Karolina
Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes,
Nicole
Wolkov, William Runkel, and George Barros
November
29, 2024, 7:45pm ET
Click here to see
ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated
daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see
ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not
a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to
access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of
Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW
produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse
map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this
product was 2:00pm ET on November 29 and covers both November 28 and 29 due to
the fact that ISW did not publish a Campaign Assessment on November 28 in
observance of the Thanksgiving holiday. ISW will cover subsequent reports in
the November 30 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Russian President Vladimir Putin
continues to laud the technical specifications of the recently launched
Oreshnik ballistic missile and threaten additional Oreshnik strikes against
Ukraine as part of an intensified Russian reflexive control campaign aimed at
forcing the West and Ukraine into self-deterrence. Putin
addressed members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization's (CSTO)
Security Council in Astana, Kazakhstan, on November 28 and reiterated several
claims about the Oreshnik ballistic missile, with which Russian forces struck
Dnipro City on November 21.[1] Putin's November 28 statements closely resembled
the speeches he gave on November 21 and 22 immediately following the Oreshnik
strike, again presenting the Oreshnik strike as the commensurate Russian
response to recent Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory using
Western-provided long-range missile systems such as ATACMS and Storm
Shadow/SCALPs.[2] Putin detailed the purported technical specifications of the
Oreshnik during his CSTO speech and subsequent press conference with
journalists on November 28, highlighting the size and maximum internal
temperature of its warhead, its launch speed, and its blast radius, and
compared the Oreshnik to both a "nuclear weapon" and a "meteorite"
in terms of the damage it can cause.[3] Putin threateningly claimed that the
Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian General Staff are "selecting
targets for destruction" in Ukraine, including "decision-making
centers in Kyiv," and later responded to a question about whether these
are military or political targets by stating that "everything is
possible."[4]
There is nothing particularly
novel about the capabilities of the Oreshnik missile, and US and Ukrainian
officials indicated that the Oreshnik missile does not portend a Russian
escalation in the war.[5] Putin's efforts to stress the missile’s
technical specifications are part of the larger reflexive control campaign that
the Kremlin is currently pursuing, and highlighting its range and payload while
comparing its destructive capabilities to that of a meteor is meant to threaten
both Ukraine and the West and discourage further Ukrainian strikes on Russian
territory using Western-provided systems. Even Putin's threat of strikes on
"decision-making centers" in Kyiv rings empty—Russian forces
regularly strike civilian and critical infrastructure in Kyiv City with drones
and nuclear-capable missiles.[6] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky
summarized this fact on November 29 in response to Putin's CSTO statements and
said that "Putin wants to add thousands more to the thousands of missiles
that have already hit Ukraine."[7] Reuters, citing five sources
close to US intelligence, reported on November 27 that the November 21 Oreshnik
strike has not changed the US intelligence assessment that Russia is unlikely
to use a nuclear weapon in Ukraine, even in retaliation for Ukrainian strikes
into Russian with Western-provided weapons.[8] Putin's constant flaunting of
the Oreshnik and Russian missile capabilities therefore remains part of the
Kremlin's reflexive control information operation and is unlikely to presage
the development of particularly novel Russian deep strike capabilities.
The Russian military is
considering establishing a separate service branch for unmanned systems, likely
as part of the Russian MoD’s in a belated effort to catch up to the
establishment of the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) in February 2024. Russian
President Vladimir Putin stated at the press conference during his visit to
Kazakhstan on November 28 that the Russian MoD and General Staff are
considering establishing a new unmanned system service within the Russian Armed
Forces and emphasized that drones are one of the most important factors of
combat operations.[9] A milblogger affiliated with the Russian Airborne (VDV)
Forces explained that Russian drone detachments currently informally operate as
part of other Russian military units while simultaneously being responsible for
their official tasks such as conducting assault operations or performing
medical and sapper functions.[10] Putin also praised Russian Defense Minister
Andrei Belousov, identified him as the lead on the establishment of the unmanned
systems service, and called him a "modern defense minister." Belousov
recently faced significant backlash from the Russian ultranationalist
milblogger community for failing to adequately respond to the amassing deaths
of Russian drone operators and specialists in assault operations in Ukraine,
and Putin's mention of Belousov's involvement may be an attempt to restore
Belousov's image among Russian ultranationalist and troops.[11]
A Kremlin insider source claimed
that the establishment of the new service may take Belousov between six months
to a year as it will require several reforms and expanding educational
programs, registering new military specialties, and integrating volunteer
projects into the Russian MoD bureaucracy.[12] Belousov notably established the
"Rubikon" Center for Prospective Unmanned Technologies in August 2024
on the base of an unspecified unmanned aircraft unit.[13] The
"Rubikon" Center appears to be the Russian MoD's initiative to
establish the educational and drone development foundation necessary for the
establishment of the new unmanned systems service.
The Russian military's efforts to
reorganize informal drone detachments into centralized, specialized military
units are already introducing significant dysfunction into the Russian
military. A former Russian Storm-Z instructor and milblogger responded
to Putin's November 28 discussion of the unmanned systems service, stating
there is a risk that the Russian MoD will try to formalize and monopolize drone
supplies to the new unmanned systems service, which will erode a competitive
and flexible environment conducive to innovation.[14] The milblogger observed
that it is also unclear how the Russian military command will integrate the new
drone service with the other combat operations, namely how this centralized
initiative will impact the Russian tactical reconnaissance strike complex. The
milblogger added that the new unmanned systems service is unlikely to prevent
the Russian military command from committing drone operators to assaults
given that Russian tank, engineering, artillery, and signals specialists are
actively fighting as infantry in the event of manpower shortages despite being
different classes of forces. Russian milbloggers previously claimed that the
Russian MoD had been trying to form "joint technical drone
battalions" by systematically disbanding informal Russian drone
detachments and connected these efforts to the establishment of the
"Rubikon" Center.[15] Russian milbloggers previously observed that
Russian military commanders may have been increasingly committing drone operators
to deadly assault operations in anticipation that the Russian MoD would deprive
them of necessary manpower by reallocating these forces into MoD-operated
"technical drone battalions." Russian milbloggers also criticized the
Russian MoD's efforts to establish separate, specialized “technical drone
battalions,” citing the lack of a joint Russian communications system that
would allow dedicated drone units to closely coordinate with assault units.[16]
Russian forces conducted a large
series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine’s energy grid and major
defense industrial facilities on the nights of November 27 to 28 and 28 to 29. The
Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 188 drones and
missiles against Ukraine on the night of November 27 to 28, including: three
S-300 air defense missiles from Belgorod Oblast targeting Kharkiv Oblast; 57
Kh-101 cruise missiles from the airspace over Volgograd Oblast; 28 Kalibr
cruise missiles from vessels in the Black Sea; three Kh-59/69 cruise missiles
from airspace over the Black Sea; and 97 Shahed drones and unknown other strike
drones (likely referring to decoy drones) from Kursk, Oryol, and Rostov oblasts
and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai as of 1030 local time on November
28.[17] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 76 Kh-101
missiles, three Kh-59/69 missiles, and 35 drones, and 62 Russian drones became
“lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. The
Ukrainian Air Force noted that Ukrainian forces also downed 90 percent of the
Russian Kalibr missiles and that at least 12 Russian drones and missiles
successfully struck Ukrainian fuel and energy objects.[18]
The Ukrainian Air Force reported
that Russian forces launched 132 Shahed drones and unknown other strike drones
(likely referring to decoy drones) from Oryol, Rostov, and Kursk oblasts and
Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai on the night of November 28 to 29 and that
Ukrainian forces downed 88 drones over Kyiv, Chernihiv, Cherkassy, Sumy,
Kharkiv, Poltava, Zhytomyr, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, and Odesa oblasts at of
900 local time on November 29.[19] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that 41
Russian drones became ”lost,” likely due to Ukrainian EW interference, and that
one Russian drone returned to Russian air space. Ukrainian officials reported
that Russian drones and missiles damaged residential buildings and critical
infrastructure in Chernihiv, Chernivitsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv,
Khmelnytskyi, Kyiv, Odesa, Sumy, and Volyn oblasts on November 28 and 29.[20]
The Ukrainian Air Force noted that Russian forces have used large numbers of
missiles and drones during recent strikes to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses
and that Russian forces are launching thermal and radar interference devices
and placing EW systems directly on missiles to defend against Ukrainian
countermeasures.[21] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces have
also recently seized on poor weather conditions to conduct strikes under dense
fog and cloud cover.
