Iran Update Special Report, June 21, 2025, Evening Edition

Ben Rezaei, Avery Borens, Carolyn Moorman, Johanna Moore, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 5:00 PM ET 

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) are publishing multiple updates daily to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The morning update will focus on the exchange of fire between Iran and Israel. The evening update will be more comprehensive, covering events over the past 24-hour period and refining items discussed in the morning update.

Please note that ISW-CTP will only be emailing the evening edition of our daily Iran Update Special Reports. You can find this morning's edition here on our website.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has begun implementing emergency succession measures in response to escalating Israeli strikes and the potential for US military involvement.[1] Unspecified Iranian sources told the New York Times on June 21 that Khamenei has relocated to a secure bunker, suspended digital communications, and now communicates with senior commanders only through a trusted aide.[2] Sources added that Khamenei named three senior clerics as candidates to replace him if he is killed.[3] Khamanei also reportedly named replacements for top military commanders and ordered senior officials to work from underground offices and avoid using cellphones.[4] These steps mark the first reported instance of Khamenei directly selecting potential successors outside the formal process of the Assembly of Experts. Khamenei likely took these steps amid heightened assassination fears, as some Israeli officials, including Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz, have openly threatened Khamenei’s life.[5] Two unspecified US officials told Reuters on June 15 that the US President Donald Trump vetoed an Israeli plan to kill Khamenei, however.[6] Trump separately stated on June 17 that the United States knows “exactly where the so-called ‘Supreme Leader’ is hiding” but would not “take him out, at least not for now.”[7]

Khamenei’s previous actions indicate that the three possible replacements are almost certainly equally as ideological as he is. Khamenei previously met with the Assembly of Experts members in November 2024 and emphasized that the next Supreme Leader must “embody the revolution” and implement Islam in Iranian society.[8] Khamenei did not name a successor at the meeting, however. Esfahan interim Friday Prayer Leader and Assembly of Experts member Abdolhasan Mahdavi confirmed a week after Khamenei’s meeting in November 2024 that the assembly had confidentially identified and prioritized three candidates for succession and framed it as “a routine responsibility.”[9] The Assembly of Experts is an 88-member elected clerical body tasked with appointing, supervising, and—at least in theory—removing the Supreme Leader, though in practice it has never challenged the position and plays a limited role in day-to-day politics.[10] The only previous leadership transition in Iran occurred in 1989 under different political conditions. The current assembly was elected in March 2024 and will serve until 2032.[11] 

It remains unclear who Khamenei selected as his potential successor. Unspecified sources added that Mojtaba Khamenei, Khamenei’s son and frequently rumored successor, is not among the designated candidates, however.[12] Former President Ebrahim Raisi, another widely speculated figure, died in a helicopter crash in May 2024 and is no longer in consideration.[13] Khamenei’s decision reflects his concerns about external threats and potential instability after his death, as the regime expects opposition groups and anti-regime actors to exploit any leadership vacuum.[14] Opposition groups and anti-regime actors are more likely to try to exploit such a vacuum during a war.

Israeli officials assess that airstrikes on Iranian ballistic missile capabilities since June 12 have degraded Iran’s ability to launch ballistic missile attacks on Israel, which is consistent with the launch rates that CTP-ISW has observed.[15] Israeli Hatzerim Airbase Commander Brigadier General “Ayin” said that the IAF has conducted over 1,000 sorties with fighter jets dropping ”hundreds” of munitions on Iranian ballistic missiles and storage sites in the past eight days.[16] IDF Spokesperson Effie Defrin said that Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities “have been heavily degraded.”[17] Brigadier General ”Ayin” stated that these airstrikes have also disrupted Iran’s ability to launch retaliatory attacks from western Iran and have forced Iranian forces to relocate eastward and southward.[18] This southward movement of Iranian forces may account for the intensifying Israeli airstrikes in southern Iran that CTP-ISW observed on June 20. The IDF stated on June 17 that Iran had attempted to launch a missile targeting Israel from Esfahan, central Iran, after withdrawing forces from western Iran.[19] Iran would not be able to use three medium-range ballistic missiles that it has previously used to attack Israel if it fires them from Esfahan. Haj Qassem (1,400-kilometer range), Fattah (1,400-kilometer range), and Kheibar Shekan (1,450-kilometer range) ballistic missiles cannot reach Israel from Esfahan due to their shorter ranges.[20] Iran would almost certainly need to rely on Emad, Ghadr, and Sejjil-1 ballistic missiles because these missiles are capable of reaching Israel from Esfahan.[21] Iran could hypothetically modify the shorter-range missiles to carry smaller payloads (thus extending the range), but doing so rapidly would be difficult. Emad and Ghadr liquid-fuel ballistic missiles are extremely volatile and challenging to transport, however.[22] Iran did not launch any ballistic missile attacks on Israel on June 21. The IDF intercepted approximately 40 Iranian drones targeting Israel overnight on June 20 and 21.[23] This is a slight increase in the number of drones that Iran has launched compared to 16 drones on June 20 and 4 drones on June 19.[24]

Key Takeaways

• The Iranian supreme leader named three unspecified senior clerics as possible successors in an effort to secure the future of the Islamic Republic in the event of his death. The limited open-source reporting about possible successors and the supreme leader’s view of his possible successors suggests that the three unspecified clerics are almost certainly equally as ideological as the current supreme leader.
• Israeli officials continue to assess that their air campaign has degraded Iranian ballistic missile capabilities, which is consistent with CTP-ISW's observations.
• The Iranian foreign affairs minister again rejected US demands for zero uranium enrichment during a June 20 meeting with European diplomats.
• The United States continued to deploy military assets to the Middle East.
• Israel has continued to conduct strikes targeting Iranian internal security and social control institutions, which could destabilize the regime over time.

