Kelly
Campa, Johanna Moore, Carolyn Moorman, Annika Ganzeveld, Alexandra
Braverman, Ria Reddy, Katherine Wells, Avery Borens, and Brian Carter
Information Cutoff: 12:30 pm ET
The
Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and
the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which
provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that
undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. Click
here
to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
We
do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are
well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military
operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn
violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and
crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these
reports.
CTP-ISW is publishing an abbreviated update
today, November 19, 2024. We will resume our regular, full coverage of
the October 7 War on November 20, 2024.
Hamas and
other unidentified Palestinian militias have formed a combined force to
stop armed gangs from looting humanitarian aid, which indicates that
Hamas has only limited control of the Gaza Strip.[1] It remains unclear if Hamas distributes the aid equitably after it recovers stolen aid. Reuters
reported on November 19 that Hamas and other militias created a force
called the Popular and Revolutionary Committees in November 2024 to
address rising Palestinian civilian anger at aid seizures and price
gouging. Palestinian sources claimed that this newly created force has
conducted multiple operations this month, killing several armed looters.
The IDF has repeatedly said that armed groups loot humanitarian aid in
the Gaza Strip. Armed criminal groups seized 98 out of 109 aid trucks in
an incident in the southern Strip on November 16.[2]
A Hamas official told Reuters that the force shows Hamas’ continued
control of governance in the Gaza Strip. The reality that criminal
organizations are capable and willing to interdict these aid shipments
indicates that these groups no longer fear Hamas to the degree they did
pre-war.[3]
This suggests that Hamas’ ability to maintain control over the Strip
has weakened considerably. The creation of a combined organization to
counter this loss of control indicates Hamas is taking steps to regain
control over the Strip, however.
Israeli media
reported on November 18 that Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar met with Turkish
intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin in Turkey on November 16 to discuss
efforts for a ceasefire-hostage deal in the Gaza Strip.[4] Israeli
media reported on November 17 that Hamas’ political leadership had
relocated from Qatar to Turkey after Qatari officials reportedly ordered
Hamas’ political leadership to relocate from Qatar.[5]
Hamas and an anonymous Turkish diplomat both denied on November 18 that
Hamas’ political leadership had relocated from Qatar to Turkey.[6]
An
Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on November 19 that the 36th
Division has advanced northwest from Chama to a hilltop overlooking the
Lebanese coast.[7] Geolocated
imagery posted on November 19 showed that Israeli forces have advanced
to al Bayyada Hill overlooking the Lebanese coast.[8]
Hezbollah claimed two separate rocket and mortar attacks targeting
Israeli forces operating on the outskirts of Chama and al Bayyada, which
is consistent with reports of Israeli troop movements.[9] Al Bayyada Hill overlooks UNIFIL position 1-26 and a nearby Hezbollah military site.[10]
It is not clear that Hezbollah can continue operating from this
position, but CTP-ISW has observed dozens of airstrikes in the areas
close to the Hezbollah military position. Al Bayyada Hill provides
Israeli forces with an advantageous position to monitor Hezbollah
activity along the coast. Lebanese and Hezbollah-controlled media
claimed Israeli forces and Hezbollah fighters continue to engage in
small arms combat in Chama suggesting that elements of the 36th Division
are continuing operations to secure Chama.[11]
US
special envoy Amos Hochstein discussed Hezbollah’s response to the
US-drafted ceasefire agreement with Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih
Berri in Beirut on November 19.[12] Berri
is Hezbollah‘s go-between in ceasefire negotiations. Hochstein called
the meeting “constructive” and noted that talks are continuing.[13]
One of Berri’s aides told Reuters on November 19 that Lebanon and
Hezbollah agreed to the proposal with several comments on its contents.[14] Unspecified US officials similarly characterized Hezbollah’s response to the draft agreement as a “yes, but” to Axios.[15]
Hezbollah and the Lebanese government remain concerned about a clause
in the agreement that says that Israel has the right to defend itself
against threats from Lebanon, according to a Lebanese government source
