any significant
threat to Ukrainian positions west of Toretsk and have likely taken
notable manpower losses in exchange for these marginal gains as in other
frontline sectors.
The Russian military command’s
new campaign design also may have sought to minimize the impact of
increased Russian manpower constraints caused by the Ukrainian incursion
into Kursk Oblast in August 2024. Russian authorities were
reportedly aware of the threat of a Ukrainian incursion into Kursk
Oblast in the months leading up to August 2024, but the incursion has
undoubtably tested Russia’s ability to generate and redeploy forces in
response to an unexpected attack.[42]
ISW has observed indications that the Russian military command
redeployed forces from almost all sectors of the frontline, including
elements of one unit from the Pokrovsk direction, to Kursk Oblast to
address the incursion.[43]
Russian forces have redeployed elements of several elite formations to
Kursk Oblast, including: the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea
Fleet [BSF]), 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern
Military District [EMD]), 98th, 104th, and 7th airborne (VDV) divisions,
and 11th and 83rd VDV brigades.[44]
The Russian military command generally regards VDV and naval infantry
elements as more “elite” forces (despite the fact that these forces have
been degraded and misused during the war) and tends to deploy these
forces to prioritized directions.[45]
The Russian military command would have likely redeployed these forces
to reinforce efforts in the Pokrovsk direction if Ukrainian forces had
not launched the Kursk incursion in August 2024.
Ukrainian
officials noted in September 2024 that the incursion “slowed” Russian
advances in Donetsk Oblast and complicated Russia’s plans for offensive
operations, including in Russia’s “main direction” – likely referring to
the Pokrovsk direction.[46]
Russian forces notably launched their offensive operation in northern
Kharkiv Oblast in mid-May 2024 several months before the incursion, and
the operation has also placed increased pressure on Russia’s manpower
reserves by committing forces that could have otherwise fought in the
Pokrovsk offensive.[47]
Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated in October 2024
that the Russian military command originally intended to commit most of
Russia's manpower reserves to the Kharkiv and Pokrovsk-Toretsk
directions during late Summer and Fall 2024, but that the Ukrainian
incursion into Kursk Oblast and slowing Russian advances in northern
Kharkiv Oblast complicated this plan.[48]
Recent
Russian advances and Russian forces’ ability to exploit the recent
seizure of Selydove and Vuhledar could force Ukrainian forces to
withdraw to more defensible positions in western Donetsk Oblast. Russian
forces have not turned north towards Pokrovsk following the seizure of
Selydove but rather have continued to advance south as Russian forces
operating southeast of Selydove intensified offensive operations along
the Tsukuryne-Hirnyk-Kurakhivka line[49]
Russian forces operating southeast of Selydove currently appear to be
attempting to eliminate the Ukrainian salient north of the Kurakhivske
Reservoir and to envelop Kurakhove from the reservoir’s northwestern
edge. Russian positions in Sontsivka (south of Selydove) are currently
four kilometers from the northwestern edge of the reservoir, and it
remains unclear how long Ukrainian forces operating east of the
Sontsivka-Stary Terny line will be able to hold positions in this small
salient. Russian forces have also successfully
exploited the seizure of Vuhledar to make tactically significant
advances south of Kurakhove, and recent Russian advances in the area may
force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the fields southeast and south
of Kurakhove to more defensible positions further west[50]
A
more level frontline in western Donetsk Oblast will provide Russian
forces a more easily defensible flank should they turn north and attempt
to envelop Toretsk from the west and attack Kostyantynivka and
Ukraine's fortress belt from the south, but the leveling of the
frontline does not immediately portend such advances. Russian forces
could also attempt to advance further towards the Donetsk Oblast
administrative boundaries along the Kurakhove-Zaporizhzhia City H-15
highway or conduct an assault on Velyka Novosilka from the east. Russian
forces are unlikely to be sufficiently combat effective to undertake a
major offensive effort without conducting at least a temporary pause for
rest and reconstitution, and several settlements west of Kurakhove
could afford strong defensive positions for Ukrainian forces. In the
unlikely event that Russian forces could advance to the Donetsk Oblast
administrative boundary west of Kurakhove, current Russian positions in
the Siversk, Chasiv Yar, and Toretsk directions are still roughly 70
kilometers from the Donetsk Oblast administrative boundary at their
closest point. Russian forces remain unable to conduct the kind of rapid
mechanized maneuver necessary to make advances to that magnitude with
the kind of speed or surprise that could collapse Ukraine’s defenses in
Donetsk Oblast.
