UA-69458566-1

Thursday, May 8, 2025

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 8, 2025

 Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Olivia Gibson, Daria Novikov, Anna Harvey
and Frederick W. Kagan with William Runkel

May 8, 2025, 10:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:50pm ET on May 8. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 9 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

[Note: The Ukrainian General Staff's 1600 May 8 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0000 to 1600 on May 8, and any reports of Russian ground activity in this SITREP are by default an accusation that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire. The Ukrainian General Staff's 0800 May 8 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0800 on May 7 to 0800 on May 8. ISW is unable to assess whether Russian attacks reported in the 0800 SITREP occurred after the start of Russia's ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8. The Ukrainian General Staff's 2200 May 7 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0000 to 2200 on May 7 before Russia's implementation of its unliteral ceasefire on May 8.]

The Kremlin continues to seize on the Russian mythos of the Second World War ahead of Russia's May 9 Victory Day holiday to set informational conditions to justify a prolonged war in Ukraine and future aggression against NATO to Russian society. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov published an article on May 8 in which he argued that Russia's war in Ukraine will go down in history as a feat of courage and significance equal to the victory of the Soviet military and people during the Second World War.[1] Belousov claimed that Russia's war in Ukraine is a continuation of the "glorious traditions" of Soviet bravery and heroism and of the Soviet people's enthusiasm for enlisting and otherwise supporting the war effort. Belousov claimed that Russia's victory in Ukraine is "inevitable." Belousov said that domestic unity is a necessity for Russia's victory in Ukraine just as the Soviet Union's "moral and spiritual unity" was a critical factor for its victory in the Second World War. Russian state media highlighted Belousov's statements comparing the Second World War to Russia's war in Ukraine in their coverage of his 10-page essay, indicating that the Kremlin is trying to message to the domestic audience that Russia will achieve its goals in its war in Ukraine as long as Russian society remains unified and supportive.[2] Kremlin officials have recently seized on the mythos of the Second World War to form the basis of a new pseudo-state ideology that will span across generations and that the Kremlin intends to use to justify potential future aggression against the West.[3]

Belousov reiterated the Kremlin's oft-repeated fallacious narrative that Russia had no choice but to launch its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 because the situation was "life or death." Belousov claimed that Ukraine is a conduit for the collective West's "crusade" against Russia, which Belousov claimed is a manifestation of "eternal Russophobia" and intended to eradicate Russian statehood. Belousov quoted Russian President Vladimir Putin's speech from February 24, 2022, announcing the full-scale invasion.[4] Belousov amplified Putin's accusations that the United States and its Western allies had a policy of "containment" against Russia and created a situation in which Russia had to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine to defend Russia's interests.[5] The Kremlin is attempting to link Putin's anti-Western claims to the mythos of the Second World War in order to heighten the existential threat against Russia that the Kremlin claims Russia is currently facing. It is also reconstructing the Soviet-era narrative that the West is conspiring to destroy Russia (in place of the Soviet Union) and that the conflict will be unending.

Belousov explicitly identified large-scale Russian military reforms as preparations for a future conflict with NATO as Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev threatened European countries that support Ukraine.[6] Belousov stated in his May 8 essay that Russia has reformed and augmented its military specifically in response to NATO expansion and military build-up (undertaken only well after the Russian 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine), including by reorganizing Russia's Western Military District (WMD) into the Moscow and Leningrad military districts (MMD and LMD); re-opening two former military academies and establishing a new third military academy; and fully forming, staffing, and equipping two combined arms armies, a river flotilla, a mixed aviation corps, and 50 other formations and units.[7] ISW has long assessed that Russian military restructuring efforts, including reforms of the LMD and MMD, are part of future preparations for war against NATO.[8]

Medvedev threatened that European countries must "remember" the "crushing defeat of Nazi Germany" when supporting Ukraine.[9] Medvedev notably made his threat on his English-language X account, indicating that Medvedev intended this threat for international audiences.[10] Other senior Russian officials have also intensified accusations against European states for supporting "Naziism" in recent days.[11] Medvedev's threat and Russian claims of European "Nazism" are part of the Kremlin's ongoing reflexive control campaign that aims to push European countries into refraining from providing further assistance to Ukraine.[12] Kremlin officials have also recently framed European efforts to shoulder more of their own defense requirements (in line with US President Donald Trump's efforts) as threatening to Russia, and the Kremlin's reflexive control campaign likely also aims to prevent European states from building up their defenses. Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service Head Vice Admiral Peter Reesink warned in an interview with Politico published on May 8 that Russia's most threatening behavior is its military buildup and moving military assets towards Russia's borders with Finland and the Baltic states.[13] Reesink stated that Russia appears to be producing more artillery than the Russian military needs for its war in Ukraine when taking account of the assistance Russia is receiving from its allies. Reuters published an investigation on May 8 revealing that Russia has been constructing a significant new production line for explosives at the Biysk Oleum Plant in Siberia that is planned to produce 6,000 metric tons of explosives annually.[14] Reuters noted that this would be enough explosive to manufacture 1.28 million 152mm artillery rounds and that Russia produced nearly two million 122mm and 152mm artillery rounds in 2024, suggesting that this new production line could expand Russia's artillery shell production capacity by over 50 percent when completed.

Russia claimed to have implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire on May 8 and accused Ukraine of ceasefire violations even though Ukraine did not officially and publicly agree to Russia's ceasefire. Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire and accusations of violations continue to demonstrate the necessity that any ceasefire or peace agreement be formally agreed to in advance by all parties and include robust monitoring mechanisms. Russian President Vladimir Putin announced on April 28 Russia's ceasefire starting at midnight on the night of May 7 to 8 and ending at midnight on the night of May 10 to 11 in honor of Victory Day on May 9.[15] Russia's Victory Day celebrates the Soviet Union's contributions to defeating Nazi Germany during the Second World War while minimizing the role of the United States. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces completely ceased combat operations and remained at their current positions at midnight Moscow time on May 8 in accordance with Russian President Vladimir Putin's unilateral ceasefire.[16] The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces did not stop combat operations "despite the announcement of the ceasefire." Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha stated on May 8 that Russian forces continued to attack across the entire frontline.[17] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that Russian forces shelled Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts after the start of the ceasefire.[18] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported that servicemembers from three Ukrainian units operating in the Pokrovsk direction and in southern Ukraine confirmed that they received instructions to open fire only in response to Russian combat operations.[19]

Ukrainian officials continue to highlight Ukraine's willingness to implement US President Donald Trump's desired 30-day ceasefire to precede peace talks. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that he spoke with Trump on May 8 about the concrete steps needed to achieve peace.[20] Zelensky reiterated to Trump that Ukraine is ready for an immediate 30-day ceasefire and for talks "in any format." Zelensky reported that Trump supported a 30-day ceasefire. Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak stated that Ukraine can only start peace negotiations after the implementation of an unconditional 30-day ceasefire and that the United States and Ukraine's European partners agree with this timeline.[21] Yermak noted that Russia and Ukraine can agree on a format for peace negotiations and appoint delegations after a longer-term ceasefire is in place.

The Kremlin is attempting to exploit its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire to blame Ukraine for the lack of progress toward a longer-term ceasefire and peace negotiations despite Russia's continued rejection of such a longer-term ceasefire. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on May 7 that Ukraine does not want to seriously discuss a long-term ceasefire.[22] Zakharova claimed that Russia's support for the previous US- and Ukrainian-proposed 30-day moratorium on strikes against energy infrastructure and Russia's unilateral Easter truce shows that Russia has never been against a ceasefire, even though the Kremlin has continued to protract and delay meaningful negotiations to establish a comprehensive ceasefire.[23] Zakharova accused Ukraine of repeatedly violating the strikes and Easter ceasefires and claimed that there could be progress toward a long-term ceasefire should Ukraine observe shorter-term ceasefires. Zakharova repeated recent Kremlin narratives that Ukraine cannot control its own military and Putin's rejection of previous US and Ukrainian 30-day ceasefire proposals on the grounds that there are "nuances" about enforcement mechanisms and weapons provisions to Ukraine that the parties would need to work out prior to implementation.[24] Russia previously accused Ukraine of violating the strikes and Easter ceasefires while rarely offering evidence supporting these accusations, and Russian officials will likely do the same during the unilateral Victory Day ceasefire in order to distract from Russia's continued intransigence in negotiations about Ukraine.[25]

Russian President Vladimir Putin and People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping conducted a series of bilateral engagements in Moscow on May 8, showcasing deeper Russian–Chinese cooperation and alignment.[26] These engagements mark the third official meeting in 2025 between Putin and Xi. Putin and Xi signed a package of bilateral intergovernmental and interdepartmental cooperation documents and issued a joint statement on May 8.[27] Xi travelled to Russia to attend Russia's Victory Day celebrations on May 9. Putin and Xi discussed the roles that China and the Soviet Union played in the Second World War, emphasized the importance of their countries' contributions to the defeat of fascism, highlighted significant Chinese and Soviet losses in the war, and claimed that China and the Soviet Union were the "main theaters" in the war.[28] Russian officials repeatedly use the mythos of the Soviet Union's sacrifice during the Second World War to persuade the Russian population that their increasing social and economic sacrifices for the Russian war effort in Ukraine can lead to victory.[29] Russian officials are likely overemphasizing World War II mythos to bolster support for Russia's war effort in Ukraine in part due to Russia's inability to showcase battlefield successes for Victory Day 2025.

The joint Russian–Chinese statement on May 8 referenced Putin's original aims in launching his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in an attempt to lend international support and legitimacy to Russia's goals and attempted justifications for the war. The Russian–Chinese joint statement asserted that Russia and the PRC are "convinced" that a long-term and sustainable settlement in the war in Ukraine requires the elimination of the "root causes" of the war.[30] The joint statement claimed that Russia and the PRC will work to counter attempts to "rehabilitate" Nazism and the rise of militarism that contribute to discrimination and intolerance. The joint statement noted that Russia "positively evaluates" the PRC's position on the war in Ukraine and that Russia welcomes the PRC's desire to play a role in the political and diplomatic efforts towards settling the war. The PRC and Brazil — two members of BRICS — have notably put forth peace proposals for the war in Ukraine that heavily favored Russia.[31] The Kremlin has repeatedly claimed that Russia must eliminate the "root causes" of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which Russian officials have defined as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to expand into eastern Europe and along Russia's borders in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s, and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[32] Putin named Ukraine's "demilitarization" and "denazification" as Russia's main goals when he launched his full-scale invasion in February 2022, and Russian officials have consistently used these terms to call for the removal of the current legitimate Ukrainian government, the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government in Kyiv, and the reduction of Ukraine's military such that Ukraine is unable to defend itself in the future.[33] Russia has attempted to exploit diplomatic meetings with PRC and Iranian officials in recent months to publicly reiterate these original war aims and posture Russia's allies as supportive in these efforts.[34] The PRC has previously publicly attributed talk of Russia's alleged need to eliminate the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine only to Kremlin officials — not PRC officials.[35] The May 8 joint Russian–Chinese statement declaring that "the parties" are "convinced" of the need to eliminate the "root causes" of the war is a notable inflection in PRC rhetoric.