Political Developments

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi again rejected zero uranium enrichment demands during his June 20 meeting with French, German, British, and European Union diplomats.[25] European partners demanded during the meeting that Iran accept zero uranium enrichment levels, restrict its ballistic missile program, and end its support for its proxy forces.[26] Araghchi suggested that Iran would be willing to return to a 3.67 uranium enrichment level stipulated under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).[27] Iranian officials have expressed their interest in negotiating a nuclear deal with the United States, but have not moderated their negotiating position from before the conflict.[28] An unspecified senior Iranian official cited by Reuters on June 21 argued that European demands were “unrealistic.”[29] Iran remains committed to preserving its stated “right” to enrich uranium.[30] The United States and Israel have rejected Iranian demands and maintained that Iran will not be permitted to enrich uranium on Iranian soil.[31] Araghchi noted that Iran would not engage in direct negotiations with the United States until Israel suspends its air campaign on Iran.[32]

Military Developments

The United States has continued to deploy military assets to the Middle East to support potential defensive or offensive operations in the region. Satellite imagery posted by open-source social media accounts on June 21 appeared to show approximately 27 KC-135 air-to-air refuelers, 12 C-130 transport aircraft, and 52 fighter aircraft at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia.[33] This does not include aircraft under shelters. A large number of US aircraft have similarly traveled into the Middle East in recent days.[34] Open-source flight trackers reported two B-2 long-range stealth bombers deployed from Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, on June 21 and are en route to Andersen Air Force Base, Guam.[35] Two air-to-air refuelers were also deployed to provide fuel to the B-2s.[36]

Israel wants to act against the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant prior to US President Donald Trump’s two-week deadline, according to unspecified sources familiar with the issue cited by Reuters on June 21.[37] US White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated on June 19 that Trump will decide whether or not to strike Iran “within the next two weeks.”[38] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Defense Minister Israel Katz, and Chief of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) General Staff Eyal Zamir argued that there is a limited window of opportunity to conduct an operation against the nuclear facility during a phone call with Trump on June 19.[39]

The IDF continued its campaign to destroy Iranian ballistic missile and drone capabilities. This line of effort is essential to preempt Iranian attacks and limit the threat that Iranian ballistic missiles and drones pose to Israeli civilians. IDF Spokesperson Effie Defrin said that the IDF has struck approximately 950 explosive drones during its airstrikes in Iran before they could be launched.[40] The Israeli Air Force (IAF) struck a twin-launch rail drone launcher in Esfahan, Esfahan Province, that was ready for immediate launch towards Israel.[41] The IDF also struck drone depots and another unspecified weapons depot in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province.[42] The IDF struck the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) 64th al Hadid Missile and Artillery Group base in Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province.[43] The 64th al Hadid Missile and Artillery Group is responsible for directing and coordinating Iranian aerial assets and weaponry, including drones, missiles, and artillery fire.[44] The IDF also reportedly struck the IRGC Shahroud Missile Facility in Semnan Province.[45] The IRGC reportedly used the facility to develop, test, and launch solid-propellant missiles.[46] The IDF previously struck the facility during its October 2024 airstrikes on Iran.[47] Israeli Hatzerim Airbase Commander Brigadier General “Ayin” said on June 21 that the IDF is carrying out new strikes against launch sites in western Iran to prevent Iranian forces from returning there.[48]

The IDF continued to strike other Iranian military sites and infrastructure on June 21. Israel struck the IRGC Ground Forces Karbala base in Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province.[49] Iranian media reported that Israel struck an Artesh 4th tactical airbase in Dezful, Khuzestan Province.[50] Israel also struck three Iranian F-14 fighter jets on an Artesh Ground Forces base in Esfahan, Esfahan Province.[51] CTP-ISW is also monitoring reports that Israel struck Iranian forces at the port of Bandar Abbas. We will cover any developments related to Bandar Abbas in the June 22 Update morning edition, given the conflicting information available at this time.

Israel struck the Iranian Cyber Police (FATA) headquarters in Tehran as part of Israel’s stated objective to destabilize the Iranian regime. Geolocated imagery posted on X (Twitter) on June 21 shows the heavily damaged headquarters.[52] The FATA is responsible for domestic surveillance and cyber operations.[53] The Iranian regime has previously used FATA to thwart dissent on online platforms, including during the crackdowns that followed the Masha Amini protests in 2022.[54] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz stated on June 20 that he instructed the IDF to “intensify” strikes on Iranian regime symbols and sites connected to domestic repression in Tehran to “destabilize” the regime.[55] Katz previously stated on June 19 that he and Prime Minister Netanyahu directed the IDF to increase the intensity of strikes on Iranian government targets to “undermine” the regime.[56] A sustained campaign that targets Iran’s internal security institutions and social control institutions, combined with economic downturn and mass population displacement that triggers protests, could destabilize the regime.[57] Israel reportedly struck Mahshahr Port in Khuzestan Province on June 21, which is a key hub for Iranian oil.[58] Popular frustration over the economic downturn could trigger internal unrest.