Ukrainian forces conducted a
series of strikes against four Russian air defense systems and radars in
occupied Ukraine and two oil depots in Russia on November 28 and 29. Ukraine’s
Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on November 29 that
Ukrainian drone units recently destroyed a Russian Zoopark radar system in an
unspecified area of Russia or occupied Ukraine, and the Ukrainian General Staff
reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Buk-M3 air defense system in
occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[22] The GUR reported on November 28 that Ukrainian
forces destroyed a ”Podlyot” mobile radar system — which identifies targets for
S-300/400 air defense systems — near occupied Kotovske, Crimea (north of
Yevpatoria on Crimea‘s northwestern coast).[23] Geolocated footage published on
November 29 purportedly shows Ukrainian forces also striking an S-400 air
defense system near occupied Simferopol, Crimea.[24] The Ukrainian General
Staff reported on November 29 that Ukrainian drones struck the Atlas Oil Depot
in Rostov Oblast and caused a fire at the oil depot.[25] The Ukrainian General
Staff noted that the Atlas Oil Depot supplies petrol products to the Russian
military. Russian sources posted imagery claiming to show a fire near the Atlas
Oil Depot and claimed that Ukrainian forces also conducted a drone strike
likely against an oil depot near Slavyansk-on-Kuban, Krasnodar Krai on November
28.[26] Ukrainian forces previously conducted a drone strike against the Atlas
Oil Depot in August 2024.[27]
Russian Defense Minister Andrei
Belousov made an unannounced visit to Pyongyang, North Korea on November 29
amid intensifying Russian-North Korean cooperation. Belousov
met with North Korean Defense Minister No Kwang Chol on November 29 and stated
that the Russian-North Korean comprehensive strategic partnership agreement
signed in June 2024 is the foundation of a "new Eurasian security
system" and will play a stabilizing role in northeast Asia.[28] Belousov
also highlighted expanding Russian-North Korean military cooperation. No stated
that strengthening military cooperation is the "highest priority" and
that the Russian and North Korean defense ministries are already engaged in
high-level exchanges.[29] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate
(GUR) told Ukrainian outlet Interfax-Ukraine in an article published on
November 29 that North Korea has supplied over five million rounds of
large-caliber artillery ammunition and 100 KN-23/24
(Hwasong-11Ga/Hwasongpho-11Na) ballistic missiles to Russia.[30] The GUR also
reported that North Korea began supplying artillery systems to Russia on
October 3 and has supplied over 100 M-1989 Koksan 170mm self-propelled
artillery systems and M-1991 240mm multiple rocket launcher systems (MLRS). The
GUR reported that over 60 M-1939 Koksan artillery systems are in Russia and
that Russia will transfer some to the Saratov Artillery Command School in
Saratov City to train Russian military personnel. US Alternate Representative
for Special Political Affairs Robert Wood stated on November 27 that North
Korea has transferred over 18,000 containers of munitions and munitions-related
materiel and over 100 ballistic missiles to Russia since November 2023.[31]
Wood added that North Korea is preparing to transfer "even more"
ballistic missiles to Russia.
Russian President Vladimir Putin
reportedly appointed Colonel General Rustam Muradov as First Deputy Commander
of the Russian Ground Forces.[32] Head of Tabasaransky Raion in the
Republic of Dagestan, Magomed Kurabanov, reported Muradov’s appointment on
November 28, though the Russian MoD has yet to confirm Muradov's reported
appointment as of this publication.[33] Muradov previously served as Eastern
Military District (EMD) and Eastern Grouping of Forces commander until his
dismissal in March or April 2023, likely due to battlefield failures and
substantial personnel and equipment casualties near Vuhledar in western Donetsk
Oblast earlier in 2023.[34] Russian milbloggers extensively criticized Muradov
for a previously failed offensive on Vuhledar and reiterated these criticisms
of Muradov in response to his new appointment, with one milblogger criticizing
the MoD’s pattern to reappoint incompetent generals perceived as loyal to the
Kremlin to new positions.[35]
The Ukrainian Prosecutor
General's Office opened additional investigations on November 28 into the
apparent Russian execution of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Donetsk and
Zaporizhia oblasts. The Prosecutor General reported that in the first
instance, four Ukrainian soldiers surrendered to Russian troops near Petrivka
(near Pokrovsk, Donetsk Oblast) on November 22, upon which Russian forces
executed them with automatic weapons at close range.[36] Russian forces also
captured six Ukrainian POWs near Novodarivka (eastern Zaporizhia Oblast) and
executed five POWs at close range on November 24.[37] In both instances the
Ukrainian soldiers had clearly surrendered or been captured and disarmed,
meaning that they were officially hors de combat and protected under
international law. The abuse of execution of POWs is a violation of the Geneva
Convention on POWs and a violation of Rule 47 of Customary International
Humanitarian Law.[38]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky the appointment of Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi as Ukraine's new
Ground Forces Commander on November 29, replacing Lieutenant General Oleksandr
Pavlyuk.[39] Zelensky also appointed Colonel Oleh Apostol as
Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Zelensky stated that
these appointments are intended to increase Ukraine's combat capabilities,
ensure quality training of Ukrainian forces, and introduce innovative
management practices into the Ukrainian military.
Georgians protested in Tbilisi,
Georgia in response to an initiative by the ruling pro-Kremlin Georgian Dream
party to delay European Union (EU) accession negotiations, prompting the
Russian information space to resurrect information operations falsely framing
the protests and Georgian opposition parties as potential threats to Georgian
sovereignty. Georgian Prime Minister and Georgian Dream party
member Irakli Kobakhidze announced on November 28 that Georgia is suspending EU
accession negotiations until 2028 and is refusing any budget grants from the EU
in the meantime.[40] Georgians protested this decision outside the Georgian
parliament building in Tbilisi on November 28 and 29 and clashed with riot
police, prompting authorities to detain protestors and use tear gas and water
cannons in attempts to disperse the protests.[41] Russian media heavily covered
the protests, and Russian milbloggers – including those with connections to the
Kremlin – claimed that these protests are the Georgian opposition’s attempt at
a "Maidan" revolution and that successful protests could result in
the installation of a new government in Georgia and Georgia "losing its
sovereignty" to the West.[42] Russian government officials and Georgian
Dream affiliates have previously claimed that Western countries are pursuing
"Maidanization" in Georgia — a specific reference to Ukraine's
Euromaidan protests and the Revolution of Dignity in 2014 — to justify efforts
to derail long-term European integration efforts that play into continued Russian
hybrid operations to divide, destabilize, and weaken Georgia.[43]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to
laud the technical specifications of the recently launched Oreshnik
ballistic missile and threaten additional Oreshnik strikes against Ukraine
as part of an intensified Russian reflexive control campaign aimed at
forcing the West and Ukraine into self-deterrence.
- There is nothing particularly novel about the
capabilities of the Oreshnik missile, and US and Ukrainian officials
indicated that the Oreshnik missile does not portend a Russian escalation
in the war. Putin's constant flaunting of the Oreshnik and Russian missile
capabilities therefore remains part of the Kremlin's reflexive control
information operation and is unlikely to presage the development of
particularly novel Russian deep strike capabilities.
- The Russian military is considering
establishing a separate service branch for unmanned systems, likely as
part of the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) in a belated effort to
catch up to the establishment of the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces
(USF) in February 2024.
- Russian forces conducted a large series of
drone and missile strikes against Ukraine’s energy grid and major defense
industrial facilities on the nights of November 27 to 28 and 28 to 29.
