Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 30

Mason Clark, Karolina Hird, and George Barros

April 30, 5:15pm ET

Further Russian reinforcements to the Izyum axis are unlikely to enable stalled Russian forces to achieve substantial advances. Elements of unspecified Eastern Military District units and several air-defense assets are reportedly deploying from Belgorod to the Izyum front to support likely degraded Russian units attempting to advance south of the city. These forces are unlikely to enable Russian forces to break the current deadlock, as Russian attacks remain confined to two major highways (toward Slovyansk and Barvinkove) and cannot leverage greater numbers. Several successful Ukrainian counterattacks out of Kharkiv city in the last 72 hours have additionally recaptured a ring of suburbs north and east of the city and may additionally force Russian forces to redeploy units intended for the Izyum axis to hold these positions. Russian forces appear increasingly unlikely to achieve any major advances in eastern Ukraine, and Ukrainian forces may be able to conduct wider counterattacks in the coming days.

Key Takeaways

• A Ukrainian counteroffensive out of Kharkiv City will likely alleviate pressure on parts of the city that have suffered the most from Russian shelling and may force Russian troops from Izyum to re-deploy northward to support forces maintaining the partial encirclement of Kharkiv.
• Additional Russian forces are deploying to the Izyum front but are unlikely to enable any major advances.
• Russian troops did not make any confirmed advances to the southwest or southeast of Izyum or to the west of the Donetsk-Luhansk frontline.
• Russian forces in Kherson are pausing major offensive operations to improve their tactical positions and regroup to prepare for a renewed offensive to capture the administrative borders of Kherson.
• Russian occupation forces in Mariupol announced plans to consolidate their control over the city and intend to return Ukrainian citizens forcibly deported into Russia at some point in the future.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

ISW has updated its assessment of the four primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time:

• Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate supporting efforts);
• Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv and Izyum;
• Supporting effort 2—Southern axis;
• Supporting effort 3—Sumy and northeastern Ukraine.

Main effort—Eastern Ukraine

Subordinate Main Effort—Mariupol (Russian objective: Capture Mariupol and reduce the Ukrainian defenders)

Russian forces remaining in Mariupol, including elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade, continued to block Ukrainian troops in the Azovstal Steel Plant and carried out airstrikes on April 30.[1] Occupying Russian forces are intensifying occupation measures through Mariupol. Advisor to the Mayor of Mariupol Petro Andryushchenko stated that abandoned homes in the Staryi Krym region of Mariupol are being resettled under DNR-issued permits and that the Kremlin plans to return Mariupol residents who were previously forcibly deported to Russia once Russian forces consolidate control of the city.[2] Head of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Denis Pushilin announced the “Great Construction” of Mariupol on April 30.[3] Pushilin claimed that DNR forces, with support from the Kremlin, will rebuild the infrastructure of Mariupol as soon as the Ukrainian positions in Azovstal are “resolved.” Russian and DNR troops will likely advance reconstruction and resettlement operations to further consolidate administrative control of Mariupol and boost the Kremlin’s claim to have fully captured the city.

Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued unsuccessful attacks alongside artillery fire and airstrikes on the entire Donetsk-Luhansk frontline and did not make any confirmed advances on April 30.[4] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces aim to capture Rubizhne and Popasna and use these towns as springboards for further advances west toward Lyman and Slovyansk.[5] Russian forces around Izyum are attempting to capture these towns from the north to merge Russian advances in eastern Ukraine, but Ukrainian forces are successfully preventing Russian forces from making major gains on either axis.

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv and Izyum: (Russian objective: Advance southeast to support Russian operations in Luhansk Oblast; defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to the Izyum axis)

Russian forces continued to attack southeast and southwest from Izyum but did not secure any confirmed advances in these directions on April 30.[6] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that elements of the 1st Guards Tank Army, 20th Combined Arms Army, 35th Combined Arms Army, 68th Army Corps, and likely 2 battalion tactical groups (BTGs) of the 76th Airborne Division are trying to advance southwest to Barvinkove and southeast to Slovyansk.[7] The Ukrainian General Staff additionally reported that Russian forces are deploying unspecified elements of the Eastern Military District to the Izyum area to support these advances.[8] The Ukrainian General Staff additionally indicated that additional Russian air-defense forces are deploying to cover Russian troops in the Izyum area.[9] A Pro-Russian military source claimed that Russian troops encircled approximately 600 Ukrainian troops in Yaremivka, about 25 kilometers southeast of Izyum on the road to Slovyansk, although ISW cannot independently confirm this report.[10] Ukrainian sources claimed an artillery strike on a Russian command post near Izyum killed Russian Major General Alexei Simonov on April 30, although ISW cannot confirm preliminary reporting at this time.[11]

