Kelly
Campa, Johanna Moore, Siddhant Kishore, Carolyn Moorman, Katherine
Wells, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Annika Ganzeveld, Andie Parry, Avery
Borens, Victoria Penza, and Nicholas Carl
Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET
The
Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and
the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which
provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that
undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. Click
here
to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Israeli state-owned broadcaster Kan published a US-drafted ceasefire proposal to end the fighting in Lebanon.[1] The
draft proposes that international mediators determine a date to begin
the ceasefire and commence a 60-day “implementation period.” During this
period, Lebanese Hezbollah would cease attacks against Israel and the
Israel Defense Forces (IDF) would cease offensive operations in Lebanon.
The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) would gradually deploy 10,000 troops to
southern Lebanon before the implementation period ends. The LAF would
be responsible for monitoring the Israel-Lebanon border and all land,
sea, and air crossings. The LAF would also dismantle all non-state
military infrastructure and confiscate arms.
The United
States, Israel, and Lebanon, according to the proposal, would establish a
"monitoring and enforcement mechanism” to address reported ceasefire
violations. The United States will administer the mechanism, which
would—in addition to Israel and Lebanon—include the United Nations and
European and regional countries. The mechanism would develop measures to
address ceasefire violations, such as sanctions packages. The mechanism
would assess progress at the end of the implementation period and
institute a permanent ceasefire. The IDF would at this point conduct a
complete withdrawal from Lebanon within seven days. The United States
and United Nations would separately facilitate Israel-Lebanon
negotiations to achieve the full implementation of UN Security Council
Resolution (UNSCR) 1701, which prohibits Hezbollah from operating south
of the Litani River. Hezbollah has violated UNSCR 1701 repeatedly over
many years.
US, Israeli, and Lebanese officials are
currently discussing the ceasefire proposal. Senior US officials Amos
Hochstein and Brett McGurk met with Israeli leaders in Jerusalem on
October 31 to that end.[2] Hochstein previously spoke with Lebanese
Prime Minister Najib Mikati on October 30.[3] Israeli Army Radio
reported that there has been ”real progress” toward an agreement.[4]
The success of this proposal depends fully on Hezbollah’s agreement and cooperation.[5] The
proposal, in its current form, requires Hezbollah to cease attacks
against Israel but does not explicitly require Hezbollah to disarm—only
that the LAF must dismantle military infrastructure and confiscate
weapons. The agreement could still be viable, however, so long as
Hezbollah leaders accept the agreement and get their lower echelons to
adhere to it. There is a risk that Hezbollah leaders cannot ensure that
some of the rank-and-file militants stop attacks and surrender their
weapons to the LAF, especially given the severe disruption to the
Hezbollah command-and-control network. There may even be some exchanges
of fire during the implementation period. This fighting would not necessarily mean that the ceasefire failed.
The
LAF would need to disarm other non-state militias in southern Lebanon
based on the text of the proposal. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad
(PIJ) maintain cells in Lebanon, particularly in the south, and
Hezbollah commonly allows these and other Palestinian groups to launch
attacks into Israel from Hezbollah-controlled territory.[6] The presence
of these armed groups could complicate Hezbollah efforts to honor the
ceasefire.
The proposal does not explicitly require Hezbollah forces to withdraw from south of the Litani River.[7] The
proposal instead stipulates that the LAF should be the only military
force in the area.[8] This language is remarkably similar to that of
UNSCR 1701, which calls for southern Lebanon to be “free any armed
personnel, assets, and weapons” other than those of the Lebanese
state.[9] UNSCR 1701 called in spirit for a Hezbollah withdrawal but
fell short of providing for it explicitly.[10] Requiring Hezbollah to
leave southern Lebanon would be extremely complicated given that many of
Hezbollah militants were born and raised in the area that they would
then need to leave.