- Ukrainian forces conducted a series of
strikes against four Russian air defense systems and radars in occupied
Ukraine and two oil depots in Russia on November 28 and 29.
- Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov made
an unannounced visit to Pyongyang, North Korea on November 29 amid
intensifying Russian-North Korean cooperation.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly
appointed Colonel General Rustam Muradov as First Deputy Commander of the
Russian Ground Forces.
- The Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office
opened additional investigations on November 28 into the apparent Russian
execution of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Donetsk and Zaporizhia
oblasts.
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky the
appointment of Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi as Ukraine's new Ground
Forces Commander on November 29, replacing Lieutenant General Oleksandr
Pavlyuk.
- Georgians protested in Tbilisi, Georgia in
response to an initiative by the ruling pro-Kremlin Georgian Dream party
to delay European Union (EU) accession negotiations, prompting the Russian
information space to resurrect information operations falsely framing the
protests and Georgian opposition parties as potential threats to Georgian
sovereignty.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast
of Vuhledar.
- Russian forces recently advanced near
Kupyansk, in Toretsk, near Pokrovsk, and near Velyka Novosilka.
- Russian opposition outlets Mediazona and
BBC Russian Service reported that they have confirmed that at least
80,937 Russian soldiers have died in Ukraine since the start of Russia's
full-scale invasion in February 2022.
We do not report in detail
on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western
media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and
forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these
criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and
specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian
violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian
Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
(comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push
Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast
and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture
the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv
Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture
the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation
Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in
the Russian Federation
Russian forces continued to
counterattack in Ukraine's main salient in Kursk Oblast on November 28 and 29
but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that
elements of the Russian 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade seized two unspecified
streets in Martynovka (northeast of Sudzha) and that elements of the 106th VDV
Division advanced 1.6 kilometers near Darino and reached Nikolaevo-Darino (both
southeast of Korenevo).[44] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian
forces advanced east and southeast of Nizhny Klin (southeast of Korenevo), near
Kamyshovka (north of Sudzha), and southwest of Pogrebki (northwest of
Sudzha).[45] ISW has not observed visual evidence confirming these claims. A
Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kursk direction reported on November 29 that
it repelled a Russian reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault in an
unspecified area of Kursk Oblast and destroyed five of the six Russian armored
vehicles using remote mining.[46] A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating
in the Kursk direction reported that Russian forces are continuing to use a
large number of armored vehicles including tanks to counterattack in Kursk
Oblast and that Russian VDV elements are also using motorcycles and all-terrain
vehicles (ATVs) in combat.[47] A Russian VDV-affiliated milblogger noted that
foggy and rainy weather conditions are inhibiting Russian and Ukrainian drone
operations in the Kursk direction.[48] Russian and Ukrainian forces reportedly
continued combat engagements southeast of Korenevo near Novoivanovka and
Darino; northeast of Sudzha near Martynovka; northwest of Sudzha near Malaya
Loknya and Sverdlikovo; and south of Sudzha near Plekhovo on November 27, 28,
and 29.[49] Elements of the Russian 106th VDV Division's 51st, 119th, and 137th
VDV regiments reportedly continue to operate near Nizhny Klin, Darino, and
Sverdlikovo; assault elements of the 346th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the
Mobilization Reserve reportedly continue to operate near Olgovka (east of
Korenevo); and elements of the 83rd VDV Brigade reportedly continue to operate
along the international border area in Suzhansky Raion.[50] Elements of the
Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet), 56th VDV Regiment (7th
VDV Division), and of the "112" Separate Reconnaissance Battalion are
reportedly operating in the Kursk direction.[51]
Sources in Ukrainian intelligence
told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne on November 29 that the Ukrainian Main
Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) conducted a successful sabotage
operation in Rylsk, Kursk Oblast and burned down a Russian vehicle transporting
Russian short-range drones.[52]
Russian Main Effort –
Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main
Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push
Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and
approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued assaults
near Hlyboke (north of Kharkiv City), Vovchansk, (northeast of Kharkiv City),
and Tykhe (east of Vovchansk) on November 27, 28, and 29 but did not make any
confirmed advances.[53] Russian milbloggers claimed on November 28 and 29 that
Russian forces made marginal advances in Vovchansk amid battles in urban areas;
that fighting continues near Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City); and that Russian
forces operating along the Kozacha Lopan-Slatyne line (north of Kharkiv City)
have become more active in the past two weeks (since mid-November 2024).[54]
ISW has not observed confirmation of Russian gains in these areas. ISW has
reported an increase in Russian cross-border raids in the Kozacha Lopan
direction over the past week, however.[55] Ukrainian military sources reported
on November 28 that Ukrainian drone operators repelled a Russian reinforced
platoon-sized mechanized assault involving three tracked infantry fighting
vehicles and one tank in the Kharkiv direction on an unspecified date.[56] The
spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade and the commander of a Ukrainian drone
platoon both operating in the Kharkiv direction reported on November 29 that
Ukrainian forces are using drones to control the airspace in northern Kharkiv
Oblast, push Russian forces away from Kharkiv City towards the international
border with Russia, have largely stopped Russian forces from using armored
equipment, and have forced Russian soldiers to move on foot and conduct
infantry assaults in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[57]
Russian Subordinate Main
Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the
remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and
northern Donetsk Oblast)
A Ukrainian official confirmed
that a small group of Russian forces has recently crossed to the west (right)
bank of the Oskil River in the Kupyansk direction amid continued fighting north
of Kupyansk on November 28 and 29. The deputy commander of a Ukrainian drone
battalion operating in the Kupyansk direction stated on November 28 that a
small group of Russian infantry crossed to the west bank and that Ukrainian
forces are working to repel the group.[58] The Ukrainian General Staff
acknowledged that Russian forces conducted attacks on the west bank near
Fyholivka (northeast of Kupyansk) and Holubivka and Kindrashivka (both
immediately north of Kupyansk) on November 28.[59] Russian sources claimed that
Russian forces established a foothold on the west bank near Dvorichna (north of
Kupyansk and southwest of Fyholivka), and a Russian military expert claimed
that Russian forces are clearing Dvorichna.[60] Ukrainian military observer
Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on November 29 that Russian forces also crossed the
Oskil River near the suspension bridge south of Novomlynsk (northeast of
Dvorichna) and that the Russian contingent on the west bank is no larger than a
company-sized force, but noted that the Russian command will likely seek to
expand this foothold.[61] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 1st
Guards Tank Army (GTA) (Moscow Military District [MMD]), 6th Combined Arms Army
(CAA) (Leningrad Military District [LMD]), 11th Army Corps (AC) (LMD), and
several battalions of the 20th CAA (MMD) are conducting offensive operations to
eliminate the Ukrainian bridgehead on the east (left) bank of the Oskil River
southeast of Kupyansk.[62] Mashovets stated that the command of the 1st GTA is
conducting all the command and control (C2) for this grouping of forces.
Russian forces recently advanced west of Svatove and northwest of Kreminna amid
continued offensive operations on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on
November 28 and 29. Geolocated footage published on November 29 shows that
Russian forces advanced to a windbreak west of Vyshneve (west of Svatove) and
on the eastern outskirts of Terny (northeast of Kreminna).[63] A Russian
milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Kopanky (west of Svatove
and south of Vyshneve).[64] Russian forces continued ground attacks south of
Kupyansk near Kupyansk-Vyzlovyi, Kolisnykivka, Kruhlaykivka, and Zahryzove;
southeast of Kupyansk near Lozova, Zeleny Hai, Pershotravneve, and Raihorodka;
northwest of Kreminna near Tverdokhlibove, Herkivka, Yampolivka, and Terny; west
of Kreminna near Torske; and south of Kreminna in the Serebryanske forest area
on November 27, 28, and 29.[65] Drone elements of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz
Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly
striking targets south of Makiivka (northwest of Kreminna) and near Torske.[66]
Russian Subordinate Main
Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the
entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in
Donbas)
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian
sources reported ground assaults in the Siversk direction on November 28 and
29.