Ukrainian forces continued counterattacks against several positions along an arc spanning from the north to the east of Kharkiv City and recaptured Verkhnya Rohanka, Ruska Lozova, Slobidske, and Prelesne.[12] Ukrainian troops have recaptured a ring of suburbs around the east of Kharkiv City in the past 72 hours that may allow them to alleviate pressure on residential areas of the city, such as Saltivka, that have been targeted by intensive Russian shelling.[13] Ukrainian counterattacks may additionally force Russian forces to redeploy units intended to support the Izyum axis. Russian forces continued to bombard Kharkiv City with air and artillery strikes throughout April 30.[14]

Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian counterattacks)

Russian forces continued to prioritize improving their tactical positions and shelling Ukrainian positions on the Southern Axis but did not make any confirmed advances on April 30.[15] The Ukrainian General Staff notably stated that elements of the 8th and 49th Combined Arms Army, 22nd Army Corps, Black Sea Fleet, and Airborne forces are engaging in combat operations to improve their tactical positions (indicating local attacks to capture key terrain, rather than major offensive operations) and are regrouping and replenishing supplies in preparation for a renewed push to reach the administrative borders of Kherson Oblast.[16] Russian forces shelled several points in Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Mykolaiv Oblasts.[17] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces continue to disseminate disinformation about the threat of Ukrainian troops to the population of Transnistria.[18]

Supporting Effort #3—Sumy and Northeastern Ukraine: (Russian objective: Withdraw combat power in good order for redeployment to eastern Ukraine)

There were no significant activities on this axis in the past 24 hours.

Immediate items to watch

• Russian forces attacking southeast from Izyum, west from Kreminna and Popasna, and north from Donetsk City will likely make steady but tactical gains against Ukrainian defenders.
• Russian forces will likely attempt to starve out the remaining defenders of the Azovstal Steel Plant in Mariupol and will not allow trapped civilians to evacuate but may conduct costly assaults on remaining Ukrainian defenders to claim a propaganda victory.
• Russian forces are likely preparing to conduct renewed offensive operations to capture the entirety of Kherson Oblast in the coming days.
• Russia may continue false-flag attacks in and around Transnistria or might move to generate a more serious crisis in Transnistria and Moldova more generally. 

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[1] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/306191908360561; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1520390620161921025; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1520389814868193286; https://t.me/milinfolive/82328; https://t dot me/nm_dnr/7784; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1520390620161921025; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1520389814868193286; https://t.me/milinfolive/82328; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/306191908360561

[2] https://t dot me/andriyshTime/577

[3] https://t dot me/andriyshTime/574; https://www.donetsk.kp dot ru/daily/27387/4580930/?from=tg

[4] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/306191908360561; https://t dot me/luhanskaVTSA/2131; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/306191908360561; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/305803498399402; https://twitter.com/UkraineSuper1/status/1520333581683470337; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1520386723955552259; https://t.me/milinfolive/82322

 

 

 

 

[5] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/306191908360561; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1520046249944170496;https://t.me/vorposte/20372; https://t dot me/millnr/8291; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/305803498399402

[6] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/305803498399402

[7] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/306191908360561

[8] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/305803498399402

[9] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/305803498399402

[10] https://twitter.com/ruslantopa40/status/1520271146062602241

[11] https://twitter.com/revishvilig/status/1520475751451172874; https://twitter.com/olex_scherba/status/1520463695813484545

[12] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/306191908360561; https://gur.gov dot ua/content/spetspryznachentsi-hur-mo-ukrainy-vidnovyly-kontrol-nad-naselenym-punktom-ruska-lozova-na-kharkivshchyni.html

[13] https://t dot me/synegubov/3028

[14] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/306191908360561

[15] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/306191908360561; https://www.facebook.com/okPivden/videos/360102089513900/; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/306191908360561; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/305803498399402; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/305803498399402

[16] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/306191908360561

[17] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/306191908360561; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/305803498399402l; https://t dot me/dnipropetrovskaODA/765; https://t dot me/dnipropetrovskaODA/784; https://t dot me/dnipropetrovskaODA/779; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/306191908360561

