Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Davit Gasparyan, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan
November 17, 2024, 4:30pm ET
Click here
to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here
to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a
computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this
data-heavy tool.
Click here
to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain
map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will
update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note:
The data cut-off for this product was 11:00 am ET on November 17. ISW
will cover subsequent reports in the November 18 Russian Offensive
Campaign Assessment.
The New York Times (NYT) and Washington Post
reported that US President Joe Biden has authorized Ukrainian forces to
use US-provided ATACMS in limited strikes against Russian and North
Korean military targets within Kursk Oblast. The NYT and Washington Post
reported on November 17 that unspecified US officials expect Ukrainian
forces to initially conduct strikes against Russian and North Korean
forces within Kursk Oblast and that the Biden Administration could
expand this authorization to use ATACMS against targets elsewhere in
Russia in the future.[1]
The US officials stated that the US authorized these limited Ukrainian
strikes in response to the deployment of North Korean forces to the
battlefield in Kursk Oblast to deter North Korea from deploying more
forces to Russia. The US officials stated that the partial lifting of
restrictions aims to generate a "specific and limited" battlefield
effect and will not change the course of the war. French outlet Le Figaro
reported on November 17 that France and the United Kingdom (UK) have
authorized Ukrainian forces to use French and UK-provided SCALP/Storm
Shadow missiles to strike within Russia.[2] Le Figaro
did not state if France and the UK had authorized Ukraine's SCALP/Storm
Shadow usage only within Kursk Oblast. The partial lifting of
restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western-provided long-range weapons
against military objects within Kursk Oblast will not completely deprive
Russian forces of their sanctuary in Russian territory, as hundreds of
military objects remain within ATACMS range in other Russian border
regions.[3]
ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will benefit from any
partial sanctuary if Western states continue to impose restrictions on
Ukraine's ability to defend itself and that the US should allow Ukraine
to strike all legitimate military targets within Russia's operational
and deep-rear within range of US-provided weapons – not just those in
Kursk Oblast.[4]
Russian
forces damaged Ukrainian energy infrastructure during the largest
missile and drone strike since August 2024 on the night of November 16
to 17. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces
launched 90 Shahed and strike drones of an unspecified type (possibly
referring to decoy drones) from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai and
Kursk and Oryol oblasts.[5]
The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 120
missiles, including one Zirkon 3M22 hypersonic cruise missile, eight
Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles, 101 Kh-101 and Kalibr cruise
missiles, one Iskander-M ballistic missile, four Kh-22/Kh-31P
cruise/anti-radiation missiles, and five Kh-59/69 cruise missiles. The
Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 42 drones
and one Zirkon, seven Kinzhal, 85 Kalibr and Kh-101, two Kh-22/31P, and
five Kh-59/69 missiles. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated
that Ukrainian F-16 pilots shot down roughly 10 aerial targets during
the strike.[6]
The Ukrainian Air Force reported that 41 drones were "lost" in
Ukrainian airspace, likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW)
interference, and that two drones flew into Russian and Russian-occupied
Ukrainian airspace. The Ukrainian Air Force noted that air defense was
active in almost all Ukrainian oblasts. Ukrainian state electricity
transmission operator Ukrenergo stated that Russian strikes damaged
energy facilities in several oblasts and noted that energy recovery work
is ongoing in Odesa, Volyn, and Rivne oblasts.[7]
Ukrainian officials reported that a Russian missile strike caused a
fire at an infrastructure facility in Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast, damaged
critical infrastructure in Rivne Oblast, and targeted energy
infrastructure in Odesa Oblast.[8]
Private Ukrainian energy enterprise DTEK stated that Russian strikes
seriously damaged an unspecified DTEK thermal power plant (TPP) and
noted that this was the eighth mass strike on a DTEK energy facility in
2024.[9] Ukrainian Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko stated that the strikes caused power outages in many areas of Ukraine.[10]
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael
Mariano Grossi stated that Russian strikes on Ukrainian energy
facilities forced Ukrainian authorities to reduce the energy production
levels of several nuclear power plants (NPPs).[11]
Grossi reported that Russian strikes damaged several electrical
substations that are connected to the Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, and
Pivdennoukrainsk NPPs, although the strikes did not damage the NPPs
themselves. Grossi stated that six out of the nine reactors at the
Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, and Pivdennoukrainsk NPPs are currently operating
at reduced capacity. Ukrainian state railway company Ukrzaliznytsia
reported that Russian forces struck a railway depot in Dnipropetrovsk
Oblast and that Russian strikes de-energized sections of several railway
lines in southern, western, and northeastern Ukraine.[12]
Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes also damaged civilian
infrastructure in Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Rivne, and Odesa oblasts.[13]
Russian
forces continue to innovate their long-range strike packages and likely
included relatively ineffective sea-launched Kalibr cruise missiles in
the November 16 to 17 strike package as decoys to distract and exhaust
Ukrainian air defenses. Russian forces notably included Kalibr cruise missiles in the strike package against Ukraine on the night of November 16 to 17.[14]
Ukrainian military officials have repeatedly noted that Ukrainian
forces are able to down Kalibr cruise missiles, and Russian forces have
rarely included Kalibr missiles in strike packages in recent months.[15]
Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated
in August 2024 that Russian forces only launch sea-based Kalibr
missiles during combined strikes in order to overwhelm the Ukrainian air
defense umbrella.[16]
ISW recently observed reports that Russia is increasing its use of
decoy drones that resemble Iranian-provided Shahed drones during
combined long-range strikes and assesses that Russia will likely
continue to use decoy drones and experiment with varying strike packages
to increase the effectiveness of long-range strikes against Ukraine
ahead of and during the winter.[17]
Russian forces likely used decoy drones to additionally overload
Ukrainian air defenses in the November 16-17 strike series, which
contributed to Ukrainian forces' below average drone shoot down rate.