The joint Russian–Chinese statement supported Putin's proposed Eurasian security architecture and Russia's ongoing efforts to create a Russia-dominated alternative, anti-Western bloc. Russia and the PRC reiterated their mutual interest in establishing a multipolar world order in which the UN plays a central role.[36] Xi further claimed that both Russia and the PRC bear a special responsibility as permanent members of the UNSC and great powers to oversee the creation of a new multipolar world.[37] The joint statement underscored both parties' commitment to the creation of a Eurasian security architecture - a reference to the architecture that Putin first proposed in June 2024 with Xi's support.[38] The joint statement highlighted the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and BRICS - organizations that Kremlin officials have previously labelled as the foundation of Putin's proposed Eurasian security architecture.[39] The joint statement paradoxically called for an end to confrontational bloc mentality and specifically cited NATO expansion as an example of such bloc mentality. The statement noted that Russia and the PRC find the construction of military blocs that are anti-Russian and anti-Chinese in nature unacceptable. The statement emphasized the need to eliminate the "root causes" of interstate conflicts before the creation of a Eurasian security architecture - the first time Russian officials have publicly linked their calls for the elimination of "root causes" with Putin's proposed Eurasian security architecture. ISW continues to assess that Russia has been building a web of overlapping coalitions and partnerships, including within the CSTO, CIS, ASEAN, BRICS, and SCO, to offset the limits of Russian state power and that Putin's Eurasian security architecture proposal is part of Russian efforts to create an alternative Russian-led bloc to further Putin's goals of destroying NATO and weaking the West and its allies.[40]

The United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine’s (UN HRMMU) reported that Ukrainian civilian casualties have significantly increased between 2024 and 2025. The UN HRMMU reported that Ukrainian civilian casualties increased 23 percent between March 2025 and April 2025 and increased by 84 percent between April 2024 and April 2025.[41] The UN HRMMU reported that at least 209 civilians were killed and 1,146 civilians were injured in the war in April 2025. The UN HRMMU reported that 97 percent of these civilian casualties were in unoccupied Ukraine and that April 2025 had the highest number of civilian casualties since September 2024. The HRMMU reported that almost half of these casualties were due to missile and loitering munition strikes and noted several Russian drone and missile strikes in urban areas of Kryvyi Rih and Sumy, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, Kyiv, and Kharkiv cities in April 2025. The UN HRMMU reported that short-range drone strikes accounted for 23 percent of civilian casualties, most of which were in Kherson Oblast. The UN HRMMU noted that a drone strike against a civilian bus in Marhanets, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (on the east [right] bank of the Dnipro River immediately across from the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant) significantly contributed to these casualties.

The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada ratified the US–Ukrainian bilateral economic partnership agreement on May 8.[42] The United States and Ukraine signed the bilateral economic partnership agreement on April 30.[43]

Key Takeaways:

  • The Kremlin continues to seize on the Russian mythos of the Second World War ahead of Russia's May 9 Victory Day holiday to set informational conditions to justify a prolonged war in Ukraine and future aggression against NATO to Russian society.
  • Belousov explicitly identified large-scale Russian military reforms as preparations for a future conflict with NATO as Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev threatened European countries that support Ukraine.
  • Russia claimed to have implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire on May 8 and accused Ukraine of ceasefire violations even though Ukraine did not officially and publicly agree to Russia's ceasefire. Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire and accusations of violations continue to demonstrate the necessity that any ceasefire or peace agreement be formally agreed to in advance by all parties and include robust monitoring mechanisms.
  • Ukrainian officials continue to highlight Ukraine's willingness to implement US President Donald Trump's desired 30-day ceasefire to precede peace talks.
  • The Kremlin is attempting to exploit its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire to blame Ukraine for the lack of progress toward a longer-term ceasefire and peace negotiations despite Russia's continued rejection of such a longer-term ceasefire.
  • Russian President Vladimir Putin and People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping conducted a series of bilateral engagements in Moscow on May 8, showcasing deeper Russian–Chinese cooperation and alignment.
  • The joint Russian–Chinese statement on May 8 referenced Putin's original aims in launching his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in an attempt to lend international support and legitimacy to Russia's goals and attempted justifications for the war.
  • The joint Russian–Chinese statement supported Putin's proposed Eurasian security architecture and Russia's ongoing efforts to create a Russia-dominated alternative, anti-Western bloc.
  • The United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine’s (UN HRMMU) reported that Ukrainian civilian casualties have significantly increased between 2024 and 2025.
  • The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada ratified the US-Ukrainian bilateral economic partnership agreement on May 8.
  • Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk and Sumy oblasts and near Kupyansk, Borova, Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.


We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Alleged Ceasefire Violation
  • Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
  • Russian Supporting Effort — Northern Axis
  • Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

Alleged Ceasefire Violations

See topline and axes text for reports of violations of Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast before Russia's unilaterally imposed Victory Day ceasefire as Russian and Ukrainian sources accused each other of violating Russia's ceasefire on May 8

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 7 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced along Chapayeva Street in southwestern Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) and southeast of the settlement.[44]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced up to the international border south of Oleshnya (southeast of Sudzha).[45]

The Ukrainian General Staff's May 7 2200 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked in Kursk Oblast on May 7 before Russia implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.[46]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces violated Russia's ceasefire by attacking across the international border in Kursk Oblast on May 8.[47] Russian milbloggers claimed on May 8 that Ukrainian forces attacked toward Tetkino and Novyi Put (east of Tetkino along the international border).[48]

A Russian milblogger claimed on May 7 that Ukrainian forces maintain limited positions in Kursk Oblast and that Ukrainian forces maintain their drone superiority over Russian forces in the area.[49] Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces reported on May 7 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian "Zaslon" radar system in Kursk Oblast.[50]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Tetkino.[51]


A Russian milblogger accused Ukrainian forces of violating Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire near Demidovka (northwest of Belgorod City) on May 8.[52]

Russian Supporting Effort — Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast before Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire as Russian sources accused Ukrainian forces of violating Russia's ceasefire on May 8.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to central Loknya (northeast of Sumy City).[53]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on May 8 that Russian forces advanced near Vodolahy, Bilovody (both north of Sumy City), and Loknya.[54]

A Russian milblogger accused Ukrainian forces of violating Russia's unilateral ceasefire near Bilovody on May 8.[55]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction, and elements of the "Anvar Spetsnaz" detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions northwest of Sumy City near the Sumy-Bryansk Oblast international border.[56]


Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Ukrainian sources accused Russian forces in northern Kharkiv Oblast of violating Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire on May 8.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on May 7 that Russian forces advanced on the eastern outskirts of Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[57]

The Ukrainian General Staff's May 7 2200 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Vovchanski Khutory on May 7 before Russia implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.[58]

The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked near Vovchansk and Vovchanski Khutory.[59] ISW is unable to assess whether these attacks occurred after the start of Russia's unilateral ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.

The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 1600 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire by attacking in unspecified areas of northern Kharkiv Oblast.[60] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on May 8 that Russian forces continued to attack in the Kharkiv direction following Russia's implementation of its unilateral ceasefire.[61]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Anvar Spetsnaz" detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Synelnykove (south of Vovchansk).[62]


Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)


Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction before the start of Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire as Ukrainian sources accused Russian forces of violating Russia's ceasefire on May 8.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 7 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced to the northeastern outskirts of Dvorichna (northeast of Kupyansk).[63]

The Ukrainian General Staff's May 7 2200 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked southeast of Kupyansk near Hlushkivka on May 7 before Russia implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.[64]

The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked near Hlushkivka.[65] ISW is unable to assess whether these attacks occurred after the start of Russia's unilateral ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.

The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 1600 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire by attacking northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka.[66] Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov stated on May 8 that fighting is ongoing in northern Kharkiv Oblast and in the Kupyansk direction.[67]


Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction as Ukrainian forces accused Russian forces of violating Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire on May 8.

Assessed Russian Advances: Geolocated footage published on May 8 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Makiivka (northeast of Borova).[68] ISW is unable to assess if this recent Russian advance occurred before the start of Russia's unilateral ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.

The Ukrainian General Staff's May 7 2200 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Kopanky; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and toward Olhivka on May 7 before Russia implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.[69]

The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked near Zahryzove, Nova Kruhlyakivka, and Hrekivka and toward Olhivka.[70] ISW is unable to assess whether these attacks occurred after the start of Russia's unilateral ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.

The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 1600 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire by attacking near Nova Kruhlyakivka, Novoyehorivka (east of Borova), and Hrekivka.[71]

Ukrainian sources accused Russian forces in the Lyman direction of violating Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire on May 8.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest and west of the Nove (northeast of Lyman).[72]

The Ukrainian General Staff's May 7 2200 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and toward Ridkodub and Novyi Mir on May 7 before Russia implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.[73]

The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked near Kolodyazi and toward Ridkodub and Novyi Mir.[74] ISW is unable to assess whether these attacks occurred after the start of Russia's unilateral ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.

The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 1600 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire by attacking near Kolodyazi and Torske (east of Lyman) and toward Novomykhailivka, Ridkodub, and Zelena Dolyna (all northeast of Lyman).[75] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported that Russian forces continued to attack in the Lyman direction after Russia's implementation of its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire.[76]


Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)


Ukrainian sources accused Russian forces in the Siversk direction of violating Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire on May 8.

The Ukrainian General Staff's May 7 2200 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on May 7 before Russia implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.[77]

The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked near Bilohorivka and Verkhnokamyanske.[78] ISW is unable to assess whether these attacks occurred after the start of Russia's unilateral ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.

The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 1600 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire by attacking near Bilohorivka and Fedorivka (southeast of Siversk)[79]

Ukrainian and Russian sources accused each other of violating Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire in the Chasiv Yar direction on May 8.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on May 8 that Russian forces advanced north of Chasiv Yar and entered the Sieverny mine.[80]

The Ukrainian General Staff's May 7 2200 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora and Predtechnye on May 7 before Russia implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.[81]

The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar, Bila Hora, and Predtechnye.[82] ISW is unable to assess whether these attacks occurred after the start of Russia's unilateral ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.

The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 1600 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire by attacking near Chasiv Yar and Kurdyumivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar) on May 8.[83] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on May 8 that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral ceasefire in the Chasiv Yar direction after Russia implemented its unilateral ceasefire[84]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces violated Russia's unilateral ceasefire and counterattacked in the Chasiv Yar direction on May 8.[85]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Burevestnik" detachment (Russian Volunteer Corps) and the "Volga" Artillery Regiment (reportedly Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[86]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction before Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire as Ukrainian and Russian sources accused each other of violating Russia's ceasefire on May 8.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 6 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced to Radhospna Street in northwest Druzhba.[87]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 7 indicates that Russian forces advanced in southern Nova Poltavka (west of Toretsk).[88]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on May 7 and 8 that Russian forces advanced north of and into central Nova Poltavka, west of Nelipivka (northwest of Toretsk), north of and into northern Novoolenivka (west of Toretsk), north of and toward Oleksandropil, and into the western outskirts of Leonidivka (both southwest of Toretsk).[89] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 8 that Russian forces seized most of Oleksandropil but did not specify when the advance occurred.[90] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 8 that Russian forces advanced to the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway near Novoolenivka.[91]

The Ukrainian General Staff's May 7 2200 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked near Toretsk, north of Toretsk near Dyliivka, west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka and Nova Poltavka, and southwest of Toretsk near Malynivka on May 7 before Russia implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.[92]

The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces Russian forces attacked near Toretsk, Dyliivka, Shcherbynivka, Nova Poltavka, Malynivka, and Yelyzavetivka and toward Romanivka (both southwest of Toretsk).[93] ISW is unable to assess whether these attacks occurred after the start of Russia's unilateral ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.

The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 1600 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire by attacking near Toretsk, Krymske (north of Toretsk), Oleksandropil (southwest of Toretsk), and Yelyzavetivka on May 8.[94] Trehubov stated on May 8 that Russian forces attacked in the Toretsk direction following Russia's implementation of its unilateral ceasefire.[95]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on May 8 that Ukrainian forces violated Russia's unilateral ceasefire by counterattacking near Toretsk.[96] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 8 that Ukrainian forces violated Russia's ceasefire near Toretsk.[97]

Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets stated on May 8 that Russian forces operating in the Toretsk direction are using the cover of spring foliage to storm Ukrainian positions in small infantry groups.[98]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukranian positions near Kleban-Byk (northwest of Toretsk).[99] Elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating in Novoolenivka (west of Toretsk).[100]


Ukrainian and Russian sources accused each other of violating Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire in the Pokrovsk direction on May 8.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on May 8 that Russian forces marginally advanced near Novoserhiivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[101] One milblogger claimed that Russian forces made this advance on May 7 prior to Russia’s unilateral Victory Day ceasefire, but the other milblogger did not specify when this advance occurred.[102]

The Ukrainian General Staff's May 7 2200 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Zvirove, Novoserhiivka, and Udachne on May 7 before Russia implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.[103]

The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk, Lysivka, Kotlyne, Zvirove, Novoserhiivka, and Udachne.[104] ISW is unable to assess whether these attacks occurred after the start of Russia's unilateral ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.