[18] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/306191908360561

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 29

Karolina Hird, Mason Clark, and George Barros

April 29, 6:15pm ET

Russian forces made limited advances west of Severodonetsk on April 29 but remain stalled south of Izyum. Ukrainian forces in eastern Ukraine are likely successfully conducting a maneuver defense rather than holding static positions, redeploying mechanized reserves to resist attempted Russian advances. Concentrated Russian artillery is enabling minor Russian advances, but Ukrainian positions remain strong. Limited Ukrainian counterattacks around Kharkiv city may additionally force Russian forces to redeploy units intended for the Izyum axis to hold these positions.

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces likely intend to leave a minimal force in Mariupol necessary to block Ukrainian positions in Azovstal and prevent partisan actions and are deploying as much combat power as possible to support offensive operations elsewhere.
• Ukrainian forces are successfully slowing Russian attacks in eastern Ukraine, which secured only minor advances west of Severodonetsk and did not advance on the Izyum front in the last 24 hours.
• Ukrainian counterattacks in Kharkiv are unlikely to develop into a major counteroffensive in the coming days but may force Russia to redeploy forces intended for the Izyum axis to hold their defensive positions around the city.
• Ukrainian intelligence continued to warn that Russian false flag attacks in Transnistria are intended to draw Transnistria into the war in some capacity and coerce Moldova to abandon pro-European policies.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

ISW has updated its assessment of the four primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time:

• Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate supporting efforts);
• Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv and Izyum;
• Supporting effort 2—Southern axis;
• Supporting effort 3—Sumy and northeastern Ukraine.

Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Subordinate Main Effort—Mariupol (Russian objective: Capture Mariupol and reduce the Ukrainian defenders)

Russian forces continued to redeploy from Mariupol on April 29 to participate in offensive operations northward to support Russia’s main effort to capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts.[1]  The Ukrainian General Staff stated on April 29 that certain units from Mariupol are deploying to participate in offensive operations toward Kurakhiv (western Donetsk Oblast, about 50 km west of Donetsk City), and an anonymous senior Pentagon official reported that a “significant” number of Russian units have redeployed toward Zaporizhia Oblast since April 20, though ISW cannot independently confirm these redeployments.[2] Russian forces likely intend to leave the minimum force necessary in Mariupol to block Ukrainian positions in Azovstal and prevent partisan actions and are deploying as much combat power as possible to support offensive operations elsewhere.

Russian airstrikes continued to bombard the Azovstal plant on April 29 and Russian forces did not conduct any major ground attacks.[3] Advisor to the Mayor of Mariupol Petro Andryushchenko reported that Russian forces are consolidating occupational control of the city and intensifying an information campaign claiming they are taking measures to ”improve life in Mariupol,” though they are reportedly failing to provide enough food for the city.[4] Andrushchenko additionally stated that Russian forces are taking inventory of residences in Mariupol to begin nationalizing Ukrainian property.[5] Russian forces likely intend to both consolidate their control of Mariupol and advance false Kremlin rhetoric of “liberation,” rather than a military occupation.

Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian troops continued to shell the entire frontline in Donetsk and Luhansk and secured several tactical advances on April 29.[6] Russian forces reportedly captured Yampil (directly west of Severodonetsk) on April 28 and are likely preparing to conduct further attacks east in the direction of Lyman.[7] Pro-Russian sources posted social media footage of Russian forces using thermobaric munitions against Ukrainian positions in Avdiivka, and the Ukrainian Head of the Donetsk Regional State Administration Serhiy Haidai claimed that Russian troops employed phosphorus bombs in Ocheretyne on April 29.[8] Haidai additionally stated that Ukrainian forces repelled an attempted Russian advance on the villages of Orikhove and Svitlychne on April 29.[9] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that intensified Russian fire against Ukrainian positions is intended to prevent Ukrainian troops from regrouping and that Ukrainian troops are conducting ”an active maneuver defense”—moving mechanized reinforcements in response to Russian attacks as needed rather than conducting a strict positional defense.[10]

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv and Izyum: (Russian objective: Advance southeast to support Russian operations in Luhansk Oblast; defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to the Izyum axis)

