Christina Harward, Karolina Hird, Davit Gasparyan, Kateryna Stepanenko, Nate Trotter, and Frederick W. Kagan
October 21, 2024, 6:35pm ET
Click here
to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here
to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a
computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this
data-heavy tool.
Click here
to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain
map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will
update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note:
The data cut-off for this product was 2pm ET on October 21. ISW will
cover subsequent reports in the October 22 Russian Offensive Campaign
Assessment.
Moldova's October 20
European Union (EU) referendum passed by an extremely narrow margin in
large part due to support from the Moldovan diaspora, and current
Moldovan President Maia Sandu will face Alexandr Stoianoglo in a second
round of voting on November 3. Several Moldovan and European officials
reported potential Russian interference in the election, and the Kremlin
and its affiliates in Moldova will likely continue their malign
influence efforts in the leadup to the November 3 runoff. The
Moldovan Central Election Commission (CEC) completed the vote count on
October 21 and reported that 50.46 percent (751,235) voted in favor of
the EU referendum and that 49.54 percent (737,639) voted against — a
difference of only 13,596 votes.[1]
The CEC reported that Sandu took first place in the presidential
election with 42.45 percent (656,354) and Stoianoglo took second with
25.98 percent (401,726). Sandu failed to gain the majority vote required
to win in the first round, and she and Stoianoglo will move to the
second round. Moldovan authorities counted votes from polling stations
abroad last, during which the number of votes in favor of the referendum
and Sandu greatly increased. Sandu stated early on October 21 while
Moldovan authorities were still counting votes that "criminal groups"
and "foreign forces" — likely referring to Russia and Kremlin-linked
Moldovan opposition politician Ilan Shor — used tens of millions of
euros to spread propaganda to destabilize Moldova.[2]
Sandu stated that Moldovan authorities have evidence that the criminal
groups wanted to buy 300,000 Moldovan votes and that the scale of fraud
was "unprecedented." The European Network of Election Monitoring
Organizations' (ENEMO) International Election Observation Mission
reported on October 21 that it found "massive malign foreign
interference attempts" ahead of the October 20 election despite Moldovan
authorities' efforts to counter misinformation and vote buying schemes.[3] The BBC reported
that it witnessed at least one instance of vote buying at a polling
station in the pro-Russian breakaway Moldovan republic of Transnistria
after a voter exited the poll and asked where she would receive her
promised payment.[4]
Moldovan authorities previously reported that Shor used a Russian state
bank to distribute at least $15 million to Shor-affiliated regional
leaders and voters in Moldova in September 2024 alone.[5]
Kremlin
officials and Russian milbloggers claimed that Moldovan authorities
falsified the results of the election and referendum and continued to
promote long-standing Kremlin narratives targeting Moldova's path
towards European integration. Russian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed that Moldovan
authorities used "totalitarian" methods during the election campaign and
that the number of votes supporting the referendum "inexplicably" began
to increase during the later stages of counting.[6]
Zakharova claimed that the West is trying to turn Moldova into a
"Russophobic NATO appendage deprived of sovereignty." Kremlin
Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov accused Moldovan authorities of persecuting
opposition forces and claimed that Russian authorities are monitoring
the allegedly questionable increase in the number of votes for Sandu and
in support of the referendum.[7]
Several Russian milbloggers, including Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers,
claimed that Moldovan authorities falsified the election results and
adjusted the referendum's voter turnout numbers.[8]
One milblogger called for Russian authorities to create a network of
"analytical and information centers" that will study how to influence
processes in Moldova and promote Russia's state interests in Russia.[9]
US
Secretary of Defense Llyod Austin traveled to Kyiv on October 21 and
announced a new $400 million military aid package for Ukraine.[10] The
aid package includes additional HIMARS ammunition; 155mm and 105mm
artillery ammunition; 60mm, 81mm, and 120mm mortar systems and rounds;
tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missiles; Javelin
anti-armor systems; M113 armored personnel carriers; satellite
communication equipment; and small arms and ammunition.[11]
Russia
appears to be scrambling to reduce tensions with South Korea following
credible reports of intensified North Korean cooperation with Russia,
including South Korean and Ukrainian intelligence warnings that a
contingent of North Korean troops has deployed for training to Russia.