The Ukrainian General Staff
reported that Russian forces continued assault operations near Chasiv Yar and
south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and Bila Hora on November 27, 28, and 29,
but Russian forces did not make any confirmed advances.[67] Ukrainian sources
posted geolocated footage on November 26 showing a failed Russian platoon-sized
mechanized assault on Ukrainian positions north of Chasiv Yar around November
24.[68] Russian milbloggers claimed on November 27 and 28 that Ukrainian forces
counterattacked west of Klishchiivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar) and that Russian
forces advanced and consolidated positions near the refractory plant in central
Chasiv Yar, are fighting near high rise buildings and the Avanhard stadium in
central Chasiv Yar, and advanced in a forested area northwest of Kurdyumivka
(southeast of Chasiv Yar).[69] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of
these claims, however. Russian drone operators of the 98th Airborne (VDV)
Division reportedly continue to operate near the Novyi Microraion, eastern
Chasiv Yar.[70]
Russian forces recently advanced
in southern Toretsk amid continued offensive operations in the Toretsk
direction on November 27, 28, and 29. Geolocated footage published on November
29 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northward along Hinky Street
in southern Toretsk.[71] Russian milbloggers claimed on November 28 and 29 that
Russian forces recently advanced 250 meters deep in southern Nelipivka (south
of Toretsk), advanced 1.2 kilometers wide by 650 meters deep in a forested area
south of Toretsk, and advanced 300 meters within the western portion of Zabalka
Microraion, southern Toretsk.[72] Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces
Spokesperson Major Anastasiya Bobovnikova reported on November 28 that the
situation in Toretsk remains very difficult due to Russian air and artillery
strikes and intense close quarters urban combat.[73] Bobovnikova reported on
November 27 that Russian forces are conducting fewer airstrikes against
Ukrainian positions in Toretsk because of poor weather but continue to use
drones and conduct ground assaults using poorly trained and equipped contract
military personnel.[74] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 28 and
29 that Russian forces continued ground assaults near Toretsk and northeast of
Toretsk near Dyliivka and Druzhba.[75]
Russian forces recently advanced
south of Pokrovsk amid continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction
on November 28 and 29. Geolocated footage published on November 28 shows that
Russian forces advanced into central Zhovte (south of Pokrovsk), and geolocated
footage published on November 29 shows further Russian advances in a forested
area northeast of Zhovte.[76] Russian advances into central Zhovte also
indicate that Russian forces likely recently seized Pustynka (southeast of
Zhovte), as Russian forces would have had to advance through Pustynka to reach
Zhovte. Additional geolocated footage published on November 28 indicates that
Russian forces advanced south of Lysivka (northeast of Zhovte and southeast of
Pokrovsk).[77] Pokrovsk City Head Serhii Dobryak noted that Russian forces are
about six kilometers away from the outskirts of Pokrovsk in the Zhovte area
south of Pokrovsk.[78] Russian milbloggers claimed on November 28 and 29 that
Russian forces made additional advances near Lysivka and Pushkine (south of
Zhovte), although ISW has not yet observed confirmation of Russian advances in
these areas.[79] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that fighting continued
east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near
Lysivka, Krutyi Yar, and Dachenske; and south of Pokrovsk near Novyi Trud,
Pustynka, Dachenske, Chumatske, and Zhovte on November 27, 28, and 29.[80]
Russian sources credited unspecified elements of the Russian Central Grouping
of Forces for advances near Pokrovsk.[81]
Russian forces reportedly
recently advanced near Kurakhove, but ISW has not observed confirmation of any
claimed Russian gains. Several Russian sources claimed on November 28 and 29
that Russian forces advanced in and west of Berestky (north of Kurakhove on the
northern bank of the Kurakhivske Reservoir) towards the dacha and forested
areas in the direction of Stari Terny (west of Berestky and on the northwestern
bank of the Kurakhivske Reservoir).[82] One milblogger claimed that Russian
forces seized a position along the Berestky-Voznesenka (north of Berestky)
railway line.[83] Russian milbloggers additionally claimed that Russian forces
are consolidating advances within central Kurakhove and in the Yuzhnyi
Microraion (southern Kurakhove).[84] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian
forces have advanced up to one kilometer towards Dalne (south of Kurakhove) and
are clearing Ukrainian positions and advancing west of Illinka (on the
northeastern bank of the Kurakhivske Reservoir, west of Berestky).[85] The Ukrainian
General Staff reported that Russian forces continued unsuccessful ground
attacks near Kurakhove itself; northwest of Kurakhove near Sontsivka and
Novodmytrivka; north of Kurakhove near Berestky; northeast of Kurakhove near
Berestky and Zorya; and south of Kurakhove near Dalne on November 27, 28, and
29.[86] Elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined
Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC])
are reportedly operating near Berestky; elements of the 102nd Motorized Rifle
Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District
[SMD]) are reportedly operating near Dalne; elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle
Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating within Kurakhove itself; elements
of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD])
are reportedly operating in the southern part of the Kurakhove direction; and
elements of the 255th Motorized Rifle Brigade (20th Motorized Rifle Division,
8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the general Kurakhove direction.[87]
Ukrainian forces recently retook
positions northeast of Vuhledar amid continued offensive operations in the
Vuhledar direction on November 28 and 29. Geolocated footage published on
November 28 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced on the
northwestern outskirts of Yelizavetivka (northeast of Vuhledar).[88] Russian
milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are clearing positions in the forest
area near Yelizavetivka; consolidating positions in Illinka (northeast of
Vuhledar); and advancing near Veselyi Hai (northwest of Vuhledar) and two
kilometers along a road north of Yasna Polyana (northwest of Vuhledar).[89] ISW
has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. A Russian milblogger
claimed that elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 1472nd
Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 68th AC, EMD) recently advanced near
Trudove and are currently two kilometers from Kostyantynopolske, which is
consistent with ISW's assessment of Russian advances in the area.[90] Russian forces
continued assault north of Vuhledar near Romanivka and northwest of Vuhledar
near Veselyi Hai, Trudove, Kostyantynopolske, Sukhy Yaly, and Rozlyv on
November 27, 28, and 29.[91] Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle
Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating
near Antonivka (northeast of Vuhledar) and elements of the Russian 14th
Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Military Intelligence
Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the south Donetsk
(Vuhledar-Velyka Novosilka) direction.[92]
Russian forces recently seized
Rozdolne (northeast of Velyka Novosilka) amid continued offensive operations in
the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on November 28 and 29. Geolocated
imagery published on November 29 indicates that elements of the Russian 37th
Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) and 40th Naval Infantry Brigade
(Pacific Fleet, EMD) recently raised a flag over central Rozdolne and seized
the settlement.[93] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also
advanced along the Shaytanka River west of Novodonetske (southwest of Velyka
Novosilka) towards Blahodatne (south of Velyka Novosilka) and from Rivnopil
(southwest of Velyka Novosilka) towards Makariivka (south of Velyka
Novosilka).[94] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims,
however. The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the
Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area reported on November 28 that Russian
forces have two main objectives in this area: interdict Ukrainian logistics
routes between Velyka Novosilka and Kurakhove and seize Velyka Novosilka
itself.[95] The spokesperson noted that the situation for Ukrainian forces is
more difficult east of Velyka Novosilka where Russian forces recently advanced
but stated that worsening weather conditions are complicating Russian drone
usage and forcing Russia to rely on foot mobile infantry to advance in the
area. An officer in another Ukrainian brigade operating near Velyka Novosilka
reported on November 29 that Russian forces are using armored vehicles, motorcycles,
all-terrain vehicles (ATVs or “buggies“), and air support to advance in the
area, however.[96] Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Velyka
Novosilka near Rozdolne; on the northeastern and eastern outskirts of Velyka
Novosilka; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Rivnopil, Novodarivka, and
Novopil on November 27, 28, and 29.[97] Elements of the Russian 5th Tank
Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Velyka Novosilka and
Rozdolne and drone operators of a tank battalion of the 60th Motorized Rifle
Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Makarivka.[98]
Russian Supporting Effort
– Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline
positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian forces continued
offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 27, 28, and 29
but did not make confirmed advances. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official
Vladimir Rogov claimed on November 27 that Russian forces advanced northeast of
Robotyne, capturing 15 square kilometers south of Mala Tokmachka and entering
the town of Bilohirya (both northeast of Robotyne).[99] ISW has not observed
visual confirmation of these claims, however. A Russian milblogger claimed on
November 29 that Russian forces continued offensive operations north of
Robotyne and near Mala Tokmachka.[100] Ukraine's Southern Operational Command
reported on November 29 that Russian forces are preparing for assault
operations in the Hulyaipole (eastern Zaporizhia Oblast) and Orikhiv (western
Zaporizhia Oblast) directions by launching airstrikes, conducting aerial
reconnaissance and engineering missions, stockpiling equipment and ammunition,
training additional assault personnel, and increasing the number of electronic
warfare (EW) and anti-aircraft systems deployed to western Zaporizhia
Oblast.[101] Drone operators of the Russian 503rd Motorized Rifle Regiment
(19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern
Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia
direction.[102]
Positional fighting continued in
the Dnipro direction in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on November 27, 28, and
29, but there were no changes to the frontline.[103] Ukraine's Southern
Operational Command reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to
seize unspecified islands in the Dnipro River Delta between November 28 and
29.[104] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav
Voloshyn reported on November 29 that Russian forces repositioned a battalion’s
worth of riverboats from occupied Crimea to the occupied Kinburn and Tendrivska
spits to better defend against potential Ukrainian offensive actions in the
Kherson River Delta area.[105] The Ukrainian Crimea-based "Atesh"
partisan group reported on November 28 that elements of the Russian 205th
Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military
District [SMD]) are reportedly abandoning their positions in the Kherson
direction en masse and suffering from high rates of desertion due to systemic
abuse from commanding officers.[106]
Russian Air, Missile, and
Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and
civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
See topline text for updates of
Russian strikes on Ukraine on November 28 and November 29.