Israel is seeking for the United States to guarantee its support for Israeli military action in Lebanon if the ceasefire fails.[11] The
United States agreed to give Israel a “side letter” that would give
assurances of US support if the LAF or UNIFIL fails to meet their
respective obligations.[12] Maintaining the option to operate in Lebanon
is consistent with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu saying on October
31 that the main Israeli priorities are to “enforce security, thwart
attacks against [Israel], and act against the arming of our enemies
despite all the pressures and constraints.”[13] The side letter
requests that Israel consult the United States before any Israeli
strikes in Lebanon and that the strikes try to minimize harm to
civilians.[14] The United States also requested that Israeli flights
over Lebanon be used only for intelligence collection and refrain from
breaking the sound barrier.[15]
Senior Lebanese officials are expressing optimism publicly about the feasibility of a ceasefire. Lebanese
Prime Minister Mikati said on October 30 that a deal could be announced
“in the coming hours or days.”[16] Lebanese officials are reportedly
avoiding criticizing any parts of the proposal publicly in order to
provide space for continued negotiations.[17] The proposal published by
Israeli media is dated October 26, but anonymous officials familiar with
the negotiations have said that no major changes have been made since
then.[18]
The IDF will establish a new division to counter threats around the Israel-Jordan border.[19] The
division will include a quick reaction force to counter anti-Israel
militancy in the Jordan Valley and to interdict weapons smuggling. The
division will be subordinate to the IDF Central Command and cooperate
with the Jordanian Army to secure the border region.[20] The
establishment of this new division comes amid IDF concerns about Iran
trying to smuggle weapons into Israel and the West Bank via Jordan.[21]
Key Takeaways:
We
do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are
well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military
operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn
violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and
crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these
reports.
Gaza Strip
Axis of Resistance objectives:
The IDF 162nd Division continued clearing operations in Jabalia, northern Gaza Strip, on October 31. Israeli forces raided dozens of Palestinian militia sites, including weapons warehouses, in Jabalia.[22] Israeli
forces have detained hundreds of Palestinian fighters in Jabalia since
resuming clearing operations there on October 6.[23] The IDF stated that
the ”surrender” of Hamas fighters in Jabalia area indicates that Hamas
is collapsing there.[24] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) attacked
Israeli armor with two explosively formed penetrators (EPF) east of
Jabalia and west of Beit Lahia.[25] It is notable that Palestinian
militias continue to conduct EPF attacks, given the specialized
components needed to manufacture the device. Palestinian fighters also
fired rockets targeting Israel forces west of Jabalia.[26]
The IDF 252nd Division continued operations around the Netzarim Corridor, south of Gaza City, on October 31.[27] The
IDF destroyed a Hamas munitions manufacturing site in the central Gaza
Strip.[28] The IDF provided no details on the size or sophistication of
the site. The presence of such a site could indicate meaningful Hamas
reconstitution efforts, depending on the production capacity of the site
and what it was producing. Commercially available satellite imagery
published on October 30 shows flattened terrain south of the Netzarim
Corridor, indicating military activity there. Palestinian militias
conducted four rocket attacks targeting Israeli forces around the
corridor.[29]
The IDF 143rd Division continued operations in Rafah around the Philadelphi Corridor on October 31.[30]
CIA
Director Bill Burns discussed possible ceasefires for the Gaza Strip
and Lebanon with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el Sisi and Egyptian
intelligence chief Hassan Rashad in Cairo on October 31.[31] Sisi
publicly proposed an initial two-day ceasefire in which four Israeli
hostages would be exchanged for an unspecified number of Palestinian
prisoners.[32] The two-day ceasefire would be followed by 10 days of
further negotiations. Israel and international mediators began sharing
new ceasefire proposals after Israel killed Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar in
the Gaza Strip on October 16. CTP-ISW continues to assess that Sinwar’s
death is unlikely to prompt a shift in Hamas strategy in the war or in
ceasefire-hostage negotiations.[33] Hamas leaders reiterated on October
31 their maximalist demands of a full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza
Strip and permanent ceasefire.[34]
West Bank
Axis of Resistance objectives:
The IDF thwarted a weapons smuggling attempt from Egypt into Israel on October 31.[35] The
IDF intercepted a small quadcopter drone that crossed from Egypt into
Israel and contained four rifles and a handgun. The IDF previously
intercepted a similar drone that carried weapons over the Egypt-Israel
border on October 19.[36]
Israeli forces conducted overnight raids on October 30 and 31 in Tulkarm and killed a local Hamas commander.[37] The