Ukrainian forces struck a defense industrial factory in the Udmurt Republic for the first time on the morning of November 17. Udmurt
Republic Head Alexander Brechalov claimed that a drone crashed on the
morning of November 17, causing an explosion at a factory workshop in
Izhevsk at the address Lenin 101.[18] Russian opposition outlets noted that the Kupol Electromechanical Plant is at this address.[19]
Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy
Kovalenko reported that "unknown" drones struck the Kupol
Electromechanical Plant that produces Tor air defense systems, radars,
and components.[20] Local residents reportedly stated to Russian opposition outlet Astra that the Kupol factory also produces drones.[21]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) did not claim that Russian forces
shot down any drones in the Udmurt Republic on November 17, and Russian
state media noted that this is the first time Russian authorities have
reported drone "crashes" in the republic.[22]
North
Korea reportedly continues to provide military support to Russia,
including the provision of rocket and artillery systems and potential
additional troop deployments, which is likely to impact Russia's
military operations in the short term, but its long-term benefits likely
remain limited. Financial Times (FT), citing
Ukrainian intelligence sources, reported on November 17 that North Korea
has supplied Russia with weapons, including 50 170mm "Koksan"
self-propelled howitzers and 20 240mm multiple launch rocket systems
(MLRS).[23]
FT's source observed that these systems, which Russian forces
reportedly deployed to Kursk Oblast, will offer North Korean forces an
opportunity to test their capabilities and weapons systems in real
combat scenarios. Bloomberg reported on November 17 that North
Korea may deploy up to 100,000 North Korean troops to Russia in future
waves if bilateral relations between the two countries continue to
deepen.[24] Kremlin-awarded founder and director of the prominent Rybar Telegram
channel and social media project Mikhail Zvinchuk claimed that North
Korean forces are less combat experienced than Russian forces but that a
North Korean deployment to fighting alongside Russian forces would
alleviate pressure on Russian forces and Russian recruitment efforts and
delay a potential decision for another partial involuntary reserve
callup.[25]
Zvinchuk also observed that North Korean forces deployed to fight
alongside Russian forces will likely learn to conduct drone warfare,
which North Korean forces would use in future operations elsewhere. The
development of North Korea's ability to use drones, in addition to the
already-announced decision to start serial drone production in North
Korea, could pose a significant challenge to South Korea and Japan.[26]
ISW
has repeatedly observed efforts by Russian authorities to delay highly
unpopular involuntary reserve callups, and the gradual deployment of
100,000 North Korean personnel could help alleviate some of these
concerns in the short term while increasing pressure on Ukrainian
forces.[27]
A gradual deployment of 100,000 North Korean troops, however, will
likely not address the eventual need for another Russian involuntary
reserve callup as the reported number of North Korean personnel will not
be sufficient to offset the current high Russian casualty
rates. The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) previously reported that
Russian forces suffered a record high average daily casualty rate of
1,271 troops per day or about 38,130 casualties total in September 2024,
and the US Department of Defense (DoD) assessed that Russian forces
have suffered an estimated 80,110 casualties in September and October 2024.[28]
The deployment of roughly 100,000 North Korean personnel would only
replace Russian losses for less than three months. Such a limited
deployment would also fail to address Russia's broader shortages of millions of workers due to demographic crises and the war and the resulting mid- to long term shortcomings in Russian defense industrial base (DIB) operations.[29]
Russian
forces will likely focus on seizing frontline Ukrainian towns and
cities during Winter 2024-2025 through urban combat amid efforts to
offset Ukrainian drone advantages and possible Russian armored vehicle
constraints. Kremlin-awarded founder and director of the prominent Rybar Telegram
channel and social media project Mikhail Zvinchuk stated during an
interview with Russian-language diaspora-focused channel RTVI on
November 16 that Russian forces will seek to concentrate fighting in
"populated areas and not in open fields" during Winter 2024-25 and
offered Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove as examples of towns and cities
where Russia will prioritize advances this winter.[30]
Zvinchuk claimed that Russian forces are preparing to begin the fight
for Pokrovsk and will approach Pokrovsk from the south and southeast now
that Russian forces have seized Selydove (southeast of Pokrovsk).