South Korea's Foreign Ministry summoned Russia's Ambassador to South
Korea, Georgy Zinoviev, over reports of the deployment of North Korean
military personnel to Russia.[12]
The Russian Embassy in South Korea falsely framed the event as a
voluntary meeting, as opposed to a diplomatic summons, and notably
claimed that any cooperation between Russia and North Korea "is not
directed against the security interests" of Seoul.[13]
Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that Russia-North Korea
cooperation "should not cause concern" to other states, and that
information about the alleged presence of North Korean troops in Russia
may be "contradictory."[14]
The Kremlin's apparent desire to assure South Korea that its
cooperation with North Korea is not a threat to Seoul suggests that the
Kremlin remains very concerned about the prospect of Seoul's potential
pivot towards providing Ukraine with necessary military support, and the
implications of worsened relations with Seoul for Russian security
interests in the Asia Pacific region. Russia has previously attempted to
court Seoul in order to mitigate the impacts of its growing reliance on
North Korea, as ISW has noted.[15]
Russian
forces continue to systematically perpetrate war crimes, including the
continued executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and use of
chemical weapons. Ukrainian officials reported on October 21
that Russian forces executed two unarmed Ukrainian POWs near Selydove,
Donetsk Oblast on October 18 by shooting them while restrained at
point-blank range.[16]
ISW assessed that Russian forces have recently increased systematic
executions of Ukrainian POWs in violation of the Geneva Convention on
POWs, which forbids the inhumane treatment and execution of POWs.[17]
A Russian milblogger also posted footage and openly claimed on October
20 that Russian forces are using chloropicrin (a pesticide and lung
damaging agent) against Ukrainian forces.[18]
The US Department of State announced on May 1 that it had determined
that Russian forces are using chloropicrin and riot control agents
(RCAs) in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to which
Russia is a signatory.[19] Ukrainian officials have previously reported that Russian forces are increasingly equipping grenades with chloropicrin.[20]
The apparent systematic perpetration of war crimes throughout the
entire theater suggests that Russian forces continue to operate at a low
level of discipline, and that Russian field commanders are doing
nothing to prevent their subordinates from engaging in such criminal
behaviors, or may even be encouraging them. There is no evidence that
Russia is holding Russian personnel accountable for the violations of
the laws of war that have been reported.
Key Takeaways:
- Moldova's
October 20 European Union (EU) referendum passed by an extremely narrow
margin in large part due to support from the Moldovan diaspora, and
current Moldovan President Maia Sandu will face Alexandr Stoianoglo in a
second round of voting on November 3. Several Moldovan and European
officials reported potential Russian interference in the election, and
the Kremlin and its affiliates in Moldova will likely continue their
malign influence efforts in the leadup to the November 3 runoff.
- Kremlin
officials and Russian milbloggers claimed that Moldovan authorities
falsified the results of the election and referendum and continued to
promote long-standing Kremlin narratives targeting Moldova's path
towards European integration.
- US Secretary of
Defense Llyod Austin travelled to Kyiv on October 21 and announced a new
$400 million military aid package for Ukraine.
- Russia
appears to be scrambling to reduce tensions with South Korea following
credible reports of intensified North Korean cooperation with Russia,
including South Korean and Ukrainian intelligence warnings that a
contingent of North Korean troops has deployed for training to Russia.
- Russian
forces continue to systematically perpetrate war crimes, including the
continued executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and use of
chemical weapons.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the western part of the Kursk Oblast salient.
- Russian forces advanced west of Kreminna, southeast of Pokrovsk, and southeast of Kurakhove.
- Russian forces recently conducted several mechanized attacks of various echelons in the Kurakhove direction.
- Russian
occupation authorities continue to coerce occupied Ukrainian
populations into signing contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense
(MoD).
We
do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities
are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the
military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue
to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on
the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on
combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations
of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian
Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the
international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube
artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort
#2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into
eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
- Russian Information Operations and Narratives
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian
forces recently advanced on the western side of the Ukrainian salient
in Kursk Oblast amid continued fighting within and west of the salient.
Geolocated footage published on October 21 shows that Ukrainian forces
advanced in western Novoivanovka (southeast of Korenevo).[21]
Fighting reportedly continued southwest of Glushkovo (west of the Kursk
Oblast salient) near Novyi Put and Veseloye; southeast of Korenevo near
Nizhny Klin, Novoivanovka, Lyubimovka, Leonidovo, and Zeleny Shlyakh;
northeast of Sudzha near Cherkasskoye Porechnoye; east of Sudzha near
Kolmakov; and south of Sudzha near Plekhovo and Cherkasskaya Konopelka
on October 20 and 21.[22]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted to cross
the international border near Volfino (southwest of Glushkovo), and that
Ukrainian forces deployed additional reserves near the
Kruglenkoye-Nikolskiy line (northwest of Sudzha and southeast of
Korenevo,) where they launched an attack with two mechanized company
tactical groups.[23]
Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division, 83rd Separate
VDV Brigade, and 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are operating near
Lyubimovka and Zeleny Shlyakh; elements of the 56th VDV Regiment are
also operating near Novyi Put; and elements of the Russian 155th Naval
Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are
operating in Kursk Oblast.[24]
Medical elements of the Russian “Chernye Volki” ("Black Wolves”)
evacuation detachment recently redeployed from the Bakhmut direction to
the Kursk direction.[25]
Elements of the Russian "Arbat,” "Pyatnashka,” "Sarmat,” and
"Arkhangely” units (all part of the Dikaya Division of Donbas [Russian
Volunteer Corps]) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[26]
Russian
sources are trying to justify the slow rate of Russian advances in
Kursk Oblast by falsely framing this direction as uniquely challenging. A
commander of the Chechen “Akhmat” Spetsnaz detachment claimed that
fighting in Kursk Oblast is very intense and claimed that the Kursk
direction is the most difficult frontline area of the entire theater.[27]
The detachment commander claimed that Russian forces are fighting
against 14 Ukrainian brigades and 'Western private military companies,”
also likely in attempt to explain away the slower Russian pace in the
area.[28]
Russian
microelectronics manufacturer “Kremniy El Group” - one of the largest
manufacturers of microelectronics and chips in Russia - announced on
October 21 that it has temporarily suspended its operations due to
Ukrainian drone strikes on the plant’s production and administrative
buildings overnight on October 18 and 19.[29]
“Kremniy El Group" announced that the drone strikes damaged special
power supply facilities, and “Kremniy El Group” CEO Oleg Dantsev
emphasized that the manufacturer is facing difficulties purchasing spare
parts to repair the energy infrastructure.[30]
The
Ukrainian General Staff announced that Ukrainian forces struck a
Russian Buk-M3 air defense system overnight on October 21 approximately
60 kilometers from the frontline.[31] The Ukrainian General Staff did not specify whether Ukrainian forces struck the Buk-M3 system in Russia or occupied Ukraine.