and Lebanese media.[16] Hochstein is expected to travel to Israel in the next few days depending on the progress of negotiations in Lebanon.[17]
Unspecified
Israeli officials told Axios that a recent intensification of Israeli
air operations and expansion of ground operations in Lebanon is intended
to increase pressure on Hezbollah to agree to a ceasefire.[18]
The IDF struck over 50 targets in Beirut’s southern suburbs over the
previous week and conducted at least three strikes in central and
northern Beirut.[19] The IDF also recently began operating in ”second-line” Lebanese towns and villages.[20]
The
Lebanese Armed Force's (LAF) unwillingness to directly confront
Hezbollah in the south will complicate the success of the ceasefire
agreement. The LAF would be the security force responsible for
enforcing Hezbollah’s withdrawal and disarmament in southern Lebanon and
would deploy to the south in the days following the ceasefire,
according to leaked copies of the proposal in late October.[21]
The LAF will need Hezbollah’s approval to deploy troops to the south to
enforce a ceasefire deal and will avoid confronting Hezbollah fighters
directly to avoid “trigger[ing] internal strife,” according to sources
close to the army and unspecified officials talking to Reuters.[22]
An unspecified diplomat said that Lebanese personnel “storming into
houses looking for Hezbollah weapons” could lead to a civil war in
Lebanon.[23]
The LAF's unwillingness to confront Hezbollah directly would complicate
its efforts to enforce the proposed ceasefire agreement. CTP-ISW has
previously noted that it is extremely unlikely that the LAF or UNIFIL
would be willing to enforce Hezbollah’s disarmament in the south, given
their failure to enforce UNSCR 1701 in southern Lebanon since 2006.
Hezbollah fired a rocket barrage toward Israel that hit a UNIFIL site in Ramyeh, southwestern Lebanon, on November 19. UNIFIL said that “likely non-state actors” fired a barrage of rockets that hit UNP 5-42 and injured four Ghanian peacekeepers.[24]
The only non-state armed groups operating in southern Lebanon are
Hezbollah and groups that Hezbollah permits to operate in southern
Lebanon. The peacekeepers were transferred to a hospital in Tyre for
treatment.[25] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson said that Hezbollah launched the rocket barrage from Deir Aames.[26]
Key Takeaways:
- Humanitarian Aid: Hamas
and other unidentified Palestinian militias have formed a combined
force to stop armed gangs from looting humanitarian aid, which indicates
that Hamas has only limited control of the Gaza Strip. The reality that
criminal organizations are capable and willing to interdict these aid
shipments indicates that these groups no longer fear Hamas to the degree
they did pre-war. This suggests that Hamas’ ability to maintain control
over the Strip has weakened considerably. The creation of a combined
organization to counter this loss of control indicates Hamas is taking
steps to regain control over the Strip, however.
- Gaza Strip Ceasefire: Israeli
media reported on November 18 that Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar met with
Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin in Turkey on November 16 to
discuss efforts for a ceasefire-hostage deal in the Gaza Strip.
- Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: An
Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on November 19 that the 36th
Division has advanced northwest from Chama to a hilltop overlooking the
Lebanese coast.
- Lebanon Ceasefire: US special
envoy Amos Hochstein discussed Hezbollah’s response to the US-drafted
ceasefire agreement with Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri in
Beirut on November 19. Unspecified Israeli officials told Axios that a
recent intensification of Israeli air operations and expansion of ground
operations in Lebanon is intended to increase pressure on Hezbollah to
agree to a ceasefire.
- Lebanese Armed Forces-Hezbollah Relations: The
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)’s unwillingness to directly confront
Hezbollah in the south will complicate the success of the ceasefire
agreement. The LAF will need Hezbollah’s approval to deploy troops to
the south to enforce a ceasefire deal and will avoid confronting
Hezbollah fighters directly to avoid “trigger[ing] internal strife,”
according to sources close to the army and unspecified officials talking
to Reuters.
UNIFIL: Hezbollah fired a rocket
barrage towards Israel that truck UN Position 5-42 near Ramyeh,
southwestern Lebanon. UNIFIL said that “likely non-state actors” fired a
barrage of rockets that hit the base and injured four Ghanian
peacekeepers. The only non-state armed groups operating in southern
Lebanon are Hezbollah and groups that Hezbollah permits to operate in
southern Lebanon.