International Atomic Energy Agency Director Rafael Grossi reported that renewed Israeli strikes targeting the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) on June 21 caused additional damage to the facility.[59] The IDF previously struck the ENTC on June 13, which damaged the central chemical laboratory, a uranium conversion facility, a reactor fuel manufacturing plant, and an enriched uranium metal processing facility. Grossi stated that the renewed Israeli strikes on June 21 damaged six other buildings at the ENTC. Grossi stated that the Israeli airstrikes damaged a natural and depleted uranium metal production facility that was not operational at the time of Israel’s June 21 airstrike. Grossi noted that the Israeli airstrikes on June 21 also damaged a fuel rod production facility, a building with low-enriched uranium pellet production, a laboratory and nuclear material storage, another laboratory building, a workshop handling contaminated equipment, and an office building with no nuclear material. Grossi noted that the targeted facilities either contained no nuclear material or small quantities of natural or low-enrichment uranium. Grossi assessed that there is no risk of off-site contamination.

The Houthis threatened on June 21 that any US involvement in the Iran-Israel war would trigger Houthi attacks on US ships and naval ships in the Red Sea, almost certainly to deter US participation.[60] The Houthis are very likely observing and reacting to ongoing discussions in Western media about the risks of a protracted war in the Middle East and seek to exploit these concerns by threatening to expand the conflict.[61] This threat follows similar statements by Iranian-backed Iraqi militias threatening the United States to avoid participating in the war.[62] The spokesperson of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah threatened on June 19 that US participation in the war would trigger attacks on US bases in the region, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al Mandab, and the closure of ports in the Red Sea.[63]

An Israeli airstrike along the Iran-Iraq border killed a senior member of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada and a personal aide to former Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah.[64] Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada released a statement on June 21, mourning the death of “security unit” head Haider al Musawi.[65] An informed source told Iraqi media on June 21 that Musawi managed Syrian affairs for Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada.[66] The strike also killed Nasrallah’s former aide Abu Ali al Khalil and his son, Mahdi al Khalil.[67]

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[1] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/21/world/middleeast/iran-ayatollah-israel-war.html?searchResultPosition=4

[2] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/21/world/middleeast/iran-ayatollah-israel-war.html?searchResultPosition=4

[3] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/21/world/middleeast/iran-ayatollah-israel-war.html?searchResultPosition=4

[4] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/21/world/middleeast/iran-ayatollah-israel-war.html?searchResultPosition=4

[5] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/ratcheting-up-threats-defense-minister-says-irans-khamenei-cannot-continue-to-exist

[6] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/trump-vetoed-an-israeli-plan-kill-irans-supreme-leader-us-officials-say-2025-06-15

[7] https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2025/06/17/trump-iran-supreme-leader/84243930007/

[8] https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/27777 ;

https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/news-content?id=58256

[9] https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/832835 ;
https://www.iranintl dot com/fa/202411176393 ;

https://farsi.alarabiya dot net/iran/2024/11/15/%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%B9%D9%87-%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%81%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B3%D9%87-%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B4%DB%8C%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86%D9%87-%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%B1%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B9%DB%8C%DB%8C%D9%86-%D8%B4%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AF

[10] https://www.brookings.edu/articles/everything-you-need-to-know-about-irans-assembly-of-experts-election/ ;

https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/understanding-irans-assembly-experts-vote#:~:text=Patrick%20Schmidt%20is%20a%20U.S.,onboard%20the%20USS%20Ronald%20Reagan.&text=The%20victors%2C%20winnowed%20from%20an,approved%20by%20the%20Guardian%20Council

[11] https://apnews.com/article/iran-parliamentary-election-protests-mahsa-amini-64c628103ff5d193da974c25a13fbb12 ;

 https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-1-2024#_ednf8771f050e6e6afa4ff71fb427f8cd151

[12] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/21/world/middleeast/iran-ayatollah-israel-war.html?searchResultPosition=4

[13] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/21/world/middleeast/iran-ayatollah-israel-war.html?searchResultPosition=4

[14] https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Whatever-it-takes-to-end-it.pdf?x85095

[15] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1936394722731229432

[16] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1936394722731229432

[17] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1936487673536909462

[18] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1936394722731229432

[19] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1935035545521930590

[20] https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-threat-and-proliferation/todays-missile-threat/iran/ ; https://presstv dot ir/Detail/2025/06/18/749984/explainer-what-makes-fattah-missile-used-op-true-promise-lethal ; https://presstv dot ir/Detail/2025/06/18/749984/explainer-what-makes-fattah-missile-used-op-true-promise-lethal

[21] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/04/17/iran-israel-attack-drones-missiles/  

[22] https://x.com/fab_hinz/status/1935257174537588816

[23] https://x.com/IAFsite/status/1936383068841124283

[24] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1936152624220327970 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1936164798267269431 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1935809822454153369 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1935851441039503824 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1935859724672434403