Zvinchuk is a prominent voice within the Russian information space with
ties to the Kremlin and may be privy to insider information about
Russia's frontline objectives and campaign design. Russian forces have
recently made advances into eastern Kupyansk and central Chasiv Yar, and
such advances may be part of a concerted effort to advance into
frontline cities in preparation for offensive operations in Winter
2024-2025.[31]
ISW has previously assessed that the seizure of Kupyansk or Chasiv Yar
would have operationally significant impacts on the geometry of the
frontline and threaten major Ukrainian defensive positions in their
respective directions, and recent Russian advances into the cities would
put Ukrainian defenses in both directions at higher but not immediate
risk.[32]
Zvinchuk
claimed that Russian forces will also look to increase their combat
capabilities during Winter 2024-2025, particularly Russian drone
capabilities because of the importance of the "drone war" in winter.[33]
Zvinchuk noted that Russian forces have an artillery advantage over
Ukrainian forces, but that Russian forces currently cannot advance due
to Ukrainian drone operations. Zvinchuk suggested that better trained
and equipped forces may be able to advance more effectively against
Ukrainian drone operators. ISW has previously noted that the Russian
Ministry of Defense (MoD) appears to be trying to centralize control
over informal Russian drone units, and Zvinchuk's comments likely refer
to this ongoing effort and indicate that the MoD may intend to intensify
this effort during Winter 2024-2025.[34]
ISW recently assessed that Ukrainian drone operations continue to play a
critical role in constraining Russian mechanized maneuver and
preventing Russian forces from fully exploiting Ukraine's ongoing
manpower and materiel constraints.[35]
The Russian military command may assess that urban combat is
preferrable for Russia's current infantry-led style of fighting as
multi-story buildings could provide Russian infantry with better cover
from Ukrainian drone operators than trees in open areas. The Russian
military command may also prefer to engage in urban combat to avoid
prolonging the cost that advancing in rural fields and settlements
imposes on Russian armored vehicle usage and reserves.[36]
The Russian military command has likely assessed that offsetting
Ukraine's drone advantages and reducing Russian armored vehicle losses
through urban combat is worth the large numbers of Russian casualties
that will come from grinding, attritional advances in frontline towns
and cities.
Russian President Vladimir Putin's
maximalist objectives demanding full Ukrainian capitulation remain
unchanged, but a prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger appears to be
trying to repackage longstanding Kremlin territorial claims to southern
Ukraine as less severe "peace proposals" that would actually militarily
threaten Ukraine, Moldova, and NATO. German Chancellor Olaf
Scholz stated on November 17 that his recent phone conversation with
Putin showed that "little has changed" in Putin's views on the war in
Ukraine and that this is "not good news."[37] Mikhail Zvinchuk in his November 16 interview with Russian-language diaspora-focused channel RTVI responded to a question about the conditions under which Russia could agree to peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.[38]
Zvinchuk claimed that first Russia must gain full control of Luhansk,
Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts that Russia has illegally
annexed, including the areas that Russian forces currently do not occupy
- a demand that Putin first made explicitly in June 2024.[39]
Zvinchuk added that Ukraine must unblock the road through Odesa Oblast
to Transnistria, the pro-Russian breakaway republic in eastern Moldova,
so that Russia can have "communication with Transnistria and the Russian
people there." Zvinchuk also called for Russia to gain access to the
Danube River, the mouth of which lies on the Ukrainian-Romanian border,
and for the creation of a "buffer zone" in border areas in which weapons
will be prohibited. Zvinchuk notably did not mention what Russia would
compromise on during potential peace talks in order to achieve these
proposals, but claimed later in the interview that Russia laying claim
to only the four illegally annexed oblasts is in and of itself a
compromise - further demonstrating how the Russian ultranationalist
community, one of Putin's key constituencies, is not supportive of good
faith negotiations with Ukraine. Russian access to Transnistria and the
Danube River would essentially allow Russia to operate in and off the
coasts of Mykolaiv and Odesa oblasts even if Russian forces did not
occupy these territories.[40]
Kremlin officials have long called for Russia's occupation of all of
southern Ukraine, including Odesa City, and Zvinchuk appears to be
proposing a new framing of this same demand.[41]
Russian access to Transnistria, areas near Odesa City, and the
northwestern Black Sea would allow Russian forces to conduct a future
attack on southern Ukraine and Odesa City after resting and
reconstituting during a potential ceasefire.
Russian
access to Transnistria and the Danube River would pose military threats
to Ukraine and NATO as well. Ukrainian strikes have pushed Russia's
Black Sea Fleet (BSF) out of the northwestern Black Sea, but Russian
access to the Danube would allow Russia to again operate in the area.[42]
Russian control of Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts would deny
Ukraine access to the Sea of Azov, and Russian access and possible
control of the northwestern Black Sea would essentially landlock
Ukraine. Russian access to the Danube River and to the road to
Transnistria may also enable Russia to establish lines of communication
to Transnistria - and possibly even Gagauzia in southern Moldova as
Moldova has a port along the Danube River at its southernmost point at
Giurgiulesti - to build up forces and means in Moldova for future
military operations against Moldova, southeastern Ukraine, or Romania.[43]
NATO is also currently constructing what will be its largest base near
Constanta in southeastern Romania less than 100 kilometers from the
mouth of the Danube River.[44]
Abkhazian
oppositionists continued protests on November 17 calling for the
resignation of the de facto Abkhazian President Aslan Bzhania. The
opposition initially stormed the de facto Abkhazian parliament building
on November 15 demanding the dismissal of a proposed investment
agreement with Russia that would grant Russian legal entities property
ownership rights and privileges in Abkhazia but has ultimately expanded
the scope of its demands to call for the resignation of Bzhania.[45]
Bzhania stated on November 16 that he would resign and appoint a vice
president as interim head of state before snap elections if the
opposition left the premises of the parliament, but the protesters
refused his demands and called for his unconditional resignation.[46]
Bzahnia called the protest an attempted coup, claimed that it is
impossible to find compromise with the opposition, and refused to step
down, prompting the opposition to continue the protests and propose the
formation of an interim government.[47]
Key Takeaways:
- The New York Times (NYT) and Washington Post
reported that US President Joe Biden has authorized Ukrainian forces to
use US-provided ATACMS in limited strikes against Russian and North
Korean military targets within Kursk Oblast.