The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 1600 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire by attacking near Myrolyubivka (east of Pokrovsk), near Hrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk), Dachenske (south of Pokrovsk), and near Kotlyne, Zvirove, and Udachne on May 8.[105] Trehubov stated on May 8 that Russian forces continued to attack in the Pokrovsk direction following Russia's implementation of its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire.[106]

A Russian milblogger accused Ukrainian forces of violating Russia's ceasefire on May 8 by conducting drone strikes against Russian positions in the Pokrovsk direction.[107]

Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on May 7 that Russian forces continue to increase their use of motorcycles in assaults in the Pokrovsk direction.[108] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on May 8 that Russian forces are conducting small infantry assaults with motorized vehicle and drone support.[109] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are repeatedly deploying assaults consisting of poorly trained infantry to first overwhelm Ukrainian defenses before better-trained infantry attack.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian "Vega" Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[110]


Ukrainian sources accused Russian forces in the Novopavlivka direction of violating Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire on May 8.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian MoD claimed on May 8 that Russian forces seized Troitske (southeast of Novopavlivka) before Russia implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire on May 8.[111] Russian milbloggers claimed on May 7 that Russian forces advanced south of Novooleksandrivka (northeast of Novopavlivka) and near Kotlyarivka, Nadiivka (both east of Novopavlivka), and Horikhove (southeast of Novopavlivka).[112]

The Ukrainian General Staff's May 7 2200 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novooleksandrivka; east of Novopavlivka near Nadiivka and Kotlyarivka; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Trotiske and Bohdanivka on May 7 before Russia implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.[113]

The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked near Novooleksandrivka, Nadiivka, Kotlyarivka, Trotiske, and Bohdanivka.[114] ISW is unable to assess whether these attacks occurred after the start of Russia's unilateral ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.

The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 1600 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire by attacking near Novooleksandrivka, Kotlyarivka, and Preobrazhenka (east of Novopavlivka) on May 8.[115] Trehubov stated on May 8 that Russian forces attacked in the Novopavlivka direction after Russia implemented its unilateral ceasefire.[116]


Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction before Russia implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire and Ukrainian sources accused Russian forces of violating Russia's ceasefire on May 8.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Rozdolne (southwest of Kurakhove).[117]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on May 8 that Russian forces advanced northwest of Andriivka (west of Kurakhove) and near Odradne (southwest of Kurakhove) prior to Russia’s unilateral Victory Day ceasefire.[118]

The Ukrainian General Staff's May 7 2200 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil, Andriivka, Bahatyr, and Oleksiivka and toward Odradne on May 7 before Russia implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.[119]

The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynopil, Andriivka, Bahatyr, Oleksiivka, and Odradne.[120] ISW is unable to assess whether these attacks occurred after the start of Russia's unilateral ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.[121]

The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 1600 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated Russia’s unilateral Victory Day ceasefire by attacking near Andriivka and Rozlyv (southwest of Kurakhove) on May 8.[122] The deputy commander of a Ukrainian detachment reported on May 8 that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral ceasefire by attacking near Bahatyr on May 8.[123]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 200th Artillery Brigade and 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 43rd Spetsnaz Company (reportedly also of the 29th CAA) are reportedly operating near Bahatyr.[124]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction before Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire and Ukrainian and Russian sources accused each other of violating Russia's ceasefire on May 8.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 7 indicates that Russian forces advanced in fields northwest of Rozdolne (northeast of Velyka Novosilka).[125]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on May 7 that Russian forces advanced north of Dniproenerhiya (north of Velyka Novosilka) and west of Novosilka (west of Velyka Novosilka).[126]

The Ukrainian General Staff's May 7 2200 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked west of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole and Novosilka and southwest of Velyka Novosilka toward Novopil on May 7 before Russia implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.[127]

The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked near Vilne Pole and Novosilka and toward Novopil.[128] ISW is unable to assess whether these attacks occurred after the start of Russia's unilateral ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.

The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 1600 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire by attacking near Burlatske (northwest of Velyka Novosilka), Novosilka, Pryvilne (west of Velyka Novosilka), and Novopil on May 8.[129] Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on May 8 that Russian forces violated Russia's ceasefire by attacking near Novopil and Novosilka.[130] Voloshyn stated that Russian aviation has ceased activity since the start of Russia’s ceasefire but that Russian forces continue artillery and drone strikes, albeit at a decreased intensity.

A Russian milblogger accused Ukrainian forces of violating Russia's ceasefire on May 8 by conducting drone strikes against Russian positions along the Vilne Pole-Novosilka-Novodarivka line (west and southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[131]

Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Ukrainian sources accused Russian forces in the Zaporizhia direction of violating Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire on May 8.

The Ukrainian General Staff's May 7 2200 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove and west of Orikhiv near Kamyanske before Russia implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.[132]

The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked near Kamyanske and Shcherbaky (west of Orikhiv).[133] ISW is unable to assess whether these attacks occurred after the start of Russia's unilateral ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.

The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 1600 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire by attacking near Stepove and Shcherbaky.[134] Russian milbloggers claimed on May 8 that Russian forces attacked near Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv), Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv), Stepove, Shcherbaky, and Kamyanske.[135]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian BARS-3 "Rodina" Battalion (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction, and drone operators of the "Viking" Drone detachment are reportedly operating near Kamyanske.[136] Drone operators of the 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) and of the "Nemets" group of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[137]


Ukrainian and Russian sources accused each other of violating Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire in the Kherson direction on May 8.

The Ukrainian General Staff's May 7 2200 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction before Russia implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.[138]

The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction.[139] ISW is unable to assess whether these attacks occurred after the start of Russia's unilateral ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8.

The Ukrainian General Staff's May 8 1600 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire by attacking in the Kherson direction.[140] Ukrainian officials reported on May 8 that Russian forces violated Russia's ceasefire by striking civilian infrastructure in the Kherson direction.[141]

A Russian milblogger accused Ukrainian forces of violating Russia's ceasefire on May 8 by attempting to land on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River near the Antonvisky Bridge.[142]

A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Kherson direction reported that Russian and Ukrainian forces are engaging in combat at a distance, so this area of the front is largely static.[143]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 61st Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River.[144]


Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a drone strike against Ukraine on the evening of May 7 before Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched a third wave of drone strikes against Ukraine during the evening consisting of 31 Shahed and decoy drones.[145] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 20 drones in northern and central Ukraine and that six decoy drones were "lost in location." The Ukrainian State Emergency Service reported that the evening drone strike hit infrastructure near Uman, Cherkasy Oblast.[146]

The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces did not launch missiles or long-range drones against Ukraine on May 8 as of 0800 Kyiv time.[147] The Ukrainian Air Force noted that Russian forces had increased glide bomb strikes against Sumy Oblast in violation of Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire.[148]

Former Ukrainian Deputy Chief of the General Staff, retired Lieutenant General Ihor Romanenko, stated in an interview published on May 8 that Russian forces are using a roughly one –to-one ratio of Shahed strike drones to decoy drones in their strike packages.[149] Romanenko stated that these decoy drones include "Gerber" and "Parodi" drones and that Russian forces have improved their decoy drones over time, using the decoys to conduct reconnaissance and equipping the decoys with small warheads. Romanenko reported that some of the explosives in decoy drones are meant to detonate immediately upon impact while others have delayed detonations. Romanenko stated that Russian forces use these decoys primarily to distract Ukrainian air defenses and augment the drones with parts that make them falsely appear on radars as much larger targets.

Romanenko clarified that reports from the Ukrainian Air Force that Russian drones were "locationally lost" mean that Ukrainian forces detected the drones but that the drones then maneuvered and left the area of responsibility of the Ukrainian unit that first identified the drone such that Ukrainian air defenders could not locate the drone again.[150]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Russia is likely using increased Belarusian-Chinese cooperation as part of its sanctions evasions measures. Belarusian Economy Minister Yuriy Chebotar claimed on May 7 during a meeting of Belarusian-Chinese Intergovernmental Committee on Cooperation's Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation in Beijing that Belarus aims to increase trade, economic, and industrial cooperation with the People's Republic of China (PRC).[151] Chebotar highlighted Belarusian-Chinese cooperation in mechanical engineering, machine tool production, and optics and electronics.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.


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[2] https://iz dot ru/1883256/2025-05-08/belousov-sravnil-borbu-vs-rf-s-neonatcizmom-s-podvigom-naroda-i-krasnoi-armii; https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/23884365; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/7711576; https://lenta dot ru/news/2025/05/08/belousov-sravnil-borbu-s-neonatsizmom-s-podvigom-krasnoy-armii/;

[3] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042025

[4] kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/67843

[5] http://www.scrf.gov dot ru/media/files/file/83ufGkI0SUHYUOJoEaGisEuiDfyFVUMu.pdf

[6] https://x.com/MedvedevRussiaE/status/1920352919485845990

[7] http://www.scrf.gov dot ru/media/files/file/83ufGkI0SUHYUOJoEaGisEuiDfyFVUMu.pdf

[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020525

[9] https://x.com/MedvedevRussiaE/status/1920352919485845990

[10] https://x.com/MedvedevRussiaE/status/1920352919485845990

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[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar04172025

[13] https://www.politico.eu/article/china-cyber-menace-more-threatening-russia-warns-dutch-spy-chief/

[14] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-russia-explore-ways-restore-russian-gas-flows-europe-sources-say-2025-05-08/

[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825

[16] https://t.me/mod_russia/52304

[17] https://x.com/andrii_sybiha/status/1920415076143514031

[18] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9223

[19] https://t.me/suspilnenews/49674

[20] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1920573788967833743

[21] https://www.zeit dot de/2025/19/andrij-jermak-wolodymyr-selenskyj-ukrainekrieg-verhandlungen-russland-usa/komplettansicht

[22] https://tass dot ru/politika/23883057

[23] https://isw.pub/UkrWar050725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar05022025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825

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[27] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76870

[28] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76873

[29] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042025

[30] http://www.kremlin dot ru/supplement/6309; http://www.news dot cn/world/20250509/753c2b212a76424ab45a3be0bab53eca/c.html

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[32] https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825

[33] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-15-2025

[34] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-25-2025

[35] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-25-2025

[36] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/transcripts/76872 ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76873 ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/transcripts/76871 ; http://www.news dot cn/world/20250508/53e27a12b51f4423b4b2602323b16015/c.html ; http://www.news dot cn/world/20250509/32253c7ff4d9487e9c68a8d58a315112/c.html

[37] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/transcripts/76872

[38] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21-2024

[39] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2024 ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/transcripts/76872 ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76873 ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/transcripts/76871 ; http://www.news dot cn/world/20250508/53e27a12b51f4423b4b2602323b16015/c.html ; http://www.news dot cn/world/20250509/32253c7ff4d9487e9c68a8d58a315112/c.html

[40] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042925 https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Putin%27s%20Offset%20The%20Kremlin%27s%20Geopolitical%20Adaptations%20Since%202014.pdf; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042925; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2024