Russian Mobilization and
Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand
combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Russian opposition outlets Mediazona
and BBC Russian Service reported that they have confirmed that at
least 80,937 Russian soldiers have died in Ukraine since the start of Russia's
full-scale invasion in February 2022.[107] Mediazona and BBC Russian
Service reported on November 29 that over half of the soldiers who they
confirmed to have died in Ukraine were not in the Russian military at the start
of the full scale invasion in February 2022; that volunteer servicemembers
usually die within two to four weeks of arriving at the frontline; that
volunteers comprise 22 percent of total Russian losses; and that convict
recruits comprise 18 percent of total losses.
The Russian MoD is expanding the
role of the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (ROC
MP) in the military, likely as part of ongoing efforts to enforce pro-Kremlin
ideological narratives among Russian military personnel.[108] The Russian MoD's
Main Military Political Directorate Deputy Chief Oleg Veselkov stated that the
Russian military created a role that would allow assistants to military
district commanders to work with ROC MP representatives. Veselkov described the
religious assistant as "the commander's confessor, who is always with him
— at the front, at the command post, among the troops" and noted that ROC
MP Head Patriarch Kirill has selected and appointed these religious
assistants.[109] Veselkov noted that priests in the Russian military will now
work with soldiers at an individual level on the frontline.
The Kremlin is reportedly
incorporating its "Time of Heroes" program that aims to place
veterans of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in positions in local,
regional, and federal governments into its effort to militarize occupied Ukraine
and illegally integrate occupied Ukrainian territory into Russia. Former
Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) First Deputy Information Minister Danil
Bezsonov claimed that the Russian presidential administration and the ruling
United Russia party are attempting to create more opportunities for veterans to
participate in the Russian State Duma elections in 2026 to represent occupied
Ukraine.[110] Bezsonov also claimed that the Russian presidential
administration and United Russia assess that the "Time of Heroes"
program has been successful and that Russian authorities plan to introduce
participation in the program into each occupied region of Ukraine. The Kremlin
may also intend to incentivize Russian military service in occupied Ukraine
through the prospects of career opportunities.
The Russian military reportedly
continues to forcibly impress civilians into the military. A Russian insider
source claimed on November 28 that Russian military enlistment offices are
working with Russian law enforcement, public associations, and Cossack groups
to conduct quarterly illegal raids to find "volunteers" to serve on
the frontline across unspecified regions and cities in Russia. The insider
source claimed that these raids target young adults and migrants and will
target people who are inebriated during the New Year holiday.[111]
Russian Technological
Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological
innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
A Ukrainian electronic warfare
(EW) system manufacturer stated on November 29 that the Russian military is
attempting to use and adapt stolen Ukrainian military technology, particularly
to improve Russian EW capabilities.[112]
Activities in
Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate
administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens
into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)
ISW is not publishing coverage of
activities in Russian-occupied areas today.
Significant activity in
Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military
presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable
frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)
The Russian military reportedly
set up a filtration camp for Ukrainian prisoners of war (POW) and civilians in
Belarus in 2022. Radio Svoboda’s investigative branch Skhemy reported
on November 28 that Russian forces established a filtration center at a
Belarusian state enterprise in Naroulia, Gomel Oblast in March 2022, where
Russian forces detained, tortured, and abused Ukrainian POWs, civilians, and
children.[113] Belarus has also been involved in Russia's systematic
deportation of Ukrainian children to Belarus and Russia.[114]
Russia and Belarus issued a joint
declaration on November 28 enhancing the role of the international law. The
declaration states that Russia and Belarus uphold the principles of
international law, that international law is the basis of fair and equal international
relations, and that both countries operate on the principle of sovereign
equality of states.[115] The declaration also noted that Russia and Belarus
jointly express concern over "politicization of the international justice
system," although failed to acknowledge that Russia is actively violating
the international law by invading Ukraine.