IDF killed Hussam al Malah, who was planning near-term attacks against
Israel.[38] Malah reportedly commanded a Hamas cell that had planned to
conduct a “major terror attack” on the anniversary of the Hamas October 7
attack into Israel.[39] The IDF has killed two other members of the
Malah-led cell in recent days.[40] The IDF separately conducted an
airstrike targeting a Palestinian militia cell that fired small arms
targeting Israeli forces in Nour Shams refugee camp in Tulkarm.[41]
Israeli
forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least two locations
across the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on October 30. PIJ
detonated several improvised explosive devices (IED) targeting IDF
armored personnel carriers and bulldozers in Nour Shams refugee
camp.[42] PIJ claimed that it ambushed Israeli forces in several
locations in Nour Shams camp by firing small arms and detonating
IEDs.[43] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired small arms and detonated
IEDs targeting Israeli forces in Tulkarm refugee camp as well.[44]
Northern Israel and Lebanon
Lebanese Hezbollah objectives:
Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations and seize terrain in southern Lebanon on October 31.[45] Israeli
forces destroyed Hezbollah infrastructure and killed Hezbollah
militants.[46] The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting a Hezbollah
anti-tank squad in a civilian area.[47]
Hezbollah has continued to engage Israeli forces around Khiam, southeastern Lebanon, since CTP-ISW's data cutoff on October 30. Hezbollah
claimed 13 separate mortar and rocket attacks targeting Israeli forces
around Khiam.[48] Lebanese media reported small arms combat between
Israeli forces and Hezbollah militants around Khiam.[49]
The
IDF 205th Armored Brigade (146th Division) located and destroyed
Hezbollah underground infrastructure, observation posts, and weapons
caches in southwestern Lebanon.[50] The 205th
Armored Brigade also located and destroyed a camouflaged Hezbollah
vehicle that contained rifles, bulletproof vests, and various other
kinds of military equipment. The 205th Armored Brigade killed Hezbollah
militants via ground engagements and by directing airstrikes targeting
them. Israeli forces separately located Hezbollah rocket launchers that
were prepared to fire into Israel. Commercially available satellite
imagery showed destroyed buildings in western Dahyra, southwestern
Lebanon, indicating that Israeli forces have conducted clearing
operations there.
The IDF continued its air campaign targeting Hezbollah capabilities, infrastructure, and leadership on October 31. The
IDF Air Force struck over 150 Hezbollah targets, including military
buildings, headquarters, weapons depots, observation posts, and
launchers.[51] The IDF conducted numerous air and drone strikes on
Hezbollah targets around Tyre, southwestern Lebanon.[52] The Hezbollah
Aziz regional command is responsible for this area. The IDF Air Force
struck and killed several militants from Hezbollah’s aerial unit, who
had launched a missile at an IDF Air Force aircraft in the Mazraat
Joudieh area, north of Tyre.[53] The IDF Air Force struck Hezbollah
command-and-control sites and headquarters and other military sites in
al Hosh, south of Tyre.[54] The IDF stated that several Hezbollah units,
including the Aziz Unit and Radwan special operations forces (SOF), use
these positions to support attacks targeting Israeli civilians and
forces.[55] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson issued evacuation
notices to the residents of several towns in Tyre governorate before
attacking the area.[56]
The IDF Air Force struck and
killed a Hezbollah anti-tank unit commander in Burj al Qalawieh,
southwestern Lebanon.[57] Mohammad Khalil Aliyan was a Nasr regional
command commander responsible for anti-tank systems in the Hajir
sector.[58]
The IDF continued its campaign to disrupt
Hezbollah’s ability to smuggle weapons from Syria into Lebanon.[59] The
IDF Air Force struck Hezbollah Radwan SOF munition warehouses and
headquarters around al Qusayr near the Lebanon-Syria border.[60] The IDF
stated that the Hezbollah Armaments Unit is responsible for storing
weapons in Lebanon and recently expanded its operations to al Qusayr,
Syria.[61] The IDF stated that Hezbollah is trying to create logistical
networks to support the smuggling of weapons from Syria into Lebanon
through border crossings.[62] The IDF conducted an airstrike on the town
of al Qaa, which is adjacent to al Qusayr.[63] The IDF Air Force also
continued its strike campaign in Baalbek, northeastern Lebanon,
targeting Hezbollah Unit 4400, which is responsible for transferring
funds and weapons from Iran.[64] The IDF struck several towns in the
Baalbek region targeting Hezbollah combat equipment and sites.[65]
Local
Lebanese sources claimed that a Lebanese Army Forces (LAF) soldier was
killed in an Israeli airstrike on a motorcycle in the Amiriya area of
Naqoura, southern Lebanon.[66] The
LAF has released no statement on the incident at the time of this
writing. This incident would mark the fourth Israeli strike that
targeted the LAF since October 1.[67]
This
map illustrates individual Israeli air and artillery strikes based on
local Lebanese reporting. This map depicts strikes reported from 2:00pm
ET on October 30 to 2:00pm ET on October 31. This map is not exhaustive.
CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the locations of Israeli strikes.
Iranian-backed Iraqi militants are fighting and dying in southern Lebanon, according to an Iranian-backed Iraqi militia source.[68] The
source told Baghdad Today that that the militants were already deployed
to Lebanon when fighting began but that the Iranian-backed Iraqi
militias “did not enter the battle with all their weight.”[69] CTP-ISW
previously assessed that Iranian-backed groups have likely embedded
their militants with Hezbollah forces in Lebanon.[70]
Hezbollah has conducted at least 12 attacks into Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 30.[71] Hezbollah rocket attacks killed seven Israeli civilians in northeastern Israel on October 31.[72] This high casualty count is abnormal, though it is unclear whether the attacks mark a change in Hezbollah tactics. An
Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that Hezbollah rockets killed
five farmworkers in Metula and two other civilians in Kiryat
Shmona.[73] Hezbollah conducted two rocket attacks
targeting Israel forces and civilians in Kiryat Shmona.[74] Hezbollah
launched a one-way attack drone targeting Israeli forces in Shomera,
which is adjacent to where some Israeli forces are in southern
Lebanon.[75] Hezbollah also fired rockets targeting Israeli warehouses
near Acre, northwestern Israel.[76]
Iran and the Axis of Resistance
The
Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi
militias—has claimed six attacks targeting Israel since CTP-ISW's last
data cutoff on October 30. The claims include:
- Three drone attacks targeting unspecified “vital target[s]” in the Golan Heights[77]
- Two drone attacks targeting unspecified “vital target[s]” in northern Israel[78]
- A drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in southern Israel[79]
The
IDF detected a drone that approached Israel from the east on October
30.[80] The drone struck the northern Golan Heights, causing no
casualties or damage.
Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Saraya Awliya al Dam has claimed four attacks targeting Israel since October 28. Saraya
Awliya al Dam professes to be affiliated with the Islamic Resistance in
Iraq and appears to claim distinct attacks targeting Israel.[81] Saraya
Awliya al Dam is likely a cover group for Iranian-backed Iraqi militias
Kataib Hezbollah or Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba.[82] Saraya Awliya al
Dam has claimed 20 drone attacks targeting Israel between May 29 and
October 27.[83] Saraya Awliya al Dam’s latest claims include the
following:
CTP-ISW is unable to independently verify these attacks occurred.
Iranian-backed
Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah spokesperson Ali Abu Askari released a
statement threatening to “strike in the heart of the capitals” of
countries supporting ISIS and Israel on October 31, possibly referring
to the United States.[88] Iran
commonly claims that the United States supports ISIS.[89] Kataib
Hezbollah is a part of the Islamic Resistance of Iraq that conducted
over 170 attacks targeting US troops in Iraq and Syria between October
2023-January 2024.[90]
Islamic Revolutionary
Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani
reaffirmed Quds Force support for Hezbollah against Israel on October
31.[91] Ghaani made this
statement in a condolence message for former Hezbollah Secretary General
Hassan Nasrallah and former Hezbollah Executive Council Chairman Hashem
Safi ed Din.[92] Ghaani also congratulated newly appointed Hezbollah
Secretary General Naim Qassem on succeeding Nasrallah.[93]
Houthi
media claimed on October 31 that the United States and the United
Kingdom conducted an airstrike targeting an unspecified site near al
Hudaydah University in Hudaydah Province, Yemen.[94] US Central Command has not confirmed the strike at the time of this writing.
Iranian
Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi held separate phone calls with
his Algerian and Indonesian counterparts on October 31.[95] Araghchi
highlighted the importance of Islamic countries condemning Israel’s
campaigns in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon and asked both officials to
support an Iranian call for a United Nations Security Council meeting.
Araghchi also wrote an op-ed in Indonesian newspaper Jakarta Times,
where he reflected on 75 years of diplomatic relations between Iran and
Indonesia.[96] Araghchi -emphasized the importance of former Iranian
President Ebrahim Raisi’s trip to Indonesia in May 2023 that resulted in
11 memorandums of understanding across various sectors between the two
states.[97] Araghchi noted that the Pezeshkian administration intends to
prioritize trade with eastern and southeastern Asian countries.[98]
Prominent clerics called on Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian to address the growing economic issues. Pezeshkian
visited Qom on October 31 and held separate meetings with Grand
Ayatollah Naser Makarem Shirazi, Grand Ayatollah Abdollah Javadi Amoli,
Grand Ayatollah Jafar Sobhani, Grand Ayatollah Hossein Nouri Hamedani,
Grand Ayatollah Mousa Shubairi Zanjani, Hojjat ol Eslam Sheikh Javad al
Shahrastani, and Hojjat ol Eslam Wal Muslimin Saeedi.[99] Grand
Ayatollah Naser Makarem Shirazi warned against raising fuel prices,
likely referring to Pezeshkian's proposed budget for the next Persian
calendar year.[100] The proposal suggests increasing fuel prices to
address government deficits amid growing domestic fuel
consumption.[101] Iranian parliamentarian Ahmad Rastineh separately
criticized the proposal for its potential negative impact on the
economy.[102] Grand Ayatollah Nouri Hamedani emphasized the need to
remedy the declining value of the Iranian rial against other currencies
during his meeting with Pezeshkian.[103]
The
Iranian Intelligence and Security Ministry announced on October 31 that
it intercepted Kurdish militants trying to enter Iran from Iraqi
Kurdistan on October 28.[104] The operation—supported by the IRGC Ground Forces—killed one of the militants.[105]
Jaish
al Adl—a Baloch Salafi-jihadi group—launched an attack on a police
station in Sistan and Baluchistan Province on October 30.[106] The
Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) claimed that the assailants
opened fire on the station but fled the scene after encountering
countermeasures from security forces. Jaish al Adl previously killed ten
Iranian LEC officers in an attack on a police patrol unit in Taftan
County, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on October 26.[107] This
activity is part of a general increase in anti-regime militancy in
southeastern Iran since December 2023.[108]
[1] www.kan dot org.il/content/kan-news/politic/818729/ ;
https://x.com/suleimanmas1/status/1851687885470102001?s=46&t=EGYcIyXosW6lVJmixq2r5Q
[2] https://www.timesofisrael
dot
com/liveblog_entry/hochstein-and-mcgurks-meetings-with-top-israeli-officials-on-gaza-and-lebanon-were-constructive-us-official-says/
[3] https://www.reuters.com/world/senior-biden-advisers-visit-israel-try-end-war-lebanon-axios-reports-2024-10-30/
[4] https://t.me/moriahdoron/16060
[5] www.kan dot org.il/content/kan-news/politic/818729/;
https://x.com/suleimanmas1/status/1851687885470102001?s=46&t=EGYcIyXosW6lVJmixq2r5Q
[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-15-2023;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-2-2023;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-6-2023;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-12-2023
[7] www.kan dot org.il/content/kan-news/politic/818729/ ;
https://x.com/suleimanmas1/status/1851687885470102001?s=46&t=EGYcIyXosW6lVJmixq2r5Q
[8] www.kan dot org.il/content/kan-news/politic/818729/ ;
https://x.com/suleimanmas1/status/1851687885470102001?s=46&t=EGYcIyXosW6lVJmixq2r5Q
[9] http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1701
[10] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/21/world/middleeast/un-resolution-1701-explained.html
[11] www.kan dot org.il/content/kan-news/politic/818729/;
https://x.com/suleimanmas1/status/1851687885470102001?s=46&t=EGYcIyXosW6lVJmixq2r5Q
[12] https://x.com/SuleimanMas1/status/1851687901677129973
[13] https://t.me/moriahdoron/16082; https://t.me/moriahdoron/16083
[14] www.kan dot org.il/content/kan-news/politic/818729/;
https://x.com/suleimanmas1/status/1851687885470102001?s=46&t=EGYcIyXosW6lVJmixq2r5Q
[15] www.kan dot org.il/content/kan-news/politic/818729/;
https://x.com/suleimanmas1/status/1851687885470102001?s=46&t=EGYcIyXosW6lVJmixq2r5Q
[16] https://www.reuters.com/world/senior-biden-advisers-visit-israel-try-end-war-lebanon-axios-reports-2024-10-30/