Gaza Strip:
Axis of Resistance objectives:
The
IDF said on November 19 that the IDF 162nd Division had killed over
1300 Palestinian militia fighters since restarting clearing operations
in Jabalia on October 6.[27] The IDF had last conducted clearing operations in the area in May 2024.[28] Israeli forces have detained over 1000 Palestinian militia fighters since October 6, including from Hamas.[29]
The IDF estimates that between 100 and 200 fighters remain in the area.
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) mortared Israeli forces and vehicles in
Jabalia camp on November 19.[30]
The IDF 162nd Division continued operations in Beit Lahia in the northern Gaza Strip on November 19. Palestinian
militias conducted three small arms attacks targeting Israeli forces in
Beit Lahia since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 18.[31]
Palestinian militias conducted two attacks targeting Israeli forces near the Netzarim Corridor on November 19.[32]
The
National Resistance Brigades mortared Israeli forces and vehicles east
of Deir al Balah in the central Gaza Strip on November 19.[33]
West Bank
Axis of Resistance objectives:
Israeli
forces conducted a counterterrorism operation in Jenin Governorate, in
the northern West Bank, overnight from November 18 to 19.[34]
Israeli security forces engaged Palestinian militias, including PIJ and
the Al Aqsa Martys’ Brigades, in at least thirteen locations in Jenin
Governorate during the operation.[35]
Palestinian militias fired small arms and detonated improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) targeting Israeli forces operating in the area.[36]
Israeli
security forces entered Qabatiya village, Jenin Governorate, on
November 19 to arrest a PIJ fighter who was recently involved in
shooting and IED attacks targeting IDF forces as part of its
counterterrorism operation.[37]
Israeli security forces conducted a “pressure cooker” operation in
which Israeli forces isolated the building, attempted to encourage his
surrender, and then opened fire.[38] Israeli security forces killed three fighters in the building during the operation, including the wanted man.[39]
Israeli forces destroyed two IED manufacturing facilities and conducted
controlled detonations of other IEDs planted under the roads.[40]
Northern Israel and Lebanon
Lebanese Hezbollah objectives:
The IDF 98th Division continued clearing operations in Khiam to disrupt Hezbollah’s ability to attack northern Israel. Geolocated footage posted by the IDF on November 19 showed the IDF operating on Khiam’s southern outskirts.[41] The IDF 7th Armored Brigade and 35th Paratroopers Brigade are currently operating in Khiam.[42]
Israeli Army Radio reported that Khiam is a “major stronghold” for
Hezbollah from which it directly threatens the northern Israel town of
Kiryat Shmona.[43] Israeli forces are operating in the area to destroy Hezbollah’s “raiding and [projectile] launching infrastructure.”[44]
CTP-ISW previously reported that Israeli forces previously conducted a
brief incursion into Khiam’s southern outskirts in late October 2024.[45] Hezbollah claimed four rocket attacks targeting IDF personnel east and south of Khiam.[46] Hezbollah rocket artillery cells previously attempted to halt Israeli advances toward Khiam on November 18.[47]
The IDF 91st Division has expanded clearing operations in southeastern Lebanon since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on November 18.
The 769th Territorial Brigade (91st Division) located a cache of
Hezbollah weapons, explosives, ammunition, and Hezbollah outposts in a
schoolyard at some point in the past week.[48]
Israeli forces also located and destroyed rocket launchers, anti-tank
guided missiles, Hezbollah documents, and various military equipment in a
building near the school. The 769th Territorial Brigade also located a
Hezbollah tunnel network “tens of meters long” that contained “hundreds”
of weapons ammunition, rocket-propelled grenades, and other unspecified
materials.
The 36th Division has continued clearing operations around Maroun al Ras since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on November 18. Hezbollah
claimed it fired an anti-tank guided munition at Israeli forces
operating in a house on the outskirts of Maroun al Ras on November 19.[49] Hezbollah also claimed three rocket attacks targeting Israeli forces in Maroun al Ras.[50]
The
IDF has continued its air campaign targeting Hezbollah leadership and
infrastructure in southern Lebanon since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on
November 18. The Israeli Army Radio stated that the IDF has
struck over 150 Hezbollah targets since November 17, including weapons
warehouses, leadership, and rocket launchers.[51]
Lebanese media reported on November 18 that IDF conducted two
airstrikes on the Ghobeiry and Chiyah areas of Beirut’s southern
suburbs.[52]
The IDF has not commented on these strikes at the time of this writing.