[25] https://www.axios.com/2025/06/20/iran-israel-meeting-geneva-trump-diplomacy

[26] https://x.com/laurnorman/status/1936021611708113400

[27] https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/restoring-jcpoas-nuclear-limits ; https://www.axios.com/2025/06/20/iran-israel-meeting-geneva-trump-diplomacy

[28] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/a-battered-iran-signals-it-wants-to-de-escalate-hostilities-with-israel-and-negotiate-9feab4ae?mod=hp_lead_pos1

[29] https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/senior-iranian-official-european-proposals-geneva-unrealistic-2025-06-21/

[30] https://x.com/Osint613/status/1936031144329531655 ; https://x.com/SaeedAzimi1772/status/1936458300746256836

[31] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-iran-hold-nuclear-talks-amid-clashing-red-lines-2025-05-23/

[32] https://www.axios.com/2025/06/20/iran-israel-meeting-geneva-trump-diplomacy

[33] https://x.com/GeoPoliticJosh/status/1936279666912006387 ; https://x.com/MenchOsint/status/1936191314720120870

[34] https://x.com/JenGriffinFNC/status/1934634030994980959 ; https://x.com/sentdefender/status/1934425218929336644 ; https://x.com/vcdgf555/status/1934427191544336737 ; https://www.airnavradar.com/data/registration/21-46086 ; https://www.airnavradar.com/data/registration/21-46094 ; https://www.airnavradar.com/data/registration/17-46035 ; https://www.airnavradar.com/data/flights/CHAOS82/2472998587 ; https://www.airnavradar.com/data/registration/16-46016 ; https://www.airnavradar.com/data/registration/16-46012

[35] https://theaviationist.com/2025/06/21/b-2-guam-amid-iran-conflict/

[36] https://theaviationist.com/2025/06/21/b-2-guam-amid-iran-conflict/

[37] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-seeks-swift-action-iran-sources-say-with-split-us-administration-2025-06-21/

[38] https://x.com/RapidResponse47/status/1935753412856967261

[39] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-seeks-swift-action-iran-sources-say-with-split-us-administration-2025-06-21/

[40] https://t.me/moriahdoron/23435

[41] https://x.com/IAFsite/status/1936379080422690952

[42] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1936499518507503734

[43] https://x.com/BabakTaghvaee1/status/1936400201301872890

[44] https://snn dot ir/fa/news/1229501/%D9%88%D8%B8%DB%8C%D9%81%D9%87-%DA%AF%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%87-%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%BE%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87-%DB%B6%DB%B4-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D9%BE%D8%B4%D8%AA%DB%8C%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%A2%D8%AA%D8%B4-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AD%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%B1%D8%B2%D9%85%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B4-%D9%BE%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B8%D9%85-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D9%81%DB%8C%D9%84%D9%85

[45] https://x.com/IranIntlbrk/status/1936526320877338789 ; https://x.com/Osinteurope/status/1936535858443665800

[46] https://www.nti.org/education-center/facilities/shahroud-missile-test-site/ ; https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/news/nuclear/ncri-report-irans-covert-nuclear-warhead-program-and-missile-sites-exposed/ ; https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/29/world/middleeast/israel-strikes-iran-shahroud-space-center.html

[47] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/29/world/middleeast/israel-strikes-iran-shahroud-space-center.html ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-29-2024

[48] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1936394722731229432

[49] https://x.com/andynovy/status/1936419095554977991

[50] https://x.com/IranIntlbrk/status/1936427040661541002 ; https://x.com/andynovy/status/1936473251846267140

[51] https://x.com/andynovy/status/1936489005719118209

[52] https://x.com/andynovy/status/1936411428807676176 ; https://x.com/MohamadAhwaze/status/1936402381916278847

[53] https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/sanctioned-person/iranian-cyber-police

[54] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0994

[55] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1935993942798930397 ; https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/1936009764791542142

[56] https://x.com/Israel_katz/status/1935588198505173249 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-19-2025-evening-edition

[57] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-20-2025-evening-edition

[58] https://x.com/Againstmullahs/status/1936472188565037137

[59] https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-on-developments-in-iran-3

[60] https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1936438990594322841

[61] https://edition.cnn.com/2025/06/19/politics/trump-us-strikes-iran-israel-analysis ; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/last-chance-middle-east-peace ; https://www.msn.com/en-us/politics/government/trump-will-make-iran-strike-decision-within-two-weeks-as-us-fears-full-scale-war-in-middle-east/ar-AA1H32zr?ocid=BingNewsVerp

[62] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-20-2025-evening-edition

[63] https://t.me/abualaskary/134

[64] https://t.me/Smedia1/1129 ; https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/middleeast/iran/210620253 ; https://x.com/JoeTruzman/status/1936441408677924997

[65] https://t.me/Smedia1/1129

[66] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7/%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%BA%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%AE%D8%B5%D9%8A-%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87-%D9%88%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D9%81%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86

[67] https://t.me/Smedia1/1129

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 21, 2025

Anna Harvey, Olivia Gibson, Jennie Olmsted, Angelica Evans, Jessica Sobieski, William Runkel, and Kateryna Stepanenko