- Russian
forces damaged Ukrainian energy infrastructure during the largest
missile and drone strike since August 2024 on the night of November 16
to 17.
- Russian forces continue to innovate
their long-range strike packages and likely included relatively
ineffective sea-launched Kalibr cruise missiles in the November 16 to 17
strike package as decoys to distract and exhaust Ukrainian air
defenses.
- Ukrainian forces struck a defense industrial factory in the Udmurt Republic for the first time on the morning of November 17.
- North
Korea reportedly continues to provide military support to Russia,
including the provision of rocket and artillery systems and potential
additional troop deployments, which is likely to impact Russia's
military operations in the short term, but its long-term benefits likely
remain limited.
- Russian forces will likely
focus on seizing frontline Ukrainian towns and cities during Winter
2024-2025 through urban combat amid efforts to offset Ukrainian drone
advantages and possible Russian armored vehicle constraints.
- Russian
President Vladimir Putin's maximalist objectives demanding full
Ukrainian capitulation remain unchanged, but a prominent
Kremlin-affiliated milblogger appears to be trying to repackage
longstanding Kremlin territorial claims to southern Ukraine as less
severe "peace proposals" that would actually militarily threaten
Ukraine, Moldova, and NATO.
- Abkhazian
oppositionists continued protests on November 17 calling for the
resignation of the de facto Abkhazian President Aslan Bzhania.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar .
- Russian
milbloggers continued to applaud their reported role in removing
frontline 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's
Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) commanders after the commanders submitted
false reports about Russian advances in the Siversk direction.
We
do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities
are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the
military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue
to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on
the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on
combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations
of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Russian
forces continued offensive operations in the main Ukrainian salient in
Kursk Oblast on November 16 and 17 but did not advance.[48]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on November 17 that
Russian forces successfully encircled Ukrainian forces near the Olgovka
forest (east of Korenevo) and struck Ukrainian forces attempting to
break out of the encirclement.[49]
A Russian milblogger claimed on November 16 that Russian forces
recently advanced east of Korenevo near Kremyanoye; southeast of
Korenevo near Darino and Novoivanovka; and south of Sudzha near
Kurilovka and Plekhovo.[50]
ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims. Elements of the
Russian 1434th "Akhmat-Chechnya" Regiment (likely a mobilized regiment)
are reportedly operating in the Kursk direction; elements of the Russian
83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating near the Snagost
river dam (south of Korenevo); and elements of the Russian 106th VDV
Division are reportedly operating near Darino (southeast of Korenevo).[51]
Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on November 17
that the Russian military redeployed elements of the 69th Separate
Covering Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military
District [EMD]) from the Hulyaipole direction to Kursk Oblast at the end
of September to beginning of October.[52]
ISW observed reports on November 16 that elements of the 69th Covering
Brigade were operating in the south Donetsk (Kurakhove-Vuhledar)
direction, and the brigade may be split between various sectors of the
front.[53]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian
objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border
with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of
Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued ground
attacks north of Kharkiv City near Strilecha and northeast of Kharkiv
City near Vovchansk and Starytsya on November 16 and 17 but did not make
any confirmed advances.[54] Elements of Rosgvardia's 116th Spetsnaz Brigade reportedly continue to operate near Vovchansk.[55]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast
(Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push
westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian
forces recently advanced south of Kupyansk amid continued offensive
operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on November 17.
Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of
the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Division (1st Guards Tank Army, Moscow
Military District [MMD]) seized Kolisnykivka (south of Kupyansk) and
occupy a roughly 3-3.5 kilometer area along the east bank of the Oskil
River.[56]
Russian forces continued assaults east of Kupyansk near Pishchane;
southeast of Kupyansk near Kolisnykivka, Kruhlyakivka, and Zahryzove;
west of Svatove near Kopanky and Nadiya; southwest of Svatove near
Tverdokhlibove, Hrekivka, Cherneshchyna, and Makiivka; and west of
Kreminna near Terny on November 16 and 17.[57]
Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 3rd Motorized Rifle
Division (20th CAA, MMD) are operating in the Kopanky (west of Svatove)
area and that elements of the 254th and 283rd motorized rifle regiments
(both 144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA],
MMD) are operating near Nevske (northwest of Kreminna) and Terny (west
of Kreminna).[58]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian
forces continued limited ground attacks in the Siversk direction near
Verkhnokamyanske (east of Siversk) and Ivano-Darivka (southeast of
Siversk) on November 16 and 17 but did not advance.[59]
Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements
of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA) (formerly 2nd Luhansk
People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) operating in the Siversk
direction have roughly 110-112 combat-ready tanks and 315-318
serviceable armored fighting vehicles for combat operations.[60]
Russian
forces recently partially closed a pocket southeast of Chasiv Yar amid
continued offensive operations in the area on November 17. Geolocated
footage published on November 17 shows that Russian forces recently
advanced into the pocket and levelled part of the frontline southwest of
Andriivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar).[61]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces in the pocket also
advanced 2.5 kilometers along the railway between Andriivka and
Zelenopillya (south of Andriivka) and 1.5 kilometers in depth near
Klishchiivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar and north of Andriivka).[62]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced south of
Orikhovo-Vasylivka (northeast of Chasiv Yar), cleared an area south of
the refractory plant within central Chasiv Yar, seized part of the
Stupky-Holubivske 2 nature reserve (southeast of Chasiv Yar), reached
the Druzbha forest south of Kalynivka (north of Chasiv Yar), and
advanced in forests south of Chasiv Yar, but ISW has not observed visual
confirmation of these claims.[63]
Elements of the Russian "Sever-V" Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps),
78th "Sever-Akhmat" Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle
Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]), and the
"Okhotnik" (Hunter) Spetsnaz Detachment (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk
People's Republic [DNR] AC) reportedly continue to operate in the Chasiv
Yar direction.[64]
Russian
forces continued ground attacks near Toretsk and west of Toretsk near
Shcherbynivka on November 16 and 17 but did not make confirmed advances.[65] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced within central and southern Toretsk.[66]
Russian
forces reportedly advanced south of Pokrovsk amid continued offensive
operations in the Pokrovsk direction on November 17. Russian milbloggers
claimed on November 17 that Russian forces advanced within and later
seized Yurivka (south of Pokrovsk), advanced towards Zorya (south of
Yurivka), and advanced in a forested area two kilometers wide and one
kilometer in depth west and south of Novooleksiivka (southeast of
Yurivka), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[67]
Russian forces also continued ground attacks east of Pokrovsk near
Myrolyubivka and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Krutyi
Yar; and south of Pokrovsk near Yurivka, Petrivka, Pustynka, and
Novooleksiivka on November 16 and 17.[68] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian counterattack near Hrodivka (east of Pokrovsk).[69]
Elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, Central
Military District [CMD]) and 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade 41st (CAA,
CMD) are reportedly operating near Novohrodivka.[70]
Geolocated
footage published on November 16 shows Ukrainian drone strikes
destroying a Russian Borisoglebsk-2 electronic warfare (EW) station in
Serhiivka (southeast of Pokrovsk) on November 15 or 16.[71]
Russian
forces recently advanced on the northern bank of the Kurakhivske
Reservoir (north of Kurakhove) amid continued offensive operations in
the Kurakhove direction on November 17. Geolocated footage published on
November 15 and 17 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into
the northern outskirts of Kurakhove on the northern bank of the
Kurakhivske Reservoir and likely seized Nova Illinka (north of
Kurakhove).[72]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Nova Illinka and
advanced in northern Berestky (north of Kurakhove, on the northern bank
of the Kurakhivske Reservoir) and eastern Kurakhove.[73]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced in an
area up to 3.3 kilometers wide and 1.5 kilometers in depth south of
Novoselydivka (north of Kurakhove).[74]
Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces are gradually withdrawing from
the northern bank of the Kurakhivske Reservoir and noted that Russian
forces' pace of advance appears to have slowed south of Kurakhove.[75]
Mashovets stated that elements of the 90th Tank Division (41st CAA,
CMD) are attacking the Ukrainian pocket north of the reservoir from the
north and that elements of the 51st CAA are attacking the Ukrainian
pocket from the east. Russian forces continued assaults northeast of
Kurakhove near Novodmytrivka, Voznesenka, Sontsivka, and Zorya; north of
Kurakhove near Novoselydivka, Nova Illinka, Illinka, and Berestky; near
Kurakhove itself; east of Kurakhove near Maksymilyanivka; and south of
Kurakhove near Dalne on November 16 and 17.[76]
Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized
Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Kurakhove
direction.[77]
Russian
forces recently advanced northwest of Vuhledar amid continued offensive
operations in the Vuhledar direction on November 17. Geolocated footage
published on November 17 indicates that Russian forces recently
advanced south of Kostyantynopolske (northwest of Vuhledar) along the
O-0510 highway.[78]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of