The IDF has been conducting airstrikes in recent days targeting
Hezbollah sites in Beirut’s southern suburbs as part of a broader air
campaign to degrade Hezbollah's military capabilities.[53]
The
IDF conducted an airstrike on November 18 targeting the commander of
Hezbollah’s medium-range rocket array, Ali Tawfiq al Dweik, in Mazraat
Kfar Jouz, southern Lebanon.[54]
The IDF stated that Dweik replaced the former medium-range rocket
commander in September 2024 and was responsible for launching more than
300 rockets toward Israel.[55]
The
IDF Air Force continued its air campaign in southwestern Lebanon. The
IDF struck several towns in the Bint Jbeil and Tyre governorates in
southwestern Lebanon.[56] Lebanese media reported that the IDF conducted a series of seven airstrikes on the town of Hosh, southwestern Lebanon.[57] The head of Tyre District’s Medical Department stated that Israeli airstrikes on Tyre killed at least 2 people and wounded 21.[58]
Hezbollah has conducted at least 22 attacks into Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 18.[59] Hezbollah conducted attacks targeting multiple IDF sites in Israel.[60]
Hezbollah claimed it fired a surface-to-surface missile and one-way
drones targeting an IDF Military Intelligence Division base in Tel Aviv.[61]
The IDF reported that Israeli air defense systems intercepted a
surface-to-surface missile, breaking the munition into several pieces.[62] The broken munition fell in Ramat Gan near Tel Aviv, causing damage and inflicting casualties.[63] Hezbollah also launched rockets targeting the IDF Glilot intelligence base near Tel Aviv.[64]
Hezbollah conducted multiple rocket and drone attacks targeting IDF
sites in northern Israel, including the Ramat David Air Base southeast
of Haifa and the Beit Lid Base east of Netanya.[65]
Hezbollah stated these attacks were part of its ”Khaybar” operations,
which are meant to retaliate for Israel's killing of Hassan Nasrallah.[66]
Iran and the Axis of Resistance
The
Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi
militias—claimed a drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target”
in southern Israel on November 18.[67] Iranian-backed
Iraqi militia Saraya Awliya al Dam, which claims to be affiliated with
the Islamic Resistance of Iraq, separately claimed a drone attack
targeting an unspecified “vital target” in Eilat on November 19.[68]
Israeli
Foreign Affairs Minister Gideon Saar wrote a letter to UN Security
Council President Barbara Woodland on November 18 expressing concern
over the “significant increase” in the frequency and intensity of
Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks targeting Israel since September
2024.[69] CTP-ISW
recorded that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq increased its rate of
attacks by approximately 148 percent between September and October 2024,
claiming 31 attacks in September and 77 attacks in October. The Islamic
Resistance in Iraq has claimed 58 attacks in November 2024 thus far.
Saar wrote that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Kataib
Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al Haq, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Kataib Sayyid
al Shuhada, Ansar Allah al Awfiya, and the Badr Organization, have
launched hundreds of Shahed, Ziad, and Arpad drones and several dozen
Raad 351 cruise missiles at Israel since October 2023. Saar wrote that
Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks on Israel target both civilian
areas and military bases. Saar emphasized that the Iraqi federal
government is responsible for preventing militias from using Iraqi
territory to attack Israel and called on the UN Security Council to
ensure that the Iraqi federal government fulfills its obligations under
the UN Charter and international law. Saar emphasized that Israel has
the right to protect itself and its citizens against Iranian-backed
Iraqi militia attacks.