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian
objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border
with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of
Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive
operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Lyptsi on
October 20 and 21 but did not make any confirmed advances.[32]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast
(Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push
westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian
forces advanced west of Kreminna amid continued offensive operations
along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on October 21. Geolocated
footage published on October 21 shows Ukrainian forces repelling a
Russian platoon-sized mechanized assault consisting of at least three
armored vehicles, during which Russian forces advanced east of Terny
(west of Kreminna).[33]
Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Kupyansk near
Holubivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk
near Kruhlyakivka, Kolisnykivka, Lozova, Novoosynove, and Pishchane;
west of Svatove near Vyshneve; southwest of Svatove near Yampolivka,
Hrekivka, and in the direction of Novomykhailivka; northwest of Kreminna
near Novosadove; west of Kreminna near Zarichne and Terny; and
southwest of Kreminna near Serebryanske forest on October 20 to 21.[34] Elements of the Russian BARS-9 (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk-Svatove direction.[35]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian
forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Siversk direction
on October 21 but did not advance. The Ukrainian General Staff reported
that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked east of Siversk near
Verkhnokamyanske; southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka; and south of
Siversk near Pereizne.[36]
Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Anastasiya
Bobovnikova stated that Russian forces continue to use various types of
equipment, ranging from tanks and infantry fighting vehicles to golf
carts and motorcycles, to conduct assaults in the Siversk direction.[37]
Russian
forces reportedly continued to advance south of Chasiv Yar on October
21, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area.
Several milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to one
kilometer in depth south of the T0504 Bakhmut-Kostyantynivka highway
towards Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar), although ISW has not yet
observed confirmation of this claim.[38]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces operating in this area
are between seven and eight kilometers from the outskirts of
Kostyantynivka, which is relatively consistent with ISW's assessment of
control of terrain south of Chasiv Yar.[39]
Elements of the Russian 331st and 217th Airborne (VDV) regiments (both
of the 98th VDV Division) and the 3rd Combined Arms Army (formerly 2nd
Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) are reportedly operating
near Chasiv Yar.[40]
Russian
forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on
October 21 but did not make any confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger
claimed that Russian forces advanced along Druzhby Street in central
Toretsk, although ISW has not yet observed confirmation of this claim.[41]
Russian milbloggers claimed that intense fighting is occurring
street-to-street within Toretsk, and that Russian forces are also
fighting northeast of Toretsk near Druzhba and south of Toretsk near
Nelipivka.[42]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted
ground attacks near Toretsk itself and west of Toretsk in the direction
of Shcherbynivka.[43]
Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets noted that elements of
the Russian 1st, 9th, and 132nd motorized rifle brigades (all of the
51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic
[DNR] AC) are operating in the Toretsk direction, and reported that
elements of the 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade's 109th Motorized Rifle
Regiment were responsible for the capture of Niu York (south of Toretsk)
and advances into Nelipivka.[44]
Russian
forces recently made confirmed advances southeast of Pokrovsk amid
continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on October 21.