Conclusion
The
seizure of Pokrovsk remains an important operational and informational
goal for the Kremlin, and Russian forces will likely pursue the seizure
of Pokrovsk in Winter 2024-25. Ukrainian officials have
repeatedly identified Pokrovsk as Russian forces’ primary operational
objective for the Summer-Fall 2024 campaign.[51]
Kremlin-awarded founder and director of the prominent Rybar Telegram
channel and social media project Mikhail Zvinchuk acknowledged in an
interview with Russian-language diaspora-focused channel RTVI on
November 16 that the Russian military intends to advance on Pokrovsk
from the south and southeast this winter now that Russian forces have
seized Selydove.[52]
Zvinchuk noted that the Russian military intends to prioritize
advancing in urban areas such as Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove and
improving Russia's drone operations during Winter 2024-25, as Russian
forces currently "cannot advance" due to Ukrainian drone operations. The
Russian military command will likely task Russian forces with seizing
Pokrovsk should Russian forces successfully level the frontline between
Selydove and Yasna Polyana (northwest of Vuhledar) in the coming weeks
and months, although Russian forces may have to conduct a short
operational pause to redeploy, rest, and reconstitute before beginning
the assault on Pokrovsk. The Russian military command is unlikely to
abandon the seizure of Pokrovsk as a major objective as control over
Pokrovsk would provide Russian forces with a defensible position that
could support Russia’s envisioned new defensive line in western Donetsk
Oblast. The Kremlin is also unlikely to support abandoning the seizure
of Pokrovsk given how many lives and how much materiel Russia has
expended in pursuit of the town, and the Kremlin likely intends to
exaggerate the importance of seizing Pokrovsk to domestic and
international audience as part of Putin’s ongoing narrative about the
inevitability of Russian victory in Ukraine.
Russia’s
offensive effort to seize Pokrovsk and level the frontline in western
Donetsk Oblast is emblematic of Putin's theory of victory. The
Russian military command appears to have willingly abandoned its
original campaign design and intention to make the CMD a rapid
exploitation and maneuver force and accepted of the realities of
positional warfare and slower Russian advances in the Pokrovsk,
Kurakhove, and Vuhledar directions.[53]
It is too soon to judge the impact of this decision on the war’s
eventual resolution. The Russian military command’s decision to embrace
and exploit the characteristics of positional warfare are based on the
assumption that Russia’s war machine, with support from its allies in
Iran, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and North Korea, can outlast
Ukraine and its Western allies. ISW has recently observed indications
to the contrary, however. Russian forces lost roughly 80,000 troops
during September and October 2024, but likely only recruited an
estimated 60-70,000 into military service– indicating that the Russian
military’s recruitment rates have begun to fall behind Russia’s previous
one-to-one loss replacement rate.[54]
Ukrainian and Western assessments repeatedly place Russian domestic
production rates of tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery systems far
below estimated rates of loss for these systems in Ukraine.[55]
Apathy towards the war and resistance to greater social and economic
hardship also appears to be growing within Russian society as the war
drags on – suggesting that it is also in the Kremlin’s interest to
resolve the war as soon as possible in order to avoid exacerbating
domestic discontent.[56]
Putin’s
theory of victory does not account for these issues nor for the impact
of Ukraine’s increasing asymmetric capabilities. Ukrainian forces have
repeatedly demonstrated their commitment and ability to develop and
employ alternative and asymmetric capabilities, namely drones and
long-range strikes, to partially counter Russia's artillery advantage in
Ukraine and to defend against Russian mechanized and infantry assaults,
often generating outsized effects considering the inexpensive systems
Ukrainian forces are employing. Ukrainian drone operators have played a
key role in constraining Russian mechanized maneuver in western Donetsk
Oblast and Russian infantry assaults throughout the frontline in
Ukraine.[57]
Ukraine’s long-range drone strikes against Russian oil depots and
warehouses storing military equipment continue to complicate Russian
logistics, force Russia to reallocate air defense assets, and burden
Russia’s war chest.[58]
Russian defeat, and Ukraine’s future success, rests on Ukraine’s
ability to further leverage these asymmetric capabilities to support
successful ground operations and directly challenge Russian forces’
control over the theater-wide initiative.[59]
Ukrainian
forces have stalled Russia's main offensive efforts for the
Summer-Autumn 2024 campaign and forced the Russian military command to
expend significant resources and valuable time on advances that have not
brought Russian forces geographically closer to their main operational
objective. Ukraine’s ability to trade space for time undermines the
Kremlin's theory of victory and narrative of an inevitable Russian
victory in Ukraine. Ukrainian forces have successfully stalled
Russian forces near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk for many months
and continue to complicate Russian offensive operations in the Siversk
and Lyman directions. Russian forces are currently exploiting localized
Ukrainian vulnerabilities to advance in the Kurakhove and Vuhledar
directions, but Ukrainian forces are attempting to counterattack into
the flanks of advancing Russian forces in these directions.[60]
The leveling of the frontline in western Donetsk Oblast does not bring
Russian forces substantially closer to their main operational objective
of seizing Pokrovsk and only brings Russian forces several kilometers
closer to their longer-term objective of seizing the remainder of
Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian forces have inflicted significant losses on
the Russian military but must completely stop Russian advances in
western Donetsk Oblast or risk Russian forces eventually advancing into
more operationally significant areas of Donetsk in the medium- to
long-term, however.