Ukrainian forces continued to repel Russian attacks southwest and south of Izyum on April 29.[11] Head of the Kharkiv Regional State Administration Oleg Synegubov reported that Russian forces attempted to advance toward Slovyansk and Barvinkove through attacks on Brazkhivka (25 km southwest of Izyum), Dovhenke (25 km south of Izyum), and Velyka Komyshuvakha (about 30 km southwest of Izyum) but suffered losses and retreated on April 29.[12] The Ukrainian General Staff claimed that elements of the 1st Guards Tank Army, the 35^th Combined Arms Army, the 68th Army Corps, and unspecified Airborne (VDV) units remain active on the Izyum axis.[13] A Pro-Russian military source additionally claimed that Russian forces are surrounding and pinning Ukrainian troops against the Oskol Reservoir, east of Izyum, but ISW cannot independently confirm this claim.[14]

Ukrainian forces continued limited counterattacks directly northeast of Kharkiv city and recaptured Ruska Lozova (10km north of the city) on April 29.[15] Russian forces of the 6th Combined Arms Army and naval infantry elements of the Baltic and Northern fleets continued to hold position around Kharkiv City and fire on settlements throughout the oblast.[16] Ukrainian counterattacks in Kharkiv are unlikely to develop into a major counteroffensive in the coming days but may force Russia to redeploy forces intended for the Izyum axis to hold their defensive positions around the city.

Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian counterattacks)

Russian forces did not make any confirmed attacks in Kherson Oblast on April 29 and prioritized improving their tactical positions.[17] Russian forces shelled several towns in Kherson, Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[18]

Ukrainian government officials continued to warn that Russian forces are disseminating pro-Kremlin disinformation in Transnistria and may be preparing to use Transnistria as a “springboard for aggression” against Ukraine and Moldova.[19] The Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) claimed that previous Russian false flag attacks in Tiraspol, Percani, and Maiac are aimed at coercing Transnistrian leadership to allow for additional Russian troop deployments to Transnistria and threaten the Moldovan government to ”abandon pro-European policies.“[20] Canada, the United States, Israel, and Germany have notably urged citizens not to visit Transnistria due to the risk of escalation and armed conflict in the area.[21] ISW cannot independently confirm the GUR report that Russian false-flag attempts are intended to convince Transnistria to acquiesce to Kremlin demands, which would indicate a lower degree of Kremlin control over its proxy in Moldova than previously assessed.

Supporting Effort #3—Sumy and Northeastern Ukraine: (Russian objective: Withdraw combat power in good order for redeployment to eastern Ukraine)

There were no significant activities on this axis in the past 24 hours.

Immediate items to watch

• Russian forces attacking southeast from Izyum, west from Kreminna and Popasna, and north from Donetsk City will likely make steady but tactical gains against Ukrainian defenders.
• Russian forces will likely attempt to starve out the remaining defenders of the Azovstal Steel Plant in Mariupol and will not allow trapped civilians to evacuate but may conduct costly assaults on the remaining Ukrainian defenders to claim a propaganda victory.
• Russian forces are likely preparing to conduct renewed offensive operations to capture the entirety of Kherson Oblast in the coming days.
• Russia may continue false-flag attacks in and around Transnistria or move to generate a more serious crisis in Transnistria and Moldova more generally.

 

 

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[1] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/305453321767753; https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-pentahon-viyska-mariupol-zaporizhzhya/31825905.html; https://t dot me/mariupolnow/8452

[2] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/305453321767753; https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-pentahon-viyska-mariupol-zaporizhzhya/31825905.html; https://t dot me/mariupolnow/8452

[3] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/305453321767753; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/305070958472656; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1519979311310286848; https://twitter.com/zcjbrooker/status/1519996171854483456

[4] https://t dot me/andriyshTime/554

[5] https://t dot me/andriyshTime/553

[6] facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/305453321767753; https://t dot me/luhanskaVTSA/2103; https://t dot me/luhanskaVTSA/2103; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/305453321767753; https://t dot me/pavlokyrylenko_donoda/3199;

[7] https://twitter.com/ruslantopa40/status/1519782726307614720; https://twitter.com/Gerashchenko7/status/1520052907831406595; https://twitter.com/2022Donetsk1/status/1519236888883830785; https://twitter.com/ruslantopa40/status/1519621521676898304; https://t.me/rybar/31848; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1520051756058689536; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1519543184224931840; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1519545828448296962; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1520044285852360704

[8] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1519929747828006914; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1520026037970743296; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1519828477217804290 ; https://t dot me/sashakots/31935; https://t dot me/svarschiki/6116; https://t.me/faceofwar/19056; https://t dot me/pavlokyrylenko_donoda/3199

[9] https://t dot me/luhanskaVTSA/2103

[10] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/305070958472656

[11] https://t dot me/synegubov/3015

[12] https://t dot me/synegubov/3015

[13]facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/305453321767753; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/305070958472656

[14] https://t dot me/epoddubny/10209

[15] https://t dot me/synegubov/3016 ; https://www.facebook.com/Zadorenko/posts/657355442036045; https://www.facebook.com/LFCofAFU/posts/108340098532863

[16]facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/305453321767753; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/305070958472656; https://t dot me/synegubov/3015; https://twitter.com/Danspiun/status/1519778336330993664

[17] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/305453321767753;

[18] https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=356807049814464&id=100064555155257; https://t dot me/starukhofficial/3073; https://t dot me/dnipropetrovskaODA/762; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=407910284181332

[19] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/305453321767753; https://gur.gov dot ua/content/rosiia-vykorystovuie-sklady-boieprypasiv-v-prydnistrovi-dlia-kontrabandy-zbroi.html

[20] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/rosiia-vykorystovuie-sklady-boieprypasiv-v-prydnistrovi-dlia-kontrabandy-zbroi.html

[21] https://travel.gc.ca/destinations/moldova#risk; https://www.gov dot il/he/departments/publications/reports/moldova280422; https://www.auswaertiges-amt dot de/de/aussenpolitik/laender/moldau-node/moldausicherheit/201932#content_0; https://md.usembassy.gov/security-alert-u-s-embassy-chisinau-moldova-4/

 

 

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 28

Mason Clark, George Barros, and Kateryna Stepanenko

April 28, 5:45pm ET

Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine made minor advances on April 28. Russian forces attacking southwest from Izyum likely seek to bypass Ukrainian defenses on the direct road to Slovyansk. Russian forces continued shelling and minor attacks along the line of contact in eastern Ukraine but did not secure any gains in the past 24 hours. Additional Russian reinforcements continue to deploy to Belgorod to support the Izyum advance. Ukrainian defenders in Mariupol’s Azovstal Steel Plant continue to hold out against heavy Russian artillery and aerial bombardment, including the likely use of multi-ton “bunker-buster” bombs against a Ukrainian field hospital.

Ukrainian news outlet Defense Express reported on April 27 that Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov will take personal command of the Russian offensive in the Izyum direction.[1] Citing unspecified Ukrainian military sources, Defense Express stated that Gerasimov is already in-theater and will command the offensive “at the operational and tactical level” and claimed the Russian military failed to create a single command structure under Southern Military District Commander Alexander Dvornikov. ISW cannot independently confirm this report. However, ISW previously assessed that Dvornikov’s appointment as overall commander in Ukraine would not solve Russia’s command and control challenges and likely strain his span of control.[2] If confirmed, the appointment of Russia’s senior general officer to command tactical operations indicates both the importance of the Izyum drive to Russia’s war in Ukraine and the breakdown in the Russian military’s normal chain of command.

Key Takeaways

• Russian strategic bombers likely targeted a Ukrainian field hospital in the Azovstal Steel Plant. The remaining Ukrainian defenders are likely running low on supplies.
• Russian attacks southwest of Izyum likely seek to outflank Ukrainian defenses on the direct road to Slovyansk and have made tactical gains in the last 24 hours.
• Russian forces continued tactical ground attacks and shelling along the entire line of contact in eastern Ukraine but did not secure any major advances.
• Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin stated that the DNR will postpone local Victory Day celebrations planned for May 9 until “the complete victory and the expansion of the DNR" to control Donetsk Oblast, though the Kremlin remains likely to attempt to claim some sort of victory on May 9.
• Russian forces conducted several locally successful attacks from Kherson toward Mykolaiv.
• Russian and proxy forces continued to mobilize in Transnistria and set conditions for a false flag attack.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

ISW has updated its assessment of the four primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time:

• Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate supporting efforts);
• Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv and Izyum;
• Supporting effort 2—Southern axis;
• Supporting effort 3—Sumy and northeastern Ukraine.