Antonivka (northeast of Vuhledar), one kilometer in a forest area east
of Bohoyavlenka (north of Vuhledar), and 2.7 kilometers west of
Maksymivka (northwest of Vuhledar).[79]
ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. A Russian
milblogger claimed that Russian forces are attacking Uspenivka (north of
Vuhledar) from the north near Dalne and the south near Bohoyavlenka.[80]
Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle
Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are unsuccessfully
attacking near Sukhyi Yaly and that elements of the Russian 39th
Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, EMD) are reportedly attacking near
Yelizavetivka (northeast of Vuhledar).[81]
Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Vuhledar
near Katerynivka, Antonivka, and in the direction of Romanivka; north of
Vuhledar near Trudove and in the direction of Yantarne; and northwest
of Vuhledar near Sukhyi Yar on November 16 and 17.[82]
Elements of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's
Main Military Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating
near Trudove, and elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific
Fleet, EMD) are reportedly operating near Shakhtarske (northwest of
Vuhledar).[83]
Russian
forces continued assaults in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area
near Novodarivka and Rivnopil (both southwest of Velyka Novosilka) on
November 16 and 17 but did not make confirmed advances.[84]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced one kilometer
in depth north of Rivnopil and continue to advance in the direction of
Novodarivka, but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[85]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Neither
Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported fighting in eastern Zaporizhia
Oblast on November 17. Elements of the Russian 35th Combined Arms Army
(CAA) (Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly continue operating in
the Polohy (south of Hulyaipole) direction.[86]
Limited
fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 17, but
there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian milblogger
claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced in the fields north and
west of Novopokrovka (northeast of Robotyne), but ISW has not observed
confirmation of this claim.[87]
Ukrainian sources posted footage of a Ukrainian HIMARS strike against a
Russian personnel and equipment concentration near occupied Tavria,
Zaporizhia Oblast (southwest of Robotyne).[88]
Russian
forces continued limited attacks in the Dnipro direction in east (left)
bank Kherson Oblast on November 17 but did not advance.[89] Elements of the Russian "Khabr" Group (18th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly operate in the Kherson direction.[90]
A
Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a naval
drone raid near gas fields in the Black Sea west of occupied Crimea on
the morning of November 17.[91]
The milblogger claimed that this is the first such Ukrainian naval
drone raid against these fields since September 2024. The Russian
Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces destroyed four
Ukrainian naval drones in the Black Sea, and the milblogger claimed that
a fifth drone withdrew from the gas fields.[92]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
See topline text for Russian air, missile, and drone strikes against Ukraine.
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Russian
milbloggers continued to applaud their reported role in removing
frontline 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's
Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) commanders after the commanders submitted
false reports about Russian advances in the Siversk direction.[93]
One milblogger praised Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov's team
for "repeatedly demonstrating its readiness for feedback" and claimed
that former Russian Defense Minister and current Security Council
Secretary Sergei Shoigu would have "hushed up" the situation despite
public outcries on the internet.[94]
Another milblogger highlighted the milblogger community's alleged role
in resolving the situation in the Siversk direction and claimed that
milbloggers have brought other problems in the Russian military to light
in the past.[95]
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
Nothing significant to report.
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
(Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed
areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural,
economic, military, and governance systems)
ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.
Significant activity in Belarus
(Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and
further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner
Group activity in Belarus)
Nothing significant to report.
Note:
ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only
publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian,
Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as
commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as
the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided
in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/17/us/politics/biden-ukraine-russia-atacms-missiles.html; https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/11/17/ukraine-russia-north-korea-atacms/
[2] https://www.lefigaro
dot
fr/international/joe-biden-aurait-donne-son-accord-a-l-ukraine-pour-frapper-la-russie-en-profondeur-avec-des-armes-americaines-20241117
; https://www.pravda.com dot ua/eng/news/2024/11/17/7484978/
[3] https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/8b060c46ee6f49908f9fb415ad23051c; https://x.com/TheStudyofWar/status/1828580873375023299:
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/putins-safe-space-defeating-russias-kharkiv-operation-requires-eliminating-russias
[4]
https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/8b060c46ee6f49908f9fb415ad23051c;
https://x.com/TheStudyofWar/status/1828580873375023299:
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/putins-safe-space-defeating-russias-kharkiv-operation-requires-eliminating-russias
[5] https://t.me/kpszsu/23111
[6] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/12432
[7] https://t.me/Ukrenergo/3449
[8]
https://suspilne dot
media/881667-kndr-peredala-rosii-artileriu-ilon-mask-vismiav-slova-zelenskogo-pro-nezaleznist-ukraini-998-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1731840344&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
; https://t.me/oleksandrkoval_rv/3731; https://suspilne dot