[41] https://ukraine.ohchr.org/en/Protection-of-Civilians-in-Armed-Conflict-April-2025 ; https://suspilne dot media/1012683-nimeccina-peredala-novij-paket-dopomogi-zelenskij-zaklikav-pripiniti-vogon-sonajmense-na-30-dib-1170-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1746708297&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[42] https://www dot rbc.ua/ukr/news ; https://www dot rbc.ua/ukr/news/rada-ratifikuvala-ugodu-zi-ssha-nadra-1746635236.html ; https://www dot youtube.com/live/k6sz-i2lmdw ; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/310279 ; https://t.me/yzheleznyak/12499; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14148; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1920507414299672651; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14147; https://suspilne dot media/1013477-zelenskij-i-prezidentka-ek-obgovorili-podalsi-kroki-dla-vstupu-ukraini-v-es/; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1920500408457236857

[43] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-1-2025

[44] https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1920202569772666922; https://x.com/Map_Hargoo/status/1920114542593364373; https://t.me/SHACHA190/130628; https://t.me/starshii_pogrannaryada/10950; https:// t [dot] me/warriorofnorth/8116; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9100

[45] https://x.com/LloydUkrYT/status/1920169394442842210; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1920028442998845493; https://t.me/tankova_brugada/2593

[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23996

[47] https://t.me/mod_russia/52304

[48] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91343; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91344; https://t.me/wargonzo/26383; https://t.me/dva_majors/70775; https://t.me/yurasumy/22845; https://t.me/rybar/70221; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91348; https://t.me/rusich_army/23249; https://t.me/rusich_army/23250; https://t.me/epoddubny/23377

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[50] https://t.me/usf_army/555

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[52] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28269

[53] https://x.com/p6060083/status/1919991600165372185 ; https://x.com/Raver__/status/1919884812900266189 ;

[54] https://t.me/dva_majors/70772

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[57] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28243

[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23996

[59]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036FNwGZDqC5NMJPcoViopueC2SCsWhE2E87EFDDbvUYgaqvqYf5AwGPmc69UqQzN9l

[60]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hLwvGYGNLsx3QuPYdwZPwR3ZCC6e68n6WmxxB1BDCjwxN5NSxwGou2HD1LHzBMWNl ;

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[63] https://t.me/rubak112/248; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9091

[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23996

[65] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036FNwGZDqC5NMJPcoViopueC2SCsWhE2E87EFDDbvUYgaqvqYf5AwGPmc69UqQzN9l

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[67] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1012873-bojovi-zitknenna-8-travna-fiksuut-na-pivnoci-harkivsini-ta-na-kupanskomu-napramku-sinegubov/

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[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23996

[70] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036FNwGZDqC5NMJPcoViopueC2SCsWhE2E87EFDDbvUYgaqvqYf5AwGPmc69UqQzN9l

[71] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hLwvGYGNLsx3QuPYdwZPwR3ZCC6e68n6WmxxB1BDCjwxN5NSxwGou2HD1LHzBMWNl

[72] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163978

[73] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23996

[74] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036FNwGZDqC5NMJPcoViopueC2SCsWhE2E87EFDDbvUYgaqvqYf5AwGPmc69UqQzN9l

[75] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hLwvGYGNLsx3QuPYdwZPwR3ZCC6e68n6WmxxB1BDCjwxN5NSxwGou2HD1LHzBMWNl

[76] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1013009-ukrainski-zahisniki-dzerkalno-vidpovidaut-na-vsi-zagrozi-osuv-hortica-pro-peremira-rf-na-frontah-doneccini/

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[80] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64081; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163978

[81] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23996

[82] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036FNwGZDqC5NMJPcoViopueC2SCsWhE2E87EFDDbvUYgaqvqYf5AwGPmc69UqQzN9l

[83] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hLwvGYGNLsx3QuPYdwZPwR3ZCC6e68n6WmxxB1BDCjwxN5NSxwGou2HD1LHzBMWNl

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[86] https://t.me/wargonzo/26392

[87] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1920364764485587240; https://t.me/Orki3MsbLauda/170

[88] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9090; https://t.me/bbs117_army/48;

[89] https://t.me/yurasumy/22851; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91335; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91315

[90] https://t.me/dva_majors/70772

[91] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64078; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28257; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28257 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70756

[92] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23996

[93] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036FNwGZDqC5NMJPcoViopueC2SCsWhE2E87EFDDbvUYgaqvqYf5AwGPmc69UqQzN9l

[94] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hLwvGYGNLsx3QuPYdwZPwR3ZCC6e68n6WmxxB1BDCjwxN5NSxwGou2HD1LHzBMWNl

[95] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1013009-ukrainski-zahisniki-dzerkalno-vidpovidaut-na-vsi-zagrozi-osuv-hortica-pro-peremira-rf-na-frontah-doneccini/

[96] https://t.me/mod_russia/52304; https://t.me/tass_agency/314041

[97] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64088

[98] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/08/dyktatura-pogody-ta-zelenky-poblyzu-toreczka-rosiyany-zminyly-grafik-shturmiv/

[99] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163939

[100] https://t.me/dva_majors/70756 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70797

[101] https://t.me/yurasumy/22850; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163978

[102] https://t.me/yurasumy/22850

[103] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23996

[104] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036FNwGZDqC5NMJPcoViopueC2SCsWhE2E87EFDDbvUYgaqvqYf5AwGPmc69UqQzN9l

[105] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hLwvGYGNLsx3QuPYdwZPwR3ZCC6e68n6WmxxB1BDCjwxN5NSxwGou2HD1LHzBMWNl

[106] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1013009-ukrainski-zahisniki-dzerkalno-vidpovidaut-na-vsi-zagrozi-osuv-hortica-pro-peremira-rf-na-frontah-doneccini/

[107] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28261

[108] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9567

[109] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/08/cze-masshtabne-slaboumiye-yakes-taktyka-myasnyh-shturmiv-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-proczvitaye/

[110] https://t.me/sashakots/53558

[111] https://t.me/mod_russia/52305

[112] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35552; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35548; https://t.me/yurasumy/22850; Https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64076; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64079

[113] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23996

[114] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036FNwGZDqC5NMJPcoViopueC2SCsWhE2E87EFDDbvUYgaqvqYf5AwGPmc69UqQzN9l

[115] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hLwvGYGNLsx3QuPYdwZPwR3ZCC6e68n6WmxxB1BDCjwxN5NSxwGou2HD1LHzBMWNl

[116] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1013009-ukrainski-zahisniki-dzerkalno-vidpovidaut-na-vsi-zagrozi-osuv-hortica-pro-peremira-rf-na-frontah-doneccini/

[117] https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/1920276526722851315; https://www.facebook.com/61573845209927/videos/1215029306922099/; https://x.com/RALee85/status/1920251724226249030; https://t.me/TyskNIP/15952; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9102

[118] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35583; https://t.me/voin_dv/14802

[119] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23996

[120] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036FNwGZDqC5NMJPcoViopueC2SCsWhE2E87EFDDbvUYgaqvqYf5AwGPmc69UqQzN9l

[121] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036FNwGZDqC5NMJPcoViopueC2SCsWhE2E87EFDDbvUYgaqvqYf5AwGPmc69UqQzN9l

[122] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hLwvGYGNLsx3QuPYdwZPwR3ZCC6e68n6WmxxB1BDCjwxN5NSxwGou2HD1LHzBMWNl

[123] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1012713-nove-peremir

[124] https://t.me/voin_dv/14781; https://t.me/voin_dv/14798

[125] https://x.com/RALee85/status/1920251724226249030; https://t.me/TyskNIP/15952; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9102

[126] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35548; https://t.me/yurasumy/22849

[127] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23996

[128] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036FNwGZDqC5NMJPcoViopueC2SCsWhE2E87EFDDbvUYgaqvqYf5AwGPmc69UqQzN9l

[129] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hLwvGYGNLsx3QuPYdwZPwR3ZCC6e68n6WmxxB1BDCjwxN5NSxwGou2HD1LHzBMWNl

[130] https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1013229-travneve-peremira-rf-rosijski-vijska-prodovzuut-obstrili-na-zaporizkomu-napramku/

[131] https://t.me/vrogov/20215

[132] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23996

[133] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036FNwGZDqC5NMJPcoViopueC2SCsWhE2E87EFDDbvUYgaqvqYf5AwGPmc69UqQzN9l

[134] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hLwvGYGNLsx3QuPYdwZPwR3ZCC6e68n6WmxxB1BDCjwxN5NSxwGou2HD1LHzBMWNl

[135] https://t.me/dva_majors/70772 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26383

[136] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163910 ; https://t.me/Viking_SpN/2754 ; https://t.me/russian_airborne/9988 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163950

[137] https://t.me/wargonzo/26380 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35555

[138] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23996

[139] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036FNwGZDqC5NMJPcoViopueC2SCsWhE2E87EFDDbvUYgaqvqYf5AwGPmc69UqQzN9l

[140] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02hLwvGYGNLsx3QuPYdwZPwR3ZCC6e68n6WmxxB1BDCjwxN5NSxwGou2HD1LHzBMWNl

[141] https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/7733 ; https://www.facebook.com/pho.gov.ua/posts/1074894061339321?ref=embed_post

[142] https://t.me/dva_majors/70822; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/26100; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/26095

[143] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IcIrtPsvoEA; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/08/yak-vpolyuvaty-okupanta-richkovym-tenisom-na-hersonskomu-napryamku-tryvayut-boyezitknennya-na-dnipri/

[144] https://t.me/dva_majors/70787

[145] https://t.me/kpszsu/34086

[146] https://t.me/dsns_telegram/42561

[147] https://t.me/kpszsu/34086

[148] https://t.me/kpszsu/34086

[149] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/08/shho-vidomo-pro-bpla-imitatory-intervyu-z-ekspertom-pro-potenczijni-zagrozy-vid-rosijskyh-droniv-obmanok/

[150] https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/05/08/shho-vidomo-pro-bpla-imitatory-intervyu-z-ekspertom-pro-potenczijni-zagrozy-vid-rosijskyh-droniv-obmanok/

[151] https://belta dot by/economics/view/chebotar-belarus-natselena-na-uglublenie-proizvodstvennoj-kooperatsii-s-kitaem-713444-2025/

Iran Update, May 8, 2025

 Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, Ria Reddy, Kelly Campa, Avery Borens,
Carolyn Moorman, Ben Schmida, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings.

Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi acknowledged the US–Houthi ceasefire but reiterated that the Houthi movement will continue to support Hamas against Israel.[1] Abdulmalik’s statements demonstrate how the Houthis view the Red Sea attack campaign as one element of a broader Houthi strategic effort to pressure Israel to end its campaign in the Gaza Strip. The ceasefire secures an end to maritime shipping attacks, but the Houthis will continue to fire on other Israeli economic targets in pursuit of the same objectives. The Houthis have already shifted to targeting Israeli airports, for example. Abdulmalik framed the ceasefire as a victory against the United States. Abdulmalik implied that the ceasefire would not be permanent by adding that “when” the United States gets involved in a “third round” of airstrikes, the Houthis will confront the United States again.[2] The Houthis could resume attacks at any time and for any reason they choose.

Air campaigns targeting the Houthis can have only temporary military effects because the Houthis can rebuild damaged infrastructure after the end of the campaign.[3] The United States conducted at least 32 airstrikes targeting Houthi oil offloading infrastructure at Ras Issa Port between April 2 and May 5.[4] This initially created fuel shortages and posed challenges for both the Houthis’ military operations and separately civil service provision in Houthi-controlled territories, but the Houthis gradually learned techniques to ensure service continuity despite the airstrikes.[5] The US airstrikes on April 17 targeting Ras Issa Port alone cost the Houthis approximately $700 million worth of damage, according to a Yemeni economist.[6] The Yemeni Oil Company announced on May 8 that they have successfully repaired the Ras Issa Oil Port’s filling platforms and would restore fuel distribution to all their stations within 24 hours, which demonstrates that even serious damage can be rapidly fixed.[7] Cargo ships have also reportedly resumed offloading operations at Ras Issa Port.[8] Even the best-designed air campaigns can only achieve temporary effects that must be sustained through other means.

