By Daniel Pitcairn
Key takeaway: Russian-backed separatists
in eastern Ukraine have postponed unrecognized local elections from October and
November 2015 to February 2016. The elections would have violated the “Minsk”
peace process which requires the vote to proceed under Ukrainian law. The
postponement will mitigate risks of armed conflict resuming in October but does
not reflect a fundamental shift in Russia’s Ukraine strategy. Instead, it
reflects Russia’s effort to balance this strategy with intervention in the
Middle East and a desire to break out of international isolation and economic
sanctions.
Russian-backed
separatists in eastern Ukraine announced on October 6 their decision to postpone upcoming local elections unrecognized by Kyiv until February
2016. They would otherwise have transpired in October and November. The
announcement follows an October 2 meeting of the heads of state of Ukraine,
Russia, Germany, and France, where Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly
promised Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko that he would pressure Ukrainian separatists
into cancelling the controversial elections. Kyiv, Paris and Berlin had decried
the upcoming elections as a major violation of the February “Minsk II”
ceasefire in Ukraine, because they would not have been held in accordance with
Ukrainian law or in the presence of recognized international monitors. Although
Moscow had originally defended the disputed elections, the decision to cancel
them does not represent a fundamental shift in Russia’s strategy in Ukraine, which
continues to rely on the threat and application of military force to pressure
the Ukrainian government into making political concessions that allow Moscow to
strongly influence Ukraine’s politics and policy. Instead, Russia is attempting
to balance its strategy for Ukraine with intervention in the Middle East and to
shed international economic sanctions.
The
Minsk II agreement signed in February represents a concession to Russia because
Ukraine had little choice but to consent to key Russian objectives, including
decentralization and the assignment of “special status” to Donetsk and Luhansk
oblasts, amidst a major Russian-backed separatist offensive. Russia had
thwarted its implementation by refusing to meet many of its provisions,
including those pertaining to the elections and the withdrawal of heavy
weaponry from the front lines. By pressuring the separatists to postpone their
elections, Russia has shifted international and domestic pressure back onto to Kyiv
to fulfill its side of the Minsk agreements and enact politically painful
concessions. The separatists claim Kyiv must now “fulfill all obligations under the
Minsk agreements”
as a condition of election postponement. These include the provision of
“special status” to Donbas, amnesty for militants in the region, and revising
amendments to the constitution in agreement with the separatists.
The
decision to delay elections all but guarantees that implementation of the Minsk
II agreement will extend into 2016 and prolongs Moscow’s ability to exert
pressure on the pro-Western government in Kyiv. This delay favors Moscow. Poroshenko
had previously insisted that implementation of the agreement must be completed by the end of this year, whereas
Moscow has indicated its willingness to extend it into 2016. By averting the
agreement’s likely collapse over separatist elections and prolonging the
implementation process, Russia has preserved the mechanism through it which it
can most effectively convert its threats of military force into political
concessions by Kyiv. Poroshenko knows that the Minsk II agreement traps him into
choosing between military escalation in Donbas and a high probability of
significant domestic political fracturing. A deadly riot by far-right groups in front of
the Ukrainian parliament on August 31 highlighted this domestic political challenge.
The riot came in response to initial approval of draft amendments extending
special status to Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.
Meanwhile,
Moscow is keen to maintain the veneer of progress in Ukraine while expanding
its military intervention in Syria and trying to escape international sanctions
brought on by its war in Ukraine. Five days after Russia began airstrikes in
Syria on September 30, Russian-backed separatists in Ukraine announced they would
postpone their disputed elections, leading the EU, among others, to express “renewed hope for a sustainable
political settlement.”
An unnamed German government source even credited Russia directly for the
progress, commenting, “Moscow has finally delivered.” In presenting itself as
constructive actor in Ukraine, Russia also seeks to weaken political will
within the EU to extend sanctions beyond their expiration in January
2016. French President Francois Hollande has already said that he “will ask for sanctions [on Russia] to be lifted” if progress toward the
implementation of the Minsk agreements continues.
Although
the postponement of disputed separatist elections to next year has been met
with significant international approval for averting a breakdown of the Minsk
II peace process in the short term, it does not presage a strategic reversal by
Russia in Ukraine. Instead it reflects an effort to balance new geopolitical
priorities, particularly in the Middle East, with a continuation of its
destabilizing strategy in Ukraine over a longer term.
Read this update online here.