June 21, 2025, 4:30pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on June 21. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 22 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

 

Russian President Vladimir Putin's long-term demands for full Ukrainian capitulation remain unchanged. Putin told Sky News Arabia on June 20 that Ukraine needs to accept neutrality, reject foreign alliances, and agree to nuclear non-proliferation before Russia and Ukraine can establish long-term peace.[1] Putin insisted that Kyiv recognize Russian control over the illegally annexed, partially occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts or risk future Russian aggression. Putin also claimed that Ukrainian leaders are being guided by the interests of "external parties" rather than national interest, reiterating a long-term Russian narrative accusing Ukraine of being controlled by the West and denying the Ukrainian government agency to make its own decisions and defend itself.[2] Putin claimed that Ukraine deserves a "better fate" than to be used by other countries as a tool against Russia. Putin also stated that no future settlement can be reached unless Russia and Ukraine resolve "outstanding humanitarian issues." Russian officials had repeatedly issued the same pre-war demands that Russian officials presented at negotiations in Istanbul in 2022, which included recognition of occupied Ukraine as Russian territory and the "demilitarization" of Ukraine.[3] ISW continues to assess that Russia is not interested in peace negotiations with Ukraine and remains committed to its pre-war demands, which amount essentially to the elimination of Ukraine as a sovereign country independent of Russian control.[4]

Ukrainian officials responded to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s June 20 statements at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) and urged the international community to take more decisive action against Russia.[5] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky responded to Putin’s statement that Russia owns everywhere a "Russian soldier steps" and emphasized that Putin clearly laid out Russia’s intention to seize all of Ukraine during this speech. Zelensky noted that this ideology implies that Russia could also lay claim to Belarus, the Baltic states, Moldova, the Caucasus, and Central Asian countries like Kazakhstan.[6] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha stated that Russian soldiers bring "only death, destruction, and devastation” wherever they step.[7] Sybiha stated that the only way that Putin will accept peace would be if the West forced his hand through increased support for Ukrainian defense, severe economic sanctions, the recognition of Russia as a terrorist state, and complete diplomatic isolation. Sybiha called on the international community to push back against Putin’s continued aspirations toward new territorial gains. ISW has previously noted that Putin's theory of victory is based on the assumption that Russia can outlast Ukraine's will to fight and the Western coalition supporting Ukraine, and that reducing US military aid to Ukraine will neither lead to a sustainable peace in Ukraine nor compel Putin to reassess his theory of victory.[8]

Kremlin officials appear to be reviving the false narrative that Ukraine intends to use a "dirty bomb" against Russia, likely in an attempt to influence Western discussions about providing additional military assistance to Ukraine. Putin responded to a question from the panel moderator at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 20 about if Ukraine will use a dirty bomb (a conventional explosive laced with radioactive material that is not a nuclear weapon) against Russia and stated that it would be a "colossal mistake" and that Russia will respond proportionately to all threats.[9] Putin underscored that Russia's response to Ukraine using a dirty bomb would be "catastrophic" for Ukraine but noted that there is no evidence that Ukraine intends to use a dirty bomb. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev seized on Putin's statement and claimed on June 21 that Russia would respond with a tactical nuclear weapon if Ukraine used a dirty bomb against Russia.[10] Russian officials previously intensified the "dirty bomb" narrative and nuclear blackmail in March and October 2022, and ISW assessed that Russian officials used this narrative to slow Western discussions of providing additional military assistance to Ukraine and to undermine Western resolve.[11] Russian officials are likely reintroducing this narrative amid ongoing debates in the United States and Europe about further aiding Ukraine.

US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg met with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in Minsk on June 21.[12] The two discussed international developments and bilateral relations.[13] US Deputy Special Envoy to Ukraine John Coale announced on June 21 that the United States brokered a deal with Belarus to free 14 Belarusian political prisoners.[14] The meeting marks the first high-profile public meeting between senior US and Belarusian officials since 2020.[15]

Russia continues to field modernized Shahed drones, expand domestic drone production capabilities, and innovate long-range strike tactics. Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy Beskrestnov told Ukrainian news agency UNIAN on June 20 that he estimates that Russia has increased its Shahed production capabilities sevenfold.[16] Beskrestnov noted that Russia is attempting to reduce its dependency on Iran by producing modernized Shahed drones with mostly Russian- and Chinese-made components and that Russia is equipping newer Shahed models with antennas that are more resistant to electronic warfare (EW) interference. Beskrestnov stated that Russian forces are constantly innovating Shahed tactics to improve strike accuracy and evade Ukrainian air defense systems and units. Beskrestnov reported that Russia is preparing to build another Shahed production facility in an unspecified location and forecasted that Russian strike packages may soon incorporate up to 800 Shaheds, compared to the 300 to 400 that Russia typically launches in nightly strikes against Ukraine.