Geolocated footage published on October 21 indicates that Russian forces
have advanced to Lysychanska Street in northeastern Selydove (southeast
of Pokrovsk).[45]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced to
Stepna Street in southeastern Selydove and westward along the E-50
highway north of Selydove, although ISW has not yet observed
confirmation of these claims.[46]
Additional geolocated footage published on October 21 indicates that
elements of the 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) advanced to
Zelena Street in central Zoryane (southeast of Selydove), consistent
with several milblogger claims that Russian forces crossed the Vovcha
River in Zoryane and advanced into the center of the settlement with the
intent of attacking northwestward into Hirnyk.[47] Russian security forces told Kremlin newswire TASS on October 21 that Ukrainian forces have begun withdrawing from Hirnyk, although ISW cannot confirm this claim.[48]
Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have
established fire control over all roads leading into Selydove,
complicating Ukrainian logistics in the Pokrovsk direction.[49]
Mashovets noted that while Russian forces are having some success
southeast of Pokrovsk, the Russian command has failed to properly
prioritize Pokrovsk itself as the main operational effort, leading to
the tactical "fragmentation" of Russian objectives in this area into
much more localized efforts, such as the effort to surround Selydove.[50]
Mashovets also confirmed that elements of the Russian 30th and 15th
motorized rifle brigades (both of the 2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA],
Central Military District [CMD]), with support of the 74th Motorized
Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) recently seized Hrodivka, Mykolaivka, and
Krasnyi Yar (all southeast of Pokrovsk), which Russian sources initially
claimed Russian forces seized between late September to mid-October.[51]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued
offensive operations east of Pokrovsk near Sukha Balka, Vozdvyzhenka,
and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Promin, Selydove, Lysivka,
Mykhailivka, and Sukhyi Yar; and south of Pokrovsk in the direction of
Novotroiitske.[52]
Mashovets noted that elements of the 2nd CAA are fighting near
Selydove, while elements of the 90th Tank Division (CMD), with support
of elements of the 51st and 2nd CAAs are operating south of Selydove.[53]
Elements of the "Maxim Krivonos" volunteer detachment, allegedly formed
by former members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces who defected to fight
on the side of Russia, are also reportedly fighting near Pokrovsk.[54]
Russian
forces recently advanced southeast of Kurakhove during several
mechanized assaults of varying echelons. Geolocated footage published on
October 20 shows Russian forces advancing north of Kostyantynivka
(southeast of Kurakhove) during a reinforced company-sized mechanized
assault consisting of 19 armored vehicles and four tanks.[55]
Additional geolocated footage published on October 21 indicates that
Russian forces advanced south of Katerynivka (west of Kostyantynivka and
southeast of Kurakhove) during a reduced platoon-sized mechanized
assault.[56]
This footage suggests that Russian forces have seized Kostyantynivka,
which the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) originally claimed in August
2024.[57]
A Ukrainian brigade operating near Maksymilyanivka (east of Kurakhove)
additionally posted recent footage of Ukrainian forces repelling a
reinforced company-sized mechanized attack from Maksymilyanivka towards
Kurakhove.[58]
Geolocated footage published on October 20 shows that Russian forces
advanced in the "dacha area east of Kurakhove, suggesting that Russian
forces have likely seized the entirety of Maksymilyanivka.[59]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported continued offensive operations
near Kurakhove itself; northeast of Kurakhove near Kurakhivka; east of
Kurakhove near Maksymilyanivka; and southeast of Kurakhove near
Antonivka and Kostyantynivka.[60]
Mashovets reported that elements of the 51st CAA, 90th Tank Division
(CMD), and 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, Southern Military
District [SMD]) are operating east of Kurakhove.[61]
Russian
forces continued offensive operations southwest of Donetsk City near
Vuhledar on October 21 but did not make any confirmed advances. A
Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near
Bohoyavlenka (northwest of Vuhledar) and in field areas northeast of
Vuhledar, although ISW has not yet observed confirmation of these
claims.[62]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted
ground attacks northeast of Vuhledar near Vodyane, near Bohoyavlenka,
and northwest of Vuhledar towards Novoukraiinka.[63]
Elements of the Russian 14th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade (Main Directorate
of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces [GRU]), 29th CAA
(Eastern Military District [EMD]), and drone operators of the 36th
Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the
western Donetsk Oblast area and near Vuhledar.[64]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported fighting in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on October 21.
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian
forces continued assaults near Robotyne and northeast of Robotyne near
Mala Tokmachka on October 20 and 21, but there were no confirmed changes
to the frontline.[65]
Russian
forces continued attacks in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on October
20 and 21 but did not make any confirmed advances.[66]
Elements of the Russian BARS-33 Detachment (Russian Combat Army
Reserve) and the 52nd Airborne (VDV) Artillery Brigade are reportedly
operating in the Kherson direction.[67]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian
forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine
on the night of October 20 to 21. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that
Russian forces launched one Iskander-M/North Korean KN-23 ballistic
missile launched from occupied Crimea; one Kh-35 and one Kh-31P missile
over the Black Sea; and 116 strike drones (including Shahed-136/131s)
from Kursk Oblast, Oryol Oblast, and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[68]
The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 59 drones
over Odesa, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Vinnytsya, Khmelnytskyi, Zhytomyr, Kyiv,
Sumy, Kirovohrad, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, and Poltava oblasts; that 45
drones were "lost,” possibly due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW)
