Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, Alison O’Neil, Karina Wugang, and Will Pickering of the Institute for the Study of War;
Alexis Turek of the American Enterprise Institute
Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute
Data Cutoff: November 18, 2024
Note: ISW will pause publication of the China-Taiwan Weekly Update during Thanksgiving week. Publication will resume according to the normal schedule following the Thanksgiving holiday.
The China–Taiwan Weekly Update is a joint product from the Institute for the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute. The update supports the ISW–AEI Coalition Defense of Taiwan project, which assesses Chinese campaigns against Taiwan, examines alternative strategies for the United States and its allies to deter the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) aggression, and—if necessary—defeat the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and cross–Taiwan Strait developments.
Key Takeaways
- ROC President Lai Ching-te may plan to transit through Hawaii and possibly Guam during a trip to Taiwan’s South Pacific allies in late November or early December.
- The PRC released the captain of a Taiwanese fishing vessel whom it had detained since July following a visit by Taiwanese officials from Penghu County.
- Xi’s and Biden’s agreement not to integrate artificial intelligence (AI) into nuclear weapons control systems signals Beijing’s willingness to implement guardrails in areas that it has previously been noncommittal about cooperating in.
- The PRC debuted its J-35A stealth fighter at Airshow China 2024. The fighter is the PRC's second stealth plane and reportedly greatly expands China's power projection capability into the Pacific.
- Xi’s and Biden’s agreement not to integrate artificial intelligence (AI) into nuclear weapons control systems signals Beijing’s willingness to discuss AI safety despite previously withholding nuclear talks to punish the US for supporting Taiwan.
- The PRC did not interfere with a Philippine resupply mission to the Sierra Madre in Second Thomas Shoal. It is continuing to abide by a provisional agreement it reached with the Philippines in July 2024 despite continuing tensions over the two countries’ territorial disputes.
- The PRC warned the United States and the Philippines against increasing regional tensions following the signing of a US-Philippines intelligence sharing agreement.
- Anonymous European Union diplomats said that the EU has “conclusive” and “credible” evidence that a factory in the PRC’s Xinjiang region is producing and exporting drones for Russia.
Cross-Strait Relations
Taiwan
Four Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) ships entered restricted waters around Taiwan’s Kinmen islands in two separate incursions on November 15th. Kinmen is a Taiwanese island group located just three kilometers (1.9 miles) from the PRC’s coast, a distance that has decreased in recent years due to a new PRC land reclamation project for an airport north of the island.[14] The Kinmen Archipelago’s restricted waters extend between 1.5 and 10 kilometers from its shores.[15] The CCG ships simultaneously entered Kinmen’s southern restricted waters at four different points at 8:50 a.m. and left at 11:00 a.m. The same four CCG ships returned to Kinmen’s restricted waters at 2:45 p.m. the same day and left at 5:00 p.m.[16] These two incidents mark the 50th and 51st times CCG ships intruded into Kinmen’s restricted waters this year. Taiwan does not claim territorial waters or a contiguous zone around Kinmen due to its proximity to the PRC but does maintain analogous “prohibited” and “restricted” maritime zones around Kinmen, where it claims exclusive rights to carry out law enforcement. The PRC claims Taiwan and all its associated waters to be PRC territory and denies the existence of any restricted or prohibited waters around Taiwanese islands.
The PRC began regular CCG patrols around Kinmen and frequent incursions into Kinmen’s waters since February 2024 in response to the February 14 capsizing incident. The patrols are intended to assert PRC law enforcement control around Kinmen and likely to punish Taiwan for the election victory of President Lai Ching-te in January. Beijing considers Lai to be a dangerous separatist. The PRC has incrementally changed its incursion strategy, especially since Lai’s inauguration in May. The patrols shifted from fixed routes and formations to dispersed, less predictable maneuvers that simultaneously enter Kinmen’s waters from multiple directions.[17] These tactics serve to establish a new status quo, desensitize Taiwan to the threat to Kinmen, and strain Taiwan’s resources as it must be prepared to mobilize at any time. Normalizing these patrols increases the likelihood that Taiwan will be caught unprepared if an apparently routine incursion turns into a full blockade that isolates Kinmen and other outlying islands. It is noteworthy that these incursions are regularly occurring at locations at which the PRC would likely need to station ships to enforce a blockade.