International shipping companies are reluctant to return to Red Sea routes despite the US–Houthi ceasefire agreement, which demonstrates the limited economic and strategic impact of the most recent US air campaign against the Houthis.[9] Shipping companies are still “assessing the deal” and remain deeply skeptical about returning to the Red Sea routes because of the ambiguity of the ceasefire terms, according to the Wall Street Journal on May 8.[10] This includes whether the truce applies broadly to commercial shipping or just US vessels.[11] Other regional events, such as a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, could prompt the Houthis to target international shipping again in the future if the Houthis see a benefit in doing so. The Houthis claimed a likely Iranian attack targeting Saudi Arabia in 2019 during the 2019 US-Iran escalation, demonstrating that the Houthis will sometimes support Iran’s regional objectives even at risk to the Houthi movement.[12] The US airstrikes only addressed the tactical manifestations of the Houthi threat to the freedom of navigation in the Red Sea rather than resolving the underlying strategic and political drivers motivating the Houthis’ campaign. The Wall Street Journal added that industry experts expect it could take months to restore shipping confidence.[13] The persistent risk that the Houthis could disrupt global maritime commerce for months--if not years--at a time underscores the seriousness of the Houthi strategic and economic threat.

Syrian Transitional President Ahmed al Shara reportedly wants to discuss a broad economic reconstruction plan with US President Donald Trump, likely in part to secure US sanctions relief for Syria.[14] Unspecified Syrian transitional government officials told the Wall Street Journal on May 7 that Syrian President Ahmed al Shara wants to meet US President Donald Trump to discuss broad US investment and aid to rebuild Syria.[15] Shara reportedly requested to meet with Trump during Trump’s upcoming Gulf visit through US businessman and liquified natural gas (LNG) company CEO Jonathan Bass and Syrian Emergency Task Force head Mouaz Moustafa.[16] Bass and Moustafa met with Shara in Damascus on May 2 and presented him with a plan for Western firms to invest in Syria’s energy industry.[17] Syria has significant oil and gas infrastructure that needs to be rebuilt or updated after over a decade of civil war.[18] Bass and Moustafa said that Shara "responded favorably" to the idea of the United States’ waiving or lessening sanctions in order to make the investment possible.[19] An unspecified senior Syrian Foreign Affairs official confirmed Shara’s interest by telling Western media that Syria seeks a relationship with the United States that includes “energy and economic ties.”[20] Bass said that Shara and Syrian officials were also interested in participation from US companies in all areas of Syrian reconstruction.[21] The Trump administration has not yet acknowledged Shara’s reported request.

Shara’s proposal may seek to obtain full sanctions relief from the United States by offering investment in Syria. Shara will find it hard to meet all of the Trump administration’s “confidence-building measures,” and could view possible investment in Syria’s energy sector as a bargaining chip.[22] The United States under the first Trump administration previously sought to allow US companies to invest in energy infrastructure in northeastern Syria, and Shara could calculate that a similar scheme would help him obtain sanctions relief.[23] US sanctions that have been in place since the fall of the Assad regime currently prevent direct US economic involvement in Syria. Shara and Syrian transitional government officials have attempted to attain partial or full US sanctions relief since assuming power in December 2024 and have communicated back and forth about several “confidence-building” conditions that the US requested that Syria observe.[24] The Syrian government said that it plans to fully address most of the US demands, including the destruction of remaining chemical weapons stockpiles and the appointment of a liaison to assist efforts to find missing US citizen Austin Tice.[25] The government has also taken tangible steps to honor the US request that it limit Palestinian military and political activity in Syria.[26] Shara is likely unwilling to act on the US condition that he bar foreign fighters from senior government positions, however, given that this condition would require him to sideline individuals who are deeply loyal to him.[27] Shara said on May 8 during a press conference in Paris that his government guarantees that foreign fighters will not pose a threat to neighboring countries, which suggests that he does not plan to remove them from the current Syrian army ranks or offices.[28] Shara could calculate that a counter-proposal that creates opportunities for US industry in Syria could mitigate his unwillingness to fully observe all the US conditions and still secure sanction relief on Syria.

Syrian officials may also be attempting to exploit perceived US interest in curtailing the People’s Republic of China (PRC) influence abroad in order to secure US sanctions relief and economic support. Unspecified Syrian government officials described Shara’s proposal as a “Marshall Plan-style" program in which US and other Western companies would invest in Syria’s reconstruction instead of China or other powers, according to the Wall Street Journal.[29] That the Syrian officials reportedly specified that Shara would be willing to exclude China suggests that the Syrian government may be attempting to exploit a perceived US interest in curbing the PRC’s influence abroad in order to spur US interest and investment in Syria. Bass said that Shara wants “Boeing” and “US telecom” and not “Huawei,” referring to the Chinese telecommunications company that has invested heavily in partnerships in the Middle East.[30]

Recent steps by the Syrian government suggest that it seeks to develop genuine economic partnerships with US adversaries like China and Russia if it cannot secure sanctions relief and economic assistance elsewhere, however. The Syrian government most recently hosted PRC officials on March 27 and discussed “enhancing cooperation,” which CTP-ISW assessed was likely related to securing Chinese support for the transition.[31] Shara and the Syrian transport minister have met with Chinese transport and medical manufacturing businessmen to discuss Chinese investment in Syria within the past week.[32] The Syrian government also reinitiated Syria’s economic ties with Russia in recent months. Russia has delivered Syrian currency and Russian oil to Syria, and Russia also reportedly seeks to re-negotiate Russian investment contracts for phosphate mines and oil fields in the central Syrian desert.[33] Both PRC and Russian officials have made it clear that they seek to increase involvement in Syria. Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin released a joint statement on May 8 following a press conference in Moscow that emphasized Russian and Chinese support for Syria’s “sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity.”[34]

A Qatari-backed initiative will provide Syria with civil sector salary support after the US Treasury Department reportedly granted Qatar a sanctions exemption.[35] Reuters originally reported that the Treasury Department granted the sanctions exemption, but the United States has not yet confirmed the sanctions exemption.[36] The Qatari-backed grant initiative will provide Syria with $27 million monthly for three months to pay the salaries of select civilian public sector workers.[37] An unspecified Syrian financial source told Western media that the grant is conditional and will not apply to Syrian Defense Ministry or Interior Ministry personnel.[38] The Syrian government previously announced in January 2025 that it would raise public sector salaries by 400% the following month, but has yet to do so due to a lack of funding.[39] The unspecified Syrian source said that the Qatari funding will help implement this salary raise over the next several months and that the Syrian government would acquire other funds for employees excluded from the initiative.[40] Qatar had previously delayed this initiative in late February 2025 due to uncertainty over whether the funding would breach US sanctions.[41] Syrian Finance Minister Mohammad Yasser Barniyeh welcomed the exemption and said that the Syrian government hopes it will be followed by further measures to ease sanctions.[42] Barniyeh is an economist trained at Damascus, Kansas State, and Oklahoma State universities before working for the Arab Monetary Fund.[43] Barniyeh participated in the liberalization of the Assad regime's economy in the early 2000s, when he served on the Syrian Commission on Financial Markets and the Damascus Securities Exchange.[44]

Senior Iranian military officials inspected a military facility in southern Iran, likely as part of preparations for a potential US or Israeli strike on Iran. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Hossein Salami and IRGC Navy Commander Rear Admiral Ali Reza Tangsiri inspected an underground drone hangar in Hormozgan Province on May 8.[45] Salami threatened to attack any country that supports an attack on Iran. Footage of the base during the visit showed Iranian Mohajer-6 and Ababil-5 drones. Mohajer-6 and Ababil-5 drones have a range of 200 and 480 km, respectively.[46] The precise location of the facility is unclear, but the inspection of a base hosting drones that has the range to target most of the Persian Gulf from the southern Iranian coast suggests that Iranian officers were inspecting units and reviewing plans for post-strike responses in the Persian Gulf region. Hormozgan Province lies along Iran‘s southern coast. The visit follows a series of similar inspections at Iranian military and defense sites in Hormozgan and the surrounding provinces.[47] Senior military officers often visit units and facilities under their command as part of their preparations for major defensive and offensive operations to ensure that their commands are well-prepared. IRGC-affiliated media also published old footage on May 8 that showed an Iranian Mohajer-6 drone surveilling the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower aircraft carrier.[48] Artesh Air Force Commander Brigadier General Hamid Vahedi separately claimed on May 8 that Iran equipped all of its fighter jets with long-range munitions and updated navigation systems.[49] Most Iranian fighter jets are Cold War third- and fourth-generation aircraft like the F4 Phantom and F14 Tomcat. These threats follow new US threats to attack Iran. US President Donald Trump stated on May 7 that he wants to "blow up" Iran's nuclear centrifuges either “nicely" through an agreement with Iran or “viciously."[50]

An attempted Iranian attack on the Israeli embassy in London highlights the unconventional ways through which Iran has and will likely continue to attempt to impose costs on Israel. UK authorities arrested eight Iranian nationals on May 4 after foiling a suspected Iranian-directed terror plot to target the Israeli Embassy in London.[51] The Guardian reported on May 8 that the UK police conducted its largest raid across the country due to threats of a suspected terror plot.[52] UK MI5 assessed that the plot had reached an “advanced but not imminent” stage and detained the suspects. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi denied Iranian involvement in the terror plot and called for diplomacy.[53] It is possible that the Iranian IRGC did not notify Araghchi about this plot. The IRGC has previously failed to notify other government bodies about its operations.[54] Iran has historically relied on unconventional methods to impose costs on Israel, including conducting terror attacks on Israeli diplomatic and civilian targets abroad. This recent Iranian plot in the UK does not represent an inflection in Iranian activity but is part of a decades-long strategy that includes assassination and bombing plots against Israeli interests in Argentina, Cyprus, Turkey, Georgia, Greece, and Azerbaijan.[55] Iranian officials and Iranian media have previously suggested that Iran may attack Israeli diplomatic facilities in response to the Israeli airstrike near the Iranian embassy in Damascus in April 2024.[56] Iranian officials have also repeatedly warned that Iran will conduct a third missile attack on Israel.[57] Israeli strikes on Iran in October 2024 damaged Iranian long-range missile production, which suggests that Iran‘s ability to respond militarily using its missile stockpile may be somewhat constrained. Iran can still impose costs on Israel by attacking Israeli diplomatic targets in the region and beyond, however.[58]

Key Takeaways:

  • Houthis Respond to Ceasefire: Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi acknowledged the US–Houthi ceasefire but reiterated that the Houthi movement will continue to support Hamas against Israel. Air campaigns targeting the Houthis can have only temporary military effects because the Houthis can rebuild damaged infrastructure after the end of the campaign. International shipping companies are reluctant to return to Red Sea routes despite the US–Houthi ceasefire agreement, which demonstrates the limited economic and strategic impact of the most recent US air campaign against the Houthis.
  • Syria and Sanctions Relief: Syrian Transitional President Ahmed al Shara reportedly wants to discuss a broad economic reconstruction plan with US President Donald Trump, likely in part to secure US sanctions relief for Syria.
  • Syrian Salaries: A Qatari-backed initiative will provide Syria with civil sector salary support after the US Treasury Department reportedly granted Qatar a sanctions exemption.
  • Iranian Officers Inspect Military Facilities: Senior Iranian military officials inspected a military facility in southern Iran, likely as part of preparations for a potential US or Israeli strike on Iran.
  • Iranian Terrorist Operations in the United Kingdom: An attempted Iranian attack on the Israeli embassy in London highlights the unconventional ways through which Iran has and will likely continue to attempt to impose costs on Israel.