Note: ISW does not receive any
classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information,
and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social
media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial
data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are
provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/transcripts/75687;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-21-2024
[2] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/transcripts/75687
(November 28 address); http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/75623
(November 22 address); http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/75614
(November 21 address)
[3] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/75689;
http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/transcripts/75687
[4] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/75689
[5]
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-22-2024;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-21-2024
[6]
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/13/world/europe/russia-missiles-ukraine-kyiv.html;
https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/articles/c86q8lewgego;
https://www.unian.ua/war/viyna-v-ukrajini-rosiya-vdarila-po-kiyevu-raketami-detali-novini-kiyeva-12689613.html;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-8-2024
[7] https://suspilne dot
media/890759-putin-rozmahue-oresnikom-sob-zmusiti-prezidenta-ssa-jti-na-umovi-rf-zelenskij/
[8]
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/nuclear-attack-unlikely-despite-putins-warnings-us-intelligence-says-2024-11-27/
[9] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/75689
[10] https://t.me/rusich_army/18867
[11]
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2024;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-22-2024;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-21-2024;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-27-2024;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-3-2024
[12] https://t.me/kremlin_sekret/16526
[13]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-3-2024;
https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/22099195
[14] https://t.me/philologist_zov/1744
[15]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-3-2024
[16]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-3-2024
[17] https://t.me/kpszsu/23855
[18] https://t.me/kpszsu/23868
[19] https://t.me/kpszsu/23924
[20] https://suspilne dot
media/lutsk/889899-u-lucku-cuti-zvuki-vibuhiv-so-vidomo/?utm_source=telegram&utm_medium=ps;
https://t.me/volynskaODA/6285 ; https://suspilne dot
media/sumy/890549-vsi-vikna-povibivalo-meskanci-sostki-rozpovili-pro-raketnij-udar/
; https://t.me/odeskaODA/7754; https://suspilne dot
media/odesa/890011-armia-rf-atakuvala-odesinu-raketami-poskodzeni-budinki-e-poranenij/?utm_source=telegram&utm_medium=ps;
https://suspilne dot media/odesa/890119-ataka-rf-na-odesinu-8-listopada-kilkist-zagiblih-zbilsilas-do-dvoh/
; https://suspilne dot
media/kyiv/889947-raketnij-udar-po-kievu-ulamki-vpali-v-dniprovskomu-rajoni/;
https://t.me/suspilne_kyiv/13418; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/3784;
https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/9731
;
https://www.facebook.com/sergii.tiurin.public/posts/pfbid034urkcgeWngifJ7yp8X36w4WPPoUjVHNcLJYv7jTfyT9qzLHBZRgVZcSBoJZF9HLQl
; https://t.me/synegubov/12260 ; https://t.me/synegubov/12259 ;
https://t.me/synegubov/12258 https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/1988 ; https://suspilne
dot
media/889867-ssa-zaklikali-kiiv-zniziti-prizovnij-vik-do-18-rokiv-tramp-obrav-predstavnika-z-pitan-ukraini-1009-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1732780770&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps;
https://suspilne dot media/ivano-frankivsk/890035-vijskovi-rf-atakuvali-obekti-kriticnoi-infrastrukturi-ivano-frankivsini/;
https://t.me/onyshchuksvitlana/18205 ; https://suspilne dot
media/chernivtsi/890067-u-seli-na-bukovini-ulamki-raketi-poskodili-visim-budinkiv/;
https://suspilne dot media/chernivtsi/890017-u-cerniveckij-oblasti-ppo-znisila-rosijsku-raketu/
; https://suspilne dot
media/889867-ssa-zaklikali-kiiv-zniziti-prizovnij-vik-do-18-rokiv-tramp-obrav-predstavnika-z-pitan-ukraini-1009-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1732780614&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
; https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2024/11/29/naslidky-vluchannya-drona-v-dytyachu-polikliniku-v-kyyevi-ye-rujnuvannya-ta-postrazhdalyj/;
https://t.me/dsns_telegram/35548 ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/35548 ;
https://od.npu dot gov.ua/news/na-odeshchyni-vnaslidok-ataky-rf-poraneno-7-liudei-politsiia-fiksuie-zlochyn-krainy-terorystky
; https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2024/11/29/odeshhyna-palaye-naslidky-ataky-udarnyh-droniv-po-zhytlovyh-kvartalah/;
https://t.me/pgo_gov_ua/27644 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/7779 ;
https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0Tcpsfa5GYKyF1zgti3z7B8KKAqoG2BnA66h2byerZmAxLK3zciMo7kkMS5wyp3t9l
[21] https://t.me/kpszsu/23868
[22] https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2024/11/29/okupanty-bidkayutsya-nashi-rozvidnyky-rozvodyat-rukamy-rosiyany-zalyshylys-bez-zooparku/;
https://www.facebook.com/DefenceIntelligenceofUkraine/videos/1098201765011427/
; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02P5JRVJzvxEef1bE6vyWcy59a1d9T6s1WndgR3sCkhQgZMuap7V4Pr1gn4qdtHrcol4
; https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2024/11/29/syly-bezpilotnyh-system-urazyly-czikavu-vijskovu-czil-rosiyan-vartistyu-10-mln/;
https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1HEB4rvWTT/
[23] https://t.me/DIUkraine/4920
[24] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/10723 ;
https://t.me/chp_crimea/53355 ; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/15432 ;
https://t.me/chp_crimea/53355 ;
https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1862488907968913442
[25]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02P5JRVJzvxEef1bE6vyWcy59a1d9T6s1WndgR3sCkhQgZMuap7V4Pr1gn4qdtHrcol
[26] https://t.me/tass_agency/287788;
https://t.me/tass_agency/287739
; https://t.me/vchkogpu/52857;
https://t.me/vchkogpu/52856;https://t.me/astrapress/69351 ;
https://t.me/astrapress/69336 ; https://t.me/astrapress/69337 ;
https://t.me/astrapress/69338 ; https://t.me/astrapress/69340 ;
https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146038 ; https://t.me/astrapress/69401 ;
https://t.me/astrapress/69456
[27]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-28-2024
[28] https://t.me/mod_russia/46324
[29] https://t.me/mod_russia/46324
[30] https://interfax.com dot ua/news/general/1030885.html
[31]
https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-at-a-un-security-council-briefing-on-ukraine-22/
[32] https://golostabasarana dot
ru/newsreg/media/2024/11/28/rustam-muradov-naznachen-pervyim-zamestitelem-glavnokomanduyuschego-suhoputnyimi-vojskami-rf/
[33] https://golostabasarana dot
ru/newsreg/media/2024/11/28/rustam-muradov-naznachen-pervyim-zamestitelem-glavnokomanduyuschego-suhoputnyimi-vojskami-rf/
[34]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-28-2023;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar032723;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2023;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-19-2023-0;
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-30-2023
[35] https://t.me/milinfolive/136095;
https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1862344967655457195; https://t.me/arbat/1932;
https://t.me/ZOV_Voevoda/24080; https://theins dot ru/news/276720;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-27-2023;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-24-2023;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-10-2023;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-10-2023;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2023
[36] https://t.me/pgo_gov_ua/27643
[37] https://t.me/pgo_gov_ua/27632
[38]
https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/geneva-convention-relative-treatment-prisoners-war;
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule47
[39] https://armyinform dodt
com.ua/2024/11/29/prezydent-nazvav-novyh-komanduvacha-suhoputnyh-vijsk-ta-zastupnyka-golovnokomanduvacha-zsu/;
https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/12617 ;
https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0oNSVHZF78kYXsAyACprV9pYJmQXf1i8HKrCPRcJ5j7ojrNnSZEZk89BoywUaPrVJl
; https://www.president dot
gov.ua/documents/7892024-52885?fbclid=IwY2xjawG2579leHRuA2FlbQIxMAABHTPMNJJ0baBt8KVKetgawnWxBeBzoYNKo4w1hO3FXXCRvTHUseeUvO_3rg_aem_q3bFRHfRU6lusKL1ohDahQ
[40] https://www.radiotavisupleba dot ge/a/33219304.html
[41]
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/georgia-says-it-will-not-enter-eu-membership-talks-until-2028-snub-brussels-2024-11-28/
; https://meduza dot