[17] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-officials-in-israel-working-on-proposal-to-end-lebanon-war-6e20c3f3?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1
[18] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-officials-in-israel-working-on-proposal-to-end-lebanon-war-6e20c3f3?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1
[19] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1851699302114169141
[20] https://t.me/moriahdoron/16062 ; https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1822861198372573278
[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-12-2024 ; https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1822861198372573278
[22] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1851872835465085398
[23] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1852034356493127756
[24] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1852034356493127756
[25] https://t.me/sarayaps/18760 ; https://t.me/sarayaps/18763
[26] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7773
[27] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1851872835465085398
[28] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1851872835465085398
[29] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7765 ; https://t.me/nedalps/4474 ; https://t.me/darebmojahden/5324 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7777
[30] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1851872835465085398
[31] https://english dot
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[32] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/mossad-head-goes-to-doha-egypt-proposes-2-day-ceasefire-for-release-of-4-hostages/
[33] https://www.aei.org/articles/sinwars-death-will-not-end-israeli-operations-in-the-gaza-strip/
[34] https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/israel-iran-palestine-gaza-war-10-31-24-intl-hnk#cm2xcrhs500073b6q6quuhxy6 ;
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[35] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1851920117661081663
[36] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-20-2024
[37] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1851852533020377163 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1851852535528665462
[38] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1851852535528665462 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/16065
[39] https://www.timesofisrael
dot
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[40] https://www.timesofisrael
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[41] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1851852533020377163
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[54] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1852037510332846456
[55] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1852037512992100774
[56] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1851901867250381234
[57] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1851872698781040858
[58] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1851872698781040858
[59] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1851965485782348069
[60] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1851965483202818200
[61] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1851965489720770705
[62] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1851965489720770705
[63] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/97973
[64] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1851965497698328653; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-30-2024
[65] https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/117584; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/98076; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/98079; https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/117591; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1851922638483902912
[66] https://t.me/moriahdoron/16071 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/97955
[67] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/21/world/middleeast/israel-kills-lebanese-army-soldiers.html
[68] https://baghdadtoday
dot
news/261053-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87-%D9%84%D8%A7-%D9%8A%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%B6-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%8B%D8%A7.-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%87%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%83-%D9%88%D9%82%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%AA-%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A1-(%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84.html
[69] https://baghdadtoday
dot