media/rivne/881969-uskodzeno-ponad-147-kvartir-so-vidomo-pro-raketnij-udar-po-rivnensini/
; https://t.me/odesa_prokuratura/746
[9] https://t.me/dtek_ua/1934
[10] https://t.me/severrealii/28348
[11] https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-260-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine
[12] https://t.me/UkrzalInfo/6256 ; https://t.me/UkrzalInfo/6255
[13]
https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/9458; https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2024/11/17/raketnyj-udar-po-kyyevu-v-pecherskomu-rajoni-goryt-pyatypoverhivka/
; https://suspilne dot
media/881695-masovanij-obstril-ukraini-vlucanna-po-zitlovomu-sektoru-u-mikolaevi-golovni-novini-ranku-17-listopada/
; https://t.me/oleksandrkoval_rv/3731; https://suspilne dot
media/rivne/881969-uskodzeno-ponad-147-kvartir-so-vidomo-pro-raketnij-udar-po-rivnensini/
; https://t.me/odesa_prokuratura/746
[14] https://t.me/kpszsu/23111
[15]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-27-2024
; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042724
[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-27-2024
[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2024
[18] https://t.me/brechalov/5609; https://t.me/brechalov/5611
[19] https://meduza
dot
io/news/2024/11/17/dron-atakoval-oboronnoe-predpriyatie-v-izhevske-eto-pervaya-ofitsialno-podtverzhdennaya-ataka-bespilotnikov-na-udmurtiyu;
https://t.me/idelrealii/38534
[20] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/8295;
[21] https://t.me/astrapress/68629
[22] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/17/11/2024/67396f7c9a79477cc189baca
[23]
https://archive.is/dwTkc;
https://www.ft.com/content/83ad844b-8ebd-45a9-9c12-9c4c8506e25b;
https://www.ukrinform dot
ua/rubric-world/3927948-pivnicna-korea-peredala-rosii-blizko-50-samohidnih-artsistem-i-20-rszv-ft.html
[24]
https://archive.ph/jlAmK ;
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-11-17/north-korea-may-end-up-sending-putin-100-000-troops-for-his-war
[25] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uN99eOO1074
[26] https://isw.pub/UkrWar111624
[27] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-14-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-1-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-5-2024
[28]
https://x.com/DefenceHQ/status/1843198787097124968/photo/1 ;
https://lordslibrary.parliament dot
uk/war-in-ukraine-update-october-2024/;
https://www.defense.gov/casualty.pdf
[29] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-14-2024
[30] https://t.me/rybar/65439 ; https://t.me/rtvimain/104838 ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uN99eOO1074
[31] https://isw.pub/UkrWar111624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111424
[32] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-winter-spring-2024-offensive-operation-kharkiv-luhansk-axis ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-13-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-25-2024
[33] https://t.me/rybar/65439 ; https://t.me/rtvimain/104838 ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uN99eOO1074
[34] https://isw.pub/UkrWar110324
[35] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2024
[36] https://isw.pub/UkrWar100624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar110924
[37] https://suspilne
dot
media/881965-vin-ne-zminiv-svoei-dumki-pro-vijnu-v-ukraini-i-ce-pogana-novina-solc-pro-dzvinok-putinu/;
https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-war-latest-putin-trump-moscow-zelenskyy-kyiv-live-sky-news-12541713
[38] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uN99eOO1074
[39] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2024
[40]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-poses-long-term-threats-moldova%E2%80%99s-european-integration-beyond-october-elections
[41] https://isw.pub/UkrWar121423; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121323; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030424
[42] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-poses-long-term-threats-moldova%E2%80%99s-european-integration-beyond-october-elections; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-strikes-have-changed-russian-naval-operations-black-sea
[43]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-poses-long-term-threats-moldova%E2%80%99s-european-integration-beyond-october-elections
[44]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-poses-long-term-threats-moldova%E2%80%99s-european-integration-beyond-october-elections
[45]
https://civil dot ge/archives/635655; https://oc-media dot
org/protesters-storm-abkhazias-parliament-as-anger-over-controversial-investment-law-boils-over/;
https://www.rferl.org/a/abkhazia-protesters-storm-parliament-russia-deal/33203385.html;
https://apnews.com/article/georgia-russia-abkhazia-protest-parliament-ae03ce7d8335e6a20316a95d0f7acc84;
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/protests-erupt-outside-parliament-breakaway-georgian-region-tass-says-2024-11-15/;
https://t.me/tass_agency/285383; https://t.me/tass_agency/285411 ; https://t.me/istories_media/8177;
https://thehill.com/homenews/ap/ap-international/ap-protesters-in-separatist-georgian-region-occupy-government-buildings-calling-for-leaders-ouster/
[46] https://www.dw.com/en/abkhazia-leader-ready-to-quit-if-protesters-exit-parliament/a-70802086
[47]
https://t.me/tass_agency/285767 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/285760 ;
https://meduza dot
io/news/2024/11/17/prezident-abhazii-zayavil-chto-ostaetsya-na-svoem-postu-ranee-aslan-bzhaniya-govoril-chto-gotov-uyti-v-otstavku-na-fone-protestov;
https://t.me/tass_agency/285759; https://t.me/tass_agency/285747; https://t.me/tass_agency/285748; https://t.me/tass_agency/285745; https://t.me/tass_agency/285739
[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EvR4TDfM7G3ABHsiyK1Qx9QG2m25YfGkJrxW2rFBmq5txarY79BkpNWCAnp4J1zql
[49] https://t.me/mod_russia/45817; https://t.me/tass_agency/285768 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/285769
[50] https://t.me/z_arhiv/29575; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29578
[51] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144574; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5233
[52]
[53] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2024
[54] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0kPzQsnHMoqUmEufA6BAeuhSdUxrBqPtLyUY9uMCAeMnh3RyYS1vrjnyVPHp4E8THl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02wB7EadVAN4htr5KmQtrdBzfBrXP6Z98oPYkGEuAQcaEndSQSukAsnnj74sf4n7SBl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EvR4TDfM7G3ABHsiyK1Qx9QG2m25YfGkJrxW2rFBmq5txarY79BkpNWCAnp4J1zql