countermeasures; and that 10 drones remained in Ukrainian air space as
of 0930 local time. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on
October 20 that Russian forces launched 129 Iranian-made Shahed drones
on the night of October 18, amounting to a total of 6,130 Shahed
launches since the start of 2024.[69]
Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Head Serhiy Lysak reported on October 21 that
Russian forces conducted a missile strike against Kryvyi Rih and damaged
civilian infrastructure, including a cultural site.[70]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian Iskander-M missiles struck a
hotel housing foreign EW specialists in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk
Oblast on October 21, though ISW is unable to verify this claim.[71]
The Kyiv City Military Administration reported on October 21 that
Russian forces launched several waves of drone strikes targeting Kyiv
City and that Ukrainian forces downed up to 10 drones.[72]
Odesa Oblast Head Oleh Kiper reported on October 21 that Russian forces
launched a combined missile and drone strike targeting port
infrastructure in Odesa Oblast.[73]
Romensky Raion Representative Valentina Nazarenko reported on October
21 that Russian aviation struck critical infrastructure in Romensky
Raion, Sumy Oblast and that Ukrainian forces destroyed four Shaheds over
Sumy Oblast.[74]
A Russian milblogger claimed that a Russian Shahed strike damaged an
electrical substation near Anastasivka and Lypova Dolyna, Sumy Oblast
and cut off power to Romny, Sumy Oblast and other neighboring
settlements in Romensky Raion and near Lypova Dolyna.[75]
Ukraine's Northern Group of Forces reported on October 21 that Russian
forces damaged three critical infrastructure objects in Anastasivka,
Lypova Dolyna, and Romny, Sumy Oblast.[76]
The Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration reported on October 21
that Russian forces conducted a ballistic missile strike on a
residential area in Zaporizhia City.[77]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian missiles struck port areas and
damaged oil infrastructure near Chornomorsk, Odesa Oblast on October 20
to 21.[78]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian
military drone production plant in Zaporizhia City, which the milblogger
alleged Ukrainian forces used to strike Crimea.[79]
A Russian milblogger claimed on October 21 that Russian Shahed drones
struck a Ukrainian air base and damaged one Ukrainian Su-27 fighter jet
near Ozerne, Zhytomyr Oblast, but ISW cannot confirm this claim.[80]
Kharkiv
Oblast National Police Head Volodymyr Tymoshko reported on October 21
that Russian forces struck three raions in Kharkiv City with KAB-250
glide bombs, resulting in civilian casualties.[81] Russian opposition outlet Sever Realii
reported on October 20 that Russian forces used four guided aerial
bombs and Grom-E1 hybrid bombs to strike civilian infrastructure in
Kharkiv Oblast.[82]
Kharkiv Oblast Head Oleh Synehubov reported on October 21 that Russian
forces struck the Osnovyansky Raion of Kharkiv City with one KAB bomb
and used six guided aerial bombs to strike elsewhere in Kharkiv Oblast.[83]
Tymoshko noted that the Russian strikes were 'chaotic” in nature and
intended to 'terrorize the civilian population” instead of targeting
Ukrainian military targets.[84]
Occupied
Zaporizhia Oblast Governor Yevgeny Balitsky baselessly claimed on
October 21 that Western countries may organize a false flag operation to
destroy the Kyiv Hydroelectric Power Plant and blame Russia for the
destruction of the plant.[85]
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Russian
authorities continue to increase one-time payments in an effort to
recruit volunteers for contract military service and avoid further
mobilization. Russian sources reported on October 21 that authorities in
Moscow Oblast reportedly increased the one-time enlistment bonuses to
contract soldiers to 2.3 million rubles (about $23,759), which includes
all categories of military personnel.[86]
A Russian milblogger complained on October 21 that efforts of Russian
authorities to increase the rate of contract-to-mobilized servicemembers
leads to increases in unmotivated personnel.[87]
Another Russian milblogger responded by claiming that Russian
authorities who loosen regulations on the rights of mobilized and
contract soldiers are those who want to advance their own careers at the
expense of the lives of Russian servicemembers.[88]
Russian
occupation authorities continue to coerce occupied Ukrainian
populations into signing contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense
(MoD). Luhansk Oblast Military Administration Head Artem Lysohor
reported on October 21 that Russian occupation authorities are offering
money and social packages to schoolchildren in Starobilsk, Luhansk
Oblast for signing contracts with the Russian MoD.[89]
Teachers in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories emphasize signing of
such contract as the most financially beneficial form of military
service.
Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate
(GUR) reported on October 21 that unspecified actors murdered the Chief
of Staff of the Russian 52nd Aviation Squadron of Heavy Bombardment
Regiment, Dmitry Golenkov, near Suponevo, Bryansk Oblast.[90]
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
Ukrainian
forces reportedly shot down a Russian “Orion” reconnaissance and strike
drone over Kursk Oblast, which could carry up to four air-to-surface
missiles.[91]
Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian “Orion” drones are
dangerous because they can both conduct aerial reconnaissance and
inflict strikes on ground targets.[92]
Russian
sources claimed that Russia will conduct tests of the Tallamho Design
Bureau’s “T1-am” modernized drone direction finding system, which can
now operate via cellular signal.[93]
Russian sources claimed that the use of cellular signal will allow
Russia to place sensors at any distance and will make drone detection
calculations more accurate. Russian sources said that this transition to
cellular signal will allow acoustic reconnaissance systems to detect
drone flying along riverbeds, which Russian forces can currently hear
but not see. The T1-am system reportedly can include up to 250 sensors,
which are deployed around facilities in the rear or along the
international border, particularly in Belgorod Oblast.
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
(Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed
areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural,
economic, military, and governance systems)
ISW is not reporting on activities in Russian-occupied areas today.
Significant activity in Belarus
(Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and
further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner
Group activity in Belarus)
Belarusian President
Alexander Lukashenko announced on October 21 that Belarus and Russia are
discussing the construction of the Moscow-Brest expressway.[94]
The
Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that a Belarusian
delegation participated in a forum for young officers of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Beijing on October 21.[95]
Note:
ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only
publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian,
Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as
commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as
the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided
in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://pv.cec dot md/cec-template-referendum-results.html
[2] https://newsmaker
dot
md/ro/dimensiunea-fraudei-este-fara-precedent-maia-sandu-dupa-afisarea-primelor-rezultatele/;
https://x.com/sandumaiamd/status/1848130004028125266
[3] https://enemo dot org/storage/uploads/QS8aYy9j1jaipfrf4AmVQE8DmWlRxGgDCb3AACtx.pdf
[4] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1wnr5qdxe7o
[5]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-poses-long-term-threats-moldova%E2%80%99s-european-integration-beyond-october-elections
[6] https://www.mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1976983/
[7] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/21/10/2024/671613919a7947d182b2ebdd; https://ria dot ru/20241021/moldaviya-1979088595.html
[8] https://t.me/pezdicide/3669; https://t.me/rybar/64621; https://t.me/rybar/64610 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/22724; https://t.me/wargonzo/22731 ; https://t.me/rybar/64596; https://t.me/dva_majors/55552 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/20083; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/141536 ; https://t.me/yurist_yug/1056
[9] https://t.me/dva_majors/55578
[10]
https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3941006/austin-affirms-united-states-unwavering-support-for-ukraine-during-visit-to-kyiv/
[11] https://x.com/laraseligman/status/1848332848312328573
[12]
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/russian-ambassador-seoul-summoned-over-nkorean-troop-deployment-yonhap-reports-2024-10-21/
[13] https://t.me/rembskorea/5293
[14] https://t.me/tass_agency/280642
[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011924
[16]
https://suspilne dot
media/donbas/862691-poblizu-selidovogo-na-doneccini-rosijski-vijska-rozstrilali-dvoh-polonenih-bijciv-zsu-prokuratura/
;
https://www.facebook.com/don.gp.gov.ua/posts/pfbid0yaSrHE3E1ZpogfgCQGps3392ZFnNT3EEEjykUakcR1Y5WHXt2CkjgNCHWL4Yi2Pjl
; https://t.me/dmytro_lubinetzs/7018
[17] https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/geneva-convention-relative-treatment-prisoners-war; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-18-2024
[18]
https://avia dot
pro/news/dshrg-rusich-soobshchaet-o-primenenii-hlorpikrina;
https://t.me/ButusovPlus/14437;
https://www.reddit.com/r/tjournal_refugees/comments/1g87oji/%D1%89%D0%B8%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B4%D0%BD%D0%B5_%D0%B7%D1%96%D0%B7%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BD%D1%8F_%D0%B2%D1%96%D0%B4_%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%86%D0%B8%D1%81%D1%82%D1%96%D0%B2/;
https://t.me/dshrg2/2431
[19] https://www.state.gov/imposing-new-measures-on-russia-for-its-full-scale-war-and-use-of-chemical-weapons-against-ukraine-2/; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-2-2024
[20] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar013024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032524
[21] https://t.me/brygada47/1031; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7199; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/21460
[22] https://t.me/mod_russia/44760; https://t.me/rybar/64598; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/19208; https://t.me/rusich_army/17844 https://t.me/rusich_army/17844; https://t.me/rusich_army/17851; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17717
[23] https://t.me/dva_majors/55547; https://t.me/rybar/64608; https://t.me/rybar/64598; https://t.me/wargonzo/22726; https://t.me/basurin_e/14979 ; https://t.me/shot_shot/73072
[24] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/11629; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/11621; https://t.me/dva_majors/55562 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/141535; https://t.me/rusich_army/17851; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79065
[25] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/141448
[26] https://t.me/zovgrad/21690
[27] https://t.me/tass_agency/280582
[28] https://t.me/tass_agency/280578
[29] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-19-2024; https://t.me/istories_media/7894 ; https://group-kremny dot ru/news/osnovnaya-zadacha-vozobnovlenie-proizvodstva/ ; https://www.platan dot ru/brands/kremn.shtml ; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/10385; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/10404; https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/21/10/2024/671642879a79479fe92836c6; https://group-kremny dot ru/news/osnovnaya-zadacha-vozobnovlenie-proizvodstva/
[30] https://t.me/istories_media/7894
[31] qdpudHoGYGMN8CitwKg5JfknJFzKsxjGfEjjHejpEl