Head of the Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor's Office Spartak Borisenko reported on June 20 that Russia is modernizing its Geran-2 drones (Russian-made analogue of the Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones).[17] Borisenko reported that Ukrainian authorities have observed downed Geran-2 drones with a modified four-cylinder two-stroke engine, increased warheads, and new antennas and fuel systems, which are different from the components that Russia used in Shahed drones as of April 2025. Borisenko noted that Russia now has two factories producing modernized Geran-2 drones that use both Russian and imported dual-purpose components. ISW has recently reported on data indicating that Russia is expanding its long-range drone production capabilities.[18]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and a Russian milblogger claimed on June 21 and 20 that Russian forces are increasingly utilizing Geran-2 drones for strikes along the frontline, marking a departure from the Russian forces' previous pattern of using long-range Shahed/Geran drones against Ukraine's rear and deep rear.[19] The milblogger noted that Russian forces are using Geran-2 drones to strike targets five to seven kilometers from the frontline, which Russian forces used to strike with glide bombs or missiles. Russian forces' increased use of Shaheds to strike frontline and near-rear Ukrainian positions is another indicator of Russia's enhanced drone production capabilities.

The Russian government formally announced its intention to reassess Russia's territorial waters in the Baltic Sea over a year after the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published and subsequently deleted a similar proposal.[20] The Russian government published a list of coordinates on June 20 that Russian officials intend to reassess Russia's territorial waters and suggested that Russia should adjust the maritime border coordinates in the Gulf of Finland in the zone of Jähi, Sommers, Gogland, Rodsher, Malyy Tyuters, and Vigrund islands, and near the northern delta of the Narva River. Sommers, Gogland, Rodsher, Malyy Tyuters, and Vigrund islands are under Russian control, while Russia and Finland share control over Jähi island. The northern delta of the Narva River is located between Russia and Estonia. The Russian MoD published a similar proposal on May 21, 2024, that suggested Russia reassess maritime border coordinates near Jähi, Sommers, Gogland, Rodsher, Malyy Tyuters, and Vigrund islands, the northern delta of the Narva River, and the islands and capes around Kaliningrad Oblast.[21] The Russian government's June 2025 proposal does not include the islands and capes around Kaliningrad Oblast. Russian officials denied that Russia planned to change its maritime borders in late May 2024, but the Russian government's June 2025 proposal suggests that Russia may attempt to reassess a smaller portion of its territorial waters, mainly in the Gulf of Finland.[22]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin's long-term demands for full Ukrainian capitulation remain unchanged.
• Ukrainian officials responded to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s June 20 statements at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) and urged the international community to take more decisive action against Russia.
• Kremlin officials appear to be reviving the false narrative that Ukraine intends to use a "dirty bomb" against Russia, likely in an attempt to influence Western discussions about providing additional military assistance to Ukraine.
• US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg met with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in Minsk on June 21.
• Russia continues to field modernized Shahed drones, expand domestic drone production capabilities, and innovate long-range strike tactics.
• The Russian government formally announced its intention to reassess Russia's territorial waters in the Baltic Sea over a year after the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published and subsequently deleted a similar proposal.
• Russian forces advanced near Novopavlivka and Velyka Novosilka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on June 21 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on June 20 and 21.[23] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) and in the Glushkovo direction.[24]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on June 21.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Sumy direction on June 21 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces recaptured Andriivka (north of Sumy City).[25]

Russian forces attacked near Andriivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yablunivka, Yunakivka, and Sadky on June 20 and 21.[26] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City), Andriivka, and Yunakivka.[27]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on June 21 that 52,000 Russian forces are attacking in the Sumy direction and that Russian forces are directing 23 percent of all strikes across the frontline in the Sumy direction.[28]

Order of Battle: Elements of the 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating south of Yunakivka.[29]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 21 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and Zelene and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Vovchanski Khutory on June 20 and 21.[30]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces attacked in the Kupyansk direction on June 21 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Holubivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe and Kamyanka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepove Novoselivka on June 20 and 21.[31]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 21 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove; and southeast of Borova near Hrekvivka, Olhivka, and toward Cherneshchyna on June 20 and 21.[32]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Lyman direction on June 21 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 252nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) advanced in central Novyi Myr (northeast of Lyman).[33]

Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Novyi Myr, and Zelena Dolyna and toward Karpivka and Hlushchenkove and east of Lyman near Torske on June 20 and 21.[34] Geolocated footage published on June 20 indicates that Russian forces conducted an unsuccessful assault with support from a tank and an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) in northeastern Serebryanka (east of Lyman).[35]

The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated that Russian forces are leveraging drone support in 80 percent of their operations in the Lyman direction.[36] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces operating in the Lyman direction have a numerical manpower advantage but are poorly trained and inexperienced in combat.[37]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA) are reportedly operating in Karpivka.[38]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 21 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on June 20 and 21.[39]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on June 21 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar toward Predtechyne, Stupochky, and Bila Hora on June 20 and 21.[40]

A Ukrainian officer of a brigade operating in the Toretsk direction reported on June 21 that Russian forces are trying to seize positions near Olkesiivka-Druzhivka (west of Chasiv Yar) in order to cut off Ukrainian forces in the area and bypass Toretsk.[41] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction reported that Russian forces are transferring forces to this direction, but are struggling to provide units with provisions and sufficient logistical support.[42]