[55] https://t.me/motopatriot/29520
[56] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2350
[57] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0kPzQsnHMoqUmEufA6BAeuhSdUxrBqPtLyUY9uMCAeMnh3RyYS1vrjnyVPHp4E8THl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02wB7EadVAN4htr5KmQtrdBzfBrXP6Z98oPYkGEuAQcaEndSQSukAsnnj74sf4n7SBl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EvR4TDfM7G3ABHsiyK1Qx9QG2m25YfGkJrxW2rFBmq5txarY79BkpNWCAnp4J1zql ; https://t.me/dva_majors/57904 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/19503 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144596
[58] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2350
[59] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0kPzQsnHMoqUmEufA6BAeuhSdUxrBqPtLyUY9uMCAeMnh3RyYS1vrjnyVPHp4E8THl; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29585
[60] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2352
[61] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/22359; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/22360
[62] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80769
[63] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144633; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29588; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19344
[64] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5235; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144606 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144607;
[65] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02wB7EadVAN4htr5KmQtrdBzfBrXP6Z98oPYkGEuAQcaEndSQSukAsnnj74sf4n7SBl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0kPzQsnHMoqUmEufA6BAeuhSdUxrBqPtLyUY9uMCAeMnh3RyYS1vrjnyVPHp4E8THl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EvR4TDfM7G3ABHsiyK1Qx9QG2m25YfGkJrxW2rFBmq5txarY79BkpNWCAnp4J1zql
[66] https://t.me/z_arhiv/29572
[67] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80773; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144554; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144626; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144657
[68] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0kPzQsnHMoqUmEufA6BAeuhSdUxrBqPtLyUY9uMCAeMnh3RyYS1vrjnyVPHp4E8THl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02wB7EadVAN4htr5KmQtrdBzfBrXP6Z98oPYkGEuAQcaEndSQSukAsnnj74sf4n7SBl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EvR4TDfM7G3ABHsiyK1Qx9QG2m25YfGkJrxW2rFBmq5txarY79BkpNWCAnp4J1zql; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80773; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80801
[69] https://t.me/btr80/22268 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80804
[70] https://t.me/skalabatalion/440; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/17/novogrobivka-dlya-ro; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/15088
[71] https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1857818090853249045; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1857894070582128687; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1857832394734162160; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1857832394734162160
[72] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7538; https://t.me/DeepStateUA/20728 ; https://x.com/strategicbakery/status/1858120060558057645; https://t.co/LdT3AjCeaK
[73] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144626 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144554 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19333 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/19505
[74] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80773
[75] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2351
[76] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0kPzQsnHMoqUmEufA6BAeuhSdUxrBqPtLyUY9uMCAeMnh3RyYS1vrjnyVPHp4E8THl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02wB7EadVAN4htr5KmQtrdBzfBrXP6Z98oPYkGEuAQcaEndSQSukAsnnj74sf4n7SBl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EvR4TDfM7G3ABHsiyK1Qx9QG2m25YfGkJrxW2rFBmq5txarY79BkpNWCAnp4J1zql
[77] https://t.me/dva_majors/57964
[78] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7537; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=540527615523311
[79] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80807 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144626
[80] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19346
[81] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2351
[82] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0kPzQsnHMoqUmEufA6BAeuhSdUxrBqPtLyUY9uMCAeMnh3RyYS1vrjnyVPHp4E8THl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02wB7EadVAN4htr5KmQtrdBzfBrXP6Z98oPYkGEuAQcaEndSQSukAsnnj74sf4n7SBl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EvR4TDfM7G3ABHsiyK1Qx9QG2m25YfGkJrxW2rFBmq5txarY79BkpNWCAnp4J1zql
[83] https://t.me/voin_dv/11868 (Trudove) ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144593 (Shakhtarske)
[84] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02wB7EadVAN4htr5KmQtrdBzfBrXP6Z98oPYkGEuAQcaEndSQSukAsnnj74sf4n7SBl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EvR4TDfM7G3ABHsiyK1Qx9QG2m25YfGkJrxW2rFBmq5txarY79BkpNWCAnp4J1zql
[85] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80807
[86] https://t.me/voin_dv/11864
[87] https://t.me/z_arhiv/29597
[88] https://t.me/gnilayachereha/20702 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1858037648901759200; https://t.me/gnilayachereha/20702 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1858037648901759200
[89] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0kPzQsnHMoqUmEufA6BAeuhSdUxrBqPtLyUY9uMCAeMnh3RyYS1vrjnyVPHp4E8THl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0kPzQsnHMoqUmEufA6BAeuhSdUxrBqPtLyUY9uMCAeMnh3RyYS1vrjnyVPHp4E8THl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EvR4TDfM7G3ABHsiyK1Qx9QG2m25YfGkJrxW2rFBmq5txarY79BkpNWCAnp4J1zql
[90] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/11816
[91] https://t.me/rybar/65453
[92] https://t.me/rybar/65453; https://t.me/mod_russia/45807; https://t.me/mod_russia/45803
[93] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144573 ; https://t.me/rybar/65435; https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/44562 ; https://t.me/rybar/65436 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/57905 ; https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/44563; https://t.me/dva_majors/57908 ;https://t.me/Pragmatic_Sol/3345 ; https://t.me/rybar/65437; https://t.me/Pragmatic_Sol/3345; https://t.me/dva_majors/57907; https://t.me/dva_majors/57906 ; https://t.me/rybar/65440
[94] https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/44563
[95] https://t.me/dva_majors/57906