US President Joe Biden met with CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping on November 16 at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in Lima, Peru. This was Biden’s third meeting with Xi since becoming president. Xi’s rhetoric toward Biden was generally placatory while continuing to warn the United States not to escalate tensions. Xi signaled the PRC’s preparation for the US presidential transition and said that the PRC is ready to work with the Trump administration.[18] Xi warned the United States, however, not to challenge what he described as Beijing’s four “red lines:” Taiwan, democracy and human rights, the PRC’s “path and system,” and the PRC’s right to development.[19] Xi expressed the PRC’s resolve to continue asserting its “sovereignty, rights, and interests” in the South China Sea and stated that the United States should not instigate or get involved in bilateral disputes over contested land features. Xi reiterated that the PRC maintains a “fair position” on Russia’s war in Ukraine and portrayed the PRC as a mediator in the conflict, which ignores the PRC’s political and economic support to Russia. Xi also denied claims that the PRC was the perpetrator of cyberattacks, in an apparent reference to an ongoing investigation by US authorities into a PRC state-sponsored cyber operation that compromised several major US telecommunications companies.[20]
The PRC debuted its J-35A stealth fighter at Airshow China 2024. The fighter is the PRC's second stealth plane and reportedly greatly expands China's power projection into the Pacific. The J-35 is a mid-size twin-engine plane intended to be a multirole fighter. There is very little information publicly available about the newly debuted fighter, but many observable features such as the aircraft shape and wing closely resemble Lockheed Martin's F-35 fighter, and this may not be a coincidence, since PRC-based hackers stole data on the F-35 project in 2007 and 2008.[31] The J-35 prototype, FC-31 V2, has smaller dimensions then the other PLA stealth fighter, the J-20, with a length of 17.3 meters, a wingspan of 11.5 meters, and a height of 4.8 meters.[32] The J-35 has two known variants, a carrier-based variant and a land-based variant; the version that made its public debut at Airshow China 2024 is the land-based J-35A.[33] The carrier-based variant has been developed to operate from the PLA’s Fujian aircraft carrier, which has yet to enter service, and other Type-003 carriers the PRC may build in the future. Photographs have shown the carrier-based J-35 to have foldable wings and a launch bar for catapult-assisted takeoff (CATOBAR).[34] The J-20 stealth jet cannot be operated from aircraft carriers, so the J-35 will thus give the PRC the ability to operate stealth combat aircraft far from its shores. The J-35 has a significantly shorter combat range than the J-20, at 750 miles and 1200 miles respectively, but this limited range is partially offset by its ability to operate from an aircraft carrier.[35] Weaponry can be mounted externally on the wings of a J-35, very likely significantly increasing its radar cross-section, or in the internal weapons bay.
The J-35 is designed to be a multirole fighter jet with strong stealth capabilities, but there are some design and logistical challenges that limit the effectiveness of the plane. The J-35 has less observable control surface than the J-20, and this may indicate less maneuverability. The J-35 may have difficulties masking its heat signature due to the double engine design—the F-22 tried to solve this issue with a specially designed trapezoidal engine nozzle, but the J-35 uses a rounded shape with serrated nozzles for heat dispersion.[36]
There are significant limitations to the PRC's technological development in spite of its espionage and intellectual property theft. For example, the PRC’s jet engine technology is outdated compared to Western military jets. The FC-31, the prototype of the J-35, is equipped with WS-13 engines, and the J-35 is supposed to be upgraded to WS-19 engines that are currently still in development.[37] The WS-13 Engines are based on Russian RD-33 engines with a major repair interval of roughly 810 hours and service lifespan of 2200 hours, and these intervals are significantly smaller than many Western engines.[38] The PRC has historically relied on Russian military technology and has made efforts to domestically develop its jet engines, but supply chain issues, reliability and quality control problems, and technological limitations have and will continue to hamper its ability to do so.[39] The PRC has strong manufacturing capabilities, however, and is successfully producing J-20s at scale using pulsating production lines, a capability that will likely expedite J-35 production as well.[40]
Southeast Asia
Philippines
The PRC conducted military exercises and a law enforcement patrol near the Scarborough Shoal, reinforcing its territorial claims amid its dispute over new Filipino maritime territory laws. On November 13 the PLA Southern Theater Command held naval and air combat drills and a joint patrol near Scarborough Shoal.[43] This is the second PLA joint air and maritime patrol around Scarborough Shoal in four months. On November 14 the China Coast Guard (CCG) carried out a “law enforcement patrol” near Scarborough Shoal.[44] These exercises follow the November 10 announcement by the PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) that demarcated the coordinates of the PRC’s territorial sea baseline claims around Scarborough Shoal. The PRC MFA stated that its claims are in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).[45] The PRC’s invocation of international law likely aims to provide legitimacy to their “law enforcement” actions near disputed territory in the South China Sea.