Order of Battle: Elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 215th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion and 299th VDV Regiment, are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[43]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on June 21 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Oleksandro-Kalynove and advanced in northeastern Yablunivka (both northwest of Toretsk).[44]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself, north of Toretsk near Dyliivka, northwest of Toretsk near Poltavka and Yablunivka, and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on June 20 and 21.[45]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Yablunivka.[46] Elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Oleksandro-Kalnyove.[47] Drone operators of the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Poltavka.[48]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on June 21 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to northern Novoekonomichne, near Koptieve (both northeast of Pokrovsk), and toward Novotroitske and Molodatske (both southwest of Pokrovsk).[49]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Koptieve, Malynivka, Myrne, Shevchenko Pershe, Razine, and Myrolyubivka and toward Volodymyrivka; east of Pokrovsk near Promin, Myrnohrad, and Yelyzavetivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Dachenske; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Novopidhorodne, Shevchenko, Novotroitske, and Kotlyne on June 20 and 21.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kotlyne.[51]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 21 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Zaporizhzhia (south of Novopavlivka) and likely seized the settlement.[52] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers credited elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) with seizing the settlement.[53]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing beyond Zaporizhzia toward Yalta (northwest of Zaporizhzhia) and Zirka (west of Zaporizhzhia) and that Russian forces advanced from Komar (south of Zaporizhzhia) toward Piddubne (just northwest of Komar).[54]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka, Novomykolaivka, and Muravka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka, Nadiivka, and Sribne; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove, Odradne, and Bahatyr; and south of Novopavlivka near Myrne, Yalta, Fedorivka, and Vesele on June 20 and 21.[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Piddubne (south of Novopavlivka).[56]

The commander of a Ukrainian artillery brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported on June 21 that Russian forces are using electric scooters in assaults to try and rapidly advance through the contested "gray zone" that Russian and Ukrainian drones have created along the frontline.[57]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 56th Separate Special Purpose Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly operating near Novoserhiivka.[58]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 21 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in western Shevchenko (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and likely seized the settlement.[59]

Unconfirmed claims: One Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in northern Shevchenko.[60]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest of Velyka Novosilka toward Voskresenka and Maliivka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and west of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole and Shevchenko on June 20 and 21.[61]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued limited attacks in the Hulyaipole direction on June 21 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on June 20 and 21 that Russian forces advanced east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka.[62] 

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself and east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on June 20 and 21.[63]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Poltavka (east of Hulyaipole).[64]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 21 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske and toward Novoandriivka on June 20 and 21.[65]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center (formerly BARS-Sarmat Detachment, subordinated to Russian Airborne [VDV] Forces) and elements of the "Nemets" group of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[66]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks near the Antonivsky Bridge (east of Kherson City) on June 21 but did not advance. [67]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 20 to 21. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Kh-47M2 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles from airspace over Tambov Oblast, four Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea, two Iskander-K cruise missiles from Belgorod Oblast, and 272 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[68] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed three Kalibr cruise missiles, one Kh-47M2 air-launched ballistic missile, and one Iskander-K cruise missile. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 140 drones and that 112 drones were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian strikes primarily targeted Kremenchuk, Poltava Oblast. Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strikes targeted Odesa, Kharkiv, and Poltava oblasts and damaged civilian and energy infrastructure in Kharkiv Oblast and Kremenchuk, Poltava Oblast.[69]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks) 

See topline text.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

---

[1] https://www.skynewsarabia dot com/world/1804376-بوتين-لسكاي-نيوز-عربية-أوكرانيا-تستحق-مصيرا-أفضل

[2] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030825; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/03/06/marko-rubio-zayavil-chto-ssha-pomogaya-ukraine-vedut-proksi-voynu-s-rossiey; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vYbwqRwNZGw; https://lenta dot ru/news/2024/08/12/putin-obvinil-zapad-v-proksi-voyne-s-rossiey-rukami-ukraintsev/; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-invasion-update-25; https://www.npr.org/2022/12/22/1145004513/russia-ukraine-us-proxy-war-zelenskyy-visit; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62389537; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/26/russia-accuses-nato-of-proxy-war-in-ukraine-as-us-hosts-crucial-defence-summit; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/reframing-us-policy-debate-%E2%80%98long-war%E2%80%99-ukraine; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-28

[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051525; https://kyivindependent dot com/russia-pushes-for-resuming-peace-talks-in-istanbul-based-on-2022-terms-situation-on-the-ground-ushakov/; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525

[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar053125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012925; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051525

[5] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/20/06/2025/685582719a79474b7e0ee61b ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2025

[6] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14807 ; https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/koli-vbivcya-kazhe-sho-hoche-vbiti-mi-sprijmayemo-ce-vidpovi-98565

[7] https://x.com/andrii_sybiha/status/1936115377437606091?s=46&t=JHHzChDbvSf3JHpnTV6Hcg; https://suspilne dot media/1047955-odin-miljon-soldativ-dva-miljoni-nig-v-mzs-vidpovili-na-zaavi-putina/

[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar053125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052525

[9] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77222

[10] https://t.me/tass_agency/321588 ; https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/591 ; https://t.me/medvedev_telegramE/80

[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-23 ; https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Radiological%20Chemical%20False%20Flag%20Warning.pdf