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

The Iranian rial depreciated from 828,500 rials to one US dollar on May 7 to 831,000 rials to one US dollar on May 8.[59]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with Indian officials in New Delhi, India, on May 8 to discuss India-Pakistan tensions and bilateral economic cooperation.[60] Araghchi met with Indian President Droupadi Murmu and Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar.[61] Araghchi and Jaishankar discussed the implementation of the May 2024 ten-year Chabahar cooperation agreement.[62] The agreement outlines the development of Iran’s southeastern Chabahar port to facilitate trade between Iran, Afghanistan, and Central Asian countries, which effectively bypasses Pakistani ports.[63] India was the second largest importer of Iranian oil before the US maximum pressure campaign in 2018.[64] Araghchi also met with Pakistani officials in Pakistan on May 5.[65] This series of meetings comes amid military escalation between India and Pakistan.[66]

Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian stated that direct negotiations under “threat or coercion” are irrational and dishonorable but that negotiations in “equal, pressure-free conditions” are "rational and honorable."[67] Ahmadian’s remarks may lay the ground for justifying direct negotiations with the United States. Ahmadian’s remarks follow an Israeli report on May 7 that Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi approached US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff to request direct US-Iran negotiations, reportedly due to Iran’s frustration with the slow progress of Omani-mediated talks.[68] The fourth round of US-Iran talks, initially scheduled for May 3, was postponed due to "logistical reasons.”[69]

Syria

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) opened a field hospital for Druze civilians in Hader, Quneitra Province, on May 8.[70] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson announced that the field hospital is part of the IDF’s efforts to support the Syrian Druze population.[71] The IDF has been operating in Hader since December 2024.[72] The establishment of an IDF field hospital in Hader follows Israel’s efforts to pressure the Syrian transitional government to halt sectarian violence against the Syrian Druze community.[73]


The Syrian and Iraqi governments continued to strengthen border security on both sides of the northern Syria-Iraq border.[74] The Syrian Interior Ministry began to recruit new members for the General Directorate of Border Guards on May 8.[75] The Syrian Defense Ministry recently deployed forces to the Iraqi border on April 18 to tighten control and curb illegal smuggling activities.[76] Syrian media also reported on May 7 that the Iraqi Army deployed new unspecified military units along the border across from the Syrian towns of Albu Kamal and Baghouz.[77] The Iraqi Army previously deployed the 34th Armored Brigade’s 1st Tank Battalion, which operates under the 9th Armored Division, to the Iraq-Syria border on April 16.[78] Iraqi Interior Minister Abdul Amir al Shammari said in an interview on May 6 that the Iraqi federal government has had no security coordination with the Syrian Interior Ministry yet.[79]


Iraq

Iraqi media reported that a “high-level” Shia Coordination Framework delegation will discuss multiple “key” issues with Iranian officials from May 8 to 9, including the upcoming November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections.[80] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. A Shia Coordination Framework source stated that the delegation represents all Shia Coordination Framework components and is authorized to “reach an understanding with Tehran on certain [unspecified] issues of mutual understanding.”[81] Iran reportedly sent a message to Shia Coordination Framework leaders on April 30 that called on the Shia Coordination Framework to remain unified ahead of the upcoming elections. Iran‘s message likely aims to increase the likelihood that Iranian-backed parties will maintain control of the Iraqi government.[82] A fragmented Shia Coordination Framework could allow smaller, less organized parties to outperform Iranian-backed parties.

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan signed multiple memoranda of understanding (MOU) during bilateral talks in Ankara, Turkey, on May 8.[83] The MoUs focused on multiple areas, including defense manufacturing and counter-narcotics. Sudani emphasized the importance of Iraq-Turkey security and counterterrorism cooperation and welcomed efforts to disarm the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) during a press conference with Erdogan.[84] Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and Jordan agreed in February 2025 to form a strategic alliance to counter the Islamic State.[85]

Arabian Peninsula

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
  • Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen
  • Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip

See topline section.

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Nothing Significant to Report.

CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.


[1] https://www.saba dot ye/ar/news3478139.htm

[2] https://www.saba dot ye/ar/news3478139.htm

[3] https://x.com/ypcye/status/1920388873915355381

[4] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1907498123565453467 ;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1912942033763004448 ;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1916213258056335479 ;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1918360758649344161 ;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1918403660272324682 ;

https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1919099222781006166 ;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1919496900392165504

[5] https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1919089443178213687 ;https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1919385020013170971

[6] https://x.com/AlHadath/status/1913172913831727220

[7] https://x.com/ypcye/status/1920388873915355381

[8] https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1920404660914933860 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/seafarers-stranded-off-yemen-port-eye-exit-after-us-houthi-ceasefire-deal-2025-05-08/

[9] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/trump-houthis-truce-shipping-industry-a3b01ecf?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1

[10] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/trump-houthis-truce-shipping-industry-a3b01ecf?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1

[11] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/trump-houthis-truce-shipping-industry-a3b01ecf?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1

[12] https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/iran-file/iran-file-october-7-2019

[13] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/trump-houthis-truce-shipping-industry-a3b01ecf?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1

[14] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/syria-dangles-oil-peace-for-u-s-help-on-sanctions-bc0481a0

[15] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/syria-dangles-oil-peace-for-u-s-help-on-sanctions-bc0481a0

[16] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/syria-dangles-oil-peace-for-u-s-help-on-sanctions-bc0481a0

[17] www dot sana.sy/en/?p=354232; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/syria-dangles-oil-peace-for-u-s-help-on-sanctions-bc0481a0

[18] https://www.spglobal.com/commodity-insights/en/news-research/latest-news/crude-oil/011725-feature-syria-seeks-to-rebuild-oil-and-gas-industry-but-needs-western-backing#:~:text=However%2C%20Syria's%20oil%20and%20gas,former%20dictator%20Bashar%20al%2DAssad.

[19] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/syria-dangles-oil-peace-for-u-s-help-on-sanctions-bc0481a0

[20] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/syria-dangles-oil-peace-for-u-s-help-on-sanctions-bc0481a0

[21] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/syria-dangles-oil-peace-for-u-s-help-on-sanctions-bc0481a0

[22] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-gave-syria-list-conditions-partial-sanctions-relief-sources-say-2025-03-25

[23] https://www.thedailybeast.com/trump-we-left-troops-behind-in-syria-only-for-the-oil; https://www.kuow.org/stories/fact-check-president-trump-s-plans-for-syrian-oil

[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-7-2025

[25] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrian-letter-delivers-response-us-conditions-sanctions-relief-2025-04-26

[26] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrian-letter-delivers-response-us-conditions-sanctions-relief-2025-04-26 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-22-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-5-2025

[27] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-26-2025

[28] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/752795/الشرع-لا-يتخلى-عن-المقاتلين-الأجانب-في ; https://x.com/Elysee/status/1920169532569595986

[29] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/syria-dangles-oil-peace-for-u-s-help-on-sanctions-bc0481a0

[30] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/syria-dangles-oil-peace-for-u-s-help-on-sanctions-bc0481a0 ; https://gulfnews.com/business/huawei-is-scoring-5g-and-cloud-wins-in-middle-east--next-it-wants-to-do-green-1.87244763 ; https://restofworld.org/2025/china-cloud-middle-east/

[31] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-27-2025

[32] https://t.me/SyPresidency/890; https://sana dot sy/?p=2213826

[33] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1890343048099303916; https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russia-ships-diesel-syria-tanker-under-us-sanctions-data-shows-2025-03-06; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/russia-is-chasing-a-deal-to-keep-its-military-bases-in-syria-f9f6ca6e?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1 ; https://www.ft.com/content/30ddfdd0-b83e-11e9-96bd-8e884d3ea203

[34] https://ria dot ru/20250508/siriya-2015806365.html;

[35] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/qatari-financing-syrian-salaries-gets-us-go-ahead-sources-say-2025-05-07

[36] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/qatari-financing-syrian-salaries-gets-us-go-ahead-sources-say-2025-05-07

[37] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/qatari-financing-syrian-salaries-gets-us-go-ahead-sources-say-2025-05-07 ; https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/129250

[38] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/qatari-financing-syrian-salaries-gets-us-go-ahead-sources-say-2025-05-07

[39] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrian-caretaker-government-hike-public-sector-salaries-by-400-next-month-2025-01-05 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/qatari-financing-syrian-salaries-gets-us-go-ahead-sources-say-2025-05-07

[40] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/qatari-financing-syrian-salaries-gets-us-go-ahead-sources-say-2025-05-07

[41] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-sanctions-hold-up-qatari-support-syria-sources-say-2025-02-26

[42] https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/129253

[43] https://www.facebook.com/AlWatanNewspaper.sy/posts/pfbid0r6zcYaC6YvcmieJi7WXdNEbL4uuTxogybg1C3Sc4tpdY4xYzNpiYtRwupAC9LWoJl?__cft__[0]=AZXVgCVo8cMwrPBbveMb0K4b3FuLegXUadoGHiQ9-_ATogTTcJDvwk-Cgyv87NibnILoEnxzemLGf85yVuF6G28S--0aLtsKkD1Gr89mHHxHqZTd2Xemnd93w63xI3Lz2xUye98iXrhV0YkyoXwDH22M2E4K5HGYh0z2NHyzwt9NDA&__tn__=%2CO*F; https://x.com/CdricLabrousse/status/1906091628840018352

[44] https://www.facebook.com/AlWatanNewspaper.sy/posts/pfbid0r6zcYaC6YvcmieJi7WXdNEbL4uuTxogybg1C3Sc4tpdY4xYzNpiYtRwupAC9LWoJl?__cft__[0]=AZXVgCVo8cMwrPBbveMb0K4b3FuLegXUadoGHiQ9-_ATogTTcJDvwk-Cgyv87NibnILoEnxzemLGf85yVuF6G28S--0aLtsKkD1Gr89mHHxHqZTd2Xemnd93w63xI3Lz2xUye98iXrhV0YkyoXwDH22M2E4K5HGYh0z2NHyzwt9NDA&__tn__=%2CO*F; https://x.com/CdricLabrousse/status/1906091628840018352

[45] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/18/3308640

[46] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/740048 ; https://farsi.iranpress dot com/ابابیل-5-گامی-جدید-در-توسعه-خانواده-پهپاد-ابابیل

[47] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-4-2025 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/01/15/3285079 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-23-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-7-2025 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-14-2025

[48] https://farsnews dot ir/M_r7726/1746724159981282069

[49] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/744752/

[50] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/trump-irans-centrifuges-will-either-blow-up-nicely-in-a-deal-or-viciously-without-one/

[51] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2025/05/04/iranian-terror-attack-uk-hours-away-from-being-launched/ ;

https://www.thetimes.com/uk/crime/article/israel-embassy-iran-terror-plot-cbj8bfcsx

[52] https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2025/may/07/iranians-arrested-in-counter-terrorism-raids-allegedly-targeted-israeli-embassy

[53] https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/865038

[54] https://www.dw.com/fa-ir/%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%81%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%84-%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D8%AE%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B8%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%81-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%85-%D8%B3%D9%84%DB%8C%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C/a-57331260

[55] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/12/argentina-iran-1994-amia-bombing ;

https://apnews.com/article/cyprus-israel-iran-mossad-plot-5f390cc785900f3f6600042779d54868 ;

https://www.timesofisrael dot com/three-iranian-agents-said-caught-in-turkey-plotting-to-kill-israelis/ ;

https://www.timesofisrael dot com/israel-says-irans-quds-force-tried-to-kill-israeli-businessman-in-georgia/ ;

https://www.reuters.com/investigations/murder-hire-inside-irans-proxy-war-with-israel-west-2024-10-05/ ;

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/01/azerbaijan-says-it-thwarted-an-iranian-plot-to-kill-an-israeli-ambassador/252111/

[56] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-2-2024 ;

https://twitter.com/j_rashidikoochi/status/1774907313402327450 ;

https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/659259

[57] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/12/10/3266596 ;

https://www.tabnak dot ir/fa/news/1289572 ;

https://www.asriran dot com/fa/news/1038817

[58] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-7-2024

[59] https://www.bon-bast.com/

[60] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/744642/

[61] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/18/3308434

[62] https://farsnews dot ir/akramsharifi/1746700625456124858

[63] https://www.reuters.com/world/india/india-sign-10-year-pact-with-iran-chabahar-port-management-et-reports-2024-05-13/

[64] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/us-oil-embargo-stalls-iran-india-energy-relations/#:~:text=India%20was%20Iran's%20second%20largest,(JCPOA)%20in%20May%202018.