Main effort—Eastern Ukraine

Subordinate Main Effort—Mariupol (Russian objective: Capture Mariupol and reduce the Ukrainian defenders)

Russian forces increased the tempo of artillery and airstrikes against Ukrainian positions in the Azovstal facility on April 28 and directly targeted a Ukrainian field hospital.[3] Mariupol’s City Council and the Ukrainian General Staff reported that seven Russian Tu-22 strategic bombers struck the hospital with multi-ton “bunker-buster” bombs.[4] ISW cannot independently confirm this report, though Russian forces have targeted Ukrainian medical facilities and hospitals throughout the war. Azov Regiment Commander Captain Svyatoslav Palamar appealed to Kyiv “to take decisive action” against Russian forces, and Ukrainian defenders are likely running low on supplies.[5]

Russian forces are expanding occupation measures amid continuing Ukrainian partisan actions. Advisor to the Mayor of Mariupol Petro Andryushenko stated that Russian forces are posing as social services employees to collect information on Mariupol residents, and other local government sources reported that Russian forces continued widespread detentions of Ukrainian civilians.[6] The Ukrainian General Staff claimed Ukrainian Special Operations Forces and organized partisan groups destroyed a railway bridge in Yakymivka (near Melitopol) used to transit supplies from Crimea towards Mariupol on April 28, though ISW cannot independently confirm this claim.[7]

Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued tactical ground attacks and shelling along the entire line of contact in eastern Ukraine on April 28 but did not secure any major advances.[8] The concentrated use of artillery by Russian forces in eastern Ukraine in April is one of the few major changes Russia has made to its operations compared to the early weeks of the war. Russian forces conducted a (failed) attack on Rubizhne on April 28 but largely shelled Ukrainian positions in the Severodonetsk region without conducting ground attacks.[9] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces concentrated on improving their tactical positions and preparing for offensive operations towards Lyman, 55 km west of Rubizhne.[10] Russian forces conducted several assaults west of Donetsk, attempting to advance on Solodke, Novomykhailivka, and Marinka; and Russian forces attempted to advance north of Mariupol in the area of Neskuchne and Vremivka.[11] ISW cannot confirm any territorial changes in these areas, however.

DNR Head Denis Pushilin stated on April 28 that the DNR will postpone local Victory Day celebrations planned for May 9 until “the complete victory and the expansion of the ‘DNR’ to the constitutional borders,” meaning the entirety of Donetsk Oblast.[12] Russian and proxy forces will likely continue steady offensive operations throughout May and possibly longer, though the Kremlin remains likely to attempt to claim some sort of victory on May 9.

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv and Izyum: (Russian objective: Advance southeast to support Russian operations in Luhansk Oblast; defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to the Izyum axis)

Ukrainian forces repelled continued Russian assaults west of Izyum toward Velyka Komushevkha and southwest on the road to Barvinkove. Russian forces launched assaults on Velyka Komushevkha (likely seeking to capture the south before pivoting south) and Nova Dmytrivka (on the direct road to Barvinkove).[13] Russian forces have made little progress in attacks directly southeast toward Slovyansk and will likely seek to bypass Ukrainian defenses by attacking further west. Ukrainian forces conducted a limited counterattack directly northwest of Kharkiv city on April 28, recapturing the town of Kutuzivka.[14]

Russian reinforcements and tactical missile systems continued to regroup in Belgorod on April 28. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that up to five Iskander-M ballistic missile formations are active in Belgorod Oblast, damaged Russian airborne units on the Izyum front are rotating back to Belgorod for refit, and elements of the 29th Combined Arms Army deployed to an unspecified location in Kharkiv Oblast.[15]

Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian counterattacks)

Russian forces conducted several locally successful attacks from Kherson toward Mykolaiv on April 28.[16] Russian forces captured the outskirts of Tavriyske and conducted assaults on the nearby settlements of Nova Zorya and Oleksandrivka, on the route to Mykolaiv.[17] Russian forces likely intend to capture the western border of Kherson Oblast and threaten Mykolaiv but are unlikely to be able to renew assaults on the city itself in the near future. Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks north towards Kryvyi Rih in the past 24 hours.[18]

Ukraine’s Operation Command “South” reported on April 28 that Russian forces are continuing to prepare to create a Kherson People’s Republic and intimidate the local population, though the Deputy Chairman of Russia’s local collaborationist government claimed there are no plans to hold a referendum in Kherson on April 28.[19] Russian authorities do likely intend to create some form of proxy republic in Kherson but may seek to mitigate protests and resistance from residents.