Ukraine’s ability to defend against
more operationally significant Russian advances is still largely
dependent on the delivery of timely Western aid and Ukraine's ability to
overcome its manpower constraints. Ukraine will have an opportunity to
contest the initiative following the future culmination of Russian
offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast if Ukraine receives
sufficient and proactive Western military assistance. Previous delays in
Western security assistance undermined Ukraine’s Summer 2023
counteroffensive effort and Ukraine’s ability to defend itself in
Spring, Summer, and Fall 2024.[61]
Delays and hesitation in Western aid only further convince Putin that
his theory of victory is valid and embolden Putin to further escalate
his war of aggression towards Ukraine and preparations for his future
envisioned war against NATO. The West must fulfill its current pledges
to Ukraine and proactively arm Ukraine in preparation for future
Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in 2025 and beyond or face the
risk of encouraging Putin’s aggressive and expansionist desires and the
possible future where those desires turn further westward.
[1] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2024
[2] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2024
[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-strikes-have-changed-russian-naval-operations-black-sea ; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Ukraine%20and%20the%20Problem%20of%20Restoring%20Maneuver%20in%20Contemporary%20War_final.pdf ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2024-0
[4] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2024
[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar100624
[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-16-2024
; https://suspilne dot
media/836927-udar-po-harkovu-i-anonsovanij-paket-dopomogi-vid-ssa-936-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1726479483&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps;
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aDXWlQ2K0dM ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2024-0 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2024
[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-ukraine-warning-update-russia-likely-pursue-phased-invasion-unoccupied-ukrainian ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar033023
[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar121523 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050324
[9] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-3-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar101324
[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-13-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-25-2024
[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar043024
[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021824
[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021724 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-27-2024
[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-27-2024
[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042724
[16] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031324 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041524 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041024
[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-24-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031324 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-29-2024
[18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar050324 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-4-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-14-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-17-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2024
[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051024
[20] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-31-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-9-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-18-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2024
[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-4-2024
[22] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2024-0
[23] https://isw.pub/UkrWar082224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar082724
[24] https://isw.pub/UkrWar082924
[25] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-18-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-22-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-27-2024
[26] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-26-2024
[27] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-27-2024
[28] https://wp.towson.edu/iajournal/2023/01/13/russias-response-to-the-challenges-of-urban-warfare-in-the-russo-ukrainian-war/ ; https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/04/russia-ukraine-urban-warfare-kyiv-mariupol/
[29] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-12-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-29-2024
[30] https://isw.pub/UkrWar073024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2024
[31] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-26-2024 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2063
[32] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-26-2024
[33] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22-2024
[34] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-16-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-9-2024
[35] https://t.me/philologist_zov/1722 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2024
[36] https://www.cnn.com/2024/09/08/europe/ukraine-military-morale-desertion-intl-cmd/index.html
[37] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-9-2024
[38] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar091324
[39] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-27-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-14-2024
[40] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-12-2024
[41] https://isw.pub/UkrWar092424 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar102924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar102524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar101724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar101424 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar101024
[42] https://isw.pub/UkrWar092024
[43] https://isw.pub/UkrWar083124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar082524
[44] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081124 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2024-0 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar082224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar082524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar082624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar083124
[45] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-28-2023
[46] https://isw.pub/UkrWar091324
[47] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051024
[48] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2024
[49] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-29-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar101824 ;
[50] https://isw.pub/UkrWar111124
[51] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-7-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-28-2024
[52] https://t.me/rybar/65439 ; https://t.me/rtvimain/104838 ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uN99eOO1074
[53] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/assessing-significance-current-russian-and-ukrainian-operations-course-war
[54] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-3-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2024
[55] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-14-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar110924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar100624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar073024
[56] https://isw.pub/UkrWar111424 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar102924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar083024
[57] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2024-0 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10-2024
[58] https://isw.pub/UkrWar101024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar092424 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-22-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-21-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-9-2024
[59] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Ukraine%20and%20the%20Problem%20of%20Restoring%20Maneuver%20in%20Contemporary%20War_final.pdf
[60] https://isw.pub/UkrWar111524
[61] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-winter-spring-2024-offensive-operation-kharkiv-luhansk-axis ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv
