- The Kremlin is exploiting new Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s political inexperience and desire to end the war in Eastern Ukraine to achieve its preferred outcome in Ukraine – a risk previously outlined by ISW. The Kremlin will likely attempt to link Ukraine and Europe’s urge to pursue peace in Ukraine with its recent diplomatic gains in parts of Europe to push for a settlement that starts lifting the economic sanctions imposed on Russia in 2014.
- Zelensky has reaffirmed Ukraine’s commitment to closer relations with the West. He likely does not voluntarily intend to empower Russia’s interests in Ukraine. His administration’s actions and inactions nevertheless create a favorable environment for the Kremlin, including a tolerant atmosphere for the return of Kremlin-linked actors displaced by the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution.
- The Kremlin’s success in Ukraine is not inevitable. The upcoming 2019 Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections will provide an opportunity for reform-oriented professionals to unite and serve as a counterbalance to Russia in Ukraine. The U.S. should expand its support for reformists in both the Zelensky Administration and the Ukrainian Parliament. The U.S. should also work with its partners in Europe to prevent Zelensky from blindly walking into a deal with Russia that compromises Ukraine’s sovereignty. The U.S. must not allow the Kremlin to legitimize its aggression by playing mediator to a conflict in which it is an active belligerent.
The new Government of Ukraine might be setting conditions for future reconciliation to end the war in Eastern Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky ran for office on a core promise to end the conflict with Russia in Donbas in Eastern Ukraine. He and his associates are now taking rhetorical steps towards that goal. Ukrainian National Security Council Secretary Oleksandr Danilyuk stated on July 1 that the Government of Ukraine is “ready to integrate Donbas” under certain conditions including the disarmament of separatist militias led by Russia.
[1] Danilyuk dismissed concerns that the reintegration could result in an enclave controlled by Russia inside Ukraine - a risk previously
highlighted by ISW.
[2] Meanwhile, Ihor Kolomoyskyi - a key oligarch who backs Zelensky - minimized the war in Eastern Ukraine as an “internal civil conflict” on July 4, mirroring the propaganda of the Kremlin.
[3] Kolomoyskyi funded militias to counter the Kremlin in Eastern Ukraine in 2014 but he is likely now hedging his bets in anticipation of restored influence for Russia in Ukraine.
[4] Zelensky and his associates have also stated that they would consider lifting the economic blockade on the Donbas.
[5] Zelensky called for businesses to reinvest in the Donbas on June 20.
[6] Ukraine’s Ukrzaliznytsia - the state-owned railway - included the potential restoration of service to the Donbas in its outlook for 2023.
[7]
Zelensky is also setting conditions on the ground for a potential reconciliation with the Donbas. The Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) withdrew from the contested town of Stanytsia Luhanska in Eastern Ukraine on July 1 under a deal first signed by Ukraine, Russia, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 2016.
[8] The U.S., Europe, and Russia all welcomed the move, which Zelensky framed as a “fragile hope” for peace in the Donbas.
[9] The deal nonetheless raised concerns among military officials and civil activists in Ukraine. One senior commander warned that the withdrawal created a tactical disadvantage for the UAF that the Kremlin and its proxies could exploit to escalate the conflict yet again in Eastern Ukraine.
[10]
Zelensky has also attempted to build new momentum for a diplomatic deal over Eastern Ukraine. Zelensky and Putin held their first telephone call to discuss the War in Donbas on July 11.
[11] He offered on July 8 to meet with Putin in the presence of the U.S., Britain, Germany and France.
[12] Putin and Zelensky also both separately discussed resuming the Normandy Four Talks between Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany in June 2019.
[13] Putin has expressed a cautious willingness to work with Zelensky.
[14] Ukraine and Russia have been discussing a meeting between the two leaders.
[15]
The Kremlin will likely exploit these efforts to advance its preferred outcome in Eastern Ukraine. The Kremlin retains its long-standing strategic goals to prevent Ukraine’s integration with the West and pull it back into the sphere of influence of Russia. Russia intends to maintain its dominance over the Donbas - overtly or covertly - and thereby the Government of Ukraine. ISW has
warned that the Kremlin intends to legitimize its proxies in Donbas within the official state structures of Ukraine. The Kremlin likely ultimately seeks a favorable political settlement that reintegrates a large and supportive bloc of voters back into the politics of Ukraine as a permanent lever of influence over Kyiv. It will likely offer superficial concessions and portray itself as a responsible international actor to achieve this preferred outcome. It will also likely amplify a narrative of “peace at all costs” through media in Ukraine.
The Kremlin’s vision of peace will undermine the sovereignty of Ukraine. Any degree of legitimization of its separatist proxies will also likely fuel polarization and civil unrest within Ukraine. It would set a number of dangerous international precedents, including the de facto legitimization of the invasion of a sovereign nation and the notion of truncated sovereignty for states in the former Soviet Union. It would set the standard that an aggressor can legitimize an invasion if it later manipulates the internal political dynamics of the victim to ‘accept’ its aggression.
The Kremlin will also likely capitalize on these efforts to lift or otherwise roll back international sanctions on Russia. Putin has a critical need to lift sanctions given the deteriorating economic situation in Russia, which is starting to affect his popular support and to some degree his inner circle of powerbrokers.
[16] The Kremlin could advance this goal by exploiting the willingness of Ukraine and Europe to reach a settlement on Eastern Ukraine. The Kremlin could similarly leverage other recent diplomatic gains in Europe. Russia and the West
aligned over a new Government of Moldova in June 2019. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) later reinstated voting rights for Russia on June 25, marking the first reversal of an international constraint imposed on Russia after its illegal occupation of Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula in 2014.
[17] Slovakia’s Parliament is reportedly drafting a resolution declaring the need to end sanctions on Russia.
[18] ISW has previously
forecast that the Kremlin could reduce overt military tensions in the Donbas and broadcast this decision as a step toward peace in Ukraine. Putin could thereby undermine sanctions against his regime by shifting only his approach rather than his underlying goals in Eastern Europe.
Zelensky likely does not voluntarily seek to advance the interests of Russia in Ukraine. His administration nonetheless is proving a favorable environment for the Kremlin. Zelensky has reaffirmed Ukraine’s preferred course towards deeper integration with the West and prioritized meetings with leaders from the U.S., Canada and Europe.
[19] He has criticized the Kremlin for its aggressive policies towards Ukraine.
[20] However, his lack of defined policy stances, his limited understanding of geopolitics, his acquiescence to the resurgence of powerbrokers linked to Russia, and the conflicting messages coming from his team (which often reinforce propaganda narratives pushed by the Kremlin) have created a permissive environment for Putin in Ukraine.
- Former Kremlin-linked powerbrokers displaced by the Euromaidan Revolution in 2014 are reestablishing themselves in Ukraine. Andrei Portnov - a key ally of former Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovych - returned to Ukraine after five years in exile in May 2019 and stated his intent to move his business back to Ukraine.[21] Portnov and his associates are attempting to initiate a criminal investigation into alleged abuse of authority by former Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko.[22] Zelensky’s Chief of Staff Andriy Bohdan has openly noted his longtime friendship with Portnov.[23] Meanwhile, the Odesa Prosecutor’s Office closed an embezzlement case against Yuriy Ivanyushchenko - another key ally of Yanukovych - on June 4.[24] The Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s Office later reversed the decision.[25] Yanukovych’s former Chief of Staff Andriy Klyuyev attempted to register in the 2019 Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections, sparking protests in Kyiv on July 2.[26] Bohdan blamed Poroshenko for the protests but did not take a stance against the return of Klyuyev.[27] Finally, the General Court of the European Union annulled asset freezes imposed by the EU on Yanukovych, his son, and five of his associates who fled Ukraine in 2014.[28]
These actors are likely taking deliberately provocative actions to test the threshold of public sentiment towards their agenda in Ukraine. The Kremlin might thus be setting conditions to either gradually return its influence or ignite popular discontent if it fails to advance its goals under Zelensky. Ukrainian activists are countering this resurgent influence but their long-term ability to sustain such resistance is not a given. Zelensky’s lack of pushback against these powerbrokers is helping to normalize the creeping gains of the Kremlin in Ukraine.
The return of former powerbrokers also poses a particular risk to good governance in Ukraine. These actors mostly hold revanchist agenda and populist policy goals antithetical to reform, as their fortunes depend on longstanding networks of corruption in Ukraine. They will most likely fall back on old habits that prioritize short-term benefits over the long-term health of the Government of Ukraine – a pattern that led to the Euromaidan Revolution. They will also likely try to sabotage integration with the EU and NATO in order to curry favor with the Kremlin.