io/news/2024/11/29/u-parlamenta-gruzii-v-tbilisi-nachalas-novaya-aktsiya-protesta-iz-za-priostanovki-peregovorov-o-vstuplenii-strany-v-es;
https://t.me/tass_agency/288156 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/288167 ;
https://t.me/tass_agency/288169
[42] https://t.me/tass_agency/288025;
https://t.me/tass_agency/288023; https://t.me/tass_agency/288015;
https://t.me/tass_agency/288009; https://t.me/tass_agency/288004;
https://t.me/tass_agency/288003; https://t.me/tass_agency/287987;
https://t.me/tass_agency/287984 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146000 ;
https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146003 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146026;
https://t.me/kremlin_sekret/16524; https://t.me/rybar/65813;
https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81565; https://t.me/tass_agency/288156 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/288167
; https://t.me/tass_agency/288169; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146042;
https://t.me/sashakots/50475; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146084
[43]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-4-2024;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar050824 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/17236177
[44] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/20100;
https://t.me/z_arhiv/29834
[45] https://t.me/z_arhiv/29834
https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/20100
[46] https://t.me/ok_pivnich1/11436
[47] https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2024/11/29/vse-chudovo-myasni-shturmy-i-kolony-tehniky-nas-vlashtovuyut-na-kurshhyni-morpihy-peremololy-ochyen-gniluyu-brygadu/;
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg
[48] https://t.me/rusich_army/18859;
https://t.me/rusich_army/18894
[49] https://t.me/dva_majors/58858;
https://t.me/rusich_army/18866; https://t.me/dva_majors/58879;
https://t.me/dva_majors/58757https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid027xfrr2ToFQQhH92aCAr8bZXJYA975XbKqYQ5Lb2DfDbH1nTZfZucHqvKQaPdBtRil;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06XEdHePFFPDUs2sE9ca2UeSPgTrCVNjqmvTvPFGLmqkvig3Xxqw7Euni6Pi1nSe4l;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03y3AFrrBHiQhxJmvkqVYWT15pR3dgvTwNww1fxPiVcCei61b7iHqCE3T5Nv3C6zBl;
https://t.me/rusich_army/18859
[50] https://t.me/rusich_army/18894;
https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/20009; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81478
[51] https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2024/11/27/na-kurshhyni-voyiny-sso-vzyaly-v-polon-morskyh-pihotyncziv-rf/;
https://t.me/BalitskyEV/4370; https://t.me/rusich_army/18859
[52] https://suspilne dot
media/890839-zakon-pro-pidvisenna-podatkiv-nabuv-cinnosti-niderlandi-peredali-tri-ustanovki-patriot-1010-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1732871799&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
[53]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02P5QjSH7c3EE7A6DZy9RTWLXV4NaMJ7SKfDNy4yQ5hThJbJ3XhRscKVeWYuPRLLHFl
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06XEdHePFFPDUs2sE9ca2UeSPgTrCVNjqmvTvPFGLmqkvig3Xxqw7Euni6Pi1nSe4l;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid027xfrr2ToFQQhH92aCAr8bZXJYA975XbKqYQ5Lb2DfDbH1nTZfZucHqvKQaPdBtRil
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03y3AFrrBHiQhxJmvkqVYWT15pR3dgvTwNww1fxPiVcCei61b7iHqCE3T5Nv3C6zBl
; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cV6ZHw7zELf3c5qyG5LhAR2nMU146RabKtANdNjqg8NpvzxHkWe3JyVJQPCgYobvl
;https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0rnf35Q648JNTm9vrcm1xp1d7NvDohokm33NgnVgVs1JagktQR28uFJN4edjqVawPl
[54]https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/11937 ;
https://t.me/dva_majors/58879
[55]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-26-2024;
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-25-2024
[56] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/15415 ;
https://t.me/ab3army/4925 ; https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2024/11/28/tank-zastryag-u-bagnyuczi-rosiyany-hotily-vtekty-yak-tretya-shturmova-vidbyvala-nastup-vorozhoyi-kolony/
[57] https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2024/11/28/pidnimayetsya-voda-v-unikalnij-misczevosti-na-pivnochi-harkivshhyny-zahysnyky-protystoyat-okupantam-i-pryrodi/
; https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2024/11/29/pihoti-dovodytsya-pishky-jty-bagato-kilometriv-praktychno-vid-kordonu-na-harkivshhyni-okupanty-minimalno-vykorystovuyut-bud-yaku-tehniku/
[58] https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2024/11/28/zi-100-okupantiv-do-liniyi-dohodyat-10-u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-pro-boyi-na-richczi-oskil/
[59]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0rnf35Q648JNTm9vrcm1xp1d7NvDohokm33NgnVgVs1JagktQR28uFJN4edjqVawPl;
[60] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/11937;
https://t.me/tass_agency/287749
[61] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2377 ;
https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid02tfyVo3gHzXoYtxG9aVWXvw8FQYiqoZvUBoVbxyLQq33W2LJ1QnFxnNtR1AmvSCtyl
[62] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2377 ;
https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid02tfyVo3gHzXoYtxG9aVWXvw8FQYiqoZvUBoVbxyLQq33W2LJ1QnFxnNtR1AmvSCtyl
[63] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7683;
https://t.me/OMIBr_60/645; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7685;
https://t.me/rubpak_liberatores/22
[64] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/20098
[65]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02P5QjSH7c3EE7A6DZy9RTWLXV4NaMJ7SKfDNy4yQ5hThJbJ3XhRscKVeWYuPRLLHFl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06XEdHePFFPDUs2sE9ca2UeSPgTrCVNjqmvTvPFGLmqkvig3Xxqw7Euni6Pi1nSe4l;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid027xfrr2ToFQQhH92aCAr8bZXJYA975XbKqYQ5Lb2DfDbH1nTZfZucHqvKQaPdBtRil;
https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2024/11/28/zi-100-okupantiv-do-liniyi-dohodyat-10-u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-pro-boyi-na-richczi-oskil/;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03y3AFrrBHiQhxJmvkqVYWT15pR3dgvTwNww1fxPiVcCei61b7iHqCE3T5Nv3C6zBl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cV6ZHw7zELf3c5qyG5LhAR2nMU146RabKtANdNjqg8NpvzxHkWe3JyVJQPCgYobvl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0rnf35Q648JNTm9vrcm1xp1d7NvDohokm33NgnVgVs1JagktQR28uFJN4edjqVawPl
[66] https://t.me/voin_dv/12021; https://t.me/voin_dv/12060;
https://t.me/Secrets_of_Vinakos/4192
[67]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02P5QjSH7c3EE7A6DZy9RTWLXV4NaMJ7SKfDNy4yQ5hThJbJ3XhRscKVeWYuPRLLHFl
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid027xfrr2ToFQQhH92aCAr8bZXJYA975XbKqYQ5Lb2DfDbH1nTZfZucHqvKQaPdBtRil
; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06XEdHePFFPDUs2sE9ca2UeSPgTrCVNjqmvTvPFGLmqkvig3Xxqw7Euni6Pi1nSe4l
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03y3AFrrBHiQhxJmvkqVYWT15pR3dgvTwNww1fxPiVcCei61b7iHqCE3T5Nv3C6zBl
; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0rnf35Q648JNTm9vrcm1xp1d7NvDohokm33NgnVgVs1JagktQR28uFJN4edjqVawPl
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cV6ZHw7zELf3c5qyG5LhAR2nMU146RabKtANdNjqg8NpvzxHkWe3JyVJQPCgYobvl
[68] https://t.me/official24ombr/696 ;
https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/22805
[69] https://t.me/dva_majors/58757 ;
https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/20003 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/23388?single
[70]https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/20009 ;
https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/20082 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/23405 ;
https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146061
[71] https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/1862422860049912063 ;
https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1862426013243727997;
https://x.com/matej0210110461/status/1862512330153599419 ;
https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/176
[72]https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81493 ;
https://t.me/dva_majors/58879 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/58879 ;
https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/20097
[73] https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2024/11/28/kontakt-na-vidstani-vytyagnutoyi-ruky-u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-pro-boyi-v-toreczku/;
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg
[74] https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2024/11/27/u-toreczku-idut-miski-boyi-okupanty-zakydayut-myasom-pozycziyi-syl-oborony/
[75]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03y3AFrrBHiQhxJmvkqVYWT15pR3dgvTwNww1fxPiVcCei61b7iHqCE3T5Nv3C6zBl
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cV6ZHw7zELf3c5qyG5LhAR2nMU146RabKtANdNjqg8NpvzxHkWe3JyVJQPCgYobvl
; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0rnf35Q648JNTm9vrcm1xp1d7NvDohokm33NgnVgVs1JagktQR28uFJN4edjqVawPl
[76] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7664;
https://t.me/mir_perezagruzka/2236; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7684;
https://t.me/groupPUMA/60
[77] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7668;
https://t.me/moment_war/165
[78] https://suspilne dot
media/889867-ssa-zaklikali-kiiv-zniziti-prizovnij-vik-do-18-rokiv-tramp-obrav-predstavnika-z-pitan-ukraini-1009-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1732802486&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
[79] https://t.me/z_arhiv/29843; https://t.me/rybar/65783;
https://t.me/z_arhiv/29853
[80]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02P5QjSH7c3EE7A6DZy9RTWLXV4NaMJ7SKfDNy4yQ5hThJbJ3XhRscKVeWYuPRLLHFl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid027xfrr2ToFQQhH92aCAr8bZXJYA975XbKqYQ5Lb2DfDbH1nTZfZucHqvKQaPdBtRil;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06XEdHePFFPDUs2sE9ca2UeSPgTrCVNjqmvTvPFGLmqkvig3Xxqw7Euni6Pi1nSe4l;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03y3AFrrBHiQhxJmvkqVYWT15pR3dgvTwNww1fxPiVcCei61b7iHqCE3T5Nv3C6zBl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cV6ZHw7zELf3c5qyG5LhAR2nMU146RabKtANdNjqg8NpvzxHkWe3JyVJQPCgYobvl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0rnf35Q648JNTm9vrcm1xp1d7NvDohokm33NgnVgVs1JagktQR28uFJN4edjqVawPl
[81] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81577;
https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146053; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146099
[82] https://t.me/dva_majors/58757;
https://t.me/wargonzo/23388?single; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/145807;
https://t.me/rybar/65789; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81573;
https://t.me/dva_majors/58879; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29856;
https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60380
[83] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60380
[84] https://t.me/rybar/65758;
https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/20003; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/145807;
https://t.me/dva_majors/58879; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60381
[85] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/20003;
https://t.me/boris_rozhin/145821
[86]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02P5QjSH7c3EE7A6DZy9RTWLXV4NaMJ7SKfDNy4yQ5hThJbJ3XhRscKVeWYuPRLLHFl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid027xfrr2ToFQQhH92aCAr8bZXJYA975XbKqYQ5Lb2DfDbH1nTZfZucHqvKQaPdBtRil;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06XEdHePFFPDUs2sE9ca2UeSPgTrCVNjqmvTvPFGLmqkvig3Xxqw7Euni6Pi1nSe4l;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03y3AFrrBHiQhxJmvkqVYWT15pR3dgvTwNww1fxPiVcCei61b7iHqCE3T5Nv3C6zBl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cV6ZHw7zELf3c5qyG5LhAR2nMU146RabKtANdNjqg8NpvzxHkWe3JyVJQPCgYobvl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0rnf35Q648JNTm9vrcm1xp1d7NvDohokm33NgnVgVs1JagktQR28uFJN4edjqVawPl
[87] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/145807;
https://t.me/z_arhiv/29826 (Berestky); https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146076 ;
https://t.me/nm_dnr/13044 (Dalne); https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/11941
https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/11941 (in Kurakhove); https://t.me/voin_dv/12038
(southern Kurakhove direction); https://t.me/dva_majors/58867 (general
Kurakhove direction)
[88] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7675;
https://t.me/BARS14GUMANITARKA/10352
[89] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60345 ;
https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60369 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/12042 ;
https://t.me/dva_majors/58879 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29859 ;
https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60381
[90] https://t.me/voin_dv/12042
[91] https://t.me/dva_majors/58757 ;
https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60369 ;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02P5QjSH7c3EE7A6DZy9RTWLXV4NaMJ7SKfDNy4yQ5hThJbJ3XhRscKVeWYuPRLLHFl
; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid027xfrr2ToFQQhH92aCAr8bZXJYA975XbKqYQ5Lb2DfDbH1nTZfZucHqvKQaPdBtRil
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06XEdHePFFPDUs2sE9ca2UeSPgTrCVNjqmvTvPFGLmqkvig3Xxqw7Euni6Pi1nSe4l
; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/20091
[92] https://t.me/dva_majors/58785 ;
https://t.me/voin_dv/12047
[93] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146067;
https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7677; https://t.me/voin_dv/12049 ;
https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81531 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/12043 ;
https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60371 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81577
[94] https://t.me/voin_dv/12042 ;
https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60369 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29837 ;
https://t.me/wargonzo/23388
[95] https://suspilne dot
media/donbas/890173-zahopiti-veliku-novosilku-ta-pererizati-dorogu-na-kurahove-vijskovij-pro-cili-rosijskogo-nastupu-na-pivdni-doneccini/
[96] https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2024/11/29/vorog-postavyv-dlya-sebe-zadachu-vyjty-na-trasu-zaporizhzhya-doneczk-okupanty-pragnut-pererizaty-logistyku/
[97] https://t.me/wargonzo/23388 ; https://t.me/rybar/65758 ;
https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0dA5rxHZXf8Awnuhp4jGPYSsLtzEg4zxLQEc6rzpohHGRXLmRiWhxnZrjdf2YiLfgl
; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02P5QjSH7c3EE7A6DZy9RTWLXV4NaMJ7SKfDNy4yQ5hThJbJ3XhRscKVeWYuPRLLHFl
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid027xfrr2ToFQQhH92aCAr8bZXJYA975XbKqYQ5Lb2DfDbH1nTZfZucHqvKQaPdBtRil
; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06XEdHePFFPDUs2sE9ca2UeSPgTrCVNjqmvTvPFGLmqkvig3Xxqw7Euni6Pi1nSe4l
; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/20101 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/23405 ;
https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0Tcpsfa5GYKyF1zgti3z7B8KKAqoG2BnA66h2byerZmAxLK3zciMo7kkMS5wyp3t9l
; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60382 ; https://ria dot
ru/20241127/svo-1985936560.html; https://t.me/vrogov/18152
[98] https://t.me/voin_dv/12041 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/12036
[99] https://t.me/vrogov/18128 ; https://ria dot
ru/20241126/spetsoperatsiya-1985699543.html
[100] https://t.me/dva_majors/58879
[101]https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0Tcpsfa5GYKyF1zgti3z7B8KKAqoG2BnA66h2byerZmAxLK3zciMo7kkMS5wyp3t9l
[102] https://t.me/dva_majors/58781
[103]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02P5QjSH7c3EE7A6DZy9RTWLXV4NaMJ7SKfDNy4yQ5hThJbJ3XhRscKVeWYuPRLLHFl
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06XEdHePFFPDUs2sE9ca2UeSPgTrCVNjqmvTvPFGLmqkvig3Xxqw7Euni6Pi1nSe4l;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid027xfrr2ToFQQhH92aCAr8bZXJYA975XbKqYQ5Lb2DfDbH1nTZfZucHqvKQaPdBtRil
;
https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0dA5rxHZXf8Awnuhp4jGPYSsLtzEg4zxLQEc6rzpohHGRXLmRiWhxnZrjdf2YiLfgl
; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03y3AFrrBHiQhxJmvkqVYWT15pR3dgvTwNww1fxPiVcCei61b7iHqCE3T5Nv3C6zBl
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cV6ZHw7zELf3c5qyG5LhAR2nMU146RabKtANdNjqg8NpvzxHkWe3JyVJQPCgYobvl
; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0rnf35Q648JNTm9vrcm1xp1d7NvDohokm33NgnVgVs1JagktQR28uFJN4edjqVawPl
[104]https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0Tcpsfa5GYKyF1zgti3z7B8KKAqoG2BnA66h2byerZmAxLK3zciMo7kkMS5wyp3t9l
[105] https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2024/11/28/vorog-boyitsya-desantu-na-kinburnsku-kosu-rosiyany-ukriplyuyut-uzberezhzhya-okupovanoyi-mykolayivshhyny/
[106] https://t.me/atesh_ua/5865
[107] https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/clygedgp40yo ;
https://meduza dot
io/news/2024/11/29/mediazona-i-bi-bi-si-podtverdili-gibel-bolee-80-tysyach-rossiyskih-voennyh-v-ukraine-bolshe-poloviny-iz-nih-ne-byli-svyazany-s-armiey-do-nachala-voyny
[108] https://www.rbc dot
ru/rbcfreenews/6747e1289a7947521222e0c7
[109] https://www.rbc dot
ru/rbcfreenews/6747e1289a7947521222e0c7
[110] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/41845
[111] https://t.me/vchkogpu/52834
[112] https://www.ukrinform dot
ua/rubric-ato/3932622-u-rosijskij-zbroi-vikoristovuutsa-vkradeni-ukrainski-tehnologii-ekspert.html
[113]
https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/skhemy-narovlya-bilorus-filtratsiynyy-tabir/33219293.html
[114]
https://www.state.gov/belaruss-involvement-in-russias-systematic-relocation-of-ukraines-children/
[115] https://t.me/MID_Russia/48865