This announcement by the PRC MFA also followed the signing of the Philippine Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act and Philippine Maritime Zones Act by Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr on November 8.[46] The Philippine Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act established a system allowing foreign vessels and aircraft to exercise the right of passage through Philippine waters. The Philippine Maritime Zones Act defined the Philippines’ internal waters, archipelagic waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf. The Philippines’ territorial definitions include the disputed Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal, claims that the PRC criticized as the illegal incorporation of PRC territory. The Philippine government stated that these two laws are intended to align Philippine domestic law with international law according to UNCLOS and the South China Sea Arbitration ruling of 2016. The ruling determined that the PRC‘s expansive South China Sea territorial claims were inconsistent with international law and rejected all PRC territorial or maritime claims determined to be part of the Philippines‘ exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf.[47] The PRC protested the Philippines’ “unilateral actions” and stated that the PRC will continue to defend its territorial rights by all means necessary.
The PRC did not interfere with a Philippine resupply mission to the Sierra Madre in Second Thomas Shoal. It is continuing to abide by a provisional agreement it reached with the Philippines in July 2024 despite continuing tensions over the two countries’ territorial disputes.[48] The Philippines successfully completed a rotation and resupply mission to the BRP Sierra Madre, a grounded warship that acts as a Philippine military outpost in Second Thomas Shoal. The PRC released a statement that the CCG observed this resupply mission and reported that the exercise was completed “with China’s approval.”[49] This marks the third resupply mission since the provisional agreement between the PRC and the Philippines was reached. The PRC claims that it “allows” Philippine resupply missions to Second Thomas Shoal to give the impression that it has legal jurisdiction over the Shoal, though the Philippines rejects this framing.
The PRC warned the United States and the Philippines against increasing regional tensions following the signing of a US-Philippines intelligence sharing agreement. On November 18 United States Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Philippine Secretary of National Defense Gilberto Teodoro signed the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA).[50] The text of the agreement has not been released by either government, but according to the US Department of Defense (DoD) the GSOMIA is focused on providing a legal framework for increased sharing of information and defense technology between the two states.[51] The DoD said the agreement was made after two years of bilateral negotiations and will enhance interoperability between United States and Philippine forces. This signing marked Defense Secretary Austin’s fourth visit to Manila, the most of any United States Secretary of Defense, emphasizing Washington’s view of the importance of close relations between Manila and Washington.
PRC MFA spokesperson Lin Jian commented on the agreement during a press conference, stating that agreements “must not target third parties or harm the interests of third parties” and warning the two states against undermining regional peace and stability.[52] The semi-official state-owned newspaper Global Times cited two PRC-based experts who argued that this agreement could result in additional provocative actions from the Philippines.[53] The PRC has previously stated its concerns over Philippine and United States military cooperation and its implications for PRC maritime security.[54]
Palauan President Surangel Whipps Jr.’s reelection reinforces US naval power projection into the Pacific islands. Palauan President Surangel Whipps Jr. won reelection in Palau’s November 2024 election.[55] Taiwan President Lai Ching-te congratulated Whipps Jr. on social media, and Whipps made a deliberate layover in Taiwan on November 13 on his way to Azerbaijan for the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC COP29).[56] Palau is one of 12 countries that has diplomatic relations with the ROC rather than the PRC. Whipps has remained extremely vocal in his support for Taiwan’s participation in international bodies, stating that the Taiwanese “deserve to have a voice” at the UN during an interview to Taiwanese media, and also commented on Palau’s efforts to diversify its economy amidst PRC tourism restrictions that Beijing imposed in retribution for Palau’s support of Taiwan.[57]
Whipps also stated that he may ask the United States for a Patriot missile defense system again in light of the recent PLA’s test of an intercontinental ballistic missile in September 2024, which landed in the southern Pacific Ocean. The Palauan Senate previously rejected the proposal in 2023.[58] The US military has been working on a number of large construction projects in Palau, including defense radars in Angaur and Ngaraad state, seaport expansion in Koror, and airstrip expansion of the WWII-era runways on Peleliu.[59] Palau has a Compact of Free Association (COFA) with the United States that grants the US military permission to operate on the island in exchange for economic and military aid.[60] Palau is strategically significant because of its location in the Second Island Chain and because it is the Pacific island closest to the South China Sea that hosts important US military infrastructure. These facts would make it a prime target for the PRC in the event of war in the Pacific, and so the Patriot missile systems would act as deterrence and add a line of defense in the event of an attack.
Russia
Anonymous European Union diplomats said the EU has “conclusive” and “credible” evidence that a factory in the PRC’s Xinjiang region is producing and exporting drones for Russia. An unspecified senior EU official told South China Morning Post on November 15 that intelligence sources have reported the existence of the drone factory in Xinjiang, but that the EU has yet to confirm this information, whether the drones have already been shipped, and how much PRC authorities knew about the operation.[63] EU foreign ministers met on November 18 to discuss the evidence. Several foreign ministers including Germany’s Annalena Baerbock warned that the PRC would face “consequences” if the EU finds that it is providing drone aid to Russia.[64] PRC MFA spokesperson Lin Jian denied the allegations, claiming that Beijing has never provided lethal weapons to parties to the conflict and has always “strictly controlled military and dual-use drones.” He claimed that the PRC’s “objective and fair” position on the Ukraine war crisis and promotion of peace talks is in “sharp contrast to the practice of some countries that have adopted double standards and fanned the flames in the Ukrainian crisis.”[65]
The US Department of the Treasury sanctioned two private PRC firms in October for their involvement in producing drones for Russia, the first time the United States has accused PRC entities of sending lethal aid to Russia’s war effort in Ukraine. The Treasury statement said that Russia’s Garpiya-series drone was developed by PRC-based experts and produced in the PRC in collaboration with Russian defense firms. It did not mention the location of the factories, however.[66] Reuters previously reported based on European intelligence sources that one of the companies now sanctioned by the United States, Redlepus Vector Industry Shenzhen Co., collaborated with Russian firms and established a joint drone research center in Xinjiang.[67] It appears likely that this joint drone research center is the same as the Xinjiang factory the EU officials mentioned, or related to it.
The PRC MFA told Reuters at the time that it was unaware of a Russia-PRC drone production project and that the PRC had strict export controls on drones. A US National Security Council spokesperson said that the United States had not seen any evidence that the PRC government was aware of the transactions or had any involvement in providing lethal aid to Russia.[68] PRC firms providing lethal assistance to US-sanctioned Russian firms or jointly collaborating with Russia to produce lethal equipment marks a significant departure from the PRC’s cautious approach to supporting Russia and undermines the PRC’s professed neutrality on the war in Ukraine.
Latin America
The PRC has used port infrastructure as a means of advancing its economic, and at times military, security around the world.[75] Some observers have expressed concerns that infrastructure projects like Chancay pose a security threat and entrench the PRC’s influence in the region.[76] The PRC has claimed that Chancay Port exists only for commercial purposes; the port could improve the PRC’s naval power projection in the region if used militarily, however.[77]
[1] https://www.reuters.com/world/taiwan-president-plans-hawaii-visit-sensitive-trip-pacific-sources-say-2024-11-15/
[2] https://focustaiwan dot tw/politics/202411140010
[3] https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/fyrbt_673021/202411/t20241115_11527073.shtml
[4] https://focustaiwan dot tw/politics/202411140027
[5] https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202411/1323056.shtml
[6] https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy-biden
[7] https://www.zaobao dot com.sg/news/china/story20240708-4112827
[8] https://focustaiwan dot tw/cross-strait/202408130017
[9] https://www.taiwannews dot com.tw/news/5972742
[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-october-30-2024
[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-august-9-2024
[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-august-2-2024
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-august-16-2024
[13] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2024/11/17/2003827038
[14] https://www.sohu dot com/a/785607715_121450515/www.sohu.com/a/785607715_121450515
[15] https://focustaiwan dot tw/cross-strait/202411150016
[16] https://www.cga.gov dot tw/GipOpen/wSite/ct?xItem=162861&ctNode=650&mp=999
[17] http://www.81 dot cn/ss_208539/16318796.html
[18] https://www.npr.org/2024/11/16/nx-s1-5193893/xi-trump-biden-ai-export-controls-tariffs
[19] https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/zyxw/202411/t20241117_11527702.shtml
[20] https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/joint-statement-fbi-and-cisa-peoples-republic-china-prc-targeting-commercial-telecommunications
[21] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/11/16/readout-of-president-joe-bidens-meeting-with-president-xi-jinping-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china-3/
[22] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/11/16/readout-of-president-joe-bidens-meeting-with-president-xi-jinping-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china-3/
[23] https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-xi-agreed-that-humans-not-ai-should-control-nuclear-weapons-white-house-2024-11-16/
[24] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2024/11/17/on-the-record-press-gaggle-by-apnsa-jake-sullivan-on-president-bidens-meeting-with-president-xi-jinping/
[25] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2024/11/17/on-the-record-press-gaggle-by-apnsa-jake-sullivan-on-president-bidens-meeting-with-president-xi-jinping/
[26] https://geneva.usmission.gov/2024/05/15/statement-from-nsc-spokesperson-adrienne-watson-on-the-us-prc-talks-on-ai-risk-and-safety/
https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3267892/china-and-ai-us-sends-mixed-message-about-talks-ban-technology-nuclear-use
[27] https://www.cnbc.com/2024/09/11/sixty-countries-endorse-blueprint-for-ai-use-in-military-china-opts-out.html
[28] https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/202407/t20240717_11455286.shtml
[29] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-china-hold-first-informal-nuclear-talks-5-years-eyeing-taiwan-2024-06-21/
[30] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-august-9-2024
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-june-21-2024
[31] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/apr/21/hackers-us-fighter-jet-strike
[32] https://armyrecognition.com/news/navy-news/2024/china-navy-to-deploy-j-35-fighter-jets-on-its-aircraft-carrier-liaoning
[33] https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-displays-new-stealth-fighter-in-race-to-match-u-s-36e8e040?mod=china_news_article_pos2
[34] https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/07/this-is-the-clearest-photo-yet-of-chinese-navys-j-35-fighter/
[35] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/military/article/3286437/why-j-35-gyrfalcon-crucial-chinas-power-projection-high-seas
https://www.sps-aviation.com/story/?id=2854&h=J-20-of-PLAAF-and-JF-17-of-PAF-Analysed
[36] https://theaviationgeekclub.com/heres-why-the-f-22-uses-square-exhaust-nozzles-and-f-35-su-57-and-chinese-stealth-fighters-dont/
[37] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/chinas-j-35a-stealth-fighter-is-black-box-despite-splashy-debut-2024-11-11/
[38] https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/ws13.htm
[39] https://www.eurasiantimes.com/chinas-struggle-with-aero-engines-keep/#:~:text=Despite%20advancements%2C%20Chinese%20engines%20have,through%20ongoing%20refinements%20and%20improvements.