[65] https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/231448

[66] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/08/world/asia/india-pakistan-diplomacy-kashmir.html

[67] https://www.jamaran dot news/fa/amp/news-1667557

[68] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/rjok30dlee

[69] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-1-2025

[70] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1920385063432204723 ; https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-853143

[71] https://t.me/damascusv011/31247 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1920385063432204723 ;

[72] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-11-2024#:~:text=The%20Israel%20Defense,Daraa%20Province.%5B20%5D

[73] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-1-2025

[74] https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/56580

[75] https://x.com/syrianmoi/status/1920164492085792839

[76] https://t.me/HalabTodayTV/121826 ; https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/55260

[77] https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/56580

[78] https://t.me/MODiraq/11367

[79] https://www.alhadath dot net/iraq/2025/05/06/%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86

[80] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%88%D9%81%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%82%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B2%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A8-%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9

[81] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%88%D9%81%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%82%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B2%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A8-%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9

[82] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%87%D9%88%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%B4-%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-30-2025

[83] https://ina dot iq/eng/39783-al-sudani-and-erdogan-sponsor-mou-signing-ceremony-between-iraq-and-turkey.html

[84] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%B8%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%88%D9%84%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%85%D8%AD-%D9%84-%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1

[85] https://shafaq dot com/en/Iraq/Iraq-neighbors-near-security-alliance-agreement

Picture, Picture, Picture
Iran Update, May 8, 2025

Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, Ria Reddy, Kelly Campa, Avery Borens, Carolyn Moorman, Ben Schmida, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

 

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.

 

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

 

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

 

A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings.

 

 

Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi acknowledged the US–Houthi ceasefire but reiterated that the Houthi movement will continue to support Hamas against Israel.[1] Abdulmalik’s statements demonstrate how the Houthis view the Red Sea attack campaign as one element of a broader Houthi strategic effort to pressure Israel to end its campaign in the Gaza Strip. The ceasefire secures an end to maritime shipping attacks, but the Houthis will continue to fire on other Israeli economic targets in pursuit of the same objectives. The Houthis have already shifted to targeting Israeli airports, for example. Abdulmalik framed the ceasefire as a victory against the United States. Abdulmalik implied that the ceasefire would not be permanent by adding that “when” the United States gets involved in a “third round” of airstrikes, the Houthis will confront the United States again.[2] The Houthis could resume attacks at any time and for any reason they choose.

 

Air campaigns targeting the Houthis can have only temporary military effects because the Houthis can rebuild damaged infrastructure after the end of the campaign.[3] The United States conducted at least 32 airstrikes targeting Houthi oil offloading infrastructure at Ras Issa Port between April 2 and May 5.[4] This initially created fuel shortages and posed challenges for both the Houthis’ military operations and separately civil service provision in Houthi-controlled territories, but the Houthis gradually learned techniques to ensure service continuity despite the airstrikes.[5] The US airstrikes on April 17 targeting Ras Issa Port alone cost the Houthis approximately $700 million worth of damage, according to a Yemeni economist.[6] The Yemeni Oil Company announced on May 8 that they have successfully repaired the Ras Issa Oil Port’s filling platforms and would restore fuel distribution to all their stations within 24 hours, which demonstrates that even serious damage can be rapidly fixed.[7] Cargo ships have also reportedly resumed offloading operations at Ras Issa Port.[8] Even the best-designed air campaigns can only achieve temporary effects that must be sustained through other means.

 

International shipping companies are reluctant to return to Red Sea routes despite the US–Houthi ceasefire agreement, which demonstrates the limited economic and strategic impact of the most recent US air campaign against the Houthis.[9] Shipping companies are still “assessing the deal” and remain deeply skeptical about returning to the Red Sea routes because of the ambiguity of the ceasefire terms, according to the Wall Street Journal on May 8.[10] This includes whether the truce applies broadly to commercial shipping or just US vessels.[11] Other regional events, such as a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, could prompt the Houthis to target international shipping again in the future if the Houthis see a benefit in doing so. The Houthis claimed a likely Iranian attack targeting Saudi Arabia in 2019 during the 2019 US-Iran escalation, demonstrating that the Houthis will sometimes support Iran’s regional objectives even at risk to the Houthi movement.[12] The US airstrikes only addressed the tactical manifestations of the Houthi threat to the freedom of navigation in the Red Sea rather than resolving the underlying strategic and political drivers motivating the Houthis’ campaign. The Wall Street Journal added that industry experts expect it could take months to restore shipping confidence.[13] The persistent risk that the Houthis could disrupt global maritime commerce for months--if not years--at a time underscores the seriousness of the Houthi strategic and economic threat.

 

Syrian Transitional President Ahmed al Shara reportedly wants to discuss a broad economic reconstruction plan with US President Donald Trump, likely in part to secure US sanctions relief for Syria.[14] Unspecified Syrian transitional government officials told the Wall Street Journal on May 7 that Syrian President Ahmed al Shara wants to meet US President Donald Trump to discuss broad US investment and aid to rebuild Syria.[15] Shara reportedly requested to meet with Trump during Trump’s upcoming Gulf visit through US businessman and liquified natural gas (LNG) company CEO Jonathan Bass and Syrian Emergency Task Force head Mouaz Moustafa.[16] Bass and Moustafa met with Shara in Damascus on May 2 and presented him with a plan for Western firms to invest in Syria’s energy industry.[17] Syria has significant oil and gas infrastructure that needs to be rebuilt or updated after over a decade of civil war.[18] Bass and Moustafa said that Shara "responded favorably" to the idea of the United States’ waiving or lessening sanctions in order to make the investment possible.[19] An unspecified senior Syrian Foreign Affairs official confirmed Shara’s interest by telling Western media that Syria seeks a relationship with the United States that includes “energy and economic ties.”[20] Bass said that Shara and Syrian officials were also interested in participation from US companies in all areas of Syrian reconstruction.[21] The Trump administration has not yet acknowledged Shara’s reported request.

 

Shara’s proposal may seek to obtain full sanctions relief from the United States by offering investment in Syria. Shara will find it hard to meet all of the Trump administration’s “confidence-building measures,” and could view possible investment in Syria’s energy sector as a bargaining chip.[22] The United States under the first Trump administration previously sought to allow US companies to invest in energy infrastructure in northeastern Syria, and Shara could calculate that a similar scheme would help him obtain sanctions relief.[23] US sanctions that have been in place since the fall of the Assad regime currently prevent direct US economic involvement in Syria. Shara and Syrian transitional government officials have attempted to attain partial or full US sanctions relief since assuming power in December 2024 and have communicated back and forth about several “confidence-building” conditions that the US requested that Syria observe.[24] The Syrian government said that it plans to fully address most of the US demands, including the destruction of remaining chemical weapons stockpiles and the appointment of a liaison to assist efforts to find missing US citizen Austin Tice.[25] The government has also taken tangible steps to honor the US request that it limit Palestinian military and political activity in Syria.[26] Shara is likely unwilling to act on the US condition that he bar foreign fighters from senior government positions, however, given that this condition would require him to sideline individuals who are deeply loyal to him.[27] Shara said on May 8 during a press conference in Paris that his government guarantees that foreign fighters will not pose a threat to neighboring countries, which suggests that he does not plan to remove them from the current Syrian army ranks or offices.[28] Shara could calculate that a counter-proposal that creates opportunities for US industry in Syria could mitigate his unwillingness to fully observe all the US conditions and still secure sanction relief on Syria.

 

Syrian officials may also be attempting to exploit perceived US interest in curtailing the People’s Republic of China (PRC) influence abroad in order to secure US sanctions relief and economic support. Unspecified Syrian government officials described Shara’s proposal as a “Marshall Plan-style" program in which US and other Western companies would invest in Syria’s reconstruction instead of China or other powers, according to the Wall Street Journal.[29] That the Syrian officials reportedly specified that Shara would be willing to exclude China suggests that the Syrian government may be attempting to exploit a perceived US interest in curbing the PRC’s influence abroad in order to spur US interest and investment in Syria. Bass said that Shara wants “Boeing” and “US telecom” and not “Huawei,” referring to the Chinese telecommunications company that has invested heavily in partnerships in the Middle East.[30]

 

Recent steps by the Syrian government suggest that it seeks to develop genuine economic partnerships with US adversaries like China and Russia if it cannot secure sanctions relief and economic assistance elsewhere, however. The Syrian government most recently hosted PRC officials on March 27 and discussed “enhancing cooperation,” which CTP-ISW assessed was likely related to securing Chinese support for the transition.[31] Shara and the Syrian transport minister have met with Chinese transport and medical manufacturing businessmen to discuss Chinese investment in Syria within the past week.[32] The Syrian government also reinitiated Syria’s economic ties with Russia in recent months. Russia has delivered Syrian currency and Russian oil to Syria, and Russia also reportedly seeks to re-negotiate Russian investment contracts for phosphate mines and oil fields in the central Syrian desert.[33] Both PRC and Russian officials have made it clear that they seek to increase involvement in Syria. Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin released a joint statement on May 8 following a press conference in Moscow that emphasized Russian and Chinese support for Syria’s “sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity.”[34]

 

A Qatari-backed initiative will provide Syria with civil sector salary support after the US Treasury Department reportedly granted Qatar a sanctions exemption.[35] Reuters originally reported that the Treasury Department granted the sanctions exemption, butthe United States has not yet confirmed the sanctions exemption.[36] The Qatari-backed grant initiative will provide Syria with $27 million monthly for three months to pay the salaries of select civilian public sector workers.[37] An unspecified Syrian financial source told Western media that the grant is conditional and will not apply to Syrian Defense Ministry or Interior Ministry personnel.[38] The Syrian government previously announced in January 2025 that it would raise public sector salaries by 400% the following month, but has yet to do so due to a lack of funding.[39] The unspecified Syrian source said that the Qatari funding will help implement this salary raise over the next several months and that the Syrian government would acquire other funds for employees excluded from the initiative.[40] Qatar had previously delayed this initiative in late February 2025 due to uncertainty over whether the funding would breach US sanctions.[41] Syrian Finance Minister Mohammad Yasser Barniyeh welcomed the exemption and said that the Syrian government hopes it will be followed by further measures to ease sanctions.[42] Barniyeh is an economist trained at Damascus, Kansas State, and Oklahoma State universities before working for the Arab Monetary Fund.[43] Barniyeh participated in the liberalization of the Assad regime's economy in the early 2000s, when he served on the Syrian Commission on Financial Markets and the Damascus Securities Exchange.[44]

 

Syria CoT Map

 