[12] https://president.gov dot by/ru/events/vstreca-so-specposlannikom-prezidenta-ssa-kitom-kellogom ; https://t.me/pul_1/17259 ; https://belta dot by/president/view/lukashenko-vstretilsja-so-spetsposlannikom-prezidenta-ssha-kitom-kellogom-722207-2025/ ; https://t.me/pul_1/17257; https://belta dot by/president/view/lukashenko-vstretilsja-so-spetsposlannikom-prezidenta-ssha-kitom-kellogom-722207-2025/; https://suspilne dot media/1048295-kit-kellog-vidvidav-bilorus-ta-zustrivsa-z-lukasenkom/ ; https://t.me/tass_agency/321640

[13] https://t.me/belta_telegramm/318996 ;

[14] https://x.com/johnpcoale/status/1936415572511875439

[15] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/trumps-ukraine-envoy-meet-belarus-lukashenko-sources-say-2025-06-17/

[16] https://www.unian dot ua/weapons/shahedi-flesh-poyasniv-chogo-varto-boyatisya-ukrajincyam-13043865.html?fbclid=IwY2xjawLCS41leHRuA2FlbQIxMABicmlkETEwelp1SjhtSFduUU5WTHRIAR4ExaFHF65wLqRNeMe8MtCVzA-P9oV_yVrEZwUBA55z_fGmwK343klOfWUHSg_aem_uhBpFekZtpfod4L1XooAZw#goog_rewarded

[17] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1047615-rosiani-atakuvali-harkiv-bpla-z-bilsou-bojovou-castinou-i-potuznisim-dvigunom-so-znacat-ci-zmini/

[18] https://isw.pub/ForceGen061125 ; https://isw.pub/ForceGen061125 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-14-2025

[19] https://t.me/milinfolive/151274 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/53971 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/53959

[20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2024 ; publication.pravo.gov dot ru/document/0001202506190024?index=2 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/321290

[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2024

[22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2024

[23] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730

[24] https://t.me/dva_majors/73867 ; https://t.me/rybar/71533

[25] https://t.me/yurasumy/23641

[26] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65307 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/73867 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23641 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/23976

[27] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65307 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/23976

[28] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14804

[29] https://t.me/sashakots/54438

[30]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/73867

[31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730

[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730

[33] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37639

[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730;

[35] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/29103; https://t.me/umftteam/524; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/20/dron-zaletiv-cherez-paradni-dveri-na-lymanshhyni-znyshheno-shturmovu-grupu-shho-shovalasya-v-hati/

[36] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/21/pochuly-dron-i-zgurtuvalysya-v-odnomu-misczi-rosiyany-sami-sproshhuyut-yihnye-znyshhennya/

[37] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/21/pochuly-dron-i-zgurtuvalysya-v-odnomu-misczi-rosiyany-sami-sproshhuyut-yihnye-znyshhennya/

[38] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37639

[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730; https://t.me/rybar/71533

[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730; https://t.me/wargonzo/27377

[41] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/21/taktyka-yak-u-bahmuti-rosiyany-namagayutsya-vidrizaty-kostyantynivku-vid-logistyky/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg

[42] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/21/yidut-na-tak-zvanyh-bronetaksi-speczyfika-shturmiv-na-kramatorskomu-napryamku/

[43] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30289

[44] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37669

[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23640 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/73867 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/24276 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65324

[46] https://t.me/dva_majors/73867

[47] https://t.me/yurasumy/23640

[48] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13947

[49] https://t.me/dva_majors/73867 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23636 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94210 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23635

[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737 ;  https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730 ; https://t.me/rybar/71537 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/73867 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94210 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65324

[51] https://t.me/wargonzo/27377

[52] https://t.me/osintpen/1250; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9432; https://t.me/voin_dv/15598; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1936348907002622296

[53] https://t.me/mod_russia/53978 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94204 ; https://t.me/vrogov/20827 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15598

[54] https://t.me/yurasumy/23632 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65309 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65309  ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65319 ; https://t.me/rybar/71533 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27377

[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737 ;  https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65319 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/73867 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23635

[56] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65309

[57] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/21/vorog-lize-navit-na-elektrosamokatah-vijskovi-pro-boyi-bilya-dnipropetrovshhyny/

[58] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13948

[59] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9431 ; https://t.me/BBS_110/391 ; https://www.facebook.com/31ombr/videos/739260038677333/

[60] https://t.me/yurasumy/23633

[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65319 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23633

[62]https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65311 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/169638 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/73867 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27377

[63]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65311

[64] https://t.me/voin_dv/15587

[65]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730

[66] https://t.me/rogozin_do/7225 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/73863 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/73876

[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730

[68] https://t.me/kpszsu/36774

[69] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/21/pryame-vluchannya-vorog-atakuvav-energetychnu-infrastrukturu-poltavshhyny/; https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/24005; https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/24005; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1048209-na-odesini-ppo-zbila-ponad-20-bezpilotnikiv/; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1048041-v-odesi-prolunali-vibuhi-so-vidomo-35/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/21/vorog-ne-prypynyaye-teror-harkivshhyny-drony-rakety-ta-zrujnovana-infrastruktura/; https://t.me/synegubov/15195; https://t.me/synegubov/15193; https://t.me/synegubov/15192; https://t.me/synegubov/15193