[32]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gV9P6PQmmQMhNaLy95evcsAN7ic5ArDH8RsQeoQA9maq3rHJaktTCRvsDibg6Pqql ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wJX8RAgNhSUU2LW4iP9ZctwwAgbZLGrjhb1H5Y2iYkQsAjsHxNHTs1csXfTqgXYFl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09Vz3hGka7MdJWezBzarGHKJhsW7ceXNMstwmY3rfAjyZB2PJEAEmLhvF3s12KSD8l ; https://t.me/otukharkiv/2201
[33] https://t.me/OMIBr_60/558; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7195
[34] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gV9P6PQmmQMhNaLy95evcsAN7ic5ArDH8RsQeoQA9maq3rHJaktTCRvsDibg6Pqql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wJX8RAgNhSUU2LW4iP9ZctwwAgbZLGrjhb1H5Y2iYkQsAjsHxNHTs1csXfTqgXYFl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09Vz3hGka7MdJWezBzarGHKJhsW7ceXNMstwmY3rfAjyZB2PJEAEmLhvF3s12KSD8l; https://t.me/rusich_army/17844
[35] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/141542
[36] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gV9P6PQmmQMhNaLy95evcsAN7ic5ArDH8RsQeoQA9maq3rHJaktTCRvsDibg6Pqql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wJX8RAgNhSUU2LW4iP9ZctwwAgbZLGrjhb1H5Y2iYkQsAjsHxNHTs1csXfTqgXYFl
[37]
https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2024/10/21/shturmy-odynakiv-ta-proryvy-na-golf-karah-de-i-chomu-vorog-transformuye-svoyu-taktyku/
; https://suspilne dot
media/donbas/862481-rosijska-armia-zmensila-kilkist-atak-na-troh-napramkah-na-doneccini-so-ce-oznacae/
; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aDXWlQ2K0dM
[38] https://t.me/dva_majors/55547; https://t.me/rybar/64608; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17674; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17697; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79066
[39] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79066; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17697; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17674
[40] https://t.me/voin_dv/11431; https://t.me/dva_majors/55535; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/141517
[41] https://t.me/z_arhiv/28710
[42] https://t.me/dva_majors/55547; https://t.me/rybar/64608; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17672; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79106
[43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wJX8RAgNhSUU2LW4iP9ZctwwAgbZLGrjhb1H5Y2iYkQsAjsHxNHTs1csXfTqgXYFl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09Vz3hGka7MdJWezBzarGHKJhsW7ceXNMstwmY3rfAjyZB2PJEAEmLhvF3s12KSD8l
[44] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2279
[45] https://t.me/ghost_of_khortytsia/179; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7194
[46] https://t.me/motopatriot/28571
[47] https://t.me/nm_dnr/12847; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7192; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79092; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28729
[48] https://t.me/tass_agency/280690
[49] https://t.me/tass_agency/280604; https://t.me/dva_majors/55547; https://t.me/rybar/64608; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17698
[50] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2281; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2278
[51] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2281
[52] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gV9P6PQmmQMhNaLy95evcsAN7ic5ArDH8RsQeoQA9maq3rHJaktTCRvsDibg6Pqql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wJX8RAgNhSUU2LW4iP9ZctwwAgbZLGrjhb1H5Y2iYkQsAjsHxNHTs1csXfTqgXYFl
[53] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2281
[54] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79113; https://ria dot ru/20240823/ukraina-1967939158.html; https://t.me/freeukrainianrepublic
[55] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/21448; https://t.me/odshbr79/399; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/14441
[56] https://t.me/opforukraine/42; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7196
[57]
https://x.com/Ukraine_Twi/status/1848312679338836469;
https://x.com/klinger66/status/1848323740620173518;
https://t.me/mod_russia/42775; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/21448;
https://t [dot] me/odshbr79/399
[58] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/21/yak-zhe-vono-goryt-desantnyky-pokazaly-chergovu-nevdalu-sprobu-proryvu-okupantiv/; https://www.facebook.com/oaembr46/videos/2787752321388663/
; https://suspilne dot
media/862161-zelenskij-sklikav-zasidanna-rnbo-cerez-falsivi-invalidnosti-obstril-harkova-971-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1729506350&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
; https://t.me/ua_dshv/4100
[59]
https://smotrim dot
ru/article/4185561?utm_source=internal&utm_medium=vesti;
https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7181; https://t.me/mod_russia/44602
[60] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gV9P6PQmmQMhNaLy95evcsAN7ic5ArDH8RsQeoQA9maq3rHJaktTCRvsDibg6Pqql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wJX8RAgNhSUU2LW4iP9ZctwwAgbZLGrjhb1H5Y2iYkQsAjsHxNHTs1csXfTqgXYFl
[61] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2282
[62] https://t.me/z_arhiv/28744
[63] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wJX8RAgNhSUU2LW4iP9ZctwwAgbZLGrjhb1H5Y2iYkQsAjsHxNHTs1csXfTqgXYFl
[64] https://t.me/voin_dv/11425; https://t.me/voin_dv/11428; https://t.me/voin_dv/11427
[65] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gV9P6PQmmQMhNaLy95evcsAN7ic5ArDH8RsQeoQA9maq3rHJaktTCRvsDibg6Pqql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wJX8RAgNhSUU2LW4iP9ZctwwAgbZLGrjhb1H5Y2iYkQsAjsHxNHTs1csXfTqgXYFl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09Vz3hGka7MdJWezBzarGHKJhsW7ceXNMstwmY3rfAjyZB2PJEAEmLhvF3s12KSD8l
[66]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gV9P6PQmmQMhNaLy95evcsAN7ic5ArDH8RsQeoQA9maq3rHJaktTCRvsDibg6Pqql;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wJX8RAgNhSUU2LW4iP9ZctwwAgbZLGrjhb1H5Y2iYkQsAjsHxNHTs1csXfTqgXYFl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09Vz3hGka7MdJWezBzarGHKJhsW7ceXNMstwmY3rfAjyZB2PJEAEmLhvF3s12KSD8l
[67] https://t.me/dva_majors/55555;
https://meduza dot
io/feature/2024/10/21/vlasti-rf-otpravlyayut-na-voynu-urozhentsev-drugih-gosudarstv-v-hersonskoy-oblasti-voyuyut-vyhodtsy-s-kuby-fotografii
[68] https://t.me/kpszsu/21696
[69] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/20/prezydent-vijna-prodovzhytsya-yakshho-ne-zupynyty-soyuz-rosiyi-ta-pivnichnoyi-koreyi/; https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/za-cej-tizhden-u-nas-ye-pidtrimka-vid-partneriv-za-planom-pe-93949
[70] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/16837; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/21/kryvyj-rig-znovu-pid-udarom-rosijski-rakety-poshkodyly-obyekt-kultury/ ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/21/raketna-ataka-na-kryvyj-rig-poraneno-dytynu-ta-troye-doroslyh/; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/16830; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/16836 ; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/862383-vijska-rf-znovu-zavdali-raketnogo-udaru-po-krivomu-rogu/
[71] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/141524 ;https://t.me/boris_rozhin/141529 ;https://t.me/rusich_army/17857
[72] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/21/pyatygodynna-tryvoga-v-kyyevi-ulamky-droniv-sprychynyly-pozhezhi-ta-poshkodzhennya/; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/8701 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/21/ataka-droniv-na-kyyivshhynu-znyshheno-vsi-czili-ale-ulamky-poshkodyly-zhytlovi-budynky/; https://t.me/kyivoda/21678 ; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/8698 ; https://suspilne dot media/862173-rosijska-armia-bezpilotnikami-atakuvala-kiiv-so-vidomo/ ; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/862221-poskodzeni-budinki-avtomobili-ta-rinok-naslidki-rosijskoi-ataki-kiivsini/
[73] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/21/pozhezhi-ta-rujnuvannya-raketna-ataka-po-pryportovij-infrastrukturi-odeshhyny/; https://t.me/odeskaODA/7178
[74] https://suspilne dot media/sumy/862211-rf-atakuvala-energeticnij-obekt-v-romenskomu-rajoni-na-sumsini/ ;
https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid0264g5AwpcZgxmQVNNGtTh9jitWSiQpsxonkyb81FE789bB34HWYULgGnqfVjiD83Sl&id=100068589042866
[75] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/141529
[76] https://www.facebook.com/kommander.nord/posts/pfbid0zbrd6EyXCnLRg12ErkpiMggvWU3SbmSfqruSuVP2jVosY1SE9oPvstoc75CbRaS6l?locale=ru_RU ; https://t.me/tass_agency/280626
[77] https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/34589
[78]
https://t.me/dva_majors/55525 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/14994 ;
https://t.me/basurin_e/14980 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/17852 ;
https://t.me/boris_rozhin/141529
[79] https://t.me/tass_agency/280589
[80] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/141529
[81] https://www.npu
dot
gov.ua/news/stanom-na-0300-u-kharkovi-12-liudei-postrazhdaly-cherez-rosiiski-obstrily-politseiski-zadokumentuvaly-naslidky-vorozhoi-ataky?v=6715a26fe43ee;
https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/21/pravoohoronczi-pokazaly-moment-udaru-po-harkovu-zrosla-kilkist-postrazhdalyh/
[82] https://t.me/severrealii/27841
[83] https://t.me/synegubov/11674 ; https://t.me/synegubov/11670
[84] https://www.npu
dot
gov.ua/news/stanom-na-0300-u-kharkovi-12-liudei-postrazhdaly-cherez-rosiiski-obstrily-politseiski-zadokumentuvaly-naslidky-vorozhoi-ataky?v=6715a26fe43ee;
https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/21/pravoohoronczi-pokazaly-moment-udaru-po-harkovu-zrosla-kilkist-postrazhdalyh/
[85] https://t.me/tass_agency/280588
[86] https://news-balashiha dot ru/incident/2024/10/21/111260.html; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/59664
[87] https://t.me/dva_majors/55585
[88] https://t.me/zhivoff/17529
[89]
https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/22123 ; https://suspilne dot
media/donbas/862259-proponuut-grosi-ta-socpaket-starsoklasnikiv-u-starobilskomu-rajoni-agituut-pidpisati-kontrakt-z-armieu-rf/
[90] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/21/na-rosiyi-zabyly-nasmert-molotkom-lotchyka-vynnogo-u-raketnyh-udarah-po-dnipru/; https://gur
dot
gov.ua/content/molotok-spravedlyvosti-na-rosii-likvidovano-voiennoho-zlochyntsia-dmitriia-golienkova.html
; https://suspilne dot
media/862243-pid-branskom-u-rosii-znajdeno-tilo-nacalnika-aviacijnoi-eskadrili-vks-rf-gur-mo/;
https://gur.gov
dot
ua/content/molotok-spravedlyvosti-na-rosii-likvidovano-voiennoho-zlochyntsia-dmitriia-golienkova.html;
https://t.me/astrapress/66805; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/14438
[91] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/20/desantnyky-zbyly-na-kurshhyni-bpla-z-4-raketamy/; https://t.me/ua_dshv/4099
[92] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/20/desantnyky-zbyly-na-kurshhyni-bpla-z-4-raketamy/; https://t.me/ua_dshv/4099
[93] https://t.me/motopatriot/28577; https://t.me/northernwarriors/536; https://t.me/bes_pilot/1090
[94] https://t.me/belta_telegramm/274003; https://belta dot by/president/view/belarus-i-rossija-obsuzhdajut-stroitelstvo-skorostnoj-magistrali-moskva-brest-669690-2024/
[95] https://t.me/modmilby/42678