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani dismissed Saar’s letter as an “excuse to attack Iraq.”[70]
Sudani claimed that Iraq has thus far refused to enter the October 7
War and that a decision to enter the war would lie with the Iraqi
federal government.[71]
Sudani’s government has proven unwilling or incapable of stopping
attacks from Iraq targeting Israel. These attacks are launched by groups
that operate under the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), an
armed force that nominally answers to Sudani but in reality answers to
Iranian-backed militia leaders. Sudani’s Political Affairs Adviser,
Sabhan al Mulla Jiyad, separately claimed that the Iraqi federal
government opposes the use of Iraqi territory by Iranian-backed Iraqi
militias to attack Israel.[72]
Jiyad stated that the Iraqi federal government similarly opposes
Israeli attacks on Iraq. Jiyad claimed that the US-led international
coalition would be “tasked with protecting [Iraqi] airspace” in the
event of an Israeli attack on Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in Iraq.
Syrian
media reported on November 18 that Russian forces established two new
observation posts near the demilitarized zone between the Golan Heights
and Syria.[73] The Deputy
Commander of Russian forces in Syria, General Alexandra Rodionov,
stated that Russian forces have established a total of nine observation
posts along the demilitarized zone in coordination with the Syrian Arab
Army (SAA).[74]
Iranian
Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with Syrian Parliament
Speaker Hammouda Sabbagh on November 19 in Tehran to discuss
strengthening bilateral ties and regional cooperation.[75]
Araghchi reaffirmed Iran's support for Syria and the Axis of Resistance
while condemning Israeli strikes in Syria. Sabbagh emphasized the need
to strengthen relations between Iran and Syria to address shared
challenges and threats. Sabbagh also announced upcoming joint economic
commission meetings in Damascus to enhance bilateral cooperation and
discuss strategies to mitigate the impact of sanctions on Iran.[76]
The
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) told IAEA member states on
November 19 that Iran has offered to limit its stockpile of uranium
enriched up to 60% if the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany)
abandon their resolution against Iran's nuclear program at the IAEA
Board of Governors meeting this week.[77]
An unspecified senior diplomat said that Iran has offered to cap its
stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60% at around 185 kg. The IAEA
reported that Iran has 182.3 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% as of
October 26.[78]
The E3 resolution would require the IAEA to produce a “comprehensive
report” on Iranian nuclear activities that would almost certainly
confirm Iranian non-compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action and lay the foundation for the E3 to reimpose UN Security Council
sanctions on Iran, known as "snapback” sanctions.[79]
CTP-ISW will provide further details on the IAEA Board of Governors
meeting and Iran's nuclear activities in the update on November 20.
Houthi fighters fired ballistic and cruise missiles targeting a cargo ship in the Red Sea on November 19. Houthi
spokesperson Yahya Sarea claimed on November 19 that the Houthis
launched “an appropriate number” of ballistic and cruise missiles at
Panama-flagged cargo ship Anadolu S off the coast of Yemen.[80]
The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) said that an
unnamed commercial vessel reported that a missile impacted near the
vessel, which was approximately 25 nautical miles west of al Mukha,
Yemen, in the Bab al Mandeb Strait.[81] A second missile impacted the ocean near the vessel when it was 60 nautical miles southeast of Aden.[82] The UKMTO stated that there were no casualties or damage to the vessel.
The
Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored
activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US
forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the
stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical
Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the
Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly
based on regional events.
CTP-ISW defines the
“Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has
cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power
in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state,
and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective
interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and
its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of
financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree
of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies
that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are
partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the
Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which
include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the
Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these
objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have
become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.