Russian and proxy forces continued to mobilize in Transnistria. The Ukrainian Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Transnistria is preparing to fully staff its military units and increase their readiness.[20] Ukraine’s Operational Command “South” reported on April 27-28 that Russia is “systematically” conducting provocations in Transnistria and creating the false threat of an attack from Ukraine.[21] Transnistrian President Vadim Krasnoselsky ordered Transnistria’s Ministry of Internal Affairs to “be ready for any scenario” on April 28, but (likely falsely) denied Moldovan government reports that Transnistrian authorities are preventing men of fighting age from leaving the region.[22]

Supporting Effort #3—Sumy and Northeastern Ukraine: (Russian objective: Withdraw combat power in good order for redeployment to eastern Ukraine)

Ukraine’s Border Guard Service reported Russian forces fired at border checkpoints in Chernihiv and Sumy Oblasts on April 27-28 but did not inflict any casualties.[23] The Ukrainian General Staff continued to report that Russian forces are highly unlikely to attempt a new offensive in northeastern Ukraine but are reinforcing the Russian border and are trying to fix Ukrainian reserves in place to prevent their redeployment to eastern Ukraine.[24]

Immediate items to watch

• Russian forces attacking southeast from Izyum, west from Kreminna and Popasna, and north from Donetsk City will likely make steady but purely tactical gains against Ukrainian defenders.
• Russian forces will likely attempt to starve out the remaining defenders of the Azovstal Steel Plant in Mariupol and will not allow trapped civilians to evacuate but may conduct costly assaults on the remaining Ukrainian defenders to claim a propaganda victory.
• Russian forces are likely preparing to conduct renewed offensive operations to capture the entirety of Kherson Oblast in the coming days.
• Russia may continue false-flag attacks in and around Transnistria or move to generate a more serious crisis in Transnistria and Moldova more generally. 

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[1] https://defence-ua dot com/army_and_war/gjerasimov_osobisto_komanduvatime_rashistami_pid_izjumom_dvornikova_vidsunuli_na_zadnij_plan-7125.html?; https://www.pravda.com dot ua/rus/news/2022/04/28/7342691/ ; https://censor dot net/ru/news/3337329/nachalnik_genshtaba_armii_rf_gerasimov_pribyl_v_izyum_smi.

[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-11.

[3] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/304747761838309;

[4] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=523661212580328; https://t.me/mariupolrada/9433; https://t.me/polkazov/4448; https://t.me/mariupolnow/8324.

[5] https://t.me/polkazov/4447 ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8VcHVxVQyD0&t=1s; https://armyinform dot.

[6] https://t.me/mariupolrada/9429; https://t.me/andriyshTime/539.

[7] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/304772608502491; https://twitter.com/uawarinfo/status/1519631076985286657.

[8] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/304747761838309.

[9] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2068?single; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2075; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2068; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2083; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/304747761838309; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2074.  

[10] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/304438135202605.

[11] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/304747761838309; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/304438135202605; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/304438135202605.

[12] https://t.me/mariupolnow/8342; https://t.me/meduzalive/58526.

[13] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/304747761838309; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/304438135202605; https://t.me/synegubov/3010.

[14] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/304747761838309.

[15] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/304747761838309.

[16] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/304438135202605;

[17] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/304747761838309; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/304438135202605; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=996138067708004

[18] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/304747761838309; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/304438135202605.

[19] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=971676876824539; https://t.me/stranaua/38974; https://t.me/rian_ru/160800; https://t.me/stranaua/39012.

[20] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/dlia-zabezpechennia-zainiatosti-naselennia-u-pmr-oholosyly-voienni-zbory.html.

[21] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=971676876824539; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=996138067708004.

[22] https://t.me/novostipmrcom/38777; https://president dot gospmr.org/press-sluzhba/novosti/prezident-provel-soveschanie-s-rukovodyaschim-sostavom-organov-vnutrennih-del.html; https://t.me/VadimKrasnoselsky/373; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/28/moldova-facing-very-dangerous-moment-amid-fears-it-could-be-drawn-into-ukraine-war?CMP=share_btn_tw.

[23] https://www.facebook.com/DPSUkraine/posts/327565272815683; https://t.me/stranaua/39072; https://www.facebook.com/DPSUkraine/posts/327152366190307.

[24] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/304747761838309; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/304438135202605.