[40] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/military/article/3200826/world-class-production-lines-speed-deliveries-chinas-j-20-stealth-jet-fighter
[41] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/china-military-displays-upgraded-z-20-helicopter-zhuhai-air-show-2024-11-12/
https://www.newsweek.com/china-news-shows-off-new-naval-hardware-rival-american-sea-power-1985070
https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2024/11/13/china-unveils-j-35a-and-other-new-fighters-at-zhuhai-airshow/
[42] https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-displays-new-stealth-fighter-in-race-to-match-u-s-36e8e040?mod=china_news_article_pos2
[43] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3286355/chinese-military-conducts-sea-and-air-patrol-around-shoal-amid-tension-philippines?module=top_story&pgtype=subsection
[44] http://www.news dot cn/politics/20241114/2ac23ba3ea7e443c84c11e2303630c20/c.html
[45] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/202411/t20241110_11524122.html
[46] https://pco.gov dot ph/news_releases/pbbm-inks-2-laws-reinforcing-ph-rights-over-its-maritime-zones/
[47] https://pca-cpa.org/ar/cases/7/
[48] https://www.pna.gov"https://www.pna.gov dot ph/articles/1237920
[49] https://english.news dot cn/20241115/505dcce006494f148b44d95bd8c9aa11/c.html
[50] https://apnews.com/article/philippines-us-general-security-of-military-information-agreement-4622f461bde4599a08be8c51d5f4db09
[51] https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3967671/austin-marks-deepening-us-philippine-ties-during-visit-to-manila/
[52] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202411/t20241118_11528455.shtml
[53] https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202411/1323330.shtml
[54] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/web/sp_683685/wjbfyrlxjzh_683691/202411/t20241111_11524590.shtml
[55] https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/president-palau-wins-second-term-election-rcna180093
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/palau-president-wins-second-term-will-seek-diversify-tiny-taiwan-allys-economy-2024-11-13/
https://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/2672/
[56] https://english.president.gov dot tw/NEWS/6832
https://www.mofa.gov dot tw/News_Content.aspx?n=95&s=118599
[57] https://focustaiwan dot tw/politics/202411120031
https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2024/11/14/2003826884
[58] https://www.scmp dot com/news/asia/australasia/article/3286490/palau-says-china-icbm-test-direct-threat-seeks-us-patriot-missile-system
https://www.reuters.com/world/us-missile-defense-proposal-stirs-debate-palau-2023-12-20/
[59] https://www.scmp dot com/news/asia/australasia/article/3286490/palau-says-china-icbm-test-direct-threat-seeks-us-patriot-missile-system
https://www.npr.org/2024/08/27/nx-s1-5071215/why-the-island-nation-of-palau-is-a-focus-of-the-worlds-2-superpowers-u-s-china
https://www.newsweek.com/palau-says-china-news-trespassing-1985157
[60] https://www.iswresearch.org/2024/11/china-taiwan-weekly-update-november-6.html
[61] https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202411/1322980.shtml
[62] https://www.newsweek.com/palau-says-china-news-trespassing-1985157
[63] http://www.scmp dot com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3286819/eu-has-conclusive-proof-armed-drones-russia-being-made-china-sources?module=top_story&pgtype=subsection
[64] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3287099/eu-warns-china-consequences-if-its-found-be-making-armed-drones-russia
[65] https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/fyrbt_673021/202411/t20241118_11528455.shtml
[66] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2651
[67] https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-has-secret-war-drones-project-china-intel-sources-say-2024-09-25/
[68] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-concerned-by-report-russia-secret-war-drones-project-china-white-house-says-2024-09-25/
https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-has-secret-war-drones-project-china-intel-sources-say-2024-09-25/
[69] https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/zyxw/202411/t20241115_11526956.shtml
[70] https://www.reuters.com/world/chinas-xi-arrives-lima-apec-open-pacific-megaport-2024-11-14/
[71] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/11/14/china-peru-port-latin-america/
[72] https://apnews.com/article/peru-apec-biden-xi-lima-china-fc2ac014b2f7314bfa1a53351b0bc3a7
[73] https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/fyrbt_673021/202411/t20241115_11527073.shtml
[74] https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/fyrbt_673021/202411/t20241115_11527073.shtml
[75] https://www.csis.org/analysis/responding-chinas-growing-influence-ports-global-south
[76] https://www.newsweek.com/china-news-xi-megaport-chancay-warships-1985770
[77] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/11/14/china-peru-port-latin-america/