news/261053-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87-%D9%84%D8%A7-%D9%8A%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%B6-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%8B%D8%A7.-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%87%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%83-%D9%88%D9%82%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%AA-%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A1-(%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84.html
[70] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-29-2024
[71] https://t.me/mmirleb/8554; https://t.me/mmirleb/8557; https://t.me/mmirleb/8558; https://t.me/mmirleb/8559; https://t.me/mmirleb/8560; https://t.me/mmirleb/8569; https://t.me/mmirleb/8572; https://t.me/mmirleb/8581; https://t.me/mmirleb/8587; https://t.me/mmirleb/8592; https://t.me/mmirleb/8590 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8592
[72] https://t.me/moriahdoron/16076 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/16078 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8559; https://t.me/mmirleb/8560
[73] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1851930431874076971
[74] https://t.me/mmirleb/8559; https://t.me/mmirleb/8560
[75] https://t.me/mmirleb/8592 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-30-2024
[76] https://t.me/mmirleb/8587
[77] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1418 ; https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1419 ; https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1427
[78] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1421 ; https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1425
[79] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1424
[80] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1851731667452596528
[81] https://t.me/awlialdm/105
[82] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-saraya-awliya-al-dam
[83] https://t.me/awlialdm/8 ; https://t.me/awlialdm/17 ; https://t.me/awlialdm/17 ; https://t.me/awlialdm/30 ; https://t.me/awlialdm/44 ; https://t.me/awlialdm/56 ; https://t.me/awlialdm/61 ; https://t.me/awlialdm/85; https://t.me/awlialdm/105 ; https://t.me/awlialdm/65 ; https://t.me/awlialdm/93 ; https://t.me/awlialdm/70 ; https://t.me/awlialdm/75 ; https://t.me/awlialdm/81 ; https://t.me/awlialdm/87 ; https://t.me/awlialdm/91 ; https://t.me/awlialdm/97;
; https://t.me/awlialdm/103 ; https://t.me/awlialdm/99 ;
[84] https://t.me/awlialdm/103
[85] https://t.me/awlialdm/105
[86] https://t.me/awlialdm/109
[87] https://t.me/awlialdm/111
[88] https://t.me/abualaskary/126
[89] https://www.newsweek.com/iran-claim-us-support-isis-evidence-prove-624489
[90] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-28-2024;
https://apnews.com/article/iraq-kataib-hezbollah-us-strikes-militias-e2d31a579001f62a12b55b4cbf16ab48
[91] https://sepahnews dot ir/fa/news/21564
[92] https://sepahnews dot ir/fa/news/21564
[93] https://sepahnews dot ir/fa/news/21564
[94] https://www.saba dot ye/ar/news3390493.htm
[95] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85645494/;
https://www.presstv dot ir/Detail/2024/10/30/736325/Iran-Muslim-countries-ceasefire-Gaza-Lebanon-Israel-Araghchi
[96] https://www.presstv
dot
ir/Detail/2024/10/31/736355/Iran-Indonesia-Foreign-Minister-Abbas-Araghchi-Jakarta-Post-inauguration-administration-relations-anniversary-sanctions-Palestine--Global-Souh-t
[97] https://www.presstv
dot
ir/Detail/2024/10/31/736355/Iran-Indonesia-Foreign-Minister-Abbas-Araghchi-Jakarta-Post-inauguration-administration-relations-anniversary-sanctions-Palestine--Global-Souh-t;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-24-2023
[98] https://www.presstv
dot
ir/Detail/2024/10/31/736355/Iran-Indonesia-Foreign-Minister-Abbas-Araghchi-Jakarta-Post-inauguration-administration-relations-anniversary-sanctions-Palestine--Global-Souh-t
[99] https://www.tasnimnews
dot com/fa/news/1403/08/10/3190550 ; https://president dot ir/fa/154901
; https://president dot ir/fa/154915 ; https://president dot
ir/fa/154894 ; https://president dot ir/fa/154904 ; https://president
dot ir/fa/154916 ; https://president dot ir/fa/154917
[100] https://president
dot ir/fa/154904 ; https://mehrnews dot com/news/6274762 ;
https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/08/01/3183873
[101] https://www.iranintl dot com/en/202410229896
[102] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/702081/
[103] https://president dot ir/fa/154916 ; https://mehrnews dot com/news/6274762
[104] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/08/09/3190393
[105] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/08/09/3190393
[106] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/08/10/3190607
[107] https://ir.voanews.com/a/attack-jaisholadl-police-iran-10-dead/7840169.html
[108] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-2-2024#_ednee8e71584b461ddfc1fb105bafa7ca4d61