Senior Iranian military officials inspected a military facility in southern Iran, likely as part of preparations for a potential US or Israeli strike on Iran. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Hossein Salami and IRGC Navy Commander Rear Admiral Ali Reza Tangsiri inspected an underground drone hangar in Hormozgan Province on May 8.[45] Salami threatened to attack any country that supports an attack on Iran. Footage of the base during the visit showed Iranian Mohajer-6 and Ababil-5 drones. Mohajer-6 and Ababil-5 drones have a range of 200 and 480 km, respectively.[46] The precise location of the facility is unclear, but the inspection of a base hosting drones that has the range to target most of the Persian Gulf from the southern Iranian coast suggests that Iranian officers were inspecting units and reviewing plans for post-strike responses in the Persian Gulf region. Hormozgan Province lies along Iran‘s southern coast. The visit follows a series of similar inspections at Iranian military and defense sites in Hormozgan and the surrounding provinces.[47] Senior military officers often visit units and facilities under their command as part of their preparations for major defensive and offensive operations to ensure that their commands are well-prepared. IRGC-affiliated media also published old footage on May 8 that showed an Iranian Mohajer-6 drone surveilling the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower aircraft carrier.[48] Artesh Air Force Commander Brigadier General Hamid Vahedi separately claimed on May 8 that Iran equipped all of its fighter jets with long-range munitions and updated navigation systems.[49] Most Iranian fighter jets are Cold War third- and fourth-generation aircraft like the F4 Phantom and F14 Tomcat. These threats follow new US threats to attack Iran. US President Donald Trump stated on May 7 that he wants to "blow up" Iran's nuclear centrifuges either “nicely" through an agreement with Iran or “viciously."[50]

 

An attempted Iranian attack on the Israeli embassy in London highlights the unconventional ways through which Iran has and will likely continue to attempt to impose costs on Israel. UK authorities arrested eight Iranian nationals on May 4 after foiling a suspected Iranian-directed terror plot to target the Israeli Embassy in London.[51] The Guardian reported on May 8 that the UK police conducted its largest raid across the country due to threats of a suspected terror plot.[52] UK MI5 assessed that the plot had reached an “advanced but not imminent” stage and detained the suspects. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi denied Iranian involvement in the terror plot and called for diplomacy.[53] It is possible that the Iranian IRGC did not notify Araghchi about this plot. The IRGC has previously failed to notify other government bodies about its operations.[54] Iran has historically relied on unconventional methods to impose costs on Israel, including conducting terror attacks on Israeli diplomatic and civilian targets abroad. This recent Iranian plot in the UK does not represent an inflection in Iranian activity but is part of a decades-long strategy that includes assassination and bombing plots against Israeli interests in Argentina, Cyprus, Turkey, Georgia, Greece, and Azerbaijan.[55] Iranian officials and Iranian media have previously suggested that Iran may attack Israeli diplomatic facilities in response to the Israeli airstrike near the Iranian embassy in Damascus in April 2024.[56] Iranian officials have also repeatedly warned that Iran will conduct a third missile attack on Israel.[57] Israeli strikes on Iran in October 2024 damaged Iranian long-range missile production, which suggests that Iran‘s ability to respond militarily using its missile stockpile may be somewhat constrained. Iran can still impose costs on Israel by attacking Israeli diplomatic targets in the region and beyond, however.[58]

 

Key Takeaways:

·        Houthis Respond to Ceasefire: Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi acknowledged the US–Houthi ceasefire but reiterated that the Houthi movement will continue to support Hamas against Israel. Air campaigns targeting the Houthis can have only temporary military effects because the Houthis can rebuild damaged infrastructure after the end of the campaign. International shipping companies are reluctant to return to Red Sea routes despite the US–Houthi ceasefire agreement, which demonstrates the limited economic and strategic impact of the most recent US air campaign against the Houthis.

·        Syria and Sanctions Relief: Syrian Transitional President Ahmed al Shara reportedly wants to discuss a broad economic reconstruction plan with US President Donald Trump, likely in part to secure US sanctions relief for Syria.

·             Syrian Salaries: A Qatari-backed initiative will provide Syria with civil sector salary support after the US Treasury Department reportedly granted Qatar a sanctions exemption.

·        Iranian Officers Inspect Military Facilities: Senior Iranian military officials inspected a military facility in southern Iran, likely as part of preparations for a potential US or Israeli strike on Iran.

·             Iranian Terrorist Operations in the United Kingdom: An attempted Iranian attack on the Israeli embassy in London highlights the unconventional ways through which Iran has and will likely continue to attempt to impose costs on Israel.

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

The Iranian rial depreciated from 828,500 rials to one US dollar on May 7 to 831,000 rials to one US dollar on May 8.[59]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with Indian officials in New Delhi, India, on May 8 to discuss India-Pakistan tensions and bilateral economic cooperation.[60] Araghchi met with Indian President Droupadi Murmu and Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar.[61] Araghchi and Jaishankar discussed the implementation of the May 2024 ten-year Chabahar cooperation agreement.[62] The agreement outlines the development of Iran’s southeastern Chabahar port to facilitate trade between Iran, Afghanistan, and Central Asian countries, which effectively bypasses Pakistani ports.[63] India was the second largest importer of Iranian oil before the US maximum pressure campaign in 2018.[64] Araghchi also met with Pakistani officials in Pakistan on May 5.[65] This series of meetings comes amid military escalation between India and Pakistan.[66]

Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian stated that direct negotiations under “threat or coercion” are irrational and dishonorable but that negotiations in “equal, pressure-free conditions” are "rational and honorable."[67] Ahmadian’s remarks may lay the ground for justifying direct negotiations with the United States. Ahmadian’s remarks follow an Israeli report on May 7 that Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi approached US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff to request direct US-Iran negotiations, reportedly due to Iran’s frustration with the slow progress of Omani-mediated talks.[68] The fourth round of US-Iran talks, initially scheduled for May 3, was postponed due to "logistical reasons.”[69]

Syria

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) opened a field hospital for Druze civilians in Hader, Quneitra Province, on May 8.[70] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson announced that the field hospital is part of the IDF’s efforts to support the Syrian Druze population.[71] The IDF has been operating in Hader since December 2024.[72] The establishment of an IDF field hospital in Hader follows Israel’s efforts to pressure the Syrian transitional government to halt sectarian violence against the Syrian Druze community.[73]

Southwestern Syria Map

The Syrian and Iraqi governments continued to strengthen border security on both sides of the northern Syria-Iraq border.[74] The Syrian Interior Ministry began to recruit new members for the General Directorate of Border Guards on May 8.[75] The Syrian Defense Ministry recently deployed forces to the Iraqi border on April 18 to tighten control and curb illegal smuggling activities.[76] Syrian media also reported on May 7 that the Iraqi Army deployed new unspecified military units along the border across from the Syrian towns of Albu Kamal and Baghouz.[77] The Iraqi Army previously deployed the 34th Armored Brigade’s 1st Tank Battalion, which operates under the 9th Armored Division, to the Iraq-Syria border on April 16.[78] Iraqi Interior Minister Abdul Amir al Shammari said in an interview on May 6 that the Iraqi federal government has had no security coordination with the Syrian Interior Ministry yet.[79]

Deir Ez Zor map

Iraq

Iraqi media reported that a “high-level” Shia Coordination Framework delegation will discuss multiple “key” issues with Iranian officials from May 8 to 9, including the upcoming November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections.[80] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. A Shia Coordination Framework source stated that the delegation represents all Shia Coordination Framework components and is authorized to “reach an understanding with Tehran on certain [unspecified] issues of mutual understanding.”[81] Iran reportedly sent a message to Shia Coordination Framework leaders on April 30 that called on the Shia Coordination Framework to remain unified ahead of the upcoming elections. Iran‘s message likely aims to increase the likelihood that Iranian-backed parties will maintain control of the Iraqi government.[82] A fragmented Shia Coordination Framework could allow smaller, less organized parties to outperform Iranian-backed parties.

 

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan signed multiple memoranda of understanding (MOU) during bilateral talks in Ankara, Turkey, on May 8.[83] The MoUs focused on multiple areas, including defense manufacturing and counter-narcotics. Sudani emphasized the importance of Iraq-Turkey security and counterterrorism cooperation and welcomed efforts to disarm the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) during a press conference with Erdogan.[84] Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and Jordan agreed in February 2025 to form a strategic alliance to counter the Islamic State.[85]

 

Arabian Peninsula

Axis of Resistance objectives:

·        Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas

·        Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen

·        Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip

 

See topline section.

 

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

 

Nothing Significant to Report.

 

CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.

 

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

 

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.



[1] https://www.saba dot ye/ar/news3478139.htm

[2] https://www.saba dot ye/ar/news3478139.htm

[5] https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1919089443178213687 ;https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1919385020013170971

[18] https://www.spglobal.com/commodity-insights/en/news-research/latest-news/crude-oil/011725-feature-syria-seeks-to-rebuild-oil-and-gas-industry-but-needs-western-backing#:~:text=However%2C%20Syria's%20oil%20and%20gas,former%20dictator%20Bashar%20al%2DAssad.

[23]https://www.thedailybeast.com/trump-we-left-troops-behind-in-syria-only-for-the-oil; https://www.kuow.org/stories/fact-check-president-trump-s-plans-for-syrian-oil

[28] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/752795/الشرع-لا-يتخلى-عن-المقاتلين-الأجانب-في ; https://x.com/Elysee/status/1920169532569595986

[31] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-27-2025

[32] https://t.me/SyPresidency/890; https://sana dot sy/?p=2213826

[33] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1890343048099303916; https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russia-ships-diesel-syria-tanker-under-us-sanctions-data-shows-2025-03-06; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/russia-is-chasing-a-deal-to-keep-its-military-bases-in-syria-f9f6ca6e?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1 ; https://www.ft.com/content/30ddfdd0-b83e-11e9-96bd-8e884d3ea203

[34] https://ria dot ru/20250508/siriya-2015806365.html;

[45] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/18/3308640

[46] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/740048 ; https://farsi.iranpress dot com/ابابیل-5-گامی-جدید-در-توسعه-خانواده-پهپاد-ابابیل

[47] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-4-2025 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/01/15/3285079 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-23-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-7-2025 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-14-2025

[48] https://farsnews dot ir/M_r7726/1746724159981282069

 

[49] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/744752/

[50] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/trump-irans-centrifuges-will-either-blow-up-nicely-in-a-deal-or-viciously-without-one/

[53] https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/865038

[55] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/12/argentina-iran-1994-amia-bombing ;

 

https://apnews.com/article/cyprus-israel-iran-mossad-plot-5f390cc785900f3f6600042779d54868 ;

 

https://www.timesofisrael dot com/three-iranian-agents-said-caught-in-turkey-plotting-to-kill-israelis/ ;

 

https://www.timesofisrael dot com/israel-says-irans-quds-force-tried-to-kill-israeli-businessman-in-georgia/ ;

 

https://www.reuters.com/investigations/murder-hire-inside-irans-proxy-war-with-israel-west-2024-10-05/ ;

 

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/01/azerbaijan-says-it-thwarted-an-iranian-plot-to-kill-an-israeli-ambassador/252111/

[57] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/12/10/3266596 ;

https://www.tabnak dot ir/fa/news/1289572 ;

https://www.asriran dot com/fa/news/1038817

[60] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/744642/

[61] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/18/3308434

[62] https://farsnews dot ir/akramsharifi/1746700625456124858

[63] https://www.reuters.com/world/india/india-sign-10-year-pact-with-iran-chabahar-port-management-et-reports-2024-05-13/

[64] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/us-oil-embargo-stalls-iran-india-energy-relations/#:~:text=India%20was%20Iran's%20second%20largest,(JCPOA)%20in%20May%202018.

[65] https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/231448

[66] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/08/world/asia/india-pakistan-diplomacy-kashmir.html

[67] https://www.jamaran dot news/fa/amp/news-1667557

[68] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/rjok30dlee

[79] https://www.alhadath dot net/iraq/2025/05/06/%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86

[80] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%88%D9%81%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%82%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B2%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A8-%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9

[81] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%88%D9%81%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%82%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B2%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A8-%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9

[82] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%87%D9%88%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%B4-%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-30-2025

[83] https://ina dot iq/eng/39783-al-sudani-and-erdogan-sponsor-mou-signing-ceremony-between-iraq-and-turkey.html

[84] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%B8%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%88%D9%84%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%85%D8%AD-%D9%84-%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1

[85] https://shafaq dot com/en/Iraq/Iraq-neighbors-near-security-alliance-agreement