[1] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-led-force-targets-gangs-looting-gaza-aid-convoys-2024-11-19/
[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-18-2024 ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/un-says-nearly-100-gaza-aid-trucks-looted-the-wars-worst-theft-in-terms-of-volume/
[3] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-led-force-targets-gangs-looting-gaza-aid-convoys-2024-11-19/
[4] https://news.walla dot co.il/item/3705439
[5] https://x.com/kann_news/status/1858210305811054897
[6] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-political-office-has-not-moved-turkey-qatar-turkish-source-says-2024-11-18/
; https://asharq dot
com/politics/107110/%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%B1-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A3%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%BA%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9/
[7] https://t.me/moriahdoron/16644
[8] https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/1858869208882335765
[9] https://t.me/mmirleb/9256 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9255
[10] https://israel-alma dot org/2022/06/09/hezbollah-military-zone-1-mansouri/ ; https://www.un.org/geospatial/content/unifil-deployment-august-2022
[11] https://t.me/alichoeib1970/12326 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/103803
[12] https://www.axios.com/2024/11/18/hezbollah-israel-ceasefire-deal-biden
[13] https://www.axios.com/2024/11/18/hezbollah-israel-ceasefire-deal-biden
[14]
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanon-hezbollah-agree-us-proposal-ceasefire-with-israel-lebanese-official-says-2024-11-18/
[15] https://www.axios.com/2024/11/18/hezbollah-israel-ceasefire-deal-biden
[16] https://www.axios.com/2024/11/18/hezbollah-israel-ceasefire-deal-biden;
https://www dot
aljazeera.net/news/2024/11/18/%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%AD-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A
[17] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-11-19/us-envoy-hochstein-visits-beirut-in-push-for-israel-hezbollah-truce
[18] https://www.axios.com/2024/11/18/hezbollah-israel-ceasefire-deal-biden
[19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-18-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-17-2024
[20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-17-2024
[21] www.kan dot org.il/content/kan-news/politic/818729/ ;
https://x.com/suleimanmas1/status/1851687885470102001?s=46&t=EGYcIyXosW6lVJmixq2r5Q
[22] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/truce-talks-progress-lebanons-army-cornered-by-politics-funding-2024-11-19/
[23] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/truce-talks-progress-lebanons-army-cornered-by-politics-funding-2024-11-19/
[24] https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-statement-19-november-2024
[25] https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-statement-19-november-2024
[26] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1858878099020005586
[27] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1858848200775393482 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-6-2024
[28] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-6-2024
[29] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1858848200775393482
[30] https://t.me/sarayaps/18829
[31]
alqassam dot
ps/arabic/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/20095/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84-409-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%A8%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1
; https://t.me/sarayaps/18823 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7894
[32] https://www.alqassam
dot
ps/arabic/%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/8283/%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AA%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B6%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%A8%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AE-107-%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%89
; https://t.me/sarayaps/18830
[33] https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4469
[34] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1858855029072871564
[35] https://t.me/sarayajneen/1800 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1802 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1803 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1804 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1805 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1806 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1807 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1808 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1810 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1811
; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1812 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7892 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7895
[36] https://t.me/sarayajneen/1802 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1806 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1809
[37] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/palestinian-islamic-jihad-confirms-3-members-killed-in-israeli-raid-in-qabatiya/ ; www.idf
dot
il/%D7%90%D7%AA%D7%A8%D7%99-%D7%99%D7%97%D7%99%D7%93%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%99%D7%95%D7%9E%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%9C%D7%97%D7%9E%D7%94/%D7%99%D7%95%D7%9E%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%9C%D7%97%D7%9E%D7%94-%D7%9B%D7%9C-%D7%94%D7%A2%D7%93%D7%9B%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%95%D7%94%D7%93%D7%99%D7%95%D7%95%D7%97%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%94%D7%90%D7%97%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%9D/
[38] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1858855035641172166 ; www.idf
dot
il/%D7%90%D7%AA%D7%A8%D7%99-%D7%99%D7%97%D7%99%D7%93%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%99%D7%95%D7%9E%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%9C%D7%97%D7%9E%D7%94/%D7%99%D7%95%D7%9E%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%9C%D7%97%D7%9E%D7%94-%D7%9B%D7%9C-%D7%94%D7%A2%D7%93%D7%9B%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%95%D7%94%D7%93%D7%99%D7%95%D7%95%D7%97%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%94%D7%90%D7%97%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%9D/
[39] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/palestinian-islamic-jihad-confirms-3-members-killed-in-israeli-raid-in-qabatiya/
[40] www.idf
dot
il/%D7%90%D7%AA%D7%A8%D7%99-%D7%99%D7%97%D7%99%D7%93%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%99%D7%95%D7%9E%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%9C%D7%97%D7%9E%D7%94/%D7%99%D7%95%D7%9E%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%9C%D7%97%D7%9E%D7%94-%D7%9B%D7%9C-%D7%94%D7%A2%D7%93%D7%9B%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%95%D7%94%D7%93%D7%99%D7%95%D7%95%D7%97%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%94%D7%90%D7%97%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%9D/
[41] https://x.com/Me1Ray/status/1858864831711113472
[42] https://t.me/moriahdoron/16644
[43] https://t.me/moriahdoron/16644
[44] https://t.me/moriahdoron/16644
[45] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-29-2024
[46] https://t.me/mmirleb/9260; https://t.me/mmirleb/9272; https://t.me/mmirleb/9237; https://t.me/mmirleb/9238
[47] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-18-2024
[48] https://www.idf dot il/249744
[49] https://t.me/mmirleb/9257
[50] https://t.me/mmirleb/9257 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9262 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9270 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9271
[51] https://t.me/moriahdoron/16644
[52] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/103854 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/103855
[53] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/103257; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/103265; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/103266; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/103319; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/103321; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/103324; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/103326; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/103355; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/103369; https://x.com/Lebanon24/status/1858205637043233221
[54] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1858851420566438322
[55] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1858851420566438322
[56] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/104021;
https://t.me/channelnabatieh/104010;
https://t.me/channelnabatieh/104004;
https://t.me/channelnabatieh/104001;
https://t.me/channelnabatieh/104000;
https://t.me/channelnabatieh/104000;
https://t.me/channelnabatieh/103998;
https://t.me/channelnabatieh/103996; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/103974
[57] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/104021
[58] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/104039
[59] https://t.me/mmirleb/9229;
https://t.me/mmirleb/9230; https://t.me/mmirleb/9239;
https://t.me/mmirleb/9240; https://t.me/mmirleb/9245;
https://t.me/moriahdoron/16639; https://t.me/mmirleb/9246;
https://t.me/mmirleb/9247; https://t.me/mmirleb/9248;
https://t.me/mmirleb/9249; https://t.me/mmirleb/9250;
https://t.me/mmirleb/9251; https://t.me/mmirleb/9252;
https://t.me/mmirleb/9259; https://t.me/mmirleb/9261;
https://t.me/mmirleb/9263; https://t.me/mmirleb/9264;
https://t.me/mmirleb/9265; https://t.me/mmirleb/9266;
https://t.me/mmirleb/9267; https://t.me/mmirleb/9268;
https://t.me/mmirleb/9269
[60] https://t.me/mmirleb/9229;
https://t.me/mmirleb/9240; https://t.me/mmirleb/9246;
https://t.me/mmirleb/9251; https://t.me/mmirleb/9252;
https://t.me/mmirleb/9259;https://t.me/mmirleb/9269
[61] https://t.me/mmirleb/9240
[62] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1858619388108079595
[63] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1858619388108079595
[64] https://t.me/mmirleb/9259
[65] https://t.me/mmirleb/9251; https://t.me/mmirleb/9252
[66] https://t.me/mmirleb/9251; https://t.me/mmirleb/9252; https://t.me/mmirleb/9259; https://t.me/mmirleb/9240
[67] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1540
[68] https://t.me/awlialdm/145
[69] https://x.com/gidonsaar/status/1858601207498956997
[70] https://t.me/MohamedShiaAlsudanii/4267
[71] https://t.me/MohamedShiaAlsudanii/4267
[72]
https://shafaq dot
com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%82-%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%88%D9%85%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%B4-%D9%86-%D8%B4%D9%83%D9%88%D9%89-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%B6%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A
[73] https://www.kan.org dot il/content/kan-news/defense/826040/ ;
https://sana dot sy/en/?p=341904
[74] https://sana dot sy/en/?p=341904
[75] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/08/29/3203276
[76] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/08/29/3203276
[77] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-offers-cap-sensitive-uranium-stock-avoid-iaea-resolution-2024-11-19/
[78] https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-iaea-grossi-enriched-uranium-weapon-0525819542521d5f89bd09008f42cb2f
[79] https://www.reuters.com/world/european-powers-pushing-resolution-against-iran-iaea-diplomats-say-2024-11-13/ ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-november-14-2024
[80] https://x.com/army21ye/status/1858878165164171278
[81] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/1858466625495630258
[82] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/1858466